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ABSTRACT
The scope of th i s  study  is  to  p rov ide an understand ing  of crude o i l  
p r ic e  d e te rm in a tio n . The approach to  th is  g en e ra l problem s t a r t s  by 
id e n tify in g  th e  key a reas  th a t  w i l l  help  us ach ieve the s p e c if ic  
o b je c tiv e s  of the  re se a rc h  which are  th e  d e r iv a tio n  of both  a 
th e o re t ic a l  and an e m p irica l framework of p r ic e  fo rm atio n .
The a rea s  examined a re : d e p le tio n  theory  (c h a p te r  one), the
e v o lu tio n  of the o i l  in d u s tr y ’s s t r u c tu re  and p r ic in g  p ra c t ic e s  
(c h a p te r  tw o), the  l i t e r a t u r e  concerned w ith  e x p la in in g  th a t  
e v o lu tio n  (c h a p te r  th r e e ) .  A c r i t iq u e  of th a t l i t e r a t u r e  enab les th e  
d e r iv a tio n  of the  th e o r e t ic a l  framework which can be c a lle d  the  
t r a n s i t io n  p e rio d  sc e n a rio  -  th e  t r a n s i t io n  from the  c e n t r a l ly  
planned in d u s try  of th e  1950s to  the com petitiv e  market of the  
1980s. Crude o i l  p r ic e s  s in c e  .1970 have been determ ined not by a 
c a r t e l  of producers but by an im perfec t m arket, w ith in  which 
in e f f i c ie n c ie s ,  im perfec t in fo rm atio n , lag s  in  adjustm ent and 
u n c e r ta in ty  to g e th e r  w ith  the  major o i l  companies fad in g  power and 
th e  OPEC group fo llow ing  r a th e r  than  lead in g  the  m arket -  d e s p ite  the  
p e rce p tio n  of i t  as a c a r t e l  -  have a l l  combined to  fo rm ulate  p r ic e s .
The attem pt to  confirm  or r e je c t  th a t  framework by e m p iric a l 
t e s t in g  s t a r t s  by choosing a s p e c if ic  methodology which i s  b e liev ed
to  be su p e r io r  to  co n v en tio n a l econom etric tech n iq u es : th e  Box and
J e n k in ’s approach to  m odelling tim e s e r i e s ,  t e s t in g  fo r  c a u s a l i ty  
p a t te rn s  and determ in ing  lead  and lag  .r e la t io n s h ip s ,  by thorough 
em p irica l in v e s t ig a t io n  of the d a ta  r a th e r  than  by a r b i t r a r y  
s p e c if ic a t io n  of c a u s a l i ty  d ir e c t io n s  and lag  s tru c tu re s  (c h a p te r  
f o u r ) .
A p p lic a tio n  of th a t  methodology to  the d a ta  c o l le c te d  y ie ld s  the 
r e s u l t s  p resen ted  in  ch ap te rs  s ix  and seven, which confirm  the b a s ic  
h y p o th esis  and supply the fu n c tio n s  which d esc rib e  th e  t r ue  behaviour 
of th e  system  and can th e re fo re  be used fo r  fo re c a s t in g .
The major co nclu sion  emerging from the study  is  th a t  OPEC should 
n o t be thought of as a c a r t e l .  The demand fo r  crude o i l  being a
derived  demand, i t  i s  the  f i n a l  consumers who w il l  in  the end d ic ta te
w hether or not we a re  l ik e ly  to  f ace  f u r t h e r  p r ic e  c r is e s  or w hether 
spot m arkets w i l l  be calm and o rd e r ly . N ev e rth e le ss , the h igh  
p ro p o rtio n  of world re se rv e s  in  OPEC member c o u n tr ie s  means th a t  OPEC 
can a s s i s t  in  the p rev en tio n  of ab rup t p r ic e  changes by assuming a 
su p erv iso ry  ro le  r a th e r  than  a ttem p ting  in  v a in  to  assume an 
a d m in is tra tin g  r o le .
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INTRODUCTION
The h is to r y  of the w orld o i l  market and of o i l  p r ic e  movements in  the 
p a st 20 years i s  not a d u ll  s to r y . Changes in  the in d u s t r y ’ s 
s tr u c tu r e  c o n siste d  of the appearance of a new and ap p aren tly  
dominant group of p ro d u cers, OPEC, the breaking up of the m a jo rs’ 
v e r t ic a l  and h o r iz o n ta l in te g r a t io n  and an in cre a se d  number of a cto rs  
on both the demand and supply s id e s .
The ch ain  of s t r u c t u r a l  changes has meant a r a d ic a l  a lt e r a t io n  
of many areas of the o i l  in d u s tr y , in  p a r t ic u la r  the p a tte rn  of o i l  
e x tr a c t io n  and m arketing as w e ll as the p r ic in g  of crude. As a 
r e s u lt  the economic and p o l i t i c a l  r e la t io n s h ip s  between producers and 
consumers of o i l  at the in t e r n a t io n a l le v e l  have been transform ed. 
Furtherm ore, there has been an enhanced awareness of the s ig n if ic a n c e  
of o i l  and the o i l  in d u s tr y  to modern in d u s t r ia l  n a t io n s , the 
economic and s o c ia l  f a b r ic  of which have been s e v e re ly  s tra in e d  by 
r is in g  o i l  p r ic e s . Thus, the need a r is e s  to understand how crude o i l  
% p r ic e s  are determ ined, which can be defined as the ’ g e n e ra l'
problemv The reasons behind a s p e c if ic  le v e l  and s tru c tu re  of o i l  
p r ic e s  in  a g iven  p erio d have to be understood and here the q u estio n  
of p o s s ib le  p r ic e  changes in  the fu tu re  is  only p art of the is s u e ; i t  
i s  the p r e c is e  nature o f ‘ the p r ic e  regimes under which o i l  p r ic e s  are  
determined th at poses an in t e l l e c t u a l  ch a lle n g e , e s p e c ia lly  because 
the l it e r a t u r e  d e a lin g  w ith t h is  is s u e  i s  o v e r a ll  q u ite  
u n s a t is f a c t o r y .
C le a r ly ,  the area i s  e x te n siv e  as there are many stages in  the  
in d u s try  and in  to d a y's  d e in te g ra te d  and co m p e titive  s tru c tu re  many 
more agents in v o lv e d . Thus, there i s  a need to id e n t if y  more
a c c u r a te ly  the ’ r e s e a r c h ’ problem i . e  s p e c ify  the key areas which  
ought to be examined and which can be j u s t i f ie d  as chosen on the
b a s is  of the c r it e r io n  th a t they can provide an understanding of the
p r ic in g  mechanism at work. T h e refo re , the f i r s t  is s u e  one i s  faced  
w ith  i s  p la n n in g  the approach to the g en eral problem; t h is  s t a r t s  by 
id e n t if y in g  the above mentioned key a re a s.
Any economic in v e s t ig a t io n  ought to s t a r t  by exam ination of the  
e x p la n a tio n  to the problem o ffered  by economic th eo ry. S ince o i l  i s  
an e x h a u s tib le  n a t u r a l re so u rc e , i t  is  n a tu r a l th at the economic 
theory of d e p le tio n  should be co nsidered f i r s t ,  the aim being to f in d  
out what r e s u lt s ,  i f  any, theory suggests about the p r ic e  path of an 
e x h a u stib le  re so u rce . T h is  i s  the f i r s t  key a re a , looked ,at in  
chapter one.
Chapter two examines the e v o lu tio n  of ( 1 )  the in d u s t r y 's
s tr u c tu r e  and (2 ) o i l  p r ic in g  p r a c t ic e s . These areas have been
id e n t if ie d  as of key im portance to d e cid in g  whether one or the other  
fo rce  in  the in d u s tr y  has been more in f lu e n t ia l  on p r ic e s  and how 
changes in  the s tr u c tu r e  have a ffe c te d  p r ic e s . The in d u s t r y 's
e v o lu tio n  i s  examined in- th ree phases: from i t s  beginnings in  1860 to  
19 5 6 , 1957 to 1969 and p o s t -19 7 0 .
The f i r s t  p erio d  (18 6 0 -19 5 6 )  saw the r is e  of the seven
m u lt in a t io n a l o i l  com panies, the form ation of o p eratin g  companies, 
co m p etitio n  and c o llu s io n  between the companies; v e r t i c a l  in te g r a t io n  
along w ith jo in t  supply c o n tro ls  have led  to c o n tro l of crude  
p ro d u ctio n  by the m a jo rs. In  t h is  period the o i l  in d u s try  was an 
o lig o p o ly  -  a few la rg e  f ir m s , each h ig h ly  in te g ra te d , lin k e d  through  
j o in t  v e n tu re s , supply and m arketing arrangements fo r  the purpose of 
c o n t r o llin g  s u p p lie s  and p r ic e s  and avo id in g  harm ful co m p etitio n .
The second period ( 19 5 7 -19 6 9 )  saw a m u ltitu d e of s t r u c t u r a l  
changes on both the demand and supply s id e s . On the demand s id e  o i l
in cre a se d  i t s  share r e la t iv e  to other f u e ls ,  w hile on the supply s id e
th ere has been in c re a se d  co m p etitio n  fo r new concessio n s due to the 
emergence of independent and s ta te  owned o i l  com panies, in cre a se d  
r o le  of host government and com petition in  crude and product 
m arkets. As a r e s u lt  of such changes, a m arginal fre e  market fo r
crude emerged and fo r the f i r s t  time a r e a lis e d  market p r ic e .  
In cre a se d  co m p etitio n  le d  to p r ic e  c u ttin g  and t h is  caused the
form ation of OPEC to p ro te ct producing c o u n tr ie s ' reven ues.
F i n a l l y ,  in  the p o s t-19 7 0  p erio d  the m a jo rs' c o n tro l over 
pro ductio n ( in  19 73 ) and m arketing ( in  1979) was d ism an tle d , w ith the 
r e s u lt in g  p r ic e  in c re a se s  cau sin g  se rio u s  changes in  energy market 
trends which are a ls o  examined at the end of chapter two.
The lo g ic a l  next step i s  to co n sid e r the ex p la n a tio n s th at have 
been o ffered  about the way in  which the p r ic in g  of o i l  has been 
c a r r ie d  out in  the p a s t . Thus, chap ter three c o n s is t s  of a c r i t i c a l  
review  of the t h e o r e t ic a l  and a ls o  the e m p ir ic a l approaches to the 
is s u e . The e x e rc is e  enables r e je c t io n  of those view s which appear 
..weak, e it h e r  at the t h e o r e t ic a l  le v e l  or w ith refere n ce  to a c t u a l  
events in  the o i l  market and acceptance of those view s which are  
found to be f a i r l y  r e a l i s t i c  and can be defended t h e o r e t ic a lly  as 
making a c o n tr ib u t io n  to the understanding of s p e c if ic  p r ic in g  
regim es. The 's y n t h e s is '  i . e  the com bination of the views accepted  
w ith  our own arguments about the o p eration  of the marker p ro vid es a 
hyp oth esis of o i l  p r ic e  form ation whch can be c a lle d  the t r a n s it io n a l  
perio d  s c e n a rio .
In  t h is  view the m ajors and-OPEC are the main a c to rs  in f lu e n c in g  
p r ic e s , w ith t h e ir  r e la t iv e  p o s it io n s  s h if t in g  over time to g iv e  way 
to a more co m p etitive  market framework. P r ic e s  have to a la rg e  
extent been market determ ined, that i s ,  set by the in t e r a c t io n  of 
supply and demand where the supply s id e  has not r e a lly  been 
c a r t e l is e d  but has grown in to  a more co m p etitive  s tr u c tu r e . The 
assum ption of market determ ined p r ic e s  does not im ply a p e rfe c t  
m arket. On the c o n tra ry , i t  i s  emphasised th at such im p e rfectio n s as 
an o l ig o p o l is t ic  supply s tr u c tu r e , lead s and la g s  in  re a c tio n  and 
adjustm ent and e x p e cta tio n s formed on the b a s is  of im perfect  
in fo rm a tio n  go a long way towards e x p la in in g  the mechanics of the 
system . T h is  concludes the f i r s t  s e c tio n  of the t h e s is  -  the  
t h e o r e t ic a l one. The need to e m p ir ic a lly  support the arguments 
advanced lead s to s e c t io n  two, concerned w ith the ap p ro p riate  
methodology and d ata th at are employed to in v e s t ig a te  the 2 
r e la t io n s h ip s  th at are id e n t if ie d  as of key im portance: between
o f f i c i a l  and spot crude o i l  p r ic e s ,  and between crude o i l  and product 
p r ic e s .
Thus, chapter fo u r i s  an attempt to j u s t i f y  the use of the Box 
Je n k in s  methodology as opposed to co n ven tio n al econom etric models and 
a ls o  to b r ie f ly  e x p la in  the workings of that methodology.
The f a c t  th a t re g re s s io n  techniques employed h ith e rto  are  
p r im a r ily  c o r r e la t io n a l  tech n iq u es which cannot be taken to rep resen t  
c a u s a l p ro ce sse s, means th at co n ven tio n al econom etric s tu d ie s  may 
conclude that c e r ta in  v a r ia b le s  are c a u s a lly  r e la te d  when they are  
not -  e .g  because of common a s s o c ia t io n  w ith a s e t  of other v a r ia b le s  
-  o r, i f  the a s s o c ia t io n  i s  n o n -l in e a r , they may conclude that two 
f u n c t io n a lly  r e la te d  v a r ia b le s  are not a s s o c ia te d . A thorough study  
of the data aimed at the e m p ir ic a l id e n t if ic a t io n  of lead  and la g  
r e la t io n s h ip s  which w i l l  in d ic a t e  the mechanism of c a u s a lit y  i s ,  
th e re fo re , n e ce ssary  before any firm  co n clu sio n s can be drawn as to 
the workings of a p a r t ic u la r  economic phenomenon, and yet such a 
study does not yet c o n s t it u te  p art of co n ven tio n al t e s t in g  techniques  
in  econom ics. The use of the B o x-Jen kin s methodology fo r the 
e m p ir ic a l d isco v e ry  of the c h ro n o lo g ic a l sequence of events and hence 
of c a u s a lit y  r e la t io n s h ip s  can be thought of as the n o v e lty  of th is  
re se a rc h .
The data req u ire d  fo r the e m p ir ic a l t e s ts  are d e scrib e d  in  
chap ter f iv e ,  which a ls o  examines the problems to be faced when u sin g  
such data as w e ll as the sources employed.
The t h ir d  p a rt of the th e s is  i s  the p re se n ta tio n  of the r e s u lt s  
which f a l l  in to  two s e c t io n s : ( 1) u n iv a r ia t e  time s e r ie s  models and 
c a u s a lit y  t e s t s ,  ( 2) la g  s tr u c tu r e s  and tra n s fe r  fu n c t io n s .
Chapter s ix  i s  concerned w ith the former namely, the models 
ap p ro p ria te  fo r  the time s e r ie s  on o f f i c i a l  OPEC p r ic e s , spot crude 
o i l  p r ic e s  and n etb ack s, which depend on the time period examined. 
For the p eriod as a whole ( 19 7 6 -8 5 )  the abrupt 'jum ps' produced by 
the c r is e s  n e c e s s it a t e  the use of in te rv e n tio n  or impact assessm ent 
m odels, w h ils t  su b -p e rio d s w ith in  which a s e r ie s  e x h ib it s  r e l a t iv e l y  
smooth behaviour are modelled acco rd in g  to stan d ard  ARIMA models. 
These models provide the f i l t e r e d  s e r ie s  used in  t e s t in g  c a u s a lit y .
The overwhelming co n c lu s io n  of these t e s ts  i s  that OPEC has 
indeed been a market fo llo w e r s in c e  c a u s a lit y  i s  t y p ic a l ly  
u n id ir e c t io n a l  from the spot market to the OPEC adm inistered p r ic e .  
The excep tio ns to t h is  ru le  are a ls o  d iscu sse d  in  chapter s ix .
Chapter seven c o n s is t s  f i r s t l y  of a d is c u s s io n  of the la g  
d is t r ib u t io n s  betwen the f i l t e r e d  p r ic e  s e r ie s  which have been 
a r r iv e d  a t by use of S im s’ methodology. A g e n eral c o n clu sio n  here i s  
th at over time the lag s of the response of the OPEC system to spot 
market changes are  g e tt in g  s h o rte r. Furtherm ore, th at t y p ic a l ly  the  
OPEC o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  i s  slow to a d ju s t  and when i t  does i t  i s  not a 
o n e-to -o n e response, w ith  the exceptions to t h is  a ls o  a n a ly se d . 
Secondly, the tr a n s fe r  fu n c tio n  models estim ated are presented in  
s e c t io n  7 .2  w h ils t  7 .3  d e a ls  w ith the ro le  of p r ic e  ex p e cta tio n s and 
the p o s s ib le  mechanism of fo rm u latin g  such e x p e c ta tio n s.
The co n clu d in g  chapter i s  an overview of the changes in  the o i l  
in d u s t r y ’ s s tr u c tu r e  in  r e la t io n  to the arguments and r e s u lt s  of t h is  
work, w ith a q u a l it a t iv e  assessm ent of p r ic e  p ro spects and some 
su g g e stio n s as to p o lic y  and fu r th e r  re se a rch .
SECTION I
THE EVOLUTION OF THE WORLD OIL MARKET: 
STRUCTURE AND PRICES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
CHAPTER Is OIL PRICES AND DEPLETION
1 . 1  OPTIMAL DEPLETION : TWO ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS
O il  i s  an e x h a u s tib le  n a tu r a l re so u rce . As such i t  belongs to the 
c la s s  of non-produced goods -  i f  we ignore t h e •act of e x tra c t io n  as a 
p roduction a c t i v i t y .  The d is t in g u is h in g  fe a tu re  of an e x h a u s tib le  
reso urce i s  th at i t  i s  used up when used as an in p u t in  production  
and at the same time i t s  ra te  of growth i s  n i l .  In  s h o r t, the in t e r ­
temporal sum of the s e r v ic e s  provided by a g iven  sto ck  of an 
e x h a u stib le  reso u rce i s  f i n i t e .
Econom ists have t r a d it io n a l ly  been concerned w ith d e fin in g  what 
i s  meant by the e f f ic ie n t  or o p tim al use of re so u rce s. In  the 
s p e c ia l  case of e x h a u s tib le  reso u rces the b a s ic  is s u e  dom inating the 
l it e r a t u r e  i s  how f a s t  should we use them up. T h is  q u estio n  'lea d s to 
an in q u ir y  in to  what c o n s t it u te s  the optim al d e p le tio n  r a t e . The 
o r ig in a l  works in  t h is  area are by Dasgupta and H eal ( 1 9 7 4 ) , Beckman 
(197*4) and S t i g l i t z  ( 1 9 7 4 ) .
Leavin g  a s id e  the q u e stio n  of in tra te m p o ra l e q u ity  -  the 
q u e stio n  of who in  the present g en eratio n  b e n e fits  from a p a r t ic u la r  
market s tr u c tu r e  -  on the grounds that i t  i s  not s p e c ia l  to 
e x h a u stib le  reso urce economics and fu rth e r  th a t i t  is  addressed at 
len g th  in  the main body of w elfare economics, we are s t i l l  confronted  
by the q u e stio n  of in te rte m p o ra l, e q u ity , th a t i s ,  e q u ity  between 
present and fu tu re  g e n e ra tio n s. T h is  i s  an im portant c o n sid e ra tio n  
when choosing among d e p le tio n  r a t e s . C le a r ly ,  the f a s t e r  we consume 
e x h a u stib le  reso u rces the le s s  i s  a v a ila b le  fo r fu tu re  g en eration s  
hence, c e r t e r is  p a rib u s , the lower w i l l  t h e ir  l iv in g  standard be.
There are two frameworks w ith in  which econom ists can work when 
approaching the is s u e  of in te rte m p o ra l e q u ity , the U t i l i t a r i a n  and 
the R aw lsian . The U t i l i t a r i a n  approach would suggest th at a
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d e p le tio n  ra te  ought to be chosen so as to maximise the sum of the 
b e n e fits  from reso u rce use a ccru in g  to a l l  g e n e ra tio n s, present and 
fu tu r e . To make t h is  approach o p e ra tio n a l one has to face the is s u e  
of w eighting the v a rio u s  b e n e fits  a ccru in g  at d if f e r e n t  dates when 
adding them up.
The t y p ic a l  argument is  th at fu tu re  b e n e fits  should be 
discounted because people are assumed to g ive  more weight to present  
than to fu tu re  b e n e f it s . S in ce money has a time v a lu e  one would 
ra th e r consume now than in  the fu tu re  and hence i t  i s  reasonable to 
demand a premium i f  one i s  to g iv e  up something now in  ex p e cta tio n  of 
something in  the fu t u r e . The fu r th e r  away from the present a sum of 
money i s ,  the le s s  v a lu a b le  i t  i s ,  th a t i s ,  one i s  d isco u n tin g  fu tu re  
b e n e f it s , the d isco u n t ra te  being d iff e r e n t  than zero and arg u ab ly  
p o s it iv e  -  due to p e o p le 's  pure time preference and due to the fa c t  
th at as consumption r is e s  the v a lu e  of m arginal consumption d e c lin e s .
A ra p id  d e p le tio n  ra te  w i l l  lead  to a co n ce n tra tio n  on present  
b e n e fits  at the expense of fu tu re  ones and w i l l  be favoured by a h igh  
d isco u n t ra te  and v ic e  v e rs a . A ccording to the U t i l i t a r i a n  approach  
the optim al d e p le tio n  ra te  i s  th a t which g iv e s the h ig h e st sum of 
a p p ro p ria te ly  d isco un ted  b e n e f it s .
There has been a long debate in  the U t i l i t a r i a n  school on the 
is s u e  of d is c o u n tin g , th at i s ,  on how to d isco u n t and on whether or 
not to d isco u n t at a l l .  The f i r s t  shots are c re d ite d  to Ram sey  
(1928 ) who disapproved of d isc o u n tin g  as " e t h ic a l ly  in d e f e n s ib le ,  
a r is in g  from a weakness of the im a g in a tio n ” and to Pigou (19 3 2 )  fo r  
whom d isc o u n tin g  im p lie s  o nly th at "our t e le s c o p ic  f a c u lt y  is  
d e fe c t iv e " .
Modern t h e o r is t s  l ik e  Koopmans (196 0 ) and Arrow & Kutz (19 7 0 )  
have taken the opposing view , arguing th at because the reve aled  
p referen ces of in d iv id u a ls  are accepted in  making other s o c ia l  
ch o ices i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to see why they should not be accepted in  
t h is  case too. However, the q u estio n  is  which in d iv id u a ls  and in  
p a r t ic u la r  why j u s t  those of the present g en eratio n ?
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An answer provided by M arg lin  (19 6 3) i s  th at the present  
consumers are so ve reig n  because " i t  i s  ax io m atic  th at a dem ocratic  
government r e f le c t s  o n ly  the p references of the in d iv id u a ls  who are  
p re s e n tly  members of the body p o l i t i c . "  T h is ,  however, i s  not 
s a t is f y in g  to one who f e e ls  th a t la c k  of re p re se n ta tio n  of the fu tu re  
i s  p r e c is e ly  the problem.
Gray ( 1 9 1 2 )  and H o t e llin g  ( 1 9 3 1 )  a ls o  argue th at there must be 
some d isc o u n tin g  of the fu t u r e , w h ils t  acco rd in g  to Vousden ( 1 9 7 3 ) ,  
u sin g  co n v e n tio n a l concave u t i l i t y  fu n ctio n s and a zero d isco u n t  
r a t e , no optim al s o lu t io n  w i l l  e x is t .
Even i f  there were agreement on d is c o u n tin g , the is s u e  s t i l l  to  
be faced  i s  whether the market in t e r e s t  ra te  or the s o c ia l  ra te  of 
d isco u n t -  a t  which p u b lic  se c to r  p ro je c ts  are d isco u n ted  -  should be 
used . M arglin  (19 6 3 )  i s  e x p l i c i t l y  concerned w ith the r e la t io n s h ip  
between g en eratio n s and h is  e s s e n t ia l  id e a  i s  th at consumption by 
fu tu re  g e n eratio n s i s  a p u b lic  good to members of the p resen t  
generation* That i s ,  each of us d e riv e s  some s a t is f a c t io n  from the 
prospect of a b r i l l i a n t  fu tu re  fo r c i v i l i s a t i o n ;  yet the f a c t  th at  
you reap t h is  s a t is f a c t io n  does not mean that there i s  any le s s  fo r  
me. Then, we are a l l  b e tte r o ff by a c o lle c t iv e  d e c is io n  to save and 
in v e s t  more than each one of us a c t in g  in d iv id u a lly  would have done. 
T h is , in  tu rn , im p lie s  th a t the s o c ia l  d isco u n t ra te  is  below the 
p r iv a te  one. T h e re fo re , u sin g  the s o c ia l  in s te a d  of the p r iv a te  ra te  
we do not d ep rive  fu tu re  g e n e ra tio n s' u t i l i t y  le v e ls  as much as under 
the p r iv a te  d isco u n t r a t e .
O p tim isin g  the ra te  of reso u rce d e p le tio n  in  the U t i l i t a r i a n  
context means m axim ising the present valu e of the re so u rce . Of 
course d if f e r e n t  d e c is io n  makers w i l l  use d if f e r e n t  in d ic a t o r s  of 
v a lu e ; the p r iv a te  f ir m  would t r y  to maximise the PV of p r o f it s ,  a 
p la n n er would maximise the PV of consumers* and p ro d ucers' s u r p lu s .  
However, even i f  the tru e  s o c ia l  d isco un t ra te  is  below the p r iv a te  
r a t e , the w elfare  c r it e r io n  remains present v a lu e  m axim isatio n . 
Fu rth er even a d isco u n t ra te  of zero would not change an im portant 
fe a tu re  of the c r it e r io n :  the v a lu e  of the reso urce i s  determined by 
adding the valu es in  d if f e r e n t  p erio d s or to d if f e r e n t  g e n e ra tio n s. 
I t  i s  t h is  a d d it iv e  p ro p erty of the U t i l i t a r i a n  approach to d e p le tio n  
th at i s  ch allen g ed  by RaHLs.
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In  h is  'Theory of J u s t ic e '  ( 19 7 1)  Rawls argues that p eo p le 's  
conceptions of a ju s t  s o c ie ty  are conditioned by t h e ir  p o s it io n s  in  
s o c ie t y . To o b ta in  in fo rm a tio n  about a more o b je c t iv e  concept of 
ju s t ic e  one has to ask what kind of s o c ie ty  people would regard as 
most d e s ir a b le  i f  they were com pletely uniformed -  behind a ' v e i l  of
i\
ig n o ran ce' -  about the p o s it io n  they would occupy in  that s o c ie t y .  
I f  making t h e ir  ch o ice  from such a detached p o s it io n , people would 
always i n s i s t  th at the s o -c a l le d  maximum p r in c ip le  of j u s t ic e  
a p p lie s : s o c ia l  and economic in e q u a lit ie s  are to be arranged so th a t  
they are both (a ) to the g re a te st b e n e fit  of the le a s t  advantaged and 
(b) attached to o f f ic e s  and p o s it io n s  open to a l l  under co n d itio n s of 
f a i r  e q u a lity  of o p p o rtu n ity .
The maximum p r in c ip le  of ju s t ic e  id e n t if ie s  ju s t ic e  w ith  
p o lic ie s  and in s t it u t io n s  designed to maximise the w e ll-b e in g  of 
those w ith minimum w e ll b eing, im plying that in e q u a lit ie s  are only  
j u s t i f ie d  in s o f a r  as they co n trib u te  to the w e ll being of the le s s  
fo rtu n a te . T h e refo re , an optim al reso’urce d e p le tio n  ra te  is  one so 
chosen as to maximise the b e n e fits  from resource use th a t w i l l  accrue  
to that generation who w il l  re c e iv e  the sm a lle st  such -b e n e f it s , i . e  
which maximises the b e n e fits  a ccru in g  to that in te rte m p o ral group who 
w il l  re c e iv e  the minimum b e n e fits .
O b vio u sly , the group who w il l  re ce iv e  minimum b e n e fits  from a 
d e p le tio n  p o lic y  depends on that p o lic y . Under rap id  d e p le tio n  i t  
w il l  be a fa r  d is ta n t  group, w hile  under s t r i c t  co n servatio n  i t  might 
be the present g e n e ra tio n . Hence, in  id e n t if y in g  an optimum, one has 
to f i r s t l y  id e n t if y  fo r each p o s s ib le  d e p le tio n  p o lic y  the le a s t  
advantaged group and secondly s e le c t  that p o lic y  whose le a s t  
advantaged group is  best tre a te d .
Solow (19 7 4 ) shows that i f  t h is  tw o-stage procedure is  c a r r ie d  
out then we s h a l l  s e le c t  th a t d e p le tio n  ra te  which g iv e s the h ig h e st  
p o ssib le  steady consumption r a te . A b a s ic  d i f f ic u l t y  noted by Solow, 
however, i s  that maximin re q u ire s  a la rg e  i n i t i a l  c a p it a l  s to c k , fo r  
i f  i t  i s  sm a ll then the le v e l of consumption w i l l  be low fo re v e r, the 
im p lic a t io n  being th a t the maximin p r in c ip le  i s  not l i k e l y  to be 
a p p lic a b le  to developing c o u n tr ie s .
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The d e p le tio n  ra te  im p lie d  by a maximin programme as compared 
w ith a U t i l i t a r i a n  one i s  shown in  the fo llo w in g  f ig u r e , where 
u t i l i t y  i s  assumed to be a fu n c tio n  of consumption.
F ig u re  1 . 1 . 1  U t i l i t a r i a n  and R aw lsian  consumption programmes
Source: Dasgupta & H eal (19 79 )
For the U t i l i t a r i a n  programme the h ig h er the d isco u n t r a te  r  the  
h ig h er the ra te  of consumption. The lower the d isco u n t ra te  the
o
fu r th e r  away in to  the fu tu re  i s  peak consumption, im p lyin g  a slow er 
ra te  of d e p le tio n . For the maximin programme s in c e  pure time 
p referen ce has no p la c e , the consumption path i s  co nstant over time 
and more e g a lit a r ia n  among g e n e ra tio n s.
Having presented the two approaches to the d eterm in atio n  of an 
optim al d e p le tio n  ra te  fo r  an e x h a u stib le  reso u rce , the next q u estio n  
should be which of the two i s  more s a t is f a c t o r y .  Such a comparison 
would c o n s is t  of norm ative judgements about the d e s i r a b i l i t y  of one 
moral framework versu s the o th e r. I t  would be out of p la ce  here to 
attempt such an e t h ic a l  comparison of the two a lt e r n a t iv e  conceptions  
of j u s t i c e .  The p o in t i s  th a t U t i l i t a r ia n is m  is  the most w e ll known 
of d o c tr in e s  and the overwhelming m a jo rity  of the e x e r c is e s  in  the  
theory of optimum p la n n in g  have been based on i t .  T h e refo re , i t  was 
decided to co n cen trate on t h is  model of reso urce d e p le tio n  in  order 
to g ain  an in s ig h t  in to  probable p r ic e  tre n d s, though aware of the • 
a lt e r n a t iv e  framework of thought.
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1 . 2  KEY RESULTS IN THE THEORY OF OPTIMAL DEPLETION
There are two c o n d itio n s  th a t must hold along an optim al d e p le tio n  
path -  the optim al c o n tro l c o n d it io n s . The f i r s t  d e r iv a t io n  of these  
u sin g  c a lc u lu s -o f -v a r ia t io n s  methods is  due to H o t e llin g  ( 1 9 3 1 ) .  
Probably due to the complex mathematics in v o lv e d , h is  work was 
la r g e ly  n eg lected  u n t i l  r e c e n t ly . However, there were some 
in d ic a t io n s  of in t e r e s t  in  the 19 6 0 s; a d ia g ra m a tic  e x p o s it io n  of 
H o t e ll in g 's  r e s u lt s  by H e r f in d a ll  (19 6 7) and fu r th e r  m athem atical 
a n a ly s is  by Gordon (19 6 7 )  and Cummings (19 6 9 ).
More r e c e n t ly , the l i t e r a t u r e  has in c r e a s in g ly  focused on g lo b a l  
co n cern s, w ith  a tte n tio n  d ire c te d  to such key is s u e s  as the 
f in it e n e s s  of reso u rce s u p p lie s  (Meadows et a l ,  19 7 2 ) and p o llu t io n  
as a c e n tr a l fe a tu re  of contemporary resource use p a tte rn s  ( J a r r e t t ,  
1966, F is h e r ,  1 9 8 1 ) .
I t  i s  u n fo rtu n ate th a t the problems a sso c ia te d  w ith the 
u t i l i s a t i o n  of e x h a u s tib le  reso u rces tend u lt im a t e ly  to become very  
co m p licated , in v o lv in g  t e c h n o lo g ic a l, economic, s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  
c o n s id e r a t io n s . Even the economic asp ects alone are not always 
stra ig h tfo rw a rd . The co n cep tu al problems that must be .fa c e d  in  
s p e c ify in g  the u t i l i t y  m axim ising a llo c a t io n  p a tte rn  of changing  
sto ck s between a m u ltitu d e  of competing uses over a continuous s e r ie s  
of time p erio d s become h ig h ly  complex, the in te rte m p o ra l aspect alone  
re q u ir in g  re s o rt  to the mathematics of dynam ics. T h is  is  r e f le c te d  
by those textbooks^ which attempt to make a v a ila b le  the rig o ro u s  
theory of n a tu r a l reso u rce use (e .g  Dasgupta and H e a l, 1974) and 
which presuppose an understanding of the c a lc u lu s  of v a r ia t io n s ,  
dynamic programming and optim al c o n tro l theory.
For those who w ish to g ain  a general a p p re c ia tio n  of the s u b je c t  
t h is  i s  almost a complete b a r r ie r  to e n try . The aim of t h is  s e c t io n  
being p r e c is e ly  t h a t , we w i l l  attempt to purvey the main id ea  by 
co n ce n tra tin g  on the p r in c ip le s  ra th e r  than on the m athem atics.
An e x h a u s tib le  reso u rce  d if f e r s  from an o rd in a ry  reso urce in  
th at i.t i s  l im ite d  in  q u a n tity  and not p ro d u c ib le . In  the standard  
textbook case of a firm  u sin g  renewable in p u ts , the d e c is io n  to
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produce today in  no way a f f e c t s  the c o sts  of producing in  the 
fu tu r e . T h e refo re , m arginal co st c o n s is ts  e n t ir e ly  of the m arginal 
pro d u ctio n  co st (MCP) th a t  i s  the c a p it a l ,  lab o u r and m a te ria l co sts  
of producing the l a s t  u n it  of output.
However, in  the case of e x h a u stib le  re so u rce s, the d e c is io n  to
produce, fo r  example, a b a r r e l of o i l  today p reclu d es the p o s s ib i l i t y  
of producing i t  at some time in  the fu tu re . Thus the d e c is io n  to
e x tr a c t  and consume today r e s u lt s  in  an o p p o rtu n ity  c o s t: the v a lu e  
of the b a r r e l th a t might have been obtained at some fu tu re  day. 
Resource owners should re c o g n ise  t h is  component of co sts  in  t h e ir  
d e c is io n s . T h e refo re , m arginal co st in  period t i s  m odified to
in c lu d e  the co n ven tio n al MCt P and the o p p o rtu n ity  co st ( a ls o  known 
as user c o s t , r o y a lt y , rent and net p r ic e ) :
MCt = MCt P + Ut
In ste a d  of the u su a l e f f ic ie n c y  c o n d itio n  p r ic e  equal to
m arginal p ro ductio n co st we have
P = MCP + U - . . .  1 . 2 . 1
T h is  i s  the f i r s t  c o n d itio n  of optim al d e p le tio n , which was f i r s t
d e scrib e d  by Gray ( 1 9 1 3 ) .  As shown in  f ig u r e  1 . 2  i t  im p lie s  th at
le s s  of the reso u rce w i l l  be e x tra cte d  today than i f  i t  were 
p ro d u c ib le .
F ig u re  1 . 2 , 1  R e la t io n s h ip  betwen MC and p r ic e  fo r an e x h a u s t ib le  
re so u rce .
P r i c e
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Given demand, o nly q* u n it s  w i l l  be e x tra cte d  by a resource owner 
seeking to a llo c a t e  e x t r a c t io n  e f f ic ie n t ly  over tim e, le a v in g  a 
p o s it iv e  d iffe r e n c e  (AB) between p r ic e  and the m arg in al co st of 
p ro d u ctio n . From ( 1 . 2 . 1 )  i t  i s  obvious th at AB rep re sen ts u ser c o s t.
S in ce  the more of the reso u rce that i s  used today the le s s  w i l l  
be a v a ila b le  tomorrow, the p r ic e  of the resource must cover not o nly  
the MCP but a ls o  the present valu e of the m arginal p r o f it s  g iven  up 
by producing now in s te a d  of l a t e r .  Thus even i f  a resource can be 
e x tra cte d  at a c o n sta ct MC u n t i l  the exhaustion d a te , i t  would be 
j u s t i f i e d  fo r  the owners to re fu se  to s e l l  any u n le ss  p r ic e  went 
h ig h e r than MCP. T h is  i s  so because i f  the reso urce were in  the 
process of becoming s c a r c e , an e f f ic ie n t  market would e s t a b lis h  a 
p r ic e  above MCP. J u s t  how much above MCP the p r ic e  would have to be 
depends on the degree of s c a r c it y .  Otherwise knowing th at the 
resource was becoming s c a r c e , i t s  owners would leave  i t  in  the ground 
and e x tra c t  i t  la t e r  when i t s  p r ic e  d id  r is e .
In  a w e ll known work Gray ( 19 14 )  a n t ic ip a te d  the second key  
r e s u lt  of optim al d e p le tio n  which d e scrib e s the behaviour of the user  
co st over tim e. C o n sid e rin g  a u n it  of the re so u rce , say a b a r r e l of 
o i l ,  the net b e n e fit  from e x tr a c t in g  the b a rre l today is  the u ser  
co st -  the d iffe r e n c e  between what consumers are w il l in g  to pay
( p r ic e )  and the co st of e x t r a c t io n . But the same b a rre l might be
expected to y ie ld  a r o y a lt y  i f  e x tracted  and so ld  (consumed) next
y e a r. The problem i s  at which of the two tim es should i t  be
e x tra cte d  to y ie ld  the h ig h e st b e n e f it . In  f ig u re  1 , 1 . 2  net b e n e fit  
i s  given by the area between the demand curve and MCP from q = 0 to  
q = q* in  a s in g le  p e rio d . The o b je c t iv e  i s  to choose a le v e l  of 
output in  each p erio d so as to maximise the sum over both p erio d s of 
these b e n e f it s .
W ealth m axim isation re q u ire s  s e tt in g  MC ~ URt .
R o y a lt ie s  are o btained by s u b tr a c tin g  m arginal p ro ductio n co sts  from 
MR : Ut = MR t -  MCt P.
The producer may e le c t  to to sw itch  production to the second p erio d  
t " ,  where u ser c o sts  are h ig h er . In  fa c t  i f  the producer maximises
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lon g  run p r o f it ,  i t  should be in d if f e r e n t  between producing the l a s t  
b a r r e l now or at any fu tu re  time p e rio d . Wealth m axim isation  
re q u ire s  that there be no g a in  to be had in  s h if t in g  a u n it  of
e x tr a c t io n  or the p a tte rn  of investm ent in  reso urces in  the ground.
T h e refo re :
UQ = UX = U2 = . . .  Ut
T h is  eq uatio n , however, o verlooks the fa c t  th at money has a time 
v a lu e . In  r e a l i t y  w ealth m axim ising agents must d isco u n t fu tu re  
r o y a lt ie s  at the ra te  of d isco u n t ( r ) :
tt _ Uf _ U2 _ Ut . . . .  1 . 2 . 2
—   —   ~ _____
1 + r  (1 + r ) 2 (1 + r)*-
T h is  means th a t u se r co st must r is e  by the ra te  of d isco u n t i f  the 
NPV of the reso u rce i s  m axim ised, th at i s :
Ify -  U0 ( 1  + r)
U2 = UL ( 1  + r )
Ut  = Ut _ ! ( l  + r )
So w ith a d isco u n t r a t e  of r  = 10% and UQ -  £ 1 ,  Ify -  1 ( 1 + 0 .1 )  =
£ 1 . 1 ,  U2 = £ 1 .2 1  and so on.
I f  U2 = £ 2 , the producer i s  not producing o p tim a lly  s in c e  the
discounted valu e of o i l  produced in  period 2 would be U2 _ ^  ^
(1  + r ) 2
and yet the disco unted v a lu e  fo r a l l  other p erio d s i s  £ 1 .  The 
producer can r a is e  the v alu e  of i t s  o i l  reserves by a llo c a t in g  more 
production to p erio d  2 and red ucing  production in  the other p e rio d s.  
W ealth m axim isation re q u ire s  ( 1 . 2 . 2 )  to hold fo r  the m arginal b a rre l  
in  any p e rio d .
The second c o n d itio n  of optim al d e p le tio n  i s ,  th e re fo re , th at  
the ro y a lty  r is e s  a t the ra te  of d isc o u n t. In  symbols
(P^ -  MCP = (PQ -  MCP) ( 1  + r )  fo r two time p e rio d s. Thus
the time path of p r ic e  can be d e scrib e d  by 
Px = MCP + (P Q -  MCP)(1 + r )  
assuming constant e x tr a c t io n  co sts  and extending i t  to many periods
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we have
Pt = MCP + (P Q -  MCP)( 1  + r ) t   1 . 2 . 3
P r ic e  draws away from MCP, r is in g  at a ra te  th a t approaches the ra te  
of d isco u n t as the r o y a lt y  component of p r ic e  comes to dominate the 
MCP components.
In  sum, assuming e x tr a c t io n  co sts  are co n stan t over tim e, p r ic e  
equals co st p lu s r o y a lt ie s  and r o y a lt ie s  in c re a se  e x p o n e n tia lly  u n t i l  
the exh austio n  d ate . At th at date p r ic e  reaches the exh austio n  p r ic e  
le v e l  where nothing i s  produced or consumed as the reso urce i s  used 
up. The time path of p r ic e  i s  optim al because, as r o y a lt ie s  in c re a se  
at the ra te  of d is c o u n t, and assuming a p e rfe ct c a p it a l  market where 
the ra te  of d isco u n t i s  the market in t e r e s t  r a t e , reso urce owners are
not tempted by h ig h e r re tu rn s elsew here to a lt e r  t h e ir  ra te  of
d e p le t io n .
O b v io u sly , p ro d u ctio n  and consumption in  each p erio d  depend on
what happens in  every other period so th at ( 1) an e x tr a c t io n  p a tte rn
i s  a dynamic concept, and ( 2) the assumption of p e rfe c t knowledge of 
the fu tu re  embodied in  the above a n a ly s is  i s  c r i t i c a l .  In  fa c t  u ser  
c o sts  in tro d u ce  a f a s c in a t in g  a sp e c t, because they are co n d itio n ed  on 
fu tu re  demand and supply c o n d it io n s .
Even though nothing may a f fe c t  demand or p ro d u ctive  c a p a b il it y  
in  the p resent p e rio d , i f  producers r e v is e  t h e ir  e x p e cta tio n s of hte  
fu tu re , r e s u lt in g  in  a new d isco un ted  user c o s t, p r ic e  in  the cu rre n t  
p erio d  may r is e  or d e c lin e  s h a r p ly , depending upon the extent of 
changed p e rce p tio n s.
To a p p re c ia te  the r o le  of' e x p e cta tio n s a sim ple d e p le tio n  model 
i s  presented below, dem onstrating how the in te rte m p o ra l a l lo c a t io n  of 
an e x h a u stib le  reso u rce o ccu rs.
1 . 3  A SIMPLE DEPLETION MODEL
L e t us assume an in d iv id u a l  producer capable of e x p lo it in g  a g iv e n , 
known, reco ve rab le  sto c k  (Q) of an e x h a u stib le  n a tu r a l re so u rce . The
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producer is  ab le to determ ine i t s  production le v e l  (q) over tim e, 
su b je c t to upper and lower l im it s  d ic ta te d  by e x is t in g  technology and 
w ithout i n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  e .g  governmental in te r v e n t io n .
The producer i s  faced w ith  an investm ent d e c is io n : whether to 
e x tra c t  some q u a n tity  of the re so u rce , s e l l  i t  at the p r e v a il in g  
market p r ic e  and in v e s t  the revenues elsew here, at an in t e r e s t  ra te  
r e f le c t in g  the market o p p o rtu n ity  co st of investm ent -  which w i l l  
y ie ld  a p o s it iv e  re tu rn  -  or le a v e  i t  in  the ground, thus in v e s t in g  
in  raw m a te ria l s to c k , in  which case the re tu rn  comes from an 
a p p re c ia tio n  of the re s o u rc e ’ s p r ic e .
The p ro d u ce r's  g o al i s  assumed to be the m axim isation of the NPV 
of h is  fu tu re  investm ent programme, so he has to compare the NPVs of 
the a lt e r n a t iv e  in vestm en ts.
The expected net cash flow i s  the expected revenue obtained from
s e l l in g  fu tu re  output minus the expected co st -  where co sts in c lu d e
e x tr a c t io n  co st p lu s  taxes and r o y a lt ie s  to the s t a t e .  D e fin in g  a 
net expected p r ic e  stream  ( p ) , where p in  any p erio d i s  expected  
p r ic e  minus expected c o s t, then the p ro d u cer's expected net revenue
in  year t i s  P^flt and be wi sBes to maximise
T T T
y  ( NR) t  y  P t9t su b je c t  to y qc < Q
NPV = L • 7 1 —— vF = L T T T -  \ t(1 + r)^ (1 + r ) c
t o  t o  t o
G iven  Q, the s ig n if ic a n t  v a r ia b le s  are r  -  the p ro d u cer's  
d isco u n t ra te  which i s  u n c o n tro lla b le  as i t  depends on market 
in t e r e s t  ra te s  -  q -  which is  a p o lic y  instrum ent s in c e  he can 
c o n tro l h is  p ro d u ctio n  programme su b je c t  to te c h n ic a l l im it s  -  and p. 
The co st component of p i s  o u tsid e  the p ro d u cer's  co n tro l to the 
extent th at i t  in c lu d e s  taxes and i s  a fu n ctio n  of the g en eral p r ic e  
le v e l .  The more the market approximates a monopoly, the nearer w i l l  
p be to a p o lic y  in stru m e n t, but i t  w i l l  be u n c o n tro lla b le  in  a 
co m p e titive  s tr u c tu r e .
Assuming fo r  s im p l ic it y  th at net p r ic e  i s  exogenous and th a t tax
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c a lc u la t io n s ,  the p ro d u cer’ s output d e c is io n  becomes a fu n c tio n  of
h is  e x p e cta tio n s about in t e r e s t  ra te s  and p r ic e s . Therefore q
becomes a fu n c tio n  of the a n t ic ip a te d  ra te  of reso u rce net p r ic e
a p p re c ia tio n
dp(p" = — —  ) and the expected in te r e s t  ra te  ( r ) .
As long as p '=  r  the producer has an in c e n t iv e  to move output
from one time p erio d  to an o th e r, so as to in c re a se  the expected NPV. 
I f  r  p" then th ere i s  a stro n g  in c e n tiv e  to produce now and in v e s t  
the revenues elsew here, as t h is  w i l l  y ie ld  a h ig h er re tu rn  than 
le a v in g  the reso urce in  the ground. The o p p ortu n ity  co st of 
in v e s t in g  in  reso u rces i s  h ig h  in  t h is  ca se , s in c e  the p r ic e  
a p p re c ia tio n  outlook i s  poor.
On the o th er hand, i f  p ' /  r ,  cu rre n t p ro ductio n w i l l  be low er, 
because the producer expects net reso u rce p r ic e  r is in g  at a 
percentage ra te  h ig h e r than the ra te  at which he i s  d isco u n tin g  the 
fu tu r e ; so the amount he expects to gain  by p r ic e  ap p re cia to n  i f  he
in v e s t s  in  resource sto ck  i s  h ig h e r.th a n  i f  he e x tr a c ts  the
re so u rce . In  t h is  case the o p p o rtu n ity  cost of e x te rn a l investm ent  
i s  h ig h .
Th e re fo re , whether or not the producer decides to produce a 
g iven  q u a n tity  of the reso u rce  in  a g iven  year depends on whether he 
b e lie v e s  the ra te  of net p r ic e  a p p re c ia tio n  (th e  o p p o rtu n ity  cost of 
p ro d u ctio n ) w i l l  exceed h is  ra te  of d isco u n t (the o p p ortu n ity  cost of 
not p ro d u cin g ). The producer i s  in  e q u ilib r iu m  when he has so 
a d ju ste d  the d istr ib u tio n  of output through time th a t p"= r .  In  t h is  
case there i s  flow  e q u ilib r iu m , i . e  producers are in d if f e r e n t  between 
producing and h o ld in g  the m arg in al u n it  of the re so u rce , s in c e  both 
a lt e r n a t iv e s  b rin g  the same re tu rn . There i s  a ls o  e q u ilib r iu m  in  the  
a sse t m arket, s in c e  a l l  producers are earning the same re tu rn  on 
t h e ir  a sse ts  in  the ground and elsew here.
The p ' = r e q u ilib r iu m  co n d itio n  holds whatever the market 
s tr u c tu r e , but of course the s ta te  of com petition may make a 
co n sid e ra b le  d iffe r e n c e  to the s o c ia l  d e s ir a b i l i t y  of the depleton  
ra te  em erging. The stan d ard  argument i s  th at a p e r f e c t ly  co m p e titive  
market in  which e x te rn a l co sts  and b e n e fits  are in t e r n a lis e d  so th a t  
expected market in t e r e s t  ra te s  approximate the s o c ia l  time p referen ce
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r a t e ,  would a u to m a tic a lly  le a d  to an optim al d e p le tio n  ra te  fo r  
s o c ie t y . ;C
H o t e ll in g 's  t h e s is  underwent a number of refinem ents and 
ex ten sio n s throughout the yea rs but fo r the most p a rt h is  b a s ic  id eas  
remain in t a c t .  In  essence they are th a t:
( 1 )  D e p le tio n  causes a reso urce to become more s c a r c e ;
(2 ) Scarce reso u rces command h ig h er p r ic e s  than abundant ones;
(3 )  Therefore the v a lu e  of a d e p le ta b le  resource w i l l  tend to r is e  
over tim e.
H o t e llin g  fu r th e r  contended th at a d e p le ta b le  resource would command 
a lower cu rren t p r ic e  under co m p etitio n  than under monopoly.
Under co m p etitio n  the e f f ic ie n c y  co n d itio n  i s  ( 1 . 2 . 1 ) .
H o t e ll in g , however, chose to s im p lif y  h is  a n a ly s is  to a case where 
MCP i s  zero , which i s  r e a l i s t i c  in  the context of most P e rs ia n  G u lf  
o i l  which has a t r i v i a l  MCP. T h erefo re, P = Ut , and s u b s t it u t in g  
p r ic e s  fo r user co sts  in  ( 1 . 2 . 2 ) y ie ld s
PQ ~ P 1 = F 2 -  J ___  = . . .  J ___
1 +  r (1 + r +  (1 + r)® (1 +  r ) c
Or, e q u iv a le n t ly , p r ic e s  w i l l  r i s e  by the ra te  of d isc o u n t:
P 1 ’= PQ ( 1  + r )
P2 =* P i d  + r )
T h erefo re under co m p e titive  c o n d it io n s , the p r ic e  of an e x h a u stib le  
reso urce is  expected to r is e  at ra te  r .  T h is  i s  the 'r -p e r  cent 
r u l e ' ,  the reasoning behind i t  being given above, under the sim ple  
d e p le tio n  model.
The p r ic e  path expected under pure monopoly i s  c h a ra c te ris e d  by 
an i n i t i a l  p r ic e  which is  h ig h er than under pure com petition because  
the m onopolist can w ithhold  o i l  from the market. Assuming ag ain  zero
p ro d u ctio n  c o s ts , H o t e llin g  notes th at MR, which i s  le s s  than p r ic e ,
w i l l  r is e  over time at the ra te  of d isc o u n t:
Mr = M*1 = MR2 = MR3 = . . . .  MRf
' o
1 + r  (1 + r ) 2 (1 + r ) 3 (1 + r ) ]
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O b v io u sly , w ith MR r i s i n g ,  p r ic e s  w i l l  r is e  too but the ra te  of 
in c re a se  depends on the nature of the demand cu rve. In  the u s u a l  
textbook case of the l in e a r  demand cu rv e , the i n i t i a l  p r ic e  w i l l  be 
h ig h e r under monopoly and r is e  at a slow er ra te  than under 
co m p etitio n . The m onopolist i s  w il l in g  to accept lower reso urce  
u t i l i s a t i o n  ra te s  and slow er p r ic e  in c re a se s  because h is  retu rn s are  
r e a lis e d  sooner. S in ce  monopoly p r o f it s  can be in vested  a t  the  
market in t e r e s t  r a t e , i t  i s  b e tte r to w ithhold o i l  from the market 
and earn a monopoly p r o f it ,  than to produce more and d r iv e  p r ic e s  to 
a co m p etitive  le v e l .
C e te r is  p a r ib u s , the m onopolist would always charge more than a 
group of co m p etitive  p ro d u cers. But in h e re n tly  o ther th in g s are not 
eq u a l. S in ce co m p e titive  producers deplete  t h e ir  re se rv e s at a 
r e l a t iv e l y  ra p id  r a t e , the reso u rce base becomes sm a lle r more r a p id ly  
under com petition than under monopoly. Thus the m onopolist of the 
d is ta n t  fu tu re  w i l l  operate w ith a la r g e r  resource base than would a 
group of co m p e tito rs. T h is  i s  what le d  Solow to argue th at 'th e  
m onopolist i s  the c o n s e r v a t io n is t 's  best f r ie n d ',  and though t h is  may 
be tru e  one must note th a t the m onopolist exacts a huge fee fo r  
perform ing t h is  r a t io n in g  fu n c tio n  and th at the m o n o p o list's  p r ic e  
path d is t o r t s  in te rte m p o ra l reso urce a l lo c a t io n .
In  the case of -the demand curve showing in c r e a s in g  e l a s t i c i t y  
over some output range, i t  i s  p o s s ib le  th a t the m onopolist may in  
f a c t  a c c e le r a te  d e p le t io n . T h is  was proved by Lewis (19 7 6 ) who a ls o  
d e rive d  the g e n eral r e s u lt  th a t d e creasin g  e l a s t i c i t y  lead s to lower 
d e p le tio n  by a m o no p olist. The same r e s u lt ,  i . e  a c c e le r a t in g  
d e p le tio n  can a ls o  occur as a consequence of changes in  demand over 
tim e, fo r example i f  demand becomes le s s  e l a s t ic  the m onopolist can 
r e s t r ic t  output in  la t e r  p erio d s to take advantage of the le s s  
e l a s t ic  demand. However, i f  d e p le tio n  is  a c c e le ra te d  p r ic e  may r is e  
a t a ra te  g re a te r than the ra te  of in te r e s t  but i t  is  not c le a r  th a t  
such an e q u ilib r iu m  can be su sta in e d  in  the fa ce  of the o p p ortu n ity  
i t  cre a te s fo r p r o f it a b le  a r b it r a g e .
F u rth e r, the n ecessary co n d itio n  fo r fa s t e r  d e p le tio n , 
e l a s t i c i t y  f a l l i n g  over tim e, does not seem very l i k e l y .  In s te a d , 
one would expect demand to become more e l a s t ic  as s u b s t it u te s  become
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in c r e a s in g ly  a v a ila b le .  So i t  seems i n t u it iv e ly  th at there i s  a
tendency fo r monopoly to re ta rd  d e p le tio n  in  a model where a reso u rce  
sto ck  of uniform  q u a l it y  i s  e x tra cte d  in  f i n i t e  tim e, as in  much of 
the l it e r a t u r e  on this" q u e s tio n . T h is , as noted above, was
H o t e ll in g 's  view and i t  is  supported by the r e s u lt s  of more recent 
s tu d ie s  by W ein stein  and Zeckhauser ( 1 9 7 5 ) ,  Dasgupta and S t i g l i t z
( 1 9 7 5 ) ,  S t i g l i t z  (19 7 6 ) and Sweeney ( 1 9 7 7 ) .
A number of these s tu d ie s  obtained the r e s u lt  th at monopoly and 
co m p etitive  d e p le tio n  paths c o in c id e  i f  e l a s t i c i t y  i s  co n stan t over
q u a n t it ie s  and over time and i f  there are no e x tr a c t io n  c o s ts ;  
however, t h is  r e s u lt  seems h a rd ly  more than a t h e o r e t ic a l c u r io s it y ,  
g iv e n  the s tr in g e n t  and u n lik e ly  co n d itio n s  required*
Assuming th a t the demand fo r a resource i s  a derived  demand 
Kamien and Schwartz ( 19 7 7 )  showed that co nstant over q u a n t it ie s  
e l a s t i c i t y  depends on a p ro d u ctio n  fu n c tio n  th a t i s  Cobb-Douglas in  
form. Where co sts  do not r is e  and the reso urce i s  e n t ir e ly  d e p leted , 
co m p e titive  and monopoly d e p le tio n  paths must c ro s s . I f  the
m onopolist produces le s s  than a co m p etitive  in d u s tr y  in  the e a r ly  
p e rio d s , he must u lt im a te ly  produce more. But t h is  need not happen 
where the reso urce i s  not exhausted and very h ig h  co st u n its  remain 
in  the ground in d e f in it e l y .  In  t h is  case cum ulative production may 
be lower fo r the m onopolist who sim p ly produces le s s  in  each p e rio d .
Recent c o n tr ib u to rs  to the theory have m ainly focused on an 
in te rm e d ia te  ca se , th a t of OPEC co nsidered as a c a r t e l  w ith a l l  o ther  
fre e  world producers tre a te d  as a co m p etitive  f r in g e . The monopoly 
p r ic e  t r a je c t o r y  may be considered the upper l im it  which could be 
achieved by a group of co o p e ra tive  pro ducers, w hile  the co m p etitive  
p r ic e  path may be seen as the lower l im it  obtained by producers who 
do not cooperate at a l l .  Between these two extremes there i s  a v a st  
range of degrees of co m p etitio n  and co o p e ratio n , one of them being  
the case of OPEC as a p e r f e c t ly  co hesive c a r t e l  which se ts  the p r ic e  
in  each p e rio d , t h is  p r ic e  being taken by the o u tsid e  co m p etitive  
pro d ucers. In  tu rn , the c a r t e l  takes account of fr in g e  supply in  
s e t t in g  p r ic e s . Assuming that fr in g e  supply a d ju s ts  w ith a la g , a 
p r ic e  path can be determined to maximise the present valu e of c a r t e l  
p r o f it s .
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The co m p etitive  fr in g e  w i l l  e x tra c t  reso urces at a ra p id  ra te  
r e la t iv e  to t h e ir  r e s e r v e s , because t h e ir  economic p r o f it s  in c lu d e  
some monopoly p r o f it  which can be in v e ste d  a t  the market in t e r e s t  
r a t e . T h is  la rg e  volume of output w i l l  hold the i n i t i a l  c a r t e l  p r ic e  
below the monopoly p r ic e .
E v e n tu a lly , however, a t  the co m p etitive  f r in g e 's  reserves become 
d e p leted , the c a r t e l  p r ic e  w i l l  r is e  towards a monopoly le v e l .  The 
monopoly p r ic e  w i l l  in c re a se  more slo w ly  u n t i l  the c a r t e l 's  rese rves  
a ls o  become d ep leted .
S in ce the i n i t i a l  c a r t e l  p r ic e  depends on the degree of cohesion  
among i t s  members and on the s iz e  and number of co m p etitive fr in g e  
p ro d u cers, the a c t u a l p r ic e  cannot be determined w ithout f u l l  
in fo rm a tio n  on those v a r ia b le s .
1 .4  DEPLETION THEORY AND THE WORLD OIL MARKET
The theory of d e p le ta b le  reso u rce s p ro vides in s ig h t  in to  probable  
p r ic e  tre n d s, ra te s  of reso urce d e p le tio n  and the time frame in  which 
e x tr a c t io n  may be expected to take p la c e . These can be provided
under id e a lis -e d  c o n d itio n s  w hich assume the resource base, r e a l  
in t e r e s t  ra te  and e x t r a c t io n  co sts  are known, so th at the o p p o rtu n ity  
co sts  to reso u rce owners are f u l l y  s p e c if ie d .
U n fo rtu n a te ly  w orld o i l  production does not take p la ce  under 
p u re ly  co m p etitive  c o n d it io n s ; the so ve reig n ty  of M iddle E a ste rn  
governments today ensures th a t en try in to  the most p r o l i f i c  f ie ld s  i s  
l im it e d . On the other hand, the o i l  in d u s try  i s  so la rg e  and
g e o g ra p h ic a lly  d isp e rse d  that i t  cannot be c h a ra c te ris e d  as 
m o n o p o listic . Even the model of OPEC as a p e r f e c t ly  co hesive u n it  
w ith  a co m p etitive fr in g e  i s  a g reat o v e r s im p lif ic a t io n . The models
o u tlin e d  thus f a r  sim p ly  p ro vid e in s ig h t  in to  the v a r ia b le s  which
should be considered in  a s s e s s in g  probable p r ic e  trends and le v e ls  of 
output in  the world o i l  m arket, and serve to a le r t  us to the f a c t  
th a t i f  market co n d itio n s  are a lte r e d  from more or le s s  co m p etitive  
to h ig h ly  co o p e ra tiv e , then the p r ic e  path may become very u n s ta b le .
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The d eterm in atio n  of dynamic p r ic e  and output paths is  d i f f i c u l t  
i f  not im p o ssib le  in  the r e a l  w orld. No s in g le  country or group of 
c o u n tr ie s  can f u l l y  determ ine e it h e r  one. The p r ic e  path depends on 
the t o t a l  re se rv e s h eld  by each co u n try , on the p ro ducers' knowledge 
of u lt im a te ly  reco v e ra b le  re s e rv e s , on the investm ent req u ired  to 
b rin g  o i l  to the market and on o p erating c o s ts , lag  r e la t io n s  and the 
ra te  of time p referen ce fo r  money by OPEC le a d e r s . I t  a lso  depends 
on the response by consumers and producers o u ts id e  OPEC as they reach  
d e c is io n s  to u t i l i s e  a lt e r n a t iv e  energy re so u rce s, to s u b s t it u te  
c a p it a l  and labou r in  the p ro d u ctio n  and consumption p ro cesses and to  
a lt e r  long e s ta b lis h e d  stan d ard s of l iv in g  in  order to conserve 
energy.
Im perfect in fo rm a tio n  about the q u a lit y  and q u a n tity  of 
re s e rv e s , u n c e rta in ty  about probable te c h n o lo g ic a l changes, p o l i t i c a l  
u n rest and r e v o lu tio n s  w ith in  and wars between producing c o u n tr ie s ,  
a l l  exert an in f lu e n c e  on p r ic e  and output tre n d s. I t  i s  a lso  
im p o ssib le  to p re d ic t  p r ic e  and output t r a je c t o r ie s  w ithout knowing 
the extent to w hlth co o p e ra tive  arrangements dominate the market, 
whether co o perating  producers w i l l  fo llo w  p o lic ie s  which best serve  
t h e ir  long-term  in t e r e s t s  and how co m p etitive fr in g e  producers w i l l  
re a c t to change.
The theory of d e p le ta b le  reso u rces p ro vid es some guidance in  
examining p r ic e  and output t r a je c t o r ie s .  C e te r is  p a r ib u s , fu tu re  
p r ic e s  w i l l  be d if f e r e n t  under co m p e titio n , monopoly and in te rm e d ia te  
market s tr u c tu r e s . A c e n t r a l  c o n c lu s io n , th erefo re  i s  th at i t  is  
im p o ssib le  to p re d ic t  e it h e r  the magnitude or d ir e c t io n  of p r ic e  
changes w ithout an in tim a te  knowledge of market s tr u c tu r e s  and how 
they are e v o lv in g . T h is  i s  the aim of the fo llo w in g  chapter ( 2 ) .
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CHAPTER 2: MARKET STRUCTURE AND OIL PRICING
A
2 . 1  18 6 0 -19 3 8 : THE R ISE OF THE OIL COMPANIES ^
Xt>
The petroleum  in d u s try  dates back from the n in etee n th  century when a
/
s e r ie s  of te c h n o lo g ic a l changes fo llo w in g  from the use of the d r i l l  
to d ig  o i l -  w e lls  made p o s s ib le  the ra p id  development of o i l  rese rves  
in  the USA. There, as o i l  e x t r a c t io n  p ro g ressed , r e f in e r ie s  were 
b u i lt  among which those of J .  R o c k e f e lle r . Between 1873 and 1882 the 
R o c k e fe lle r  group acq u ired  c o n tro l of numerous r e f in e r ie s  formed 
a l l ia n c e s  w ith other oilm en and created  the Standard O il  Company, 
which obtained m o n o p o listic  c o n tro l over tra n s p o rta tio n  and r e f in in g  
in  the USA and reached out to European and O r ie n ta l m arkets.
In  a p p lic a t io n  of the a n t i - t r u s t  r e g u la t io n s , Standard O il  was 
req u ire d  by the supreme co u rt in  1 9 1 1  to d iv e s t  i t s e l f  of the sto ck  
of 33 c o n stitu e n t companies which wen£. to become le g a l ly  sep arate  
com panies. Standard O il  of New Je rs e y  (to d a y 's  Exxon), of C a l if o r n ia  
(SOCAL) and of New York (M obil) formed the bulk of the companies 
known as in te r n a t io n a l m ajo rs, or the seven s i s t e r s .
The fo u rth  major -  and the second la r g e s t  o i l  company in  the 
world -  i s  Royal D u t c h /S h e ll, which is  a group w ith two parent 
com panies, the S h e ll  Tran sp o rt and Trad in g  Company Ltd  -  which is  
B r it is h  -  and the Royal Dutch Petr^eum Company. The merger of t h e ir  
in t e r e s t s  took p la ce  in  1907 as the outcome of the co m p etitive  
stru g g le  of each w ith the o ld  Standard O il  group.
The Texas O i l  Company (Texaco) and the G u lf O i l  Co rp o ration  
succeeded in  s u r v iv in g  the a g g re ssiv e  com petition of Standard O il  and 
i t s  h e ir s  thanks to t h e ir  e a r ly  e f fo r ts  fo r in te g r a t io n  of t h e ir  
a c t i v i t i e s  a t home and fo r d iv e r s if ic a t io n  of supply sources o u tsid e  
the USA.
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The seventh s i s t e r  i s  B r it i s h  Petroleum  (BP) e s ta b lis h e d  as the 
A n g lo -P e rs ia n  o i l  company in  1909 a f te r  o i l  d is c o v e r ie s  in  a 
co n cessio n  in  Southern P e r s ia  which had been obtained in  190 1 by W. 
D’ A rcy . When D 'A rcy ran in to  f in a n c ia l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  the Burmah O il  
Company took 2 4 .5%  of the company’ s share and when in  19 14  the  
B r it is h  Government decided to convert i t s  Navy from co a l to o i l ,  i t  
took 5 1 ,6 %  sh a re .
The m a jo rs, which are among the la r g e s t  companies in  the w orld, 
are composed of a network of s u b s id ia r ie s ,  many of which have a h ig h  
degree of autonomy and conduct t h e ir  a f f a ir s  as q u asi-in d ep en d en t  
e n t i t i e s ,  but f ir m ly  w ith in  the broad p o lic y  l in e s  la id  out fo r each 
group.
Any understanding of c o n tro l over world o i l  must n e c e s s a r ily  
begin w ith the e v o lu tio n  of c o n tro l over M iddle E a st o i l ,  s in c e  the 
a r e a 's  im portance in  terms of world crude o i l  re se rv e s  and supply is  
overwhelming. U n t i l  1973 when host governments began e x e r c is in g  
c o n tro l over t h e ir  o i l ,  c o n tro l of M ideast o i l  belonged to the majors 
and was rooted in  a s e r ie s  of jo in t l y  owned o p eratin g  companies 
e s ta b lis h e d  in  Ir a n ,  Ir a q , Kuwait and Saudi A ra b ia . The system fo r  
crude o i l  p ro d u ctio n  -  which in c lu d e s  e x p lo ra t io n , development and 
e x tr a c t io n  of o i l  -  was c h a ra c te r is e d  by the co n cessio n s arrangements 
and the inter-com pany agreem ents.
The system fo r  petroleum  co n cessio n s -  which covered the e n t ir e  
t e r r i t o r ie s  in  the producing areas -  in v o lv e d  the e x c lu s iv e  r ig h t  of
the c o n c e ss io n a ire  to e x p lo ra t io n , e x tra c t io n  and export of o i l ,  so
th a t no other in v e s to r  could compete w ith in  the co n cessio n  a re a . The 
co n cessio n  holder was made the s o le  a r b it e r  of the volume and nature  
of investm ent in  the host co u n try , the ch o ice  of area fo r  
e x p lo it a t io n , the determ in atio n  of e x p lo ra tio n  p la n s , p ro ductio n
le v e ls  e t c . The s t a t e  was thus deprived of the r ig h t  to in te r fe r e  in  
any of these m a tters, l im it in g  i t s  ro le  to th at of a tax  c o lle c t o r .
Throughout most of t h is  p erio d com petition between the companies 
has been in te n se  as they were t r y in g  to expand market share in  an 
o l ig o p o l is t ic  s tr u c tu r e  by c u tt in g  p r ic e s . In  the Far E a st the
s tru g g le  fo r markets was marked by a number of p r ic e  w ars, follow ed  
by market sh a rin g  arrangements aim ing at the re s to r a t io n  of p r ic e s  to 
le v e ls  considered ’ n o rm a l'.
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Two such p r ic e  wars occurred in  1 9 1 0 - 1 1  and 19 2 7 -2 8  when the  
r iv a l s  of Standard O il  combined a g a in st  i t .  One of the immediate
causes of the 1927 war was the In tro d u c tio n  by Standard of kerosene  
from R u ss ia  in  In d ia .  The USSR had exp ro p riated  S h e ll  p ro p e rtie s  in  
R u s s ia  w ithout compensation and S h e ll  n a t u r a lly  resented S ta n d a rd ’ s 
a c t io n  in  subsequently  buying the ’ s t o le n 1 o i l  and u sin g  i t  in  
co m p etitio n  w ith  S h e ll  in  In d ia .
The war r a p id ly  spread to other markets and formed the 
background on the A chnacarry or 'As I s ’ agreement in  1928 between 
Exxon, BP and S h e l l ,  the f i r s t  la rg e  s c a le  attempt at a c a r t e l
agreement among the m ajors to re g u la te  world m arkets, whereby the
companies fo rm a lly  agreed to le a v e  market shares as they were.
A part from the co n cessio n s system , the other s ig n if ic a n t  aspect  
of the o i l  in d u s tr y  a t the upstream was the predominance of the 
inter-com pany o l ig o p o l is t ic  arrangements -  the 'In t e r n a t io n a l  
Petroleum  C a r t e l ’ . The main fe a tu re  of the c a r t e l  agreements was the  
c o lle c t iv e  en try  of the companies in to  crude p ro d u ctio n , as opposed 
to the downstream phases th a t were c o n tro lle d  by each company
in d iv id u a l ly ,  s in c e  each of the m ajors was v e r t i c a l l y  in te g ra te d , 
having a cce ss to investm ent and ownership at a l l  in d u s try  sta g e s .
The c o l le c t iv e  en try  in to  production was made by means of
c o n s o rt ia  whose ta sk  was making crude a v a ila b le  fo r l i f t i n g  by the  
sh are h o ld in g  com panies. The consortium  phenomenon caused the m ajo rs' 
in t e r e s t s  to be in t e r lin k e d  at the production sta g e , s in c e  each 
company had a share in  one or more of the co n cessio n  h o ld in g  
c o n s o r t ia . Thus the m ajors were h o r iz o n t a lly  in te g ra te d  at the 
upstream .
T h is ,  combined w ith the v e r t ic a l  in te g r a t io n  of he in d u s try  had 
s e r io u s  im p lic a t io n s : ( 1) investm ent d e c is io n s  upstream were
connected w ith downstream in vestm en t, which meant th a t what decided  
the volume of crude p ro d u ctio n  was the c a p a c ity  of the d is t r ib u t io n  
netw orks; ( 2 ) investm ent r is k s  were shared among the companies, thus 
red u cing  c o s ts , hence r a is in g  p r o f it s ;  (3 ) the co ncessio ns system and 
the c a r t e l  agreements were the to o ls  fo r  p lan n in g  crude p ro d u ctio n , 
the main aims of p lan n in g  being to avo id  im balances in  the world 
demand-supply eq u a tio n , to p reserve the r e la t iv e  shares of the
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p a r t ie s  in  the c o n s o rt ia  acco rd in g  to the 'As I s '  r u le ,  and to 
ach ieve a balance between crude su rp lu s and crude d e f ic i t  companies. 
Thus o i l  p ro d u ctio n  was c u r t a ile d  to the m a jo rs’ needs, which d id not 
n e c e s s a r ily  c o in c id e  w ith those of the host c o u n tr ie s .
The h o r iz o n ta l and v e r t ic a l  in te g r a t io n  of the' majors le d , by 
v ir t u e  of t h e ir  dom ination over the bulk of o i l  r e f in in g  and 
tra n s p o rta t io n  f a c i l i t i e s  in  the world o u tsid e  the USA and the 
Communist B lo ck , to a c h a r a c t e r is t ic  fe a tu re  of the world o i l  trad e  
in  t h is  p erio d and up to the la t e  1950 s: the in t e r n a t io n a l flow of 
crude was confined to a closed  c i r c u i t  of in t e r n a l channels fo r the 
crude o i l  exchanges w ith in  the c a r t e l  of in te g ra te d  o p e ra tio n s, which 
made no crude a v a ila b le  fo r s a le  to , or purchase from, th ir d  p arty  
d e a le r s . A market fo r  crude o i l  was sim ply n o n -e x is te n t , s in c e  o i l  
was e x c lu s iv e ly  traded among the m ajo rs. Any attempt by other 
p a r t ie s  to g ain  acce ss was doomed to f a i l u r e ;  s in c e  there were no 
channels fo r s e l l in g  crude to t h ir d  p a r t ie s ,  no one except the majors 
would undertake upstream in vestm en t, s in c e  there was no guaranteed  
market fo r the p ro d u ct.
In  sum, market sh a rin g  and p r ic e  agreements were made and there  
were fu s io n s  of in t e r e s t  through jo in t  ventures in  p ro d u ctio n , 
r e f in in g  and m arketing. However, the majors have a lso  been genuine 
com petitors in  many f ie ld s  and the problem of d e cid in g  whether the 
in d u s try  in  t h is  p erio d  i s  best d e scrib e d  in  terms of an 
in t e r n a t io n a l petroleum  c a r t e l  or of r iv a lr y  among the firm s in  i t ,  
i s  d e cid in g  how much weight to g iv e  to the co m p etitive and the 
co o p e rative  elements r e s p e c t iv e ly , s in c e  both com petition and 
c o llu s io n  were p rese n t.
Not only was crude o i l  p ro d u ctio n  in  the hands of the m ajors -  
or some com bination of them -  in  the M iddle E a s t , but a ls o  in  
Venezuela and In d o n e sia . I t  would, th e re fo re , seem th a t the 
circum stances were id e a l  fo r  the c re a tio n  of a tru e  c a r t e l  through 
which the companies could p la n  as an enormous m onopolist. To have 
been e f f e c t iv e  such a c a r t e l  would have to extend to the p ro d u c ts ’ 
m arkets, otherw ise continuous s t r a in  would e x is t .
-  22  -
The F e d e ra l Trade Commission in  i t s  report 'The In t e r n a t io n a l  
Petroleum  C a r t e l'  having examined the evidence a v a ila b le  concluded  
th a t the d e sig n a tio n  'c a r t e l '  was a p p ro p ria te . The report showed how 
the companies had attempted to e s t a b lis h  m arketing c a r t e ls  before the 
Second World War and th a t a l l  of them were aware of the d e s ir a b i l i t y  
of l im it in g  r i v a l r y .
However, in  P e n ro se 's  o p in io n  (Penrose 1968) the report was 
unable to show th at th ere was s u f f ic ie n t  community of in t e r e s t  among 
the m ajors to perm it the c re a tio n  of a worldwide c a r t e l  fo r  the 
c o n tro l of both the crude and products market; the s it u a t io n  was too 
com plicated to perm it such a sim p le s o lu t io n .
N e v e rth e le ss, the ra te  of sup p ly was c o n tro lle d  so that output 
would expand in  l in e  w ith demand, w ithout d is r u p tin g  e f fe c ts  on 
p r ic e s  and each major was a b le  to a d ju s t  output to planned s a le s .  
These f a c t s ,  however, do not by themselves prove th at c o n tro l was 
e x e rc ise d  in  a c e n t r a l ly  coordinated manner.
L o g ic a l ly ,  the next step  i s  to examine how such c o n tro l was 
e x e rc ise d  e s p e c ia lly  because, d e sp ite  the changes In  the co n d itio n s  
of supply consequent upon the ra p id  development of la r g e , low co st  
rese rves a f t e r  World War Two, the ra te  of crude o i l  production was 
u n t i l  the la t e  1950s c lo s e ly  a d ju ste d  to the ra te  at which i t  could  
be processed and so ld  as p ro d u cts. T h is  i s  p r e c is e ly  the aim of B\e~ 
next s e c t io n .
2 .2  19 4 5 -19 5 5 : THE TEN GOLDEN YEARS
In  the ten golden years a f te r  the war the o nly s e r io u s  - c o n f l ic t  in  
the in d u s try  has been th a t  beween the Ir a n ia n  government and the 
companies o p eratin g  th e re . T h is  d isp u te  r a is e d  many of the b a s ic  
is s u e s  surrounding the o p eration  of the majors in  the M iddle E a st and 
culm inated in  the n a t io n a lis a t io n  of the A n g lo -Ir a n ia n  company in  
19 5 1 .
Producing c o u n trie s  seemed g e n e ra lly  s a t is f ie d  w ith  the 
co n ce ssio n s, however, demand was r is in g  and s u p p lie s  were a ssu re d . 
N e v e rth e le ss there were s ig n s  of change to the o b server: some o i l  was
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being so ld  on d isco u n t or on s p e c ia l  terms to independent companies, 
some new companies obtained c o n ce ssio n s, some im porting c o u n trie s  
began q u e stio n in g  the p r ic e  a t  which o i l  was s o ld . These events  
marked the s t a r t  of the steady d e c lin e  in  the m a jo rs' co n tro l a f te r  
the w ar, a d e c lin e  which became evid e n t in  the la t e  1950s and was the 
consequence of im portant developm ents, two of w hich -  in cre a se d  
m p e titio n  fo r  co n cessio n s and in cre a se d  co m p etitio n  in  crude and 
product markets -  were a lre a d y  in  progress in  the ten golden y e a r s .
2 . 2 . 1  V e r t ic a l  In te g r a t io n
A standard argument in  economic theory i s  th a t v e r t ic a l  in te g r a t io n  
d e stro y s co m p e titio n . T h e re fo re , as long as the majors were 
v e r t i c a l l y  in te g ra te d  they could  e f f e c t iv e ly  r e s t r i c t  com petition and 
c o n tro l crude o i l  output and p r ic e s . To examine t h is  argument we 
w il l  f i r s t l y  focus on the r a t io n a le  fo r  V . I  ( V e r t ic a l  in te g r a t io n )  in  
theory and seco ndly on the p o s s ib le  a n t i-c o m p e tit iv e  e f fe c ts  th at V . I  
may have both in  theory and w ith referen ce to the o i l  market.
There are two r a t io n a l  o ffered in  theory fo r v e r t ic a l  
in te g r a t io n : ( 1) a m o n o p o listic  s tru c tu re  and ( 2 ) market weaknesses
and c o s t s . The e x is te n c e  of sep arate  firm s at d if f e r e n t  stages of an 
in d u s try  co n ta in in g  monopoly elements may account fo r le s s  than  
monopoly p r o f it  and h ig h er than monopoly p r ic e .  V . I  i s  seen as 
c o r r e c t in g  t h is  r e s u lt  of m o n o p o listic  s tr u c tu r e .
As Machlup and Taber (196 0 ) show there are three stra n d s  
agreeing in  t h a t . F i r s t l y ,  there i s  S t i g l e r ’ s argument about 
b i la t e r a l  monopoly, when a m onopolist s e l le r  d e a ls  w ith a monopsonist 
buyer in  a v e r t i c a l l y  fragmented in d u s tr y . In  t h is  case the 
m o n o p o list's  m arginal co st i s  average co st to the buyer, s in c e  at  
f ix e d  p r ic e s  the m onopolist would supply q u a n t it ie s  in d ic a te d  by h is  
MC cu rv e . The m onopsonist' s m arg in al revenue curve i s  the AR to the 
s e l l e r ,  s in c e  he would purchase q u a n t it ie s  on that curve fo r f ix e d  
p r ic e . In  these c ircu m sta n ce s, as S t ig le r  shows d ia g r a m a t ic a lly , i f  
the two firm s d id  not seek to e x p lo it  each others but in s te a d  
combined, the r e s u lt  would be a h ig h er output at a lower p r ic e  and 
a ls o  la rg e  jo in t  p r o f it  than i f  they were g e n eratin g  s e p a r a te ly .
Where no such c o n d itio n s  of b i la t e r a l  monopoly have developed in  
a v e r t i c a l l y  fragmented in d u s t r y , i t  is  s t i l l  very  l i k e l y  th a t
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m o n o p o listic  elements are p re v a le n t in  one of the s u c c e ss iv e  stages  
so th a t we have monopoly a t one sta g e , say a r e f in e r ,  and a s e r ie s  of 
co m p e titive  firm s a t  the other end such as p e tr o l s t a t io n s . The 
demand curve fa c in g  the m onopolist i s  derived from the demand curves  
fa c in g  the firm s one stage la t e r  in  the p ro c e ss. Under these  
c o n d it io n s , v e r t ic a l  in te g r a t io n  would secure la r g e r  outputs and 
lower p r ic e s  to consumers -  i . e  in c re a se  consumers' s u r p lu s . An 
analogous argument holds fo r  a monopsonist buyer in  any of the 
s u c c e ss iv e  sta g e s .
F i n a l l y ,  when the f ir m s ’ conduct i s  based on the f u l l - c o s t  
mark-up p r in c ip le ,  v e r t ic a l  fragm entation of an in d u s tr y  w i l l  r e s u lt  
in  a p i l in g  up of s u c c e ss iv e  m ark-ups. I f  each firm  adds a fix e d  
p r o f it  margin to i t s  f u l l  c o s t , and t h is  f u l l  co st in c lu d e s  the 
p r o f it  margins of the s u p p lie r s ,  there must r e s u lt  a mark-up of 
mark-ups and an e le v a t io n  of p r ic e s .  V e r t ic a l  in te g r a t io n  would do 
away w ith  in te rm e d ia te  m ark-ups and would th e re fo re  reduce p r ic e  to 
consumers and hence r a is e  consum ers’ su rp lu s  as output would be 
in cre a se d  a c c o r d in g ly .
V e r t ic a l  in te g r a t io n  i s  e s s e n t ia l ly  the s u b s t it u t io n  of in t e r n a l  
o rg a n is a tio n  fo r  the m arket. A firm  has two d e c is io n s  to make fo r  
each p ro d u ct: ( 1) to buy i t  or to make i t ,  ( 2) to s e l l  i t  or to
process i t  fu r th e r . When a firm  chooses to make or proces fu r th e r  i t  
engages in  V . I  and does so because i t  i s  le s s  c o s t ly  to in t e r n a l is e  a 
tr a n s a c t io n  than to use the m arket. In  fa c t  the second r a t io n a le  fo r  
V . I  r e f e r s ,  as noted above, to market weaknesses and c o s ts , the  
argument being th a t th ere are circum stances in  w hich V . I  i s  su p e rio r  
to the m arket. There are two such c ircu m stan ce s: t ra n s a t io n  co sts
and in fo rm a tio n  advantages.
T ra n sa c tio n  c o sts  may be very high and the market exchange 
c o s t ly ,  e s p e c ia lly  when the c o n tra c tu a l arrangemens entered in to  by 
the p a r t ie s  cannot adequately guarantee what each p arty  r e q u ir e s .  
The p a r t ic u la r  cases under which c o n tra c tu a l or market co sts  may 
become so c o s t ly  as to lead  to economy-motivated in t e r n a l is a t io n  are
( 1) when the investm ents in v o lv e d  are long term, in  which case a 
c o n tra ct im p e rfe ctio n  can not be changed, and ( 2) when the
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investm ents are h ig h ly  s p e c if ic  e .g  a r e f in e r y  h an d lin g  a p a r t ic u la r  
type of crude. I t  may be th a t co sts  are lowered in  t h is  way but the 
investm ent is  v u ln e ra b le  to any c o n tra c tu a l performance problems th at  
may a r is e  because the a lt e r n a t iv e  sources of the p a r t ic u la r  crude a r  
too narrow . F a ilu r e  to allo w  a firm  to in te g r a te  v e r t i c a l l y  by 
owning i t s  crude supply may fo rc e  i t  to b u ild  a le s s  s p e c if ic ,  h ig h er  
co st r e f in e r y  s in c e  th ere may be no co n tra ct th at w i l l  s a t is f a c t o r i l y  
re p la ce  ownership.
The c o n tra c tu a l dilemma, as presented by W illiam son  ( 1 9 7 1 )  i s  
th a t on the one hand i t  may be very c o s t ly  to s p e c ify  in  a co n tra ct  
the f u l l  range of c o n tig e n c ie s  and s p e c ify  resp o n ses. On the other  
hand i f  the co n tra ct is  incom plete in  these re s p e c ts , the p a r t ie s '  
d iverg e n t in t e r e s t s  w i l l  lead  to o p p o rtu n is tic  behaviour and 
h a g g lin g . But h ag g lin g  i s  a zero sum game, s in c e  what one p a rty
gain s the other lo s e s . I f  the p a r t ie s  to the d isp u te  were
departments w ith in  the same o r g a n is a t io n , the managers would p e rce iv e  
of the waste in v o lv e d  and would s e t t le  the d isp u te  by a r b it r a r y  f i a t .
With refere n ce  to in fo rm a tio n  advantages, acco rd in g  to Adelman 
(19 5 5 ) in fo rm a tio n  may be a v a ila b le  more q u ic k ly  or more cheaply to 
the in te g ra te d  f irm  th at to o u tsid e rs', s in c e  knowledge can often be
communicated f a s t e r  and more cheaply w ith in  an o rg a n is a tio n  than
between two firm s through the market p la c e . V e r t ic a l  in te g r a t io n
occurs in  r a p id ly  changing or growing in d u s t r ie s ,  where economies of 
s c a le  do a r is e  as S t ig le r  arg u es, but these tend to lag  behind a f e l t  
need; a s lu g g is h  response w i l l  o ften  fo rce  the growing firm  to 
provide i t s  own s u p p lie s  an d /o r marketing o u t le t s . So the p erce p tio n  
of what upstream or downstream f a c i l i t i e s  are req u ired  w i l l  occur
much e a r l ie r  to an in te g ra te d  firm  than to p o te n t ia l e n tra n ts .
Adelm an's example of t h is  motive fo r V . I  i s  the case of o i l  
p ip e lin e s , where the knowledge of where and when a p ip e lin e  ought to 
be b u i lt  occurs to the p r o d u c e r -re f in e r  before i t  occurs to anyone 
e ls e .
The communications motive fo r  V . I  i s  r e in f o r  ced by the
tr a n s a c t io n s  co st m otive in  the case of p ip e lin e s , which are among 
the lo n g e r -l iv e d  and most s p e c if ic  in vestm en ts, so th at any 
c o n tra c tu a l e rro rs  w i l l  prove very c o s t ly .
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S in ce  V . I  p ro vid e s a b e tte r  flow of in fo rm a tio n  the in te g ra te d  
f irm  possesses lo n g -te rm  assuran ces of the terms of the supply of i t s  
raw m a te r ia ls  and the demand fo r i t s  p ro d u ct, thus the firm  in c u rs  
lower average c o sts  -  s in c e  knowledge of fu tu re  ra te s  of o p eratio n  
p erm its more s p e c ia lis e d  f a c i l i t i e s  -  and in c u rs  sm a lle r  v a r ia t io n  in  
output le v e ls  and hence in  average u n it  c o s ts . T h is  r e s u lt s  in  le s s  
v a r ia b le  p r o f it s  and le s s  r is k y  investm ent fo r s to c k h o ld e rs . In  
tu rn , lower r i s k  im p lie s  lower c a p it a l  co sts  and hence lower o v e r a ll  
pro d u ctio n  c o s ts , which in  a co m p etitive  market would be tr a n s la te d  
to lower consumer p r ic e s .  Thus . V . I  would o ffe r  a b e n e fit  to 
s o c ie t y . In  fa c t  M it c h e ll  (19 7 6 ) confirm s w ith data th at the g re a te r  
the p re d icte d  r i s k ,  the h ig h er the v a r i a b i l i t y  over time and la c k  of 
p r e d ic t a b i l i t y  of lon g -term  ra te s  of re tu rn .
Turning next to the arguments th at V . I  causes a n t i-c o m p e tit iv e  
e f f e c t s ,  these are m ainly of three k in d s : p r ic e  d is c r im in a t io n  en try  
b a r r ie r s  and w e lfa re  lo s s e s .
W ith re fe re n ce  to p r ic e  d is c r im in a t io n  the argument i s  th at by 
t h e ir  in fo rm a tio n  advantage V . I  companies can id e n t if y  d if f e r e n t ia l  
e l a s t i c i t i e s  and can prevent r e s e ll in g  by moving downstream in to  
h ig h er p rice d  m arkets, so th a t they are a b le  to c a rry  out p r ic e  
d is c r im in a t io n  between c o u n tr ie s , o ff s e t t in g  c o u n trie s  w ith h ig h er  
taxes a g a in st  those w ith low and en jo yin g  co st advantages in  t r a n s fe r  
p r ic in g .
Looking .a t  b a r r ie r s  to e n try , we see from Machlup and T a b e r's  
(196 0 ) a n a ly s is  th a t in te g ra te d  firm s enjoy ab so lute co st  
advantages. Assuming monopoly is  not the g e n eral case in  any stage -  
as supported by T e e ce 's  (19 7 6 )  evidence on low co n cen tra tio n  r a t io s  -  
th ere s t i l l  e x is t s  a co st advantage to the firm  th a t operates on the 
f u l l  co st p r in c ip le .  In  t h is  case the B a in -L a b in i theory on 
e n t r y -b a r r ie r s  a p p lie s . When t e c h n ic a l economies of sc a le  e x is t  and 
there is  a minimum e f f ic ie n t  s c a le  of p la n t ( f o r  B ain  200,000 b /d  i s  
the MES fo r r e f in in g )  the V . I  firm s may set an en try preventing  
p r ic e ,  provided i t  does not exceed LRAC by more than the h eig h t of 
the s c a le  economies.
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However, as Bhagwati (19 7 0 ) argues i t  is  p o s s ib le  fo r new firm s  
to take a r is k  and en ter a market i f  the premium i s  high enough. 
Firm s w i l l  enter at a p r ic e  below AC which w i l l  cause a l l  of them, 
e s ta b lis h e d  and new, to lo s e . Then i t  is  not n ece ssary  that only the  
e n tra n ts  w i l l  be fo rced  o u t. A ls o , d iv e r s if ie d  firm s w ith  la rg e
w .
f in a n c ia l  reso u rces may be prepared to undergo p r o f it s  now fo r
p r o f it s  in  the fu tu re  and thus en ter at a lo s s .  For. example, in  the  
North Sea p o te n t ia l p r o f it  was s u f f ic ie n t  to a t t r a c t  independents  
w ith no o i l  e x p e rie n ce , d e sp ite  the b a r r ie r s  to en try enjoyed by the 
in te g ra te d  m ajo rs.
F i n a l l y ,  on the q u e stio n  of w elfare lo s s  caused by V . I  there i s  
a g a in  disagreem ent. Machlup and T a b e r's  argument presented e a r l ie r  
th a t V . I  r e s u lt s  in  a net b e n e fit  to s o c ie t y , i s  supported by 
Greenhut and Ohta (19 7 9 ) who co n sid e r the e f fe c ts  of the in te g r a t io n  
of s u c c e ss iv e  o l ig o p o lis t s  in  energy (n independent r e f in e r ie s  at the 
upstream , m independent g a so lin e  s e l le r s  at the downstream). T h e ir  
in q u ir y  in d ic a t e s  th a t the b reaking  up of la rg e  o i l  companies in  the
USA would lower output and w e lfa re .
An a lt e r n a t iv e  view i s  g iven  by C a rlto n  (19 7 9 ) who shows th a t  
although th ere are  strong in c e n t iv e s  fo r V . I  due to u n c e r ta in ty , the  
o v e r a ll  e f fe c t  i s  reduced s o c ia l  w e lfa re .
The t h ir d  argument i s  presented by W arren-Boulton ( 1 9 7 4 ) : the  
e f fe c t  of V . I  on w elfare  may be e it h e r  p o s it iv e  or n e g a tiv e , 
depending on c e r t a in  param eters in  the demand and p ro ductio n  
fu n c t io n s , such as the e l a s t i c i t y  of s u b s t it u t io n .
C le a r ly  economic theory does not provide a c le a r  answer as to  
whether V . I  reduces com p etitio n or n o t. I t  is  p o ssib le  v ia  
t h e o r e t ic a l  m anipulaton to show th at i t  i s  harm ful but a ls o  to 
demonstrate th at i t  is  n o t. S in ce  there i s  no d e f in it e  t h e o r e t ic a l  
answer one has to turn  to case stu d ie s  in  order to reach a 
co n c lu s io n . Thus we w i l l  next examine V . I  in  the petroleum  in d u s tr y ,  
where there are  strong in c e n t iv e s  fo r in t e g r a t io n , as a means of 
red ucing  tr a n s a c t io n  and in fo rm a tio n  c o s ts , g iven  the u n c e rta in ty  of 
the spot markets and the lon g -term  p r o je c t  s p e c if ic  nature of 
in vestm en ts.
-  28 -
Adelman argues th at in  t h is  p e rio d , the tru e  b a r r ie r  to 
co m p etitio n d id  not come from the m ajors' in te g r a t io n  in  marine 
t ra n s p o rt , because the tan k er in d u s try  i s  co m p e titiv e , w ith each sh ip  
being e f f e c t iv e ly  a f irm  th a t can make i t s  own p r o f it .  En try  is  open 
and the economies of s c a le  in s ig n if ic a n t .
S im ila r ly ,  the m arketing stage i s  co m p etitive w ith la rg e  numbers 
of independents. M arketing can be lo c a lis e d  w ith d is c r im in a t io n  in  
is o la t e d  m arkets, but fo r Manclce t h is  i s  sh o rt l iv e d  because en try  i s  
e a sy . O ften, the sm a lle r  n o n -in te g ra te d  companies are tougher 
com petitors s in c e  they are not concerned about the impact, of product 
p r ic e s  on crude p r ic e s .  The m ajors would be p e n a lise d  by c u tt in g  
product p r ic e s  as t h is  would a f f e c t  a l l  p revio u s sta g e s; th u s, t h e ir  
re lu c ta n c e  to do t h is  enabled the s u r v iv a l  of indep endents.
The main b a r r ie r  to co m p etitio n  probably came from in te g r a t io n  
in to  r e f in in g . C le a r ly ,  ownership of crude provided the m ajors w ith  
an enormous advantage. An independent r e f in e r  could not buy at the 
low co n cessio n are p r ic e s  n e ith e r  could he cover any lo s s e s  from other 
a c t i v i t i e s  as the companies d id . So the v e r t i c a l l y  in te g ra te d  
s tr u c tu r e  of the in d u s try  was a b a r r ie r  to com petition as crude o i l  
producers were few and e n try  very  slow and unprom ising, so th at w h ile  
some succeeded, none d id  so on a s c a le  to r i v a l  e s ta b lis h e d  
p ro d u cers. N e v e rth e le ss, there are disagreem ents about the e f fe c ts  
of t h is  on p r ic e : fo r  Adelman the majors had a vested in t e r e s t  in
statesm anship  and t h is  re s u lte d  in  a p r ic e  near to the co m p e titiv e , 
w h ile  B la ir  (19 7 6 ) b e lie v e s  the companies could r e a d ily  press h ig h e r  
p r ic e s  to consumers.
V ario u s e m p ir ic ia l  s tu d ie s  e x is t  in  t h is  a r a , e .g  M ancke's
(19 7 6 ) who u sin g  co n ce n tra tio n  r a t io s  shows th a t in  the US o i l  
in d u s try  of the 1950s there has been co m p etitive  adequacy. There are  
v a rio u s  c r it ic is m s  on the use of such r a t io s  ( e .g  W ilso n , 1975)  
probably the most im portant being th at t h e ir  use in  the o i l  in d u s try  
i s  m islead in g  s in c e  they t o t a l ly  ignore the unique s t r u c t u r a l  
fe a tu re s  of the in d u s tr y .
J o in t  ventures have been a key s t r u c t u r a l  fe a tu re  in  t h is  
p e rio d , both in  the USA and the M iddle E a s t . In  a d d it io n , US data
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shows the e x iste n c e  of e x te n siv e  in te r lo c k in g  d ir e c to r a te s  between 
the m a jo rs. The Chase Manhattan Bank i s ,  fo r  example, one of the top 
10 sto ck h o ld e rs in  Exxon, O c c id e n ta l, Amoco and o th e rs . C le a r ly ,  
such a s s o c ia t io n s  serve to reinform ce mutual in t e r e s t s  and i t  i s  hard  
to see how they can be c o n d u c iv e  to the advancement of rig o ro u s  
co m p e titio n .
One i s ,  th e re fo re , in c lin e d  to agree th a t V . I  reduces  
co m p e titio n . At the same tim e, however, lo o kin g  a t  the co m p etitive  
o lig o p o ly  th at e x is t s  s in c e  19 79 , w ith the la c k  of any constraints on 
overproduction, u n c e r ta in ty , i n s t a b i l i t y ,  l o g i s t i c a l  in e f f ic ie n c ie s  
and p r ic e  v o l a t i l i t y ,  perhaps V . I  was only the p r ic e  that had to be 
p aid  fo r a s ta b le  m arket.
As seen e a r l i e r ,  crude o i l  production o u tsid e  the USA and 
Communist c o u n trie s  was c o n tro lle d  by a few companies which were 
j o i n t l y  owned by two or more of the m ajo rs. In  s p ite  of jo in t  
ownership each major was m ainly concerned w ith own p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  
Hence, the f a c t  th at the producing companies in  the M iddle E a s t  were 
jo in t l y  owned a f f i l i a t e s  of groups which ,were in  com p etitio n in  
products markets meant th at some method of c o n tr o llin g  the  
a llo c a t io n  of crude o i l  s u p p lie s  among the jo in t  owners had to be 
d e v ise d .
2 .2 .2  J o in t  c o n tro l of su p p ly
The re g u la tio n  of the ra te  of p ro ductio n of crude from the M iddle  
E a st req u ire d  the fo rm u la tio n  of acce p ta b le  r u le s  fo r  determ ining the 
amount of crude th a t would be made a v a ila b le  to the se v e ra l owners. 
A l l  the arrangements made seem to have been d e rive d  from two b a s ic  
p r in c ip le s :  ( 1) th a t an in v e s to r  i s  e n t it le d  to a share in  the
b e n e fits  of a jo in t  venture in  p ro p o rtio n  to h is  investm ent in  i t ;  
and ( 2 ) th a t those owners wanting to o b tain  more crude than they were 
e n t it le d  to by v ir t u e  of t h e ir  ownership sh a re , should be a b le  to 
purchase at le a s t  some a d d it io n a l q u a n t it ie s  at a p r e f e n t ia l  r a t e .
A l l  the a f f i l i a t e s  had to se t ru le s  about the ap p ro p riate  course  
of a c t io n  when a parent company wants and i s  w il l in g  to put up the 
funds fo r an amount of crude t h a t , g iven  the demands of other owners, 
exceeds the amount i t  i s  e n t it le d  to acco rd in g  to i t s  ownership 
sh are .
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The most r ig id  arrangement would be to re q u ire  that a d d it io n a l  
investm ent from each owner should be accepted in  the same p ro p o rtio n  
as the ownership s h a re s. But ap art from t h is  extreme there were many 
o p p o rtu n itie s  fo r arrangements between the owners to perm it those who 
want to o v e r l if t  to pay more in  order to induce co-owners to make the  
r e q u is it e  investm ent.
I t  seems th a t the most l ib e r a l  arrangement was adopted by the  
owners of the Kuwait O i l  Company, BP and G u lf O i l  (H arshorne, 19 6 7 ) . 
Funds fo r new investm ent were put up by the owners in  p ro p oriton  to  
ownership shares (50% each) but each of the p aren ts was allow ed to 
ask fo r and l i f t  as much as they wanted. I f  one of them l i f t e d  more 
than t h e ir  50% s h a re , they paid the other the c a p it a l  co st of the 
investm ent re q u ire d  fo r i t s  p ro d u ctio n .
In  Ira q  the arrangements were more co m p licate d . The IP C ’ s 
investm ent programme was set fo r 5 -y e a r  p e rio d s, 5 yea rs in  advance. 
Investm ent in  the company was made by each parent in  p ro p ortion  to 
t h e ir  e q u ity .
There were no sta te d  r e s t r ic t io n s  fo r the p erio d 1948 -  when the 
re g u la tio n s  governing the p lan n in g  of in cre a se d  output were la id  down 
-  to 1952 -  when w ith post-w ar readjustm ents takin g  p la c e , output was 
p r im a r ily  determined by the speed w ith which p h y s ic a l c a p a c ity  could  
be made a v a i la b le .  For the p erio d 1952-1.956 d e f in it e  q u a n t it ie s  were 
s e t  fo rth  but there i s  no way of knowing how they were determ ined. 
For the p erio d  1 9 5 7 -1 9 6 1 ,  which had to be planned in  19 5 2 , there were 
two o p tio n s: each of the owners was lim ite d  to e it h e r  a sta te d
in c re a se  (26,00 0  tons fo r  each 1% of ow nership), or to a q u a n tity  
c a lc u la te d  a cco rd in g  to the 5 /7 t h s  r u le , w hichever was the h ig h e r.
A ccording to the 5 /7 t h s  r u le , the t o t a l  amount to be programmed 
would be determined by adding up the amounts wanted by the v a rio u s  
groups and then red ucing the t o t a l  demanded i f  the h ig h e st s in g le  
demand exceeded 5 /7 t h s  of the sum of the 2 low est demands. The 
re v ise d  t o t a l  would then be a llo c a te d  to the groups acco rd in g  to  
t h e ir  ownership s h a re s. Arrangements were made to enable a group 
wanting more than i t s  share to buy from those wanting le s s .  Thus a 
l im it  was se t to the t o t a l  amount th at could be obtained by any
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group, but no group by s e t t in g  i t s  demands very low could thereby  
keep the amount a v a ila b le  to the others below the f ix e d  q u a n t it ie s  
sta te d  in  the f i r s t  o p tio n .
With re fe re n ce  to l i f t i n g  from curren t output -  as d is t in c t  from 
p lan n in g  the investm ent to p ro vid e fo r fu tu re  output -  l i f t i n g  was 
perm itted in  excess of ownership shares from those w ishing to s e l l  at  
a p r ic e  h a lf-w a y  between co st and the average market valu e of the 
o i l .  Thus the s e l l in g  group could make a p r o f it  and the cost of o i l  
to o v e r l if t e r s  was in c re a se d . A s im ila r  s it u a t io n  e x is te d  in  Saudi 
A ra b ia , where th ere was a com plicated system of d is t r ib u t in g  Aramco 
p r o f it s  to i t s  parents which in  e f fe c t  made o i l  l i f t e d  in  excess of 
ownership share more expensive than 'owned' o i l .
In  Ir a n  each p a rtn er nominated each year in  advance an estim ate  
not of h is  own requirem ents but of the t o t a l  consortium  p ro d uctio n  
fo r  the fo llo w in g  y e a r. The f ig u re  accepted was the lowest t o t a l  
nominated th a t would cover the estim ates put in  by sh areh o ld ers  
re p re se n tin g  a g iven  precentage m a jo rity  of the shares in  the  
consortium . T h is  t o t a l  was then r e d is t r ib u te d  in to  e n title m e n ts  
p ro p o rtio n a te  to the h o ld in g s of each sh areh old er (APQ system , i . e  
average programme q u a n t it y ) .
For u n d e r lif t e r s  there was no p e n a lty . I f  one wanted to buy 
more than h is  e n title m e n t, he would have to buy the excess from any 
u n d e r lif t e r s  a t f u l l  posted p r ic e . Over the years there had been a 
f a i r l y  re g u la r  d iv is io n  between those companies th at nominated h igh  
t o t a ls  fo r  next y e a r 's  sch ed u le -  m ainly those in h e r e n tly  sho rt of 
crude -  and those th at nominated low because they had more crude 
a v a ila b le  elsew here e it h e r  a t a lower cost or in  c o u n trie s  where they  
were concerned to in c re a se  t o t a l  o ffta k e .
The jo in t  c o n tro l of s u p p lie s  by the majores has meant f i r s t l y ,  
the a b i l i t y  to c o n tro l o v e r a ll  producton -  s in c e  everyone knew who 
l i f t e d  what -  and se co n d ly , the mechanisms to c o n tro l who l i f t e d  what 
-  such as the 5 /7 t h s  r u le  and APQ.
The rem arkably e f f e c t iv e  system of supply c o n tro l can best be 
exp la in ed  by the h igh le v e l  of co n ce n tra tio n  which req u ire d  
observance of the system by o n ly  a few p ro d u cers. I f  output were
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d isp e rse d  w id ely  among a la rg e  number of producers no mechanism of 
c o n tro l could fu n c tio n  e f f e c t iv e ly .  But in  the in t e r n a t io n a l o i l  
market of t h is  p e rio d , market co n ce n tra tio n  has been re in fo rce d  by 
t h is  jo in t  venture system .
As long as each major was assured th at h is  r i v a l  o lig o p o lis t s  
are observing the system , each gained from the jo in t  venture a reason  
to avoid the o verp ro d uctio n  of o i l  th at could not be marketed at 
acce p ta b le  p r ic e s :  the in c re a se d  p r o f it s  he might g a in  from ra p id
expansion in  one country would be more than o ffs e t  by r e s u lta n t  lower 
p r ic e s  in  the other c o u n trie s  in  which he a ls o  operated.
A ccording to B la ir  (19 7 5 )  the ex tra  dim ension in tro d u ced  by the  
p a tte rn  of jo in t  ventures i n t o ' im perfect co m p etitio n theory i s  an 
awareness by each o l ig o p o lis t  of the probable consequences in  a l l  of 
h is  areas of p ro d u ctio n  of a co m p etitive  move he might i n i t i a t e  in  
any one of them.
2 .3  19 5 6 -19 6 9 : THE CRACKS APPEAR
The p erio d  fo llo w in g  the reopening of the Suez Canal marked the  
u n le a sh in g  of com p e tit iv e  fo rce s  i n the world o i l  in d u s tr y . Major 
changes took p la ce  which were d ir e c t l y  r e la te d  to the e v o lu tio n  of 
the in d u s tr y  and of the in s t i t u t io n a l  arrangemets w ith in  which i t  
o perated. Such changes occurred on both the demand and supply s id e s ,  
and t h e ir  n atu re i s  examined in  the fo llo w in g  two s e c t io n s .
2 . 3 . 1  Demand changes
I t  has long been an axiom w ith oilm en that t o t a l  market demand fo r  
o i l  products i s  p r ic e  i n e l a s t i c ;  hence p r ic e  red u ctio n s are  
in a p p ro p ria te  fo r  a t t a in in g  in cre a se d  s a le s .  Up to the 1950s in  most 
c o u n trie s  ample s u p p lie s  of lo w -co st c o a l were a v a ila b le ,  w hile  o i l  
was co nsidered too p re cio u s to burn as a f u e l.
In  s p it e  of ra p id  in c re a s e s  in  energy demand in  the post-w ar era  
i n  Europe, the p e n e tra tio n  of o i l  was modest, the share of b la ck  o i ls  
r is in g  from 2% of t o t a l  energy consumption in  1943 to 8%_ in  19 5 3 . 
T h is  modest advance probably r e f le c te d  the fa c t  that co a l p r ic e s  
during the p erio d  were c o n tro lle d  and kept low by the governments of 
producing c o u n tr ie s , on the assum ption th at any in c re a se  would have a
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d e trim e n ta l e f f e c t  on in d u s tr y  c o s ts , w h ile  o i l  p r ic e s  were based on 
the co m p ara tively  h igh d e liv e re d  co st of products imported from the 
C a rrib e a n ,
G iven  these market r e la t io n s h ip s , i t  could not be assumed th a t  
reduced o i l  p r ic e s  would g r e a t ly  stim u la te  o i l  s a le s .  Even though 
demand fo r in d iv id u a l  s u p p lie r s ’ crudes might be more e l a s t ic  than 
in d u s tr y  demand, any p r ic e  cut would be matched by the r iv a l s  in  the 
o l ig o p o l is t ic  s e t t in g  o f •the p e rio d , so th a t the p r ic e  c u tte r  would 
have gained o n ly  h is  p ro p o rtio n a te  share of the s l i g h t l y  la rg e r  t o t a l  
in d u s try  s a le s . Thus we have an e x p lan atio n  fo r the f a i lu r e  of o i l  
p r ic e s  to be reduced p r io r  to the m id -10 5 0 s, g iven  the e x is t in g  
o l ig o p o l is t ic  o rg a n is a t io n  and a r t i f i c i a l l y  low c o a l p r ic e s .
However, s tu d ie s  of energy requirem ents led  g ra d u a lly  to the  
c o n c lu sio n  th at the r o le  of o i l  was bound to undergo r a d ic a l  
changes. So the H a rtle y  rep o rt in  Europe expected the energy gap 
between consumption and indigenous production to grow from 146 MTCE 
in  1955 to 195 MTCE in  1960 and 455 MTCE in  19 7 5 , and sta te d  th at o i l  
im ports should be a b le  to f i l l  t h is  gap. A lso , i t  became c le a r  th at  
c o a l p r ic e s  would have to r is e  i f  production was to be m ain tain ed , i f  
o n ly  to keep the lab ou r fo rce  in t a c t .
The m ajors had, th e re fo re , to examine whether o i l  could be 
produced and marketed p r o f it a b ly  in  com petition w ith  o ther f u e ls .  
Provided c e r t a in  a d a p ta tio n s were made -  e .g  c o n s tru c tio n  of fu e l o i l  
o rien ted  r e f in e r ie s  near consuming markets and furfcfeer economies in  
tra n sp o rt through g ia n t tankers and p ip e lin e s  in  Europe -  the answer 
was th at i t  co u ld . By s h if t in g  from a high p r ic e  to a low p r ic e  
p o lic y ,  the q u a n tity  of o i l  so ld  could expand adequately to 
compensate s u p p lie r s  fo r the lower per u n it  p r ic e .
In d eed , one of the developments on the demand s id e  in  t h is
p erio d  was a continued r is e  in  t o t a l  o i l  consumption. The demand fo r  
o i l  being income e l a s t i c ,  i t  follow ed that w ith in c re a s in g  income in  
the r a p id ly  growing in d u s t r ia l  c o u n tr ie s , o i l  demand rose too.
European o i l  demand, fo r  example, t r ip p le d  between 1955 anjd 1964 to
over 300 m il l io n  to n s.
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Moreover, o i l  consumption has r is e n  more than th at of most 
f u e ls ,  due p a r t ly  to te c h n o lo g ic a l change, p a r t ly  to a r e la t iv e  f a l l  
in  the p r ic e  of o i l  products fo r which there i s  some p r ic e  e l a s t i c i t y  
of demand, and p a r t ly  to a d e creasin g  p ro te c tio n  fo r co al in  many 
c o u n tr ie s .
So o i l  in c re a se d  i t s  market share w hile  new uses in  in d u s try  
have been expanding -  e s p e c ia lly  in  p e tro ch e m ica ls. N e v e rth e le ss, 
the ra te  of in c re a se  of o i l  consumption o u tsid e the USA a t 6 -7 %  p .a .  
was below the 11% or more the in d u s try  had become accustomed to in  
the immediate po st-w ar p e rio d .
In  a d d it io n , there have been s h if t s  in  the g eo g rap h ical 
d is t r ib u t io n  of consum ption, w ith  the European and Japanese markets 
growing more r a p id ly  than the US m arket, w hile  the im portance of 
markets in  the developing c o u n trie s  of A s ia , A f r ic a  and L a t in  Am erica  
has been in c r e a s in g  too. With US import r e s t r ic t io n s ,  the sh are of 
t h is  market to exp o rting  c o u n trie s  was fu rth e r  r e s t r ic t e d .
In  sum, th e re fo re , there have been s t r u c t u r a l  changes in  demand, 
due to r is in g  incomes unevenly d is t r ib u t e d  among consuming c o u n tr ie s ,  
te c h n o lo g ic a l change a f fe c t in g  consumption, changes in  the p o s it io n  
of o i l  r e la t iv e  to competing uses and changes in  government p o lic y  
a f fe c t in g  im ports of competing f u e ls .
The le v e l  and com position of demand are o n ly  one p art of 
in d u s try  s tr u c tu r e  and there have a ls o  been sup p ly s id e  changes in  
t h is  p e rio d .
2 .3 .2  Supply changes
In  the p erio d  examined the p ro ductio n of crude and i t s  g eo g rap h ical 
d is t r ib u t io n  have changed r a p id ly  due to a number of reasons: 
expansion of e x is t in g  companies' p ro d u ctio n , en try  of new com panies, 
changes in  co n cessio n  terms and new types of c o n tra c ts , en try  of new 
o il-p r o d u c in g  c o u n tr ie s , te c h n o lo g ic a l in n o v a tio n  making o ffsh o re  
o p eratio n s more economic.
Some of these changes had a lre a d y  appeared a f t e r  the end of the 
war, but a c c e le ra te d  a f t e r  1957 m ainly due to three m u tu ally  
r e f in fo r c in g  developm ents.
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I .  Com petition fo r  New Concessions
T h is  arose due to two main f a c t o r s :
(a) In crea se d  a v a i l a b i l i t y  to acreage due to :
( 1) the development of o ffsh o re  technology th a t opened the  
whole co ast to co n c e ssio n s,
( 2 ) changes in  the relin q u ish m en t p ro v is io n s  of co n cessio n  
term s, which f a c i l i t a t e d  an in cre a se d  supply of crude, 
s in c e  they have eased the entry of new companies.
The e a r l ie r  co n cessio n s were co verin g  the major p a rt  -  i f  not a l l  -  
of a c o u n try 's  area and la s t in g  fo r long time p e rio d s . The 1933  
Aramco co n cessio n  agreement in  Saudi A rab ia  made p ro v is io n s  fo r  
re lin q u ish m en t at the d is c r e t io n  of Aramco of areas i t  d id  not 
e x p lo it ,  but i t  was not u n t i l  1948 th at the company agreed on a 
program of re lin q u ish m e n ts .
In  most of the agreements w ith  newcomers ta k in g  up concessio n s  
s in c e  the la t e  19 5 0 s, however, p ro v is io n s  have been made fo r  
re lin q u ish m en t acco rd in g  to a predeterm ined tim e ta b le  and e x is t in g  
c o n c e ss io n a ire s  have v o lu n t a r i ly  accepted the p r in c ip le .
By 1963 Aramco had r e lin q u is h e d  75% of i t s  o r ig in a l  co ncessio n  
a re a , w hile  the Kuwait O i l  Company had g iven  up about J^alf of i t s  
o r ig in a l  a re a . The r e s u lt  was th at e sta b lis h e d  major o i l  companies 
could no longer keep u n e x p lo ite d  areas out of r i v a l s '  hands. Hence, 
t h e ir  c o n tro l over the e x p lo it a t io n  of o i l  reso u rce s was weakened,
(b) E n try  of new companies.
The key date fo r  t h is  fa c to r  i s  the form ation of the Ir a n ia n  
consortium  in  19 5 4 j when 9 independents o btained s h a re s. When 
Venezuela put up to a u ctio n  new t r a c t s  of land in  19 5 7 , la rg e  numbers 
of US companies were a t tr a c te d . During the 3 years fo llo w in g  the 
passage of L ib y a 's  f i r s t  o i l  law in  19 5 5 , co n cessio n s covering 55% of 
the c o u n try 's  land area were granted to 15 o i l  companies, in c lu d in g  6 
of the 7 m a jo rs, CFP and US and German independents. In  1964 Ir a n  
opened some o ffsh o re  areas fo r  co m p etitive  b id d in g  which a ttra c te d  
some 30 com panies, most of them combined in  groups and in c lu d in g  
Je rse y  Stan d ard , M o b il, S h e l l ,  CFP, 16 US ind ep en d en ts, 5 French and 
5 German companies and E N I.
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Thus co m p etitio n  fo r new co n cessio n s came from the new en tran ts  
but a ls o  from the m ajo rs, eager to co ntinue t h e ir  e x p lo ra tio n
programmes d e sp ite  the e x is t in g  su rp lu s  of crude and t h e ir  co n tro l of 
very la rg e  r e s e r v e s .
The e n try  of new in v e s to r s  in  o i l  p ro d uctio n  has been la r g e ly  
due to two f a c t o r s :
( 1) the growing emergence of independent o i l  companies, m ain ly  
Am erican. In  the 1950s the US se t up a tax system to encourage 
US com panies’ investm ent abroad w ith the aim of sounding out 
energy p o te n t ia l o v e rse a s. F a st  dom estic d e p le tio n  made US 
p o licy -m a k e rs  b e lie v e  th a t t h is  course of a c t io n  could secu re  
low co st fo re ig n  o i l  to keep pace w ith the US o i l  import needs.
(2 ) The emergence of n a t io n a l o i l  companies in  consuming c o u n trie s
w ith  support from t h e ir  governments who were seeking s e c u r it y  of 
s u p p lie s  and cheap o i l .  D i f f ic u l t ie s  w ith the balance of
payments faced by consuming co u n trie s  in  the 1950s led
governments to encourage investm ent in  r e f in in g  and 
d is t r ib u t io n ,  aim ing at s e c u r it y  of supply of o i l  products to be 
achieved by d iv e r s if y in g  crude sources -  concern fo r which grew 
a f t e r  the in te r r u p tio n s  in  crude s u p p lie s  fo llo w in g  the Suez 
c r i s i s .
The en try  in to  the in d u s try  of the newcomers was made p o s s ib le  
by d e v is in g  new form ulae fo r o i l  e x p lo it a t io n , d if f e r e n t  from the 
co n cessio n  system and a lle g e d ly  more favo u rab le  to host governments.
One such form ula was the jo in t  venture agreement w ith the NOC's
(N a tio n a l O i l  Companies) of producing c o u n tr ie s , based on investm ent  
co sts  -  in c lu s iv e  of taxes and r o y a lt ie s  due to the host country -  
being shared e q u a lly  between the fo re ig n  company and the NOC and 
equal sh a rin g  of the in v e stm e n t's  p r o f it s .
The fo re ig n  company assumed the f u l l  investm ent r is k  in  the  
event of f a i l u r e  as a g a in st  equal d iv is io n  of t h is  r is k  w ith the NOC 
in  the event of s u c c e ss . The government was p aid  taxes and r o y a lt ie s  
at the ra te  of 50% of the r e a lis e d  market p r ic e  per b a r r e l le s s  
pro d u ctio n  c o s ts ; the o ther h a lf  of the p r o f it s  was d iv id e d  e q u a lly  
between the fo re ig n  company and the NOC.
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Under t h is  form ula the net per b a r r e l government take was 
m a rg in a lly  h ig h er than under the co n ven tio n al co n cessio n  system , 
s in c e  under the l a t t e r  t a x e s /r o y a lt ie s  were c a lc u la te d  on the b a s is  
of the posted p r ic e ,  whereas under the new system taxes were computed 
on the b a s is  of the r e a lis e d  market p r ic e s  -  to be d iscu sse d  la t e r  -  
which were lower due to v a rio u s  d is c o u n ts .
The second form ula adopted was the s e r v ic e  c o n tra c t  acco rd in g  to 
which the fo re ig n  in v e s to r  acted  as the co n tra c to r working in  the  
producing area on b eh a lf of the NOC. The fo re ig n  company d id  not 
enjoy the r ig h t  of ownership or e q u ity  share in  the o i l  venture and 
bore the f u l l  r i s k  in  the event of f a i l u r e ,  w ith the NOC bearing f u l l  
c o st of d isco v e ry  in  the event of su cce ss. In  a d d it io n , the fo re ig n  
in v e s to r  secured m arketing o u tle ts  fo r the n a t io n a l o i l  produced from 
the co n tra ct a re a . In  re tu rn , he obtained secure a cce ss at low cost  
to a s p e c if ic  p ro p o rtio n  of the crude produced.
I I .  In c re a s in g  Role of Host Governments
The attempted n a t io n a lis a t io n  in  Ir a n  in  the e a r ly  19 5 0 s, d e sp ite  i t s  
f a i l u r e ,  had -  acco rd in g  to Penrose and A l-C h a la b i -  an impact on the 
system in  th at i t  le d  to a w idespread d isse m in a tio n  of the concept of 
c o n tro l by the S ta te  over o i l  o p e ra tio n s, by government takeover or 
by mutual agreement w ith  the companies and la id  the foundations fo r  
subsequent developm ents. One such development was the growing trend  
in  producing c o u n trie s  towards the estab lish m en t of NOC's designed to 
be the instrum ents through which the S ta te  could g a in  c o n tro l over 
i t s  re so u rc e s . NOC's could in v e s t  in  jo in t  ventures w ith  
independents, in  areas e it h e r  not covered by the concession or 
re lin q u is h e d  by the majors a s , fo r  example, in  Ir a n . There were a ls o  
lan d s re sto re d  to the governments by le g is la t io n ,  as by Law 80 of 
1961 in  Ir a q .
I I I .  In crea se d  Com petition in  Crude and Product M arkets
As new investm ent p a tte rn s in  crude o i l  producton emerged,
independent of the m ajo rs, fre e  exchanges of crude, o u tsid e  the  
m a jo rs' c lo se d  c i r c u i t  of inter-com pany tra d e , were i n i t i a t e d .  As a
fre e  market fo r  ‘ crude grew, so the m ajo rs' a b i l i t y  to c o n tro l
production le sse n e d .
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Ero sio n  to t h e ir  c o n tro l was caused by some host governments, 
such as Ir a n , e x e r c is in g  p ressu re  to in c re a se  t h e ir  p ro d u ctio n . 
T h is ,  coupled w ith  the s u c c e s s f u l search  fo r new o i l  re so u rce s, 
brought a d d it io n a l o i l  s u p p lie s  on the market in  excess of the 
m a jo rs1 needs fo r  r e f in in g , thus le a d in g  to in cre a se d  sup p ly  
p ressu re s and a weakening of the m ajo rs' power to p lan  and programme 
p ro d u ctio n  -  s in c e  some of the new su p p lie s  were c o n tro lle d  by the 
NOC's and some by the independents.
From 1950 to 1966 the share of the seven m ajors in  t o t a l  crude  
o i l  p ro d u ctio n  o u tsid e  the US and the communist w orld, f e l l  from 85% 
to 76%. At the same time th at of independents and NOCs rose
co rre sp o n d in g ly .
Furtherm ore, R u ssia n  p ro d uctio n  in  t h is  p erio d  ro se from 730,000  
b/d in  1950 to over 5 m il l io n  b a r r e ls  per day in  1966. Such a ra te  
in  in c re a se  was h ig h er than R u s s ia  could d o m e s tic a lly  absorb and was 
due to new o i l  f in d s .  The r e s u lt  was R u ssian  crude su rp lu se s being  
a v a ila b le  fo r exp o rt, the d e s ir e  fo r  which was sharpened by t h is
c o u n try 's  needs fo r  fo re ig n  exchange.
The emergence of the USSR as a s e l le r  in  the world market gave 
impetus to the free* market of buyers and s e l le r s  independent of the 
m ajo rs. The o l ig o p o l is t ic  system of crude o i l  p ro ductio n was being  
g r a d u a lly  cracked . T h is  le d  to an im portant change in  the in d u s t r y 's  
s tr u c tu r e : the emergence of r e f in e r ie s  Independent of the m ajors,
hence the c re a tio n  of an independent demand fo r cru d e, marking the 
beginning of an era of o i l  buyers seeking crude in  the fre e  m arket.
In  a d d it io n , w ith the US government's p o lic y  on crude im ports 
changed to c lo s in g  the door to independent o i l  in  order to p ro te ct  
dom estic o i l  in vestm en ts, the US independent companies which had
entered p ro d u ctio n  found them selves in  a d i f f i c u l t  m arketing  
p o s it io n . T h e ir  investm ents were geared to t h e ir  home market, as 
most of them looked a t t h is  market as the main o u t le t . As a
consequence t h e ir  p ro d u ctio n  was o ffered  in  the in t e r n a t io n a l m arket.
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F a cin g  the problem of how to meet the bank loans th a t had 
fin a n ce d  t h e ir  in vestm en ts, they were in  search  of immediate buyers 
and thus o ffe red  t h e ir  o i l  output at p r ic e s  lower than the 
in t e r n a t io n a l m ajors were p u b lic ly  p o stin g . At the same time the 
USSR undercut posted p r ic e s  to get in to  the m arket. The r e s u lt  was 
in cre a se d  p r ic e  co m p etitio n  in  crude and product m arkets, not of the 
’ p r ic e  w ar1 v a r ie t y  but ra th e r a w idespread response to the 
u n d e rly in g  c o n d it io n s .
The e ffe c tiv e n e s s  of the m a jo rs' system of p ro ductio n p lan n in g  
was being eroded due to changes in  the in d u s t r y 's  o r g a n is a t io n , which 
le d  to changes in  the c o n d itio n s  a f fe c t in g  supply and p r ic e s . At 
f i r s t  the blame fo r f a l l i n g  p r ic e s  was placed on the USSR and the 
independents, both of whom were a lle g e d  to be guided by ir r a t io n a l  
c o n s id e r a t io n s .
However, these a lle g a t io n s  d id  not stand up fo r long in  the 
presence of the f a c t s .  The h yp o th esis th at the USSR cut p r ic e s  ju s t  
enough to break in to  the market as would any other s e l l e r  i s
c o n s is te n t  w ith the f a c t s  (see Adelman, 19 6 4 ). A ls o , i t  was nonsense 
to argue th at lower o i l  p r ic e s  were u n ju s t if ie d  by co sts of
p ro d u ctio n ; no evidence was presented th at the independents were 
fo rced  to produce uneconom ically  in  order to reco ve r overheads. But 
in  a d d it io n  the majors them selves were g iv in g  d isco u n ts on crude to  
n o n -a f f i l ia t e d  buyers on lo n g -te rm  c o n tra c t, in  an attempt to secure  
a la r g e r  share of the m arket.
In crea se d  co m p etitio n  in  p ro d u cts' markets re in fo rc e d  the d e s ir e  
of r e f in e r ie s  to o b ta in  crude on the most fa vo u ra b le  term s. Crude 
flowed to r e f in e r ie s  under every co n ce iv a b le  s o rt  of arrangem ent.
Some was so ld  to arm s-len g th  b uyers; R u ssian  crude was so ld  to 
state-ow ned companies and n o n -in te g ra te d  r e f in e r s ;  some of the
n o n -v e r t ic a l ly  in te g ra te d  independents so ld  much of t h e ir  crude  
e it h e r  to t h e ir  p a rtn e rs in  p ro d uctio n  on lo n g -te rm  c o n tra cts  or to  
o th er companies -  in c lu d in g  the m ajors.
T h e refo re , the com petition fo r sources of crude, fo r r e f in in g  
c a p a c ity  and fo r  products markets created new p a tte rn s in  the
-  40 -
in d u s t r y ’ s o r g a n is a t io n . The developments d e scrib e d  above le d  to a 
growth in  the fre e  market fo r crude o i l  and although t h is  market 
remained fo r  a long time only m a rg in al -  in v o lv in g  around 10% of the 
o i l  e n te rin g  world trad e -  n e v e rth e le ss  i t s  emergence marked the
beg inning of major s t r u c t u r a l  changes.
2 .4  OIL PRICING 18 6 0 -19 6 9
2 . 4 . 1  P r io r  to World War I I
The c lo se d  system fo r  the p ro d u ctio n  and m arketing of o i l  before the 
Second World War enabled the m ajors to cre a te  a system fo r  o i l  
p r ic in g  which was no more than d e c is io n s  taken by them fo r t h e ir  own 
ends, w ithout these d e c is io n s  being m otivated by the fo rce s  of supply  
and demand. Such p r ic in g  d e c is io n s  had no economic s ig n if ic a n c e
because channels fo r the exchange of crude o u tsid e  t h e ir  v e r t i c a l l y  
in te g ra te d  channels d id  not e x is t .
Though in  t h is  p erio d there were a number of centres of o i l  
p ro d u ctio n , world p r ic e s  fo r  crude and products were se t as though
th ere were o n ly  one, the co ast of the US on the G u lf of M exico. The 
form ula fo r  t h is  system was the 'US G u lf P l u s ' :  a buyer anywhere in  
the world p aid  the US G u lf p r ic e  p lu s fr e ig h t  from the G u lf , even 
though the o i l  was d e liv e re d  from a nearer f i e l d .  T h is  system was a 
s in g le  basing p o in t system which ensured th at uniform  p r ic e s  were 
quoted by a l l  s e l l e r s .
A ccording to F ra n k e l (196 4 ) and Levy ( 1 9 5 1 )  before the war a 
la rg e  p a rt of world demand was met by exports from the G u lf Coast of 
the US, which was the main source of supply fo r independent im porters  
in  consuming c o u n tr ie s . However, t h is  o b se rv a tio n  i s  not r e a l ly  a 
defence of the predominance of US G u lf p r ic e s . The q u estio n  i s  why 
c e r t a in  other areas -  such as Venezuela or the M iddle E a st which in  
1938 was producing c lo s e  to 6% of t o t a l world p ro d u ctio n  -  d id  not 
carve out t h e ir  sep arate  market areas and form t h e ir  own p r ic e s .
There are two p o s s ib le  ex p la n a tio n s why the majors d id  not 
stru g g le  fo r d is t in c t  m arketing t e r r it o r y  in  o ther a re a s : f i r s t l y ,
the US companies • may have been in te re s te d  in  p ro te c tin g  t h e ir
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investm ents in  US p ro d u ctio n . S e rio u s p r ic e  c u tt in g  by the companies 
producing in  the M iddle E a st might have pushed the US out of world 
export markets and even captured some US markets from dom estic  
p ro d u cers. T h is  would have reduced the valu e of the US h o ld in g s of 
American companies.
R e f le c t io n  on market s tr u c tu r e  in  t h is  p e rio d , w hile  not 
p re clu d in g  the above e x p la n a tio n , makes the second more p la u s ib le ,  
namely th a t the p r ic e  of US G u lf p lu s was so w id e ly  accepted sim p ly  
because the m ajors were a c t in g  as o lig o p o lis t s .  In  the M iddle E a st  
the few producers were aware th at p r ic e  cu ts would be matched by 
t h e ir  r i v a l s ,  so ra th e r  than cut p r ic e s  to nearby markets and develop  
sep arate  market a re a s , they seem to have chosen to l iv e  and le t  l iv e  
under the u m brella  of US G u lf Coast p r ic e s .
Such a p o lic y  could  be defended by referen ce to the atmosphere 
of the 1920s and 1930s which tended to approve o rd e rly  m arkets; 
however, i t  i s  w id ely  recognised th a t the US G u lf P lu s  provided q u ite  
a d if f e r e n t  p a tte rn  of world o i l  p r ic e s  than would have e x iste d  had 
the in d u s try  been more co m p e titiv e .
To explore t h is  argument we w i l l  examine the co n d itio n s  that" 
would p r e v a il  under co m p etitio n  and check the a c tu a l s it u a t io n  
a g a in s t  them. To do t h is  we have to r e fe r  to the theory of 
g eo g rap h ical p r ic e  d if f e r e n c e s . The q u estio n  explored by t h is  theory  
i s  how p r ic e s  of a commodity vary  through space in  the long run at 
e q u ilib r iu m  and under co m p etitive  c o n d itio n s .
We assume a uniform  b lan k et of buyers w ith s im ila r  ta s te s  and a 
number of d is c r e t e  ce n tre s of p ro d u ctio n . S u p p lie s  in  the v a rio u s  
producing reg io n s reach out in to  surrounding areas fo r custom ers. 
From p r ic e s  at p o in ts  of o r ig in  -  fob p r ic e s  -  th ere w i l l  be an 
in c re a se  w ith d is ta n c e , those d e liv e re d  -  or c i f  p r ic e s  -  r is in g  from 
each producing reg io n  to the p o in ts  a t which su p p lie s  from the 
d iff e r e n t  reg io n s meet. The l in e s  formed by these p o in ts  of co n tact  
c o n s t it u te  w atersheds or maximum d e liv e re d  p r ic e s  and boundaries  
between re g io n s.
With numerous cen tres of p ro d uctio n  we can im agine a number of 
n a tu r a l m arketing a re a s , the p r ic e s  in  each forming a so rt  of c r a t e r :
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custom ers at surrounding p r ic e  h i l l s  paying h ig h er c i f  p r ic e s  as they 
are fa r th e r  away from a p ro d uctio n  ce n tre , u n t i l  those on the peaks -  
or w atersheds -  loo k down in to  more than one c r a te r  and have a choice  
of re g io n a l ce n tre s from which they may buy.
Under the lo n g -ru n  co m p e titive  e q u ilib r iu m  there would be no 
g e o g ra p h ica l p r ic e  d is c r im in a t io n . S e lle r s  would r e a l is e  the same 
amount on a l l  s a le s ,  d is ta n t  or nearby. So t h e ir  netbacks (p r ic e  of 
s a le s  minus f r e ig h t  c o st)  in  a l l  cases would be the same. A l l  fob 
s a le s  would be at the same p r ic e  no m atter what the d e s t in a t io n  i s  
and d e liv e re d  p r ic e s  fo r a l l  d e s t in a t io n s  minus a c tu a l f r e ig h t  co st  
would y ie ld  the same amounts. So the p r ic e  of any good would vary  in  
space only by the tra n s p o rta tio n  c o st.
The s it u a t io n  i s  b e tte r  understood by c o n tra stin g  i t  w ith an 
im p e rfe c tly  co m p e titive  m arket. In  an o lig o p o ly  s e l le r s  are l i k e l y  
over a long time p erio d  to top the c re st  of the watershed and drop 
down on the other s id e , c u tt in g  p r ic e s  to take b u sin ess away from 
more advantageously s itu a te d  s u p p lie r s . Of course they r e a l is e  le s s  
on such, d is ta n t  s a le s  than on those to nearby custom ers; they have 
not charged fo r  the e x tra  f r e ig h t  co sts  in cu rre d  and t h is  fr e ig h t  
ab so rp tio n  r e s u lt s  in  lower n etb acks.
G eog rap h ical p r ic e  d is c r im in a t io n  of t h is  so rt  makes sense to  
them because, i f  t h e ir  r e a l is a t io n s  on a d d it io n a l s a le s  cover the  
m arginal c o sts  in v o lv e d , w ith  a l i t t l e  e x tra  which can be devoted to  
f ix e d  c o s ts , t o t a l  p r o f it s  are en larg e d . O l ig o p o lis t ic  s e l le r s  do 
not choose to push the a d d it io n a l output in to  nearby markets where 
n etbacks are h ig h e r because they want to p ro te ct the p r ic e  s tru c tu re  
in  those m arkets. P r ic e  cu ts would be matched by t h e ir  r iv a l s  and 
they would end up s e l l in g  the same volume at a lower p r ic e .
The p ic tu r e  i s  d if f e r e n t  in  a co m p etitive market where the  
number of s e l le r s  i s  so la rg e  th at no one .can d etect any in flu e n c e  on 
p r ic e  of changes in  h is  output. Here s u p p lie rs  are p r ic e  tak ers who 
en ter nearby markets i f  netbacks are high and withdraw from markets 
in  which netbacks are low u n t i l  p r ic e s  in  a l l  markets d if f e r  by no 
more than the co sts  of tra n s p o rta t io n  and r e a l is a t io n s  on a l l  s a le s  
are e q u a lis e d .
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Because co m p etitio n  would produce uniform  d e liv e re d  p r ic e s  in  
any given m arket, the o i l  companies have pointed to the u n ifo rm ity  of 
p a r it y  p r ic e s  as evidence of the e x iste n ce  of co m p etitio n . However, 
as Penrose and Adelman argu e, u n ifo rm ity  of p r ic e s  p ro vid es no 
e m p ir ic a l c r it e r io n  fo r d is t in g u is h in g  co m p etitive  from c o llu s iv e  
b eh avio u r.
The basing p o in t system i s  r e s t r ic t iv e  because i t  prevents the 
expansion of low co st p ro d uctio n  by p r ic e  co m p e titio n . Had 
com petition been p resent the p ro d uctio n  of low co st crude from the 
E a ste rn  Hemisphere would have in cre a se d  to the p o in t where no fu r th e r  
expansion of output was deemed p r o f it a b le  at p r e v a il in g  p r ic e s  and 
th ere  would be no attempt to r e s t r a in  co m p etitio n  in  order to 
m a in tain  p a r it y  p r ic e s  nor evidence that the expansion of low co st  
su p p ly  sources was being co n stra in e d  to avoid s p o il in g  the m arket.
The 'As I s '  or A chnacarry agreement (19 2 8 ) acco rd in g  to which  
the companies pledged to m a in tain  the e x is t in g  s it u a t io n  (market 
sh a re s) as i s  at the moment of the agreement, i s  evidence enough of 
the d e s ir e  to r e s t r a in  co m p etitio n  in  order to m a in tain  p r ic e s . As 
an in c r e a s in g  p ro p o rtio n  of E a ste rn  Hemisphere markets came to be 
su p p lie d  from the M iddle E a s t , the d e liv e re d  p r ic e  of o i l  products  
should have f a l l e n  in  those m arkets, and fob p r ic e s  in  the M iddle  
E a st should have f a l le n  r e l a t iv e l y  to those from the US G u lf c o a s t, 
g iven  the lower MC of M iddle E a ste rn  o i l .  Such changes d id  not take 
p la ce  before the war.
Under the b asin g  p o in t system p r ic e  was quoted only fo r the 
p o in t of d e liv e r y  and i t  e q u a lled  the p r ic e  at the n ea rest base p lu s  
the f r e ig h t  to d e s t in a t io n . I f  buyers could buy f r e e ly  fob the 
system would c o lla p s e , fo r the more d is ta n t  buyers paying the lower 
fob p r ic e  and a b le  to take d e liv e r y  at the p o int of shipm ent, would 
tu rn  a q u ick  p r o f it  by im m ediately r e s e ll in g  to others at an 
in te rm e d ia te  p r ic e .  The system would break down and over time 
approach a uniform  fob system .
The purpose of the system was to head o ff  any independent 
a c t io n , prevent any . d ivergence among s e l le r s '  o ffe rs  and hence
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p reclu d e co m p e titive  p ressu re s to push a l l  s e l le r s  down in  the 
d ir e c t io n  of the low est o f f e r .
In  a fr e e , w e ll informed market p r ic e  would g r a v it a te  to a 
uniform  lower l e v e l .  The purpose of the b asin g  p o int system was 
p r e c is e ly  to b lo ck  th at fo rce  of g r a v it a t io n  and enforce a 
predeterm ined id e n t it y  at a h ig h er le v e l .
2 .4 .2  During the war
During the Second World War, under p ressu re from the A l l i e s  to reduce 
the co st of o i l  n e ce ssary  fo r  the war, e s p e c ia lly  in  the 
M editerranean and E a st of Suez, the companies rep lace d  the s in g le  
basing p o in t system (SBP) by the double basing p o in t system (DBP), 
e s t a b lis h in g  the P e r s ia n  G u lf  as the new b asing p o in t to match the 
f i r s t  in  the G u lf of M exico. In  other words, they e sta b lis h e d  the  
e q u a lis a t io n  of the p r ic e  of M iddle E a st o i l  and th a t of US o i l  at  
the export te rm in a l ( fo b ). Thus the P e rs ia n  G u lf production centre  
began to develop i t s  own d is t in c t  m arketing t e r r it o r y  and p r ic e  
s tr u c tu r e .
In  f ig u r e  2 . 4 , 2 . 1  the prewar US G u lf P lu s is'* represented by the  
s o lid  l in e ;  the wartime e stab lish m en t of P e rs ia n  G u lf  as a basing  
p o in t i s  resp resen ted  by the broken l in e .
F ig u re  2 . 4 . 2 . 1  New B asing P o in t in  the P e rs ia n  G u lf
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As a consequence of the adoption of the DBP, the P e rs ia n  G u lf  
fob p r ic e  was lowered from a to b. In  e ffe c t  P e r s ia n  G u lf fob p r ic e s  
were lowered by an amount equal to the co st of tra n s p o rta tio n  from 
the US G u lf Coast to the P e rs ia n  G u lf (a b ).
Leeman (19 6 2 ) estim ates th at the abandonment of the SBP system  
and the adoption of the DBP system in  1944 le d  to an a c tu a l red u ctio n  
in  the p r ic e  of M iddle E a st o i l  from $ 2 ,9 5 /b b l to $ 1 .0 5 /b b l .
2 .4 .3  Post war developments -  the 10 golden ye a rs •
During the two and a h a lf  years fo llo w in g  the emergence of the DBP 
system , the dominant in f lu e n c e  on M iddle E a st p r ic e s  was p r ic e  
movements of s im ila r  crudes in  the US. In c re a se s  in  the US were 
follow ed in  the M iddle E a st  though w ith a la g  and by sm a lle r  
amounts. By A p r i l  1948 the $ 2 .2 2 /b b l  p r ic e  p re v a ile d  on shipments to 
v i r t u a l l y  a l l  d e s t in a t io n s .
The $ 2 .2 2 /b b l  in  -e ffe ct at the P e rs ia n  G u lf in  1948 perm itted  
M iddle E a st crude to be d e liv e re d  to North Western Europe 
c o m p e titiv e ly  w ith  crudes from the US. The netback form ula r e la t in g  
the two p r ic e s  was a p p lic a b le  to Ir a n ia n  o i l  fob Abadan -  the Ir a n ia n  
fo rm u la. T h is  form ula was aimed at e s t a b lis h in g  a p r ic e  which could  
be ap p lie d  to a l l  E a ste rn  Hemisphere shipments w ithout the need to 
absorb f r e ig h t .
T h is  was not a ch ie ve d , however, s in c e  the a lt e r n a t iv e  supply  
source fo r  Europe was no lon g er the US -  that became an im porter in  
1948 -  but the C a rr ib e a n . There, p r ic e s  where r e la te d  to those at  
the US G u lf but were lower by the amount of the US import ta x , and by 
the tra n sp o rt advantage fo r shipments to the E a ste rn  Hem isphere. As 
a r e s u lt  the $ 2 .22  p r ic e  began to weaken and a new form ula -  the 
A rab ian  one -  was adopted by a l l  companies, re p re se n tin g  e q u a lis a t io n  
w ith C a rrib e a n  crudes i n  North Western Europe. T h is  was adopted in  
o rder to avoid the r e s u lt s  of the Ir a n ia n  form ula whereby p r ic e s  of 
Venezuelan crudes i n  North Western Europe were some 25 c e n ts /b b l  
below those of M iddle E a st cru d es. The A rab ian  form ula le d  to a 
re d u ctio n  fo r  A rab ian  crude to $ 2 .0 3  /b b l fob Ros Tanura in  May 1948.
In  J u ly  1949 the p r ic e  of 3 6 ° A rabian crude o i l  was fu rth e r  
reduced to $ l , 7 5 / b b l  w ithout a s im ila r  move in  the US, I t  seemed
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th a t the d ir e c t  l in k  between P e r s ia n  G u lf and US G u lf co ast p r ic e s  
was broken. The q u estio n  i s  what were the reasons fo r the d e c lin e .
R if a i  ( 19 7 5 )  argues th at the d e c lin e  came about under p ressu re  
from the US government through the Economic Cooperation  
A d m in istra tio a n  (EC A ), which between 1948 and 1952 fin an ced  la rg e  
crude o i l  purchases and products imported in  Western Europe under the 
M a rsh a ll p la n . The a u th o ris in g  a c t had req u ire d  purchases to be at  
the low est co m p etitive  p r ic e  and G u lf p lu s  p r ic e s  d id  not look  
c o m p e titiv e . R i f a i  o ffe rs  three reasons why the o i l  companies 
a lig n e d  t h e ir  p r ic e s  w ith ECA 's xdemands:
1 .  T h is  was a commanding c o n d itio n  fo r t h e ir  a cce ss to the r a p id ly  
expanding markets in  Europe.
2 . The huge re se rv e s and very low p ro ductio n co sts of M iddle  
E a ste rn  crudes compensated fo r the r e la t iv e  lo s s  in  p r ic e s  as 
compared w ith a lt e r n a t iv e  so u rce s, so th at p r o f it  margins 
remained h e a lth y .
3 . There was no s ig n if ic a n t  co u n terp ressure to the move from 
producing c o u n tr ie s .
In  t h is  view , as the b arg a in in g  agent fo r about h a lf  the P e rs ia n  
G u lf output and w ith  a le g a l  com pulsion not to overpay, ECA d id  make 
i t s e l f  heard.
However, can i t  be s a id  th at the in te rv e n tio n  of the ECA was 
d e c is iv e  in  b rin g in g  such a p r ic e  s tru c tu re  change th at the P e rs ia n  
G u lf p r ic e  was h alved in  le s s  than two y e a rs?  Adelman's e x p la n a tio n  
of the d e c lin e  i s  based on h is  b e l ie f  th at the o i l  market was during
1948-49 under the in f lu e n c e  of co m p etitive  fo r c e s .
Adelman (19 7 2 )  makes a stro n g  case on te c h n o lo g ic a l grounds th a t  
the crude o i l  in d u s try  i s  su b je c t  to in c re a s in g  co sts  -  d e crea sin g  
re tu rn s  -  and f in d s  th at in  gen eral the co sts of development and 
p ro d u ctio n  may be expected to r is e  f a i r l y  q u ic k ly  as output r i s e s ,  so 
that i t  pays producers in  co m p e titive  co n d itio n s  to produce up to the 
p o in t where the r is in g  MC = P and the in d u stry  w i l l  thus be s e lf  
a d ju s t in g : r is in g  MC fo r  a l l  producers chokes o ff p ro ductio n as net 
revenue per output u n it  decreases w ith expanding o utp ut, so th at the
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in d u s tr y  i s  reg u la te d  by the same fo rce s as other in d u s tr ie s  under 
co m p e titio n . Thus, in  h is  o p in io n  i t  was the fo rc e  of com petition  
th a t put o i l  p r ic e s  down -  approaching the very low MC in  the M iddle  
Ea st -  during t h is  p e rio d .
T h is  e x p la n a tio n  i s  not accepted by Penrose, however, who argues 
th a t market p r ic e s  of crude could not have determined the  
co m p etitiven ess of o i l  from the M iddle E a s t, because the companies 
were the buyers -  r e f in e r s  as w e ll as the s e l le r s  -  producers of that  
o i l .  The p r ic e  cut was a d e lib e r a te  d e c is io n  of. the companies ra th e r  
than the consequence of co m p e titio n . I t  was as buyers of crude that  
the companies decided when and how f a r  p r ic e s  should f a l l  and s u r e ly  
a very im portant fa c to r  in  t h e ir  d e c is io n  was the d e s ir a b i l i t y  of 
u sin g  low co st M iddle E a st crude in  t h e ir  r e f in in g  op erations in  the 
E a ste rn  Hem isphere, p a r t ic u la r ly  in  Europe.
There i s  evidence to support the argument th a t market fo rce s  
were o p erating in  the d ir e c t io n  of lower M iddle E a st p r ic e s . During  
the second h a lf  of 194 8 , crude o i l  output from that area continued to 
r is e  r a p id ly  and the re g io n 's  share in  Eu rope's t o t a l  crude o i l
im ports rose from le s s  than o n e -h a lf  in  1947 to over f o u r - f i f t h s .  
V ast in c re a se s  in  o i l  re se rv e s and extrem ely low p ro ductio n co sts
were the r e a l  bases of the huge expansion of M iddle E a s t  p ro d u ctio n .
T h is ,  in  tu rn , extended the market range of M iddle E a st crude, so 
th a t a g rad u al re d u c tio n  in  fob p r ic e s  would have probably occurred  
in  any ca se . C e r t a in ly , the ECA speeded up the p ro ce ss.
By the end of 1952 the p erio d of o i l  shortages had ended. The 
demand in c re a s e s  r e s u lt in g  from the Korean war had slackened w h ile  
o i l  s u p p lie s , tra n s p o ra tio n  f a c i l i t i e s  and r e f in in g  c a p a c ity  had been 
expanded. T h is  se t of fo rce s exerted a p u l l  towards lower p r ic e s .  
On the other hand, the m ajors' in t e r e s t s ,  th re a ts  of import
r e s t r ic t io n s  in  the US and p r o f it -s h a r in g  agreements w ith host 
governments. a l l  m il it a t e d  a g a in st  p r ic e  re d u c tio n s.
Indeed, the p r ic e  evolu t io n  stopped in  19 51 and by 1952 P e rs ia n  
G u lf crude was o verp riced  in  r e la t io n  to New York p r ic e s . A ccording  
to Adelman, some o u tsid e  fo rce  blocked buyers and s e l le r s  from doing  
what is  more p r o f it a b le  and p r ic e s  from d e c lin in g . T h is  fo rce  was
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the r e s t r ic t io n  in  US im ports which led  to h ig h e r US p r ic e s ,  
fo llo w in g  the US example, o i l  p r ic e s  were r a is e d  by about 25% between
19 4 9 -5 7  d e s p ite  the f a c t  th a t c o sts  were only a f r a c t io n  of p r ic e s  
and th at huge amounts of o i l  were a v a ila b le .  There were no longer  
any inducements to shade p r ic e  in  the hope of expanding output; 
anyone contem plating a p r ic e  re d u ctio n  knew th a t i t  would be met by 
a l l  other s e l le r s .  So the few producers were ab le  to avo id  any p ric e  
re d u ctio n s or any market expanding r iv a l r y  th at might have reduced 
p r ic e s .
2 .4 .4  1956-69
The s t r u c t u r a l  changes in  the world o i l  market analysed in  s e c t io n
2 .3  and p a r t ic u la r ly  those p e rta in in g  to the emergence of a fre e  
m arket, were in e v it a b ly  r e f le c te d  in  changes in  the o i l  p r ic e  
s t r u c t u r e . By the end of the 1950s the supply and p r ic e  s it u a t io n  
was showing a l l  the s ig n s  of g e tt in g  out of hand.
In  1957 posted p r ic e s  were ra is e d  a l l  over the world in  a 
response to a US in c r e a s e , not because of s c a r c it y  but because w ith  
h ig h e r US p r ic e s , unchanged fo re ig n  p r ic e s  would have su p p lie d  a 
la rg e  reward fo r  im porting in  the US by anyone who could buy cheap 
and s e l l  in  the dearer m arket.
H igher posted p r ic e s  meant h ig h e r payments to governments. I t  
o nly made sense to r a is e  them i f  h ig h er p r ic e s  would a c t u a lly  be
r e c e iv e d . However, i t  was soon apparent th a t h ig h e r posted p r ic e s  
were so w id ely  d isco un ted  th a t they sim ply meant more money paid out 
to governments of producing c o u n tr ie s . Soon the 1957 in c re a s e  
appeared as a m istak e.
By 1958 p r ic e s  were being openly d iscounted due to mounting 
co m p etitio n  in  crude and products m arkets. By 1960 p u b lish ed  b id s  
fo r la rg e  crude o i l  c o n tra c ts  showed la rg e  d iffe re n c e s  in  the p r ic e s
and terms quoted by r i v a l  b id d e rs ; c le a r ly ,  one could no longer speak
of a world p r ic e  s tr u c tu r e  fo r crude.
The p r o f it  p ic tu r e  of the majors remained h e a lth y  enough
acco rd in g  to Seymour ( 19 8 0 ) . S in ce  the in tro d u c t io n  of the 50 -50  
p r o f it  s h a r in g , they were l e f t  w ith a com fortable p r o f it  margin of
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80-90 cents a b a re l (ap p roxim ately  $ 4 .0 -4 .5  in  1980 d o lla r s )  at the 
p ro ductio n stage in  the M iddle E a s t. N e v e rth e le ss, p ressu re on 
p r ic e s  was mounting and the q u estio n  was who should bear the brunt of 
the impeding re d u ctio n  in  income from crude o i l  s a le s .
As a r e s u lt  of the emergence of a free market there appeared fo r  
the f i r s t  time the phenomenon of a r e a lis e d  market p r ic e  fo r the s a le  
and purchase of crude i . e  a r e a l  commodity exchange and t r a n s fe r  
between buyers and s e l l e r s .  S t i l l ,  these r e a lis e d  p r ic e s  took the 
form of a d isco u n t on the posted p r ic e  set by the m ajors so the 
r e a lis e d  p r ic e  was s u b je c t  to le a d e rsh ip  by the m ajors.
T h is  p r ic e  le a d e rs h ip  stemmed from the g en eral le v e l  of the per 
b a r r e l tax  p aid  co st in c u rre d  by' the companies fo r l i f t i n g  o i l .  Due 
to the uniform  f in a n c ia l  terms of the concessions in  the M iddle E a s t ,  
there was a ls o  u n ifo rm ity  in  the le v e l  of the tax  p aid  c o s t. The 
uniform  tax paid  co st p lu s  the p r o f it  margins deemed n ece ssary  by the 
m ajo rs, were the b a s is  on which they p rice d  the o i l  o ffered  to th ir d  
p a rty  buyers, and in flu e n c e d  the p r ic e  fo r other s e l le r s  too as i t  
formed the f lo o r  below which the m ajors would not go as t h is  would 
e n t a i l  lower p r o f it s .
At the same time p r e v a ilin g  p r ic e s  in  the market were 
determ ining the taxes payable to host governments in  the new 
producing a re a s . So w h ils t  the per ba - government take in  the  
M iddle E a st was c o n sta n t, th at ra te  was f lu c t u a t in g  in  the new 
producing reg io n s w ith  v a ry in g  r e a lis e d  crude market p r ic e s . Hence, 
by low ering p r ic e s  the independents could reduce the tax p ayab le . 
Such a c t io n  was th re a te n in g  the m a jo rs’ dom ination and c re a tin g  
in c e n t iv e s  fo r them to reduce t h e ir  tax paid co sts in  the M iddle E a st  
to p reserve co m p etitiven ess and c o n tro l of the market and to r a is e  
t h e ir  p r o f it  margins to fin a n c e  investm ent in  the new a re a s . Indeed, 
the m ajors cut posted p r ic e s  in  1959 and a g a in  in  196 0 .
The o v e r a ll  r e s u lt  of these p r ic e  cu ts was that per b a r r e l  
government take from a crude such as A rabian L ig h t  f e l l  by some 14 
cents or 15 % , from 84 cents in  1957 to 70 cents a f t e r  August 1960.
-  50 -
T h is  worked out as a lo s s  of $270 m il l io n  fo r the 5 major M iddle E a st  
producers -  K uw ait, Saudi A r a b ia , I r a n ,  Ira q  and Q atar.
Under the p r e v a il in g  c o n d it io n s , producing governments had no 
p ro te c tio n  a g a in s t  a c o lla p s e  of t h e ir  income le v e ls ,  s in c e  under the 
system there was no f lo o r  to crude o i l  p r ic e s  -  beyond e x tr a c t io n  
c o s t. Newcomers tended to depress r e a lis e d  market p r ic e s  in  order to 
reduce t h e ir  tax  burden, thus fo rc in g  the majors to cut posted p r ic e s  
to reduce f i s c a l  co’s t s  and s ta y  co m p e titiv e ; s in c e  r e a lis e d  p r ic e s  
took the fo.rm of d isco u n ts on posted p r ic e s , any re d u ctio n  by the  
m ajors on posted p r ic e s  would in  turn lead  to a fu r th e r  p r ic e  
d epressio n  and so on and so f o r t h . There would be a v ic io u s  c i r c l e  
of p r ic e  cu ts  u n le ss  someone co n stru cted  a f lo o r .
T h is  was to be done by host governments. Fo llo w in g  the 1960  
p r ic e  re d u ctio n  re p re s e n ta tiv e s  of the le a d in g  M iddle E a st o i l  
producers -  Ir a n ,  Ir a q , Saudi A ra b ia , Kuwait -  and Venezuela formed 
the o rg a n is a tio n  of petroleum  exp o rting c o u n trie s  (OPEC) which  
decided to put an end to fu r th e r  p r ic e  cuts by the companies.
OPEC’ s su cce sse s in  the f i r s t  decade of i t s  l i f e  were modest and 
l im it e d . The o r g a n is a tio n  moved w ith ca u tio n  in  the 1960s as i t s  
members were fa c in g  d i f f i c u l t  p o l i t i c a l  and economic c o n d itio n s .  
P o l i t i c a l l y ,  th ere was a la c k  of s e lf -c o n f id e n c e  and the memory of 
I r a n 's  1 9 5 1 -5 3  c r i s i s  was fr e s h . Econom ically  i t  was a p erio d  of 
su rp lu s  export c a p a c ity  and d e c lin in g  p r ic e s .
I t  seems th at except from the in crea se d  in te rv e n tio n  of host  
governments, OPEC had had no ro le  at a l l  in  b rin g in g  about the other  
major s t r u c t u r a l  changes ta k in g  p la c e : the In cre a se d  number of
companies in  the in d u s tr y , t h e ir  more heterogenous c h a ra c te r, the 
lessened s ig n if ic a n c e  of in te g r a t io n  as a fa c to r  dom inating o i l  flows 
and p r ic e s , the emergence of new types of co n tra ct and ownership 
c o n d it io n s , the emergence of new sources of p ro d u ctio n , the changed 
d is t r ib u t io n  of demand.
N e v e rth e le ss, through the confidence th at OPEC's e x iste n ce  has 
im parted to governments d e s ir in g  to weaken the b a rg a in in g  power of
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t h e ir  major c o n c e s s io n a ir e s , OPEC has probably been m a rg in a lly  
in f l u e n t ia l  in  speeding up re lin q u ish m e n t, in  underm ining the o ld e r  
types of co n tra ct and in c r e a s in g  new e n t r ie s .  But s u re ly  such
changes would come about in  any ca se ; governments would not have been 
w il l in g  much longer to accept the r o le  of the tax c o lle c t o r .
Thus OPEC has been formed as a re a c tio n  to the changes but I t
d id  not b rin g  them about. I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to say how e f f e c t iv e ly
they d id  re a c t in  the 19 6 0 s, s in c e  one cannot know how f a s t  the
changes would come about in  i t s  absence.
The p o st-S u e z h is t o r y  may be summed up by sa y in g  th at the growth 
of o i l  volume o u tsid e  the v e r t i c a l ly  in te g ra te d  companies, reacted  
back upon these companies: independence in  buying and s e l l in g
m o b ilise d  the growing excess c a p a c ity  in  the world o i l  trade and made 
i t  bear down upon p r ic e s .
As a consequence e x p e cta tio n s were generated of d e c lin in g  
p r ic e s ,  o r ig in a t in g  in  the US import r e s t r ic t io n s  which pushed o i l  
newly d isco ve red  by US independents < onto European and Japanese  
m arkets. At the same tim e, the p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  of the M iddle  
E a st -  confirm ed by the 1957 Suez c r i s i s  -  made the companies .aware 
th a t i t  was only a q u e stio n  of time before producing governments took 
over c o n tro l of o i l  o p eratio n s in  ' t h e ir  t e r r i t o r i e s .  Hence the 
m a jo rs' tim e h o rizo n s were shortened, thus d isco u n t ra te s  were very  
h ig h . R e f le c t io n  on the sim ple d e p le tio n  model of s e c t io n  1 . 3  
confirm s th at w ith  an u n u su a lly  high d isco u n t ra te  and no p r ic e  
a p p re c ia tio n  (n e g a tiv e  p) the tendency was to e x tra c t  the o i l  there  
and then ra th e r than le ave  i t  in  the ground u n t i l  the presumed lower 
p rice d  fu tu re .
Furtherm ore, the beg innings o f 't h e  process of g rad u al breakdown 
of the m a jo rs1 m o n o lith ic  s tr u c tu r e  of co n tro l in  the 19 6 0 s, a ls o  
marked the a c c e le r a t io n  of the process of d iv e r s if ic a t io n  of the 
companies. Confronted w ith  a decrease in  t h e ir  share of the o i l  
m arket, the m ajors in c r e a s in g ly  u t i l i s e d  t h e ir  in t e r n a l funds to  
d iv e r s if y  in to  other s e c to rs  -  g e n e r a lly  through a c q u is it io n s  -  such  
as the w ider energy se c to r  (n u c le a r p la n t s , co al m ines, uranium ,
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s o la r  energy) and a ls o  in to  se c to rs  t e c h n ic a lly  d is t in c t  from o i l  
( e le c t r o n ic s ,  o f f ic e  equipment, e t c ) .  Thus, one of the b eh a vio u ra l 
trends of the companies in  t h is  period was fu n c t io n a l and 
g e o g rap h ical d iv e r s if ic a t io n .
I t  may appear th at as a response to t h e ir  d e c lin in g  c o n tro l of 
the o i l  m arket, they attempted to s u b s t it u te  other prim ary energy
sources fo r o i l ,  so as to keep an unchanged share of the w ider market
of prim ary energy p ro d u ctio n . I n s t a b i l i t y  in  the M iddle E a st meant 
g eo g rap h ical d iv e r s if ic a t io n  fo r o i l  in to  o th e r, h ig h er co st a re a s ; 
in  tu rn , ' h ig h er co sts  meant th at p r ic e s  had to r is e  to ensure 
a cce p ta b le  ra te s  of r e tu rn . However, in  the longer term such a h igh  
p r ic e  stra te g y  would generate the p ro g re ssiv e  d e c lin e  in  the ro le  of 
o i l  and thus would be a s u ic id e  fo r  the m a jo rs, u n le ss they had 
a lt e r n a t iv e  sources of income.
I t  i s  p o s s ib le  to b u ild  a sce n a rio  acco rd in g  to which e ve ryth in g
was planned. However, i t  has to be recognised th at the m ajo rs'
ch o ice was la r g e ly  com pulsory, a consequence of the changing 
s tr u c tu r e  in  the w orld o i l  in d u s tr y .
2 .5  THE WORLD OIL MARKET SINCE 1970
In  the 1960s the w idespread b e lie f  was that the r e a l  p r ic e  of crude  
o i l  would continue to f a l l  in  the fu tu re  as i t  had in  the p ast and as 
o i l  output was expected to go on r is in g .  T h is  b e l ie f  was proved
wrong when o i l  p r ic e s  began r is in g  a f t e r  19 7 0 , to shoot up 
d r a m a tic a lly  in  1973 and ag a in  in  1979 .
The 1973 o i l  c r i s i s  was brought about by la rg e  crude o i l  p r ic e  
in c re a se s  and M iddle E a st output r e s t r ic t io n s .  Exam ination of 
e v e n ts, however, re v e a ls  th at the r e a l  tu rn in g  p o in t came around 
19 6 9 -19 7 0 . In  1969 the L ib y a n  monarchy was overthrown by r a d ic a ls
led  by Q a d a ff i. The new government’ s b e l ie f  was th a t L ib y a  had been
cheated by the o i l  companies who were re c e iv in g  much of the economic 
r e n t.
The c lo su re  of the Suez Canal s in c e  196 7, coupled w ith the 
sabotage of the tra n s -A ra b ia n  p ip e lin e  and an unexpected b ig  in c re a se
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in  world o i l  demand, r e s u lte d  in  a s e r io u s  tanker shortage and thus 
extrem ely h igh tan ker r a t e s . L ib yan  o i l  re q u ir in g  o nly a sh o rt t r ip  
to Europe became h ig h ly  p r o f it a b le  fo r the companies o p eratin g  in  
L ib y a . The L ib y a n  le a d e rs h ip  demanded an in c re a se  in  p r ic e s  from 
$ 1 .8 0  to $ 2 .20  per b a r r e l.
I n i t i a l l y ,  the companies r e s is t e d  such demands but fo llo w in g  
th re a ts  of n a t io n a lis a t io n  and re d u ctio n s in  a llo w a b le  production fo r  
'c o n s e r v a tio n ' p urp o ses, the s m a lle r  companies acceded to the demands 
in  September 1970 . Soon a f t e r  t h a t , the other companies o p eratin g  in  
L ib y a  and A lg e r ia  agreed to the same term s, and then the P e rs ia n  G u lf  
c o u n trie s  demanded s im ila r  in c r e a s e s .
The o p eratin g  companies suggested jo in t  n e g o tia tio n s  to in c lu d e  
both North A fr ic a n  and P e r s ia n  G u lf c o u n tr ie s , hoping to re s to re  
s t a b i l i t y  to the p r ic e  s t r u c t u r e . O p position by L ib y a  and Ir a n  
re s u lte d  in  sep arate  n e g o tia tio n s  fo r  the P e r s ia n  G u lf and A f r ic a n  
c o u n trie s  in  Tehran and T r ip o l i  r e s p e c t iv e ly . The former
n e g o tia tio n s  were concluded by the Tehran Agreements on 14 February  
1 9 7 1 ,  wheras the la t t e r  were concluded by the T r i p o l i  Agreements on 2 
A p r i l  1 9 7 1 .
The aim of these n e g o tia tio n s  was to e s t a b lis h  a 5 -y e a r  p r ic e  
pact fo r  1 9 7 1 -7 6 .  T h reaten in g  to embargo any company not acceding to  
i t s  demands, OPEC fo rced  through an i n i t i a l  in c re a se  in  the tax  
refere n ce  p r ic e  from $ 1 .8 0  to $ 2 .1 8 ,  coupled w ith a tax ra te  in c re a se  
from 50 to 55 per ce n t. The tax referen ce p r ic e  was pegged to 
e s c a la te  by 7 .5  per cents per annum through 1976 .
The agreements were intended to be long term, but in  September 
19 7 1 the OPEC m in is te rs  decided th at member c o u n trie s  should  
e s t a b lis h  n e g o tia tio n s  w ith  the companies w ith a view to a c h ie v in g  
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  the com panies' o p e ra tio n s. In  December 19 7 1 L ib y a  
n a t io n a lis e d  BP's in t e r e s t s  in  r e t a l ia t io n  fo r the B r it is h  r o le  in  
p e rm ittin g  Ir a n  to occupy A ra b -c o n tro lle d  is la n d s  in  the P e rs ia n  
G u lf . Subsequently, the e n t ir e  o i l  in d u s tr ie s  in  L ib y a  and Ira q  were 
n a t io n a lis e d .
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These events were p a r a lle le d  in  other P e rs ia n  G u lf  c o u n tr ie s , 
where the G eneral P a r t ic ip a t io n  Agreement was sig n ed  in  December 
19 7 2 , p ro v id in g  fo r  a 25% p a r t ic ip a t io n  to take e ffe c t  im m ediately  
w ith scheduled in c r e a s e s , le a d in g  to 5 1%  by 198 2. However, Kuwait 
d id  not r a t i f y  the agreement, h o ld in g  out and o b ta in in g  a 60% 
ownership sh a re , e f f e c t iv e  in  Jan u ary 1974 .
The r a p id ly  changing events of the 1970s were m irrored in  the 
f r a g i l i t y  of these agreem ents: p a r t ic ip a t io n  le v e ls  c a lle d  fo r in
1972 were deemed u n s a t is f a c t o r y  le s s  than a year la t e r  and were 
e s c a la te d  so th a t most of the other G u lf s ta te s  jo in e d  Kuwait in  
a c h ie v in g  60% ownership e f f e c t iv e  January 1974 . P a r t ic ip a t io n  and 
n a t io n a lis a t io n  have meant the end of the co n cessio n  e ra ; companies 
continued to operate under the new arrangements (se e  s e c t io n  2 . 3 . 2 ,  
I - b ) .
The T e h r a n -T r ip o li  agreements were sh o rt l iv e d  as i t  soon became 
evid e n t th a t OPEC had l e f t  money on the t a b le . Strong market 
c o n d itio n s  led  to a w orld p r ic e  which suddenly began r is in g  towards 
the posted tax re fe re n ce  p r ic e  and,by e a r ly  1973 surpassed i t  fo r the 
f i r s t  tim e. In  the fa ce  of such developments, the P e rs ia n  G u lf OPEC 
members met w ith the o i l '  companies in  October 1973 to p ro cla im  the 
n e c e s s it y  of r a is in g  tax refere n ce  p r ic e s  from $ 3 .0 1  to $ 5 . 1 2 .
The m o tiva tio n  behind the proposed in c re a se  was most l i k e l y  not 
to r a is e  the a c t u a l market p r ic e  of o i l  but ra th e r  to r a is e  tax  
re fe re n ce s above cu rre n t market p r ic e s  to g ive  OPEC members a la r g e r  
share of o i l  company p r o f it s .  Before t h is  meeting could reconvene, 
A r a b - Is r a e l i  h o s t i l i t i e s  erupted, opening a new era .
With the outbreak of the h o s t i l i t i e s  the Arab members of OPEC 
announced a u n i la t e r a l  in c re a se  in  the tax refere n ce  p r ic e ,  
in s t it u t e d  p ro d u ctio n  cutbacks and embargoed o i l  to the US and 
N e th erla n d s. Up u n t i l  the 1973 embargo OPEC had la r g e ly  been, 
concerned w ith  ca p tu rin g  a la r g e r  f r a c t io n  of the economic rent th a t  
would otherw ise accru e to the o i l  companies or consuming n a t io n s .  
The embargo marked a tu rn in g  p o in t whereby the retu rn  to OPEC members 
arose la r g e ly  from h ig h er p r ic e s  to consumers.
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In  November 1973 the Arab c o u n trie s  agreed to speed up the 
producton cutbacks by red ucing  l i f t i n g s  by 25% from September 
le v e l s .  Im plem entation of these cu ts re s u lte d  in  unpresedented spot 
p r ic e  in c r e a s e s , w h ile  co n tra c t p r ic e s  remained in  the $5 to $6 per 
b a r r e l range.
Reports th at o i l  was s t i l l  being d iv e rte d  to c o u n trie s  
c l a s s if i e d  as ' h o s t i l e 1 aggravated the Arab le a d e r s h ip . In  December 
1973 OAPEC decided th at January production cu ts  would apply to a l l  
c o u n tr ie s . At the Tehran meeting the 6 P e rs ia n  G u lf members r a is e d  
the market crude p r ic e  to $ 1 1 . 6 5 .  However, Saudi A ra b ia  lo s t  much of 
i t s  enthusiasm  fo r  the embargo a f te r  that meeting and c o n t in u a lly  
advocated th a t i t  be ended. Indeed, the embargo was o f f i c i a l l y  ended 
in  March 1974.
The p r ic e  in c re a s e s  achieved during the embargo were due to the  
reduced p ro d uctio n  l e v e l s ,  which caused p a n ic  buying on the spot 
market and sent p r ic e s  in  s p e c ia l  a u ctio n s to over $ 15  per b a r r e l.
P ro d u ctio n  in  1974 and 1975 was u n sta b le  as the OAPEC members
sought to re sto re  market shares to pre-embargo le v e ls .  The h ig h er
p r ic e s  proved an in c e n t iv e  to expand p ro d u ctio n ; at the same time
0
in v e n to r ie s  were b u i lt  s u b s t a n t ia l ly  in  19 74 . However, as a r e s u lt  
of economic re c e s s io n  o i l  demand f e l l  in  19 7 5 . Thus the q u estio n  
aro se concerning who would shut in  production to m a in ta in  p r ic e s . At 
the same time a c t u a l p r ic e s  p aid  were fre q u e n tly  o n ly  80% of the 
posted p r ic e  and there was g re at d is s e n s io n  w ith in  OPEC.. Saudi 
A ra b ia  was p a r t ic u la r ly  agg rieved as i t s  market share f e l l  to 22% of 
the OPEC t o t a l  in  19 7 5 .
The OPEC meeting in  V ienna in  October 1975 re sto re d  u n it y ,  
r a is in g  p r ic e s  by 10 % . The Saudis were subsequently ab le  to re sto re  
t h e ir  market share to the normal 28-29% range. In  t h is  p erio d  
c o n tra ct and spot p r ic e s  were r e l a t iv e l y  s t a b le .
The December 1976 OPEC meeting in  Doha marked the f i r s t  open 
s p l i t  w ith in  OPEC on o i l  p r ic e s ,  s in c e  the 19 73 embargo. Saudi 
A ra b ia  and the UAE argued fo r a 5% p r ic e  in c re a se  whereas the other 
members advocated a 10% in c r e a s e . The r e s u lt  was the s p l i t  le v e l
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p r ic e  in c re a s e  of Jan u ary 19 7 7 . The Saudi p o s it io n  was presented by 
Yamani as an attempt to h elp  the economies of the in d u s t r ia l is e d
world and was in te rp re te d  as an attempt to become A m erica’ s fr ie n d  in
the M iddle E a s t .
The c r i s i s  was over a f t e r  7 months, at a Stockholm conference in  
J u ly  1977 when the Saudi p r ic e  was ra is e d  by another 5%, and thus 
p r ic in g  u n ity  was re s to re d . The f a i lu r e  of the N orth-South d ia lo g u e  
in  June 1977 provided an ap p ro p riate  id e o lo g ic a l p re te x t to make the 
conference outcome appear honourable: the Saudis le t  i t  be known th at  
the w estern in d u s t r ia l is e d  c o u n trie s  had shown them selves in ca p a b le  
of a p p re c ia tin g  t h e ir  g estu re in  Doha and thus no longer deserved
such s a c r if ic e s  on t h e ir  p a r t .
The fa c t  was th at having provoked the c r i s i s  the S au d is were 
in ca p a b le  of m a in ta in in g  s u f f ic ie n t  p ressu re on the other members.
T h e ir  aim was to r a p id ly  boost production so th a t the r e s t  of OPEC 
would be unable to s u s t a in  the h ig h er p r ic e s . They would lo se  export 
volume and thus would be o b lig e d  to seek a compromise w ith Saudi 
A ra b ia . The p la n  d id  not work because of a s e r ie s  of 'm ishaps and 
a c c id e n ts ' (Seymour, 1980) which were probably p erp etrated  on the 
Saudis by Aramco (see PIN supplem ent, 23 A p r il  19 7 9 ).
In  1976 Aramco had sta te d  th at Saudi A r a b ia 's  p ro d uctio n  
c a p a c ity  was 1 1 . 8  mbd, 3 mbd more than the country had produced in  
December of the same y e a r . Thus, Yamani could assume that r a is in g  
output by the e x tra  3 mbd they could fo rce the 'gang of e leve n ' to  
compromise.
When the S au d is d id  order Aramco to s t a r t  producing at f u l l  
c a p a c ity  in  December 1976 i t  became evid en t th a t the company's 
maximum c a p a c ity  was o n ly  9 .3  mbd. Under p ressu re  from the Saudi 
le a d e r s , Aramco pushed p ro d u ctio n  up to 10 mbd r e s u lt in g  in  the 
e x p lo sio n  of two p ip e lin e s  due to the in cre a se d  throughput. In  May 
p ro d u ctio n  dropped to 8 .3  mbd.
The s p l i t - l e v e l  p r ic e  in c re a s e  re s u lte d  in  much h ig h er l i f t i n g  
le v e ls  fo r  Saudi A ra b ia  and the UAE during e a r ly  1977 and lower
-  57 -
p ro d u ctio n  in  the other OPEC members. A fte r  the r e s to r a t io n  of 
p r ic in g  u n ity  the marker p r ic e  remained at $ 12 .7 0  throughout 1977 and 
1978 w ith spot p r ic e s  d e c lin in g  probably due to the low le v e l  of OPEC 
p ro d u ctio n . OPEC shut in  c a p a c ity  in cre a se d  in  1978 and o i l  markets 
were thought to be in  a g lu t .
N a t io n a lis a t io n  of o i l  by producing governments has meant the 
d ism a n tlin g  of the jo in t  m u lt in a t io n a l co n tro l of the m ajo rs; c o n tro l 
was tra n s fe rre d  to the so ve reig n  producing governments. The 7 m ajors 
who up to 1973 c o n tr o lle d  some 92% of t o t a l  world crude o i l  su p p lie s  
had s in c e  seen a d e c lin e .
The dram atic r e v e r s a l in  the r e la t io n s h ip  between the q u a n t it ie s  
of crude a c c e s s ib le  to the m ajors and the q u a n t it ie s  processed by 
them in  t h e ir  own downstream f a c i l i t i e s  in d ic a te s  t h e ir  fa d in g  power: 
in  the 1960s and e a r ly  1970s the m ajors were net crude s e l le r s  s in c e  
the o i l  a c c e s s ib le  to them was in  excess of the o i l  processed by
them. T h is  enabled them to c o n tro l the market.
By 1980 « the m ajors had become net buyers of crude from OPEC
c o u n tr ie s . The sh are of crude marketed by them was reduced from 92% 
of world crude sup p ly in  1973 to 75% in  1976 and 35% in  e a r ly  1980 
(H a rtsh o rn , 19 8 0 ). So the 1970s marked a s h if t  of o l ig o p o lis t ic
power to producing c o u n tr ie s .
However, the s t r u c t u r a l  tran sfo rm atio n s were s t i l l  in co m p lete , 
s in c e  producing c o u n trie s  were e x e r c is in g  c o n tro l a t the upstream  
phases a lo n e , w ith the v e r t i c a l l y  in te g ra te d  s tr u c tu r e  being  
m aintained u n t i l  19 7 8 -7 9 . D e sp ite  t h e ir  c o n tro l over p ro d u ctio n ,
s ta te  owned o i l  companies were r e lu c ta n t  at t h is  stage to assume the 
m arketing ro le  e it h e r  in  the spot market -  which was only m arginal 
and where p r ic e s  were below o f f i c i a l  ones -  or w ith long term 
c o n tr a c ts , where they probably f e l t  they lacked  any exp erien ce. So 
OPEC c o u n trie s  were content to le t  the companies do the work. The 
events of 19 78 -79  proved c o n c lu s iv e  in  t h is  re s p e c t, w ith NOC's 
e n te rin g  m arketing thus fu rth e r  l im it in g  the m a jo rs' r o le .
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The Ir a n ia n  r e v o lu t io n  began in  October 1978 w ith a b ig  o i l  
w orkers' s t r ik e ;  w ith in  5 days a l l  p la n ts  were at a s t a n d s t i l l ,  at a 
time when the companies u s u a lly  stocked up fo r the in cre a se d  w in ter  
consumption. With a 5 mbd in p u t on the world market before the 
c r i s i s ,  Ir a n  was the w o rld ’ s second la r g e s t  o i l  e x p o rte r. N a t u r a lly ,  
the p a r a ly s is  of i t s  p ro d u ctio n  had heavy consequences.
Saudi A ra b ia  d id  compensate fo r the lo s s  of Ir a n ia n  output by 
r a is in g  p ro d uctio n  to 10 mbd in  November and December as a g a in s t  7 .5  
mbd fo r t h e . p erio d  Jan u ary-A u g u st 1978 . Thus th ere was no p h y s ic a l  
shortage of crude u n t i l  the end of that y e a r.
N e v e rth e le ss, s in c e  October spot p r ic e s  had begun to clim b w ith  
spot d e a ls  becoming more in fre q u e n t. The independent r e f in e r s ,  w ith  
no d ir e c t  access to crude s u p p lie s , began to look d e sp e ra te ly  fo r o i l
on the fre e  m arket. But from November most of the m ajors invoked
fo rc e  majeure and reduced t h ie r  d e liv e r ie s  to th ir d  p a r t ie s  by 10 -3 0 %  
often w ithdraw ing from t h ir d  p arty  co n tra cts  a lto g e th e r .
With the USA in c r e a s in g  i t s  o i l  im ports in  Jan u ary  1979 in  order  
to b u ild  up more re se rv e s  ra th e r  than drawing on i t s  s to c k s , and
Ir a n ia n  s a le s  coming to a complete s t a n d s t i l l  in  the same month, not
even Saudi A ra b ia  -  who by A p r i l  re v ise d  downwards i t s  allow ances -  
could f i l l  the gap. The B r it is h  and Norwegian producers in cre a se d  
t h e ir  p r ic e s  by 1 1%  i n  January 19 7 9 , when OPEC was s t i l l  implementing  
a 5% in c r e a s e . In  February G u lf crude p r ic e s  o s c il la t e d  between $21  
and $23 and at t h is  stage OPEC jo in e d  the p r ic e  s p i r a l .  By the end 
of the year spot p r ic e s  jumped to over $40 per b a r r e l.
N e v e rth e le ss, most OPEC governments were r e lu c ta n t  to r a is e  
o f f i c i a l  p r ic e s  in  l in e  w ith  spot d e als seeking in ste a d  s t a b i l i t y  
through grad ual in c re a s e s  (e .g  10% in  March 19 7 9 ). So the m ajors 
were buying t h e ir  crude a t lower p r ic e s  than the independents or 
consuming c o u n tr ie s ' NOC's buying spot and were thus ab le  to s e l l  i t  
a t a h igh mark up. The re te n tio n  of a f lo o r  market p r ic e  by the 
Saudis se t below o f f i c i a l  p r ic e s ,  provided t h e ir  Aramco p artn ers w ith  
an a d d it io n a l s u b sid y .
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Average revenues fo r the m ajors clim bed more d r a m a tic a lly  in  
e a r ly  1979 than of producing c o u n trie s  who thus became d i s s a t is f ie d .  
The re lu c ta n c e  of OPEC to expand t h e ir  d ir e c t  lon g -term  s a le s  of 
crude d e clin e d  and spot market tra d in g  was deemed p r o f it a b le  to be 
in v o lv e d  in ;  in  a d d it io n , as governments took over crude o i l  
m arketing the spot market was at f i r s t  t h e ir  o n ly  o p tio n .
By March 1979 the spot market accounted fo r  15 -2 0 %  of world o i l  
output compared w ith  3 -5 %  in  Jan u ary 19 79 ; a t t h is  time p r ic e s  
announced by producers were based on in fo rm a tio n  revealed  by the spot 
market which re a c ts  much f a s t e r  than OPEC. Furtherm ore, there was 
’ weak and confused market le a d e rs h ip ' (El-Mokadem, 1984) w ith the  
Sau d is expected to r a is e  output but due to t e c h n ic a l d i f f i c u l t i e s  
unable to do so -  and in  f a c t ,  as mentioned above, red ucing
p ro d uctio n  to 8 .5  mbd in  A p r i l .  As a r e s u lt ,  Saudi A ra b ia  was not 
ab le  to enforce the Geneva co n fe re n ce ’ s d e c is io n  of June 1979 and 
d if f e r e n t ia ls  were s e r io u s ly  d is to r t e d . So in  November 1979 the  
d if f e r e n t ia l  between A ra b ia n  L ig h t  and Ir a n ia n  L ig h t  was $ 5 .5 0  ($ 18  
v e rsu s  $ 2 3 .5 0 )  w h ile  in  January i t  had been $ 0 .1 1  ( $ 1 3 .3 4  versu s
$ 1 3 .4 5 ) .
In  December 19 79 , p r io r  to the Caracas co n feren ce, in  an attempt 
to re g a in  lo s t  i n i t i a t i v e  and w ith a spot p r ic e  of $40 Saudi A ra b ia  
p ric e d  the marker a t $ 2 4 /b b l, from $ 18 . The conference ended in
disagreem ent. On 26 January 198 0 , the Saudis fu r th e r  r a is e d  t h e ir
p r ic e  to $26 probably hoping to reduce world demand and bridge the 
gap w ith other producing c o u n tr ie s . But Kuw ait, Ira q  and the UAE 
a ls o  r a is e d  t h e ir  p r ic e s  making the ' o f f i c i a l  p r ic e '  of $26 the 
lo w est. With an o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  of $28 , deemed maker p r ic e  of $32 and 
S a u d i's  s e l l in g  p r ic e  of $26, there was no q u e stio n  in  the A lg ie r s  
conference th a t OPEC's p r ic e  u n ity  had broken down. The conference  
opted fo r  'f r e e  fo r a l l '  i . e  each member fre e  to p r ic e  i t s  crude  
in d iv id u a l ly .
T h is  time the Sau d is decided to w ait and l e t  market fo rce s work 
them selves out and indeed in  the second h a lf  1980 the market d id  
r e a c t . In  the summer an excess supply s it u a t io n  arose w ith demand 
f a l l i n g  due to the p r ic e  in c re a se s  and the co n tin u in g  r e c e s s io n  in
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the in d u s t r ia l  c o u n tr ie s . S e v e ra l OPEC members responded by c u ttin g  
p ro d u ctio n , but spot p r ic e s  began to f a l l  n o n e th e le ss, as Saudi 
A ra b ia  continued to produce 1 mbd more than expected*
For the f i r s t  time s in c e  the outbreak of the Ir a n ia n  c r i s i s  the 
s p ir a l  of p r ic e s  and surcharg es came to a h a lt  and OPEC judged that  
the time was r ig h t  to re u n ify  p r ic e s . In  the September 1980 Vienna  
conference Saudi A ra b ia  r a is e d  i t s  p r ic e s  by $ 2 /b b l up to $30 w ith  
a l l  other OPEC p r ic e s  unchanged. Furtherm ore, the conference stu d ie d  
the p ro je c t  fo r  an OPEC lo n g -te rm  s tr a te g y , which on the q u estio n  of 
p r ic e s  envisaged an in d e x a tio n  a g a in s t  world in f l a t io n ,  currency  
f lu c t u a t io n s  and economic growth in  the OECD. However, there were 
some o b je c tio n s  th a t t h is  in d e x a tio n  took no account of fa c to r s  
p a r t ic u la r  to the T h ird  W orld. The problem was l e f t  unresolved and 
i t  was to be the s u b je c t  of the scheduled Baghdad meeting where
OPEC's 20th a n n iv e rs a ry  was to be c e le b ra te d . But there was no OPEC
summit th e re ; on 22 September the Ir a n -Ir a q  War broke out.
The m arket' however, was now weak and the war w ith the lo s s  of 
2 .4  mbd i t  caused led  o n ly  to a temporary in c re a se  in  spot p r ic e s .
With t h is  background the B a l i  conference in  December 1980 reached
another u n r e a l is t ic  d e c is io n : to se t the market p r ic e  in  the $ 3 2 -3 6  
range.
The p erio d  from the I r a n -I r a q  War to the Geneva conference of 
May 1981 was thus c h a ra c te r is e d  by a weak market and p r ic e  d is a r r a y .  
The conference decided to fre e ze  p r ic e s , which to the Sau d is meant a 
p r ic e  of £32 w h ile  to the r e s t  of OPEC i t  meant th at the m arker's  
p r ic e  should be $36 . In  October 1981 Saudi A ra b ia  agreed to a p r ic e  
of $34 -  the peak was reached -  and p r ic e  u n if ic a t io n  was claim ed .
The year 1982 commenced w ith a weak market and fo r the f i r s t  
time in  OPEC's h is t o r y  i t s  output was surpassed by non-communist 
w orld, non OPEC p ro d u cers. From an annual average growth ra te  of 
3 .4 %  between 1 9 7 5 -7 9 , OPEC output f e l l  by 1 1 .8 %  in  198 0, 16 .5 %  in  
19 8 1 , 18% in  198 2, a fu r th e r  5 .6 %  in  1983 and 0 .4 %  in  1984 (se e  Table
2 .5 .3  and F ig u re  2 . 5 . 1 ) .
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In  the Vienna meeting in  December 1982 the need fo r production  
r e s t r a in t  in  the fa ce  of f a l l i n g  demand was c le a r ,  but OPEC was 
unable to d e c la re  a unanimous p o lic y .  So the G u lf  producers met in  
February 1983 and s ig n a lle d  t h e ir  in te n t  to cut p r ic e s  by $ 4 /b b l. In  
f a c t  i t  was N ig e r ia  th at was pressed in to  a c t io n . Fo llo w in g  BNOC's 
announcement of a re d u ctio n  in  the p r ic e  of North Sea o i l  by $ 3 ,  
N ig e r ia  a ls o  cut i t s  p r ic e  by $ 5 .5 0  to r e t a in  i t s  co m p etitiven ess to 
the q u a l it a t iv e ly  s im ila r  North Sea o i l .  Then, i t  became n ecessary  
fo r  OPEC to p ro vid e a form al re c o g n itio n  of the problems and a 
d iff e r e n t  p o lic y  framework.
T h is  happened in  the London agreement in  March 1983 when the 
m arker's p r ic e  was cut to $29 from $34 and a c e i l in g  was set on t o t a l  
OPEC p ro d uctio n  a t  1 7 .5  mbd. Market observers were very s c e p t ic a l  at  
the time about the re leva n ce  of the c e i l in g ,  g iv e n  the b e lie f  that  
worldwide demand fo r  OPEC o i l  was u n lik e ly  to be above 16 mbd. 
N e v e rth e le ss, i t  seemed th at a f t e r  22 years of e x iste n ce  OPEC was 
f i n a l l y  tu rn in g  in to  a c a r t e l .  P r ic e s  d id  firm  up on a l l  markets fo r
about a month, but from then on a n x ie ty  p re v a ile d  s in c e  demand fo r
OPEC o i l  was stagnant a t  14 mbd. From May 1983 onwards p r ic e s  
s ta r te d  f a l l i n g  a g a in , w ith demand never r e v iv in g .
T ab le  2 . 5 . 1  in d ic a t e s  th at between 1970 and 198 1 the annual ra te  
of change of the m arker's p r ic e  was 33% compound on average and 2 1 .9 %  
in  r e a l  term s. The average export p r ic e  of l ig h t  A rab ian  crude was 
$ 3 2 .5  in  1981 as compared w ith the nominal p r ic e  of $ 1 .8 0  in  1970 as 
shown in  T ab le  2 . 5 , 2 ,  i . e  alm ost 18 tim es h ig h er -  in  r e a l term s,
about 6 .5  tim es h ig h e r . Such o i l  p r ic e  in c re a se s  were dram atic and
le d  to marked changes in  the trends of the world energy m arket.
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Tab le 2 . 5 . 1  Estim ated  R ates of Change of Market P r ic e  of L ig h t
A rabian crude 
(% p .a  compound)
Time period In  Nominal Terms In  R e al Terms
19 5 0 -19 6 0 - 0 .2 - 2 .4
19 6 0 -19 7 0 - 3 . 0 -4 .5
19 7 0 -19 8 1 + 3 3 .0 + 2 1 .9
19 5 0 -19 8 1 + 10.0 + 5 .2
Note: Assumed market p r ic e s  in c lu d in g  d isco u n ts are as fo llo w s :
1950 1 . 7 1
1960 1 .6 7
1970 1 .2 5
1980 ' 34.00  
( $ /b b l ,  nominal terms)
D e fla t io n  by the UN d o lla r  index of u n it  v alu es of world  
m anufacturing e x p o rts.
Source: Adelman, ( 1 9 7 2 ) ,  Robinson-Morgan ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Petroleum  Econom ist, 
UN S t a t i s t i c a l  Yearbook
T ab le  2 . 5 . 2 :  Annual Average fob export p r ic e  of marker crude
P e rs ia n  G u lf ( $ /b b l)
Year Posted P r ic e R eal P r ic e  
(19 8 1 $)
1965 1 .8 0 5 .0
1970 1.8 0 5 .0
19 7 1 2.20 5 .8
1972 2.48 6 .0
1973 3 .2 9 6 .8
1974 1 1 .5 8 19 .5
1975 10 .7 2 1 6 .1
1976 1 1 . 5 1 1 7 .3
1977 12 .4 0 1 7 . 1
1978 1 2 .7 0 1 5 .2
1979 17 .2 6 1 8 .1
1980 28.67 2 7 .2
198 1 3 2 .5 0 3 2 .5 0
Note: Posted p r ic e  fo r  19 7 0 -7 4 , o f f i c i a l  s e l l in g  p r ic e  s in c e  1975  
Source: As fo r  T ab le  2 . 5 . 1
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What an economist would expect in  a s it u a t io n  of r is in g  r e a l  energy 
p r ic e s , when the p r ic e  of one fu e l ( o i l )  i s  r is in g  f a s t e r  than th a t  
of other fu e ls  is  th at the d e s ire  to move away from o i l  in c re a se s  and 
th at the a b i l i t y  to do so in c re a se s  too, as te c h n o lo g ic a l changes 
should be stim u la te d .
From T ab le  2 .5 .3  one f in d s  that s in c e  1973 there has been a 
change f i r s t l y  in  the average growth ra te  of t o t a l  world energy 
consumption which has more than halved between 19 7 3 -8 1  as compared 
w ith 19 6 5 -7 3 , from 5 .2 %  to 1 .8 %  per annum. T h is  i s  indeed what would 
be expected, i . e  w ith  r is in g  energy p r ic e s , fo r any given  growth of 
GNP there w i l l  be a much slow er ra te  of growth of energy consumption.
Whether one can a t t r ib u t e  the world re c e ss io n  that se t upon 
us a f t e r  1973 to the o i l  c r i s i s  i s  not c e r t a in . What is  c le a r  i s  the  
e x iste n ce  of a r e la t io n s h ip  between the two: the slow er GNP growth
was p a r t ly , a consequence of lower energy consumption, caused by 
h ig h er energy p r ic e s , w hile  at the same time lower GNP growth 
co n trib u te d  to lower energy consumption.
The second change found in  T ab le 2 .5 .3  concerns the consumption 
of d if f e r e n t  f u e ls .  C le a r ly  o i l  consumption showed the most marked 
d e c lin e  from a growth ra te  of 7 .8 %  per annum between 19 6 5 -7 3  to only
0.4 5%  per annum between 1 9 7 3 -8 1 .  From the r e s t  of the fu e ls  o nly
c o a l showed an in c r e a s e , w hile  the others d e clin e d  w ith gas 
e x p e rien cin g  the la r g e r  d e c lin e  apart from o i l  by 3 .9 %  per annum 
(from 6 . 6% between 19 6 5 -7 3  to 2 .7 %  between 1 9 7 3 -8 1 ) .  S in ce co a l 
consumption was r is in g  f a s t e r  in  19 7 3 -8 1 than t o t a l  energy  
consumption (2 .3 %  per annum versu s 1 .8 %  per annum) co a l in  t h is  
period in crea se d  i t s  market share s l i g h t ly .
However, the p r ic e  in c re a se s  have taken time before e ffe c t in g  
any changes and such changes became c le a r e r  as time passed. From 
Table 2 .5 .3  i t  i s  obvious that the growth ra te s of energy consumption 
p o s t-19 7 3  were lower than p r e -19 7 3 , but a lso  that there are  
d iffe re n c e s  in  trends between the 19 7 3 -7 9  and 19 7 9 -8 1 p e rio d s. A fte r  
the f i r s t  o i l  c r i s i s  and up to 1979 consumption of energy slowed down
but i t  was s t i l l  r is in g  fo r  a l l  f u e ls ,  whereas a f te r  1979 t o t a l
consumption was a c t u a lly  f a l l i n g  and so was o i l  consumption.
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Furtherm ore, there has been a red u ctio n  in  OPEC's share of world 
o i l  output as shown i n  T ab le  2 .5 .4  from 5 4 .1 %  in  1973 to 30% of world 
output in  1984. F ig u re  2 . 5 . 1  shows the c o n tra st between the f a l l i n g  
OPEC output and the r is in g  non-OPEC output s in c e  19 73 .
Table 2 .5 .4 :  World and OPEC Crude O i l  P ro d u ctio n , 19 7 3 -19 8 4
m il l io n  tonnes
Year World OPEC OPEC's Share (%)
1973 2 8 5 1. 1542 54.08
1974 2876 1523 53
1975 2707 1348 49.8
1976 2937 15 19 5 1 .7 2
1977 3049 1524 50
1978 3 10 2 .4 1482.6 4 7.78
1979 3 2 1 7 .3 15 2 2 .2 4 7 .3
1980 3 10 3 .5 13 4 2 .4 4 3.2 5
1981 2890.8 112 0 .9 3 8 .7 7
1982 2738 .5 9 18 .2 3 3 .5 3
1983 2 7 7 6 .16 866.2 3 1 .2
1984 2869.05 862.8 30
Source: The Petroleum  Economist
C le a r ly ,  the two o i l  c r is e s  have brought about a lo t  of changes, 
though perhaps not very d ram atic ones due to the v a rio u s  lag s  
in v o lv e d  in  the adjustm ent p ro c e ss. The lo g ic a l  next step is  to 
attempt to p ro vid e an e x p la n a tio n  fo r these changes.
CRUDE O IL  PRODUCTION : OPEC, NON-OPEC AND 
WORLD TOTAL.
M IL L IO N  TONNES 
1973-1984
?JSPI5!S 2,5.1 - 66 -
SOURCE :THE PETROLEUM ECONOMIST
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CHAPTER 3: IN SEARCH OF AN EXPLANATION
3 . 1  REVIEW OF THEORETICAL APPROACHES
V ario u s in t e r p r e t a t io n s  have been put forward to e x p la in  the  
lo n g -te rm  movements of the p r ic e  of crude o i l  and in  p a r t ic u la r  the  
m u lt ifo ld  in c re a se s  of 1973 and 1979. A g e n e ra lly  accepted  
h yp o th esis  i s  the one based on the fa c t  th at o i l  * i s  a v a ila b le  in  
f i n i t e  q u a n t ity ; in c r e a s in g  demand w ith a g iven  supply is  bound to 
provoke a p r ic e  in c r e a s e .
I t  can be argued th a t the above statem ent i s  incom plete. The 
sto ck  of u lt im a t e ly  re co v e ra b le  o i l  re se rv e s cannot be d ir e c t ly  
compared w ith demand which i s  a flow and whose magnitude is  d efined  
w ith refere n ce to a s p e c if ic  time p e rio d . U lt im a te ly  reco ve rab le  
re se rv e s are not known w ith  c e r t a in t y  but they are l im it e d ; even so ,
the flow supply of o i l  in  any tim e period before exh austio n  can be
0
in cre a se d  to match demand, g iven  the e x iste n ce  of unused p ro d u ctive  
c a p a c ity  or the p o s s i b i l i t y  of augmenting th at c a p a c it y .
The r e la t io n s h ip  between in t e r e s t  ra te s and the expected ra te  of 
change in  the o i l  p r ic e  as presented in  s e c tio n  1 . 3  i s  the c r u c ia l  
a n a ly t ic a l  to o l fo r  the e x p la n a tio n  of p ro d uctio n  d e c is io n s .  
N e v e rth e le ss, t h is  r e la t io n s h ip  does not in  i t s e l f  c o n s titu te  an 
in te r p r e t a t io n  of the o i l  market and of o i l  p r ic e  le v e ls .  I t  sim p ly  
i l l u s t r a t e s  the c e n t r a l ro le  of e x p e cta tio n s.
C e r t a in ly  the m a r g in a lis t  theory of d e p le tio n  of e x h a u stib le  
reso u rces does d e fin e  a p r ic e  p r o f i le .  Under p e rfe c t co m p etitio n , a 
co nstant technology s ta te  and the e x iste n ce  of fu tu re s  markets fo r  
a l l  fu tu re  dates to the time of ex h a u stio n , the resource w i l l  
a p p re c ia te  over time aco rd in g  to the r -p e rc e n t r u le , u n t i l  the  
exh austio n  date i s  reached. T h is  p r ic e  p r o f i le  i s  h igh enough to 
b rin g  about the re s o u rc e ’ s complete s u b s t it u t io n  by that date.
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C le a r ly ,  the absence of a complete s tr u c tu r e  of fu tu re s  m arkets, 
and the e x iste n c e  of t e c h n ic a l  change and u n c e rta in ty  over the exact  
q u a n tity  of re co v e ra b le  re se rv e s d e p rives the approach of making a 
p o s it iv e  c o n tr ib u t io n  to the e x p la n a tio n  of a c tu a l p r ic e  le v e ls .
I t  seems th a t the s c a r c it y  of o i l  would only a f fe c t  i t s  cu rre n t  
p r ic e  i f  there was a w id ely  held b e l ie f  in  i t s  imminent exh au stio n . 
In  such a case the o i l  p r ic e  would most probably r i s e ,  hence in d u cin g  
p ro d uctio n  cutbacks and thus fu r th e r  p r ic e  in c r e a s e s . Such a 
s it u a t io n  of s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g  e x p e c ta tio n s, however, would only have a 
s ig n if ic a n t  impact fo r  a sh o rt time p e rio d , u n le ss  exhaustion were 
indeed imminent. Thus, the in te r p r e t a t io n  of o i l  p r ic e  le v e ls  being  
a fu n c tio n  of s c a r c it y  re q u ire s  th a t o i l  re se rv e s w i l l  be exhausted  
w ith in  a r e l a t iv e l y  sh o rt p e rio d . In t e r e s t in g ly ,  the recen t  
downwards trend in  o i l  p r ic e s  has not been accompanied by any 
statem ents s t r e s s in g  o i l ' s  e x h a u s t ib i l i t y  of the type experienced in  
the 19 7 0 s.
Another way of arguing th at p r ic e s  are determined by o i l ' s  
s c a r c it y  i s  by a p p lic a t io n  of the R ic a rd ia n  theory of d if f e r e n t ia l  
r e n t . R icard o  presented t h is  theory in  h is  'P r in c ip le s  of P o l i t i c a l  
Economy and T a x a tio n ' ( 1 8 1 7 )  in  which he co n stru cted  a t h e o r e t ic a l  
• model of an a g r ic u lt u r a l  s o c ie ty  and attempted to determ ine the laws 
re g u la tin g  the d is t r ib u t io n  of output between d if f e r e n t  c la s s e s .  H is  
b a s ic  c a u sa l c h a in  c o n s is t s  of : ( i )  in c r e a s in g  demand coupled w ith
maximum supply from e x is t in g  o u t le t s ,  ( i i )  in c r e a s in g  p r ic e ,  ( i i i )  
e x p lo it a t io n  of more c o s t ly  new o u t le t s .
A p p lic a t io n  of t h is  theory re q u ire s  a d is t in c t io n  ' between 
o i l f i e l d s  on the b a s is  of fe a tu re s  such as e x tr a c t io n  c o s ts , the 
q u a lit y  of crude -  and hence r e f in in g  co sts  -  and tra n sp o rt c o s ts .  
In  a co m p e titive  s it u a t io n  there w i l l  be a tendency to e x p lo it  
f i r s t l y  the f ie ld s  th at are most p r o f it a b le , g iven  the above 
fe a tu r e s . Only when these f ie ld s  are exhausted w ith  demand growth, 
w i l l  le s s  p r o f it a b le  f ie ld s  be brought in to  p ro d u ctio n , or more 
expensive enhanced recovery techniques used. T h e refo re , in c r e a s in g  
co sts  w i l l  be connected w ith  p r ic e  in c re a se s  to the f i n a l  consumer. 
C le a r ly ,  the owners of the most p ro d u ctive  -  lower cost -  
non -m arg in al f ie ld s  w i l l  earn a d if f e r e n t ia l  re n t.
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I t  seems that two cond itions make the theory inappropriate for  
the o i l  market. (1) The choice of the most productive o i l f i e ld s  i s  
lim ited  to the f ie ld s  already d iscovered. Therefore, there is  a lo t  
of uncertain ty  about the prospect of d isco v er ies  of more productive  
o i l f i e l d s .  (2) There are su b sta n tia l market im perfections rather than 
a p er fe c tly  com petitive s itu a t io n . Oil w ells  located  in  d iffe r e n t  
countries are su b ject to  d iffe r e n t  laws and such regu lation s may 
enable a c o s t ly  o i l f i e l d  to compete e f f e c t iv e ly  by means of custom 
b arriers ( e .g  the case of the USA in  the 1950-60s). Such conditions  
do not imply d if f e r e n t ia l  rents for le s s  c o s t ly  o i l f i e ld s  located  
ou tsid e the country in  qu estion .
Furthermore, a firm that has the r igh t to develop a p ro fita b le  
f ie ld  may not fu l ly  e x p lo it  i t  in  order to avoid market d isruptions  
and to protect p r o f i ta b i l i t y  in  more c o s tly  o i l f i e l d s  that i t  may 
operate. An example of th is  type of behaviour i s  provided by the 
majors' operations in  the Middle East up to the 1970s, when 
h orizonta l in teg ra tio n  meant jo in t  supply con tro ls in  order to avoid 
any g lu ts  or shortages. C learly , such 'com plications' reduce the 
a p p lic a b ility  of the argument.
In p a r ticu la r , an explanation of the events of the 1970s based 
on the Ricardian causal chain mentioned above is  inappropriate, 
because the p rice in creases were not the r e su lt  of more c o s t ly  
o i l f i e l d s  being developed. On the contrary, i t  was these p rice  r is e s  
that encouraged exp loration  in  the North Sea or Alaska. In ad d ition , 
p o l i t i c a l  fa c to rs  would have encouraged such d iv e r s if ic a t io n  even at 
unchanged p r ic e s , as argued in  se c t io n  2 .4 .4 .
A d iffe r e n t theory of o i l  price determ ination is  the one 
presented by Frankel (1964) who argues that the o i l  industry cannot 
operate under com petitive con d itio n s. Because of the uncertain  
r e su lts  of exp loration , the high overhead costs  at a l l  stages of the 
industry and a high in e la s t i c i t y  of demand in  the short run, the 
industry i s  not s e l f  ad ju sting , in  the sense that a f a l l  in  prices  
s ig n if ic a n t ly  chokes o ff  supply or stim ulates demand.
The uncertain  r e su lts  of exploration  create the lik e lih o o d  that 
e ith er  too l i t t l e  or too much o i l  w i l l  be discovered in  re la tio n  to
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the amount that w i l l  be bought at p ro fita b le  p r ic e s . The fa c t  that 
crude o i l  production, tran sportation , r e fin in g , storage and 
d istr ib u tio n , a l l  require large amounts of c a p ita l, r e s u lts  in  heavy- 
fix ed  co sts  and forces com petitive producers to ex tract as much as 
they can as quickly as p o ss ib le  in  an attempt to recoup th e ir  sunk 
costs  and to cover part of th e ir  overheads. Because consumption i s  
not read ily  expanded when p r ices  f a l l ,  r e la t iv e ly  small surpluses 
w il l  push prices e a s i ly  below costs  of production. So, in  the 
absence of control over supply and p r ic e s , the industry is  subject to  
continuous c r is e s .
Frankel's th e s is  i s  based on the premise that the o i l  market 
d isp lays in creasin g  returns to sc a le  because of a high r a tio  between 
f ix ed  and variab le c o s ts ,  g iv ing  larger firms a strong cost advantage 
over sm aller ones. The consequence i s  continuous in s ta b i l i t y  unless  
the market is  regulated; the tendency to o ligop o ly  is  seen as an 
inherent feature of the industry , the only means to ensure i t s
e f fe c t iv e  operation .
I t  seems that th is  a n a ly s is  does not recognise that a rapid 
increase in  market s iz e  i s  bound to decrease the strength  of
o l ig o p o l is t ic  co n tro l, something that seems to have happened in  
recent years, w ith the majors and then OPEC lo s in g  control w ith  
market expansion. But in  ad d ition , the two basic fea tu res of the 
a n a ly s is  -  in s t a b i l i t y  and hence o l ig o p o l is t ic  tendencies -  can both 
be refuted  by r e je c t in g  Frankel's cru cia l assumption of increasing  
returns to s c a le . This i s  accomplished by Adelman who vigorously  
disputes the natural tendency to o ligop o ly  by arguing that i t  i s
decreasing returns to sca le  that predominate the industry. This 
im plies com petitive conditions and market s t a b i l i t y .
In h is  1972 book Adelman argued that o i l  p rices would continue  
to come down due to the wide a v a ila b i l i ty  of low cost crude, thus
precluding the Ricardian r e su lt  of an increasing p rice trend. P rices  
would continue to come down to the point where long-run marginal 
costs  are equated w ith the increm ental costs  of f ie ld  development in  
the Middle East supergiant f i e ld s .  His m eticulous and w e ll 
documented attempt at evaluating  costs  led him to argue that the 
industry i s  not a natural monopoly, that i t  pays producers under 
com petitive cond itions to produce up to the point where MG = P and
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that the industry w i l l  then be s e l f  ad justing , i . e  w i l l  determine 
output le v e ls  v ia  the price/m arginal cost mechanism, as mentioned in  
se c t io n  2 .4 .3 .  The downwards p rice trend predicted  was seen as 
strong enough to defeat any r e s tr a in ts  on com petition, which would 
dominate both among companies and among producing cou n tr ies .
I t  i s  c lea r  from the th e o r e tic a l debate over returns to  sca le  
and the theory of the firm  (e .g  S ra ffa , 1926) that the e lim in ation  of 
a tendency towards an o l ig o p o l is t ic  market structure requires 
decreasing returns in  the long run to the in d iv id u a l firm . According 
to m a rg in a lis ts , in  p erfect com petition each firm i s  so small as to 
be a p rice taker in e f fe c t iv e  on the p reva ilin g  market price and 
acquiring inputs in  any amount at the p rev a ilin g  p r ic e s . Adelman's 
derivation  of the hypothesis of decreasing returns r e s ts  on fa cto rs  
such as in creasin g  development co sts  in  known o i l f i e l d s ,  which refer  
to the industry as a whole in  the long run, not to the in d iv id u a l 
firm  in  the short run. I n s ta b il ity  might m anifest i t s e l f  as the 
r e su lt  of short-term  in creasin g  returns to the in d iv id u a l firm . I f  
the growth of such a firm i s  prevented by an increased d i f f ic u l t y  of 
new d iscoverers or of developing older f ie ld s  as they get dep leted , 
then one would probably conclude that there e x is t  non-com petitive  
conditions in  the industry; bigger firms produce at a lower un it cost  
than sm aller ones.
Adelman's th e s is  that increasing  q u a n titie s  of o i l  can be 
produced at an in creasin g  cost re fers to the secto r  as a whole, 
w h ils t  not precluding the ex isten ce  of o l ig o p o l is t ic  fo rce s . 
Furthermore, h is  reasons for increasing costs  are not v a lid  in  a 
dynamic framework, because over time tech n ica l innovation may
counterbalance the tendency to increasing costs  in  both exp loration  
and development. F in a lly , i t  is  c lear  from the examination of the 
market's evo lu tion  that p erfec t com petition has not been the
c h a r a c te r is t ic  of the industry in  the 1970s. D espite the
documentation of the fa c tu a l evidence in  Adelman's book, • h is  
p red ic tion s did not m a te r ia lise . When concerned w ith the p rice of 
crude o i l  i t  seems of l i t t l e  relevance to e s ta b lish  that development 
co sts  in  the Middle East are 20 cents a barrel i f  one i s  then forced  
to accept the ex isten ce  of monopoly p r o fit  margins.
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3 .2  REVIEW QF EMPIRICAL APPROACHES
The decade of the 1970s ushered in  a new epoch in  the h isto ry  of the 
world petroleum industry , and s in ce  the 1973 c r i s i s  OPEC has been the 
subject of ex ten sive  a n a ly s is . The price path for  o i l  in  the future  
depends s ig n if ic a n t ly  on the production d ecision s of o i l  exporting  
co u n tr ies . Therefore, in  order to be able to make p red ic tion s about 
p r ic e s , one should f i r s t  consider the question of how to ch aracterise  
OPEC and how to exp la in  i t s  behaviour and the events of the 1970s.
A survey of the relevant l ite r a tu r e  reveals that the 
conventional wisdom is  the c a r te l approach to the determ ination of 
crude o i l  p r ic e s . The words 'OPEC c a r te l' are a s in g le , inseparable  
expression  in  the various models of the o i l  market. The consensus of 
such models is  that the world p rice of o i l  s in ce  1973 has been 
considerably above the le v e l  that would p reva il i f  prices were 
com petitively  formed. This i s  seen as a confirm ation of the presence 
of d iscretion ary  power over p rice  -  power exercised  by the OPEC 
c a r te l.  N everth eless, id e n tify in g  the type of c a r te l in  operation i s  
not a matter upon which there i s  agreement among the w r iter s .
In th is  se c tio n  various models are surveyed which can be 
categorised  according to two c r ite r ia :  (1) assumptions about
producers' o b jec tiv e s  (w ealth versus non-wealth maximising behaviour) 
and (2) methodology (energy balances, sim ulation or optim isation  
m odels).
Fo cusin g  f i r s t l y  on the former d is t in c t io n ,  one f in d s  under the 
w ealth -m ax im isatio n  models both a m o n o p o listic  and a co m p etitive  
in te r p r e t a t io n  of the e v e n ts, w h ils t  the ta rg e t-re v e n u e  model p o s its  
non-w ealth m axim ising b eh avio u r.
MODELS OF OPEC BEHAVIOUR
Monopoly: Dominant Producer Model
Wealth-maximising models
Com petition: Property R ig h ts Model
Non-wealth maximising models -  Target Revenue model
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The dominant producer model -  a m onopolistic in terp re ta tio n  
This model views Saudi Arabia as the dominant producer who se ts  the 
p r ic e , allow s the other OPEC members to s e l l  a l l  they wish and 
su pp lies the remaining demand* Thus Saudi Arabia is  the swing 
producer that absorbs demand and supply flu c tu a tio n s  to maintain  
p r ice .
The swing producer has to choose a p rice  path that maximises i t s  
w ealth over tim e. The p rice  should not be so high as to a ttr a c t  
expansion of capacity  by fr in ge  producers, as th is  w i l l  reduce the 
resid u a l demand facing the swing producer. This im plies the adoption  
of a low discount ra te , s e t t in g  a high value on future p r o fits  and 
reducing current p rice  to a le v e l  that discourages frin ge production  
-  lim it  p r ic in g . OPEC's s t a b i l i t y  in  th is  case depends on whether 
world supply and demand at the monopoly price r e su lts  in  s u f f ic ie n t  
demand for  Saudi Arabia to s a t is f y  i t s  o b je c tiv e s .
To introduce c o llu s iv e  elements in  the model, a number of 
varian ts have emerged w ith a group of OPEC producers acting  as the 
s in g le  dominant producer -  the c a r te l core, variou sly  defined . This 
version  depends for success on co-operative behaviour w ith in  the 
core, w h ilst the previous model does not depend on co llu sio n ; the 
d ifferen ce  is  important for  a sse ss in g  the c a r te l's  s t a b i l i t y .
Models of th is  genre represent accepted dogma among most 
econom ists. Since in  th is  view each OPEC member is  aware of the 
interdependencies e x is t in g  among producers, they are w illin g  to share 
the burden of output reductions by adhering to some prorationing  
scheme. Widespread cheating i s  u n lik ely  sin ce  a l l  p artic ip an ts are 
aware of the d isastrous outcome. Hence, a co lla p se  of the c a r te l 
p rice seems u n lik e ly  and modest price increases are q u ite  p o ss ib le .
This conclusion  i s  c lo se  to Adelman's view that OPEC w il l  
attempt to ra ise  the p rice h igher, because of in tern a l pressures from 
OPEC poducers outside the Persian G ulf. As these producers begin to 
run budget d e f ic i t s  they w il l  demand that the Saudis and the others 
in  the Gulf core go along with higher p r ic e s . Providing the rea l 
p rice  in creases are not large and ca r te l core production does not 
f a l l  below some threshold , the model p red icts p rice s t a b i l i t y  and 
OPEC v i t a l i t y  d esp ite  a prolonged s o ft  market environment.
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Examining in  more d e ta il  some of the models o ffer in g  a 
m onopolistic in terp re ta tio n  of the p r o fit  maximising producers, among 
early  models are those by Bohi-Russel (1975), Kennedy (1974), 
Nordhaus (1973 ), Kalymon (1975), B litzer-M eerau s-S tou tjesd ijk  (1975) 
and the Federal Energy Adm inistration (FEA, 1974).
Their common conclusion  was that the o i l  price in  the mid-1970s 
was much higher than consideration  of OPEC's long-run in te r e s ts  would 
d ic ta te .  The im p lica tion  of a l l  the models i s  that prices below 
$6/bbl w i l l  be u n lik e ly  in  the long run, w hile p rices above $10./bbl 
w il l  not be f e a s ib le .
An in te r e st in g  conclusion  of the dynamic models concerns the 
d ifferen ce  between c a r te l and com petitive price le v e ls  as compared 
w ith Adelman's (1972) and Nordhaus' (1973) s tu d ie s . According to  
Adelman the long-run com petitive equilibrium  o i l  p rice is  about 
$ 1 .0 0 /b b l, w hile Nordhaus concludes that com petitive o i l  p rices w i l l  
not r ise  above $3/bbl for  the rest of the century.
In co n tra st, Kennedy, the FEA and B litz e r  e t a l argue that even 
under com petition o i l  p r ices w i l l  be $5.00 -  $6 .00 /b b l by 1985 and 
that p rices near the $3.00 le v e l  are not fe a s ib le  -  in  the sense that 
demand exceeds supply by 1985. However, as the basic assumptions of 
Nordhaus and the FEA do not appear to be too d if fe r e n t , the 
divergence in  conclusions i s  cause for concern. As F isher, Gately 
and Kyle (1975) argue, the reason may be that the models and th e ir  
r e s u lts  are very s e n s it iv e  to the s e t  of parameter values adopted.
None of the above mentioned models e x p l ic i t ly  analyses OPEC 
s t a b i l i t y  or the importance of price expectations and the mechanism 
of formation of exp ecta tion s, w hile the postu lated  behaviour of 
demand and non-OPEC supply is  rather naive. In a l l  cases non-OPEC 
supply i s  described as responding symmetrically to both price r ise s  
and price cu ts . In r e a l i ty  higher prices w il l  induce l i t t l e  response 
where non-OPEC supply i s  operating near excess capacity , w h ils t  a 
drop in  p rices can be expected to cause a s ig n if ic a n t  supply response 
as higher cost producers are priced out. These lim ita tio n s  would 
lead to the conclusion  that the models do not consider the f u l l  range 
of p rice  paths a v a ila b le  to OPEC. '
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N everth eless, th e ir  conclusion  with regards to the p rice of o i l  
being higher than the le v e l  that OPEC's in te r e s ts  would d ic ta te  has 
been confirmed by subsequent models by Cremer-Weitzman (1976), 
H ynilicza-Pindyck (1976), Ben Shahar (1977). The H ynilicza-Pindyck  
model i s  more r e a l i s t i c  than the r e s t ,  a l l  of which su ffe r  from a 
common weakness: the assumption that OPEC is  a homogeneous group,
pursuing sim ilar  o b je c tiv e s .
The Pindyck model examines the c a r te l in  two p arts , a block of
savers (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait) and a
block of spenders (Iran , Venezuela, Indonesia, A lgeria , N igeria , 
Ecuador). Savers have sm all populations and l i t t l e  immediate need 
for  cash and thus use a low rate of d iscount, w hile spenders have 
large cash needs and use a higher discount ra te .
The model computes the optimal bargaining so lu tio n  for the two 
part c a r te l using the theory of cooperative games developed by Nash 
to arrive  at the p rice  path and quota a llo c a t io n s . However, the 
optim isation  rule arrived at i s  a very u n r e a lis t ic  one: that saver 
countries should only s ta r t  ex tractin g  th e ir  o i l  a fte r  spenders have 
exhausted th e ir  resou rces. I n tu it iv e ly  i t  seems that saver's  o i l  in  
the ground lo se s  value le s s  rap id ly  than that of spenders because the 
former discount the future at a lower rate and that therefore savers 
should keep th e ir  o i l  in  the ground u n til a l l  the spenders' o i l  i s  
exhausted. But in r e a l ity  the conclusion does not correspond to  
actu a l OPEC behaviour s in ce  both spenders and savers have been 
producing o i l  sim ultaneously.
However, i t  may be the case that the model provides the above 
conclusion under id e a lis e d  conditions and that th erefore the r e su lt  
may be intended as an approximation to the production patterns of the 
two groups. So i f  the hypothesis that the c a r te lis a t io n  of the 
market by OPEC caused the price increases of the 1970s is  correct,
then one would expect the share of saver countries in  to ta l  OPEC
output to f a l l  over tim e. Table 3 .2 .1  presents the saver cou n tries' 
shares in  to ta l  OPEC production between 1973 and 1984.
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Table 3 .2 .1  Share of Saver C ountries in  OPEC Production
Year Share (%) Year Share (%)
1973 41.2 1979 46.8
1974 43.1 1980 51.4
1975 41.6 1981 56.6
1976 43.0 1982 46.7
1977 43.8 1983 43.0
1978 43.0 1984 42.1
Note: Gulf saver cou n tries include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and
Qatar. (Libya excluded as exh ib itin g  e r r a tic  price  p o licy  
with sharp flu c tu a tio n s  in  production .)
Source: BP S t a t i s t ic a l  Review o f’ World Energy, annual
I t  i s  c lear from the above tab le that at the time of the f i r s t  
c r i s i s  the sa v e r s1 share rose from 41.2% to 43.1%, remained sta b le  up 
to 1978 and increased considerably during the second c r i s i s  
(1979-81). The a llo c a t io n  of production i s  d iffe r e n t  from the
H nyilicza-Pindyck p red ic tion  - and thus the evidence does not favour 
the hypothesis that OPEC was actin g  as a two-part c a r te l.
The strength  of the model l i e s  in  the fa c t  that i t  examines 
producers as two blocks rather than a m onolith, w h ilst a lso
incorporating short-term  adjustment la g s . However, apart from i t s  
fa ilu r e  to predict su c c e ss fu lly  and hence i t s  in a b il i ty  to provide an 
acceptable explanation  of the even ts, the model m isses out an
important point: among those in  the saver block there are c lear
d ifferen ces  in  philosophy, o i l  reserves and the a b i l i t y  to save.
Grouping Iran and Libya in  one group with Saudi Arabia hardly 
r e f le c t s  a uniform ity of outlook.
The consensus reached by the models examined above with respect 
to  o i l  p rices being too high was contrary to the one that seemed to 
have emerged by 1977 in  consuming cou n tries, that o i l  prices were in  
fa c t  not too high in view of prospective excess demand beginning in  
the mid-1980s (Workshop on A ltern ative  Energy S u pp lies, 1977).
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I f  i t  i s  true that the problems with these models are rooted in  
the in correct sp e c if ic a t io n  of cer ta in  functions and parameter values  
-  such as overestim ation  of demand e l a s t i c i t y  or of non-OPEC supply 
e l a s t i c i t y ,  or underestim ation of OPEC's a b i l i t y  to absorb production  
cutbacks -  then the appropriate course of action  ought to be avoiding  
to a ssign  s p e c if ic  values to such parameters s in ce  p rice  p rojections  
are too s e n s it iv e  to them and instead  an attempt ought to be made to  
cope with the problem of not knowing the exact functions and v a lu es.
A model which attempts to adopt th is  approach was constructed by 
Gately and Kyle (1977) who trea t the demand for OPEC o i l  as a 
resid u a l demand and conclude that there does not e x is t  a unique p rice  
path which is  optimal for OPEC and that an a lysis  of OPEC's p ric in g
d ecision s should focus not on the best p rice  path, but on what
p ric in g  stra tegy  -  which responds to market s ig n a ls  -  ought to be 
adopted. Furthermore, that one rule-of-thumb pric in g  stra tegy  that 
i s  l ik e ly  to serve OPEC both in  terms of high p r o f its  and avoiding  
u n d eru tilised  capacity i s  a stra tegy  that is  r e la t iv e ly  cautious 
about major abrupt p rice  in crea ses.
N everth eless, more aggressive pricing s tr a te g ie s  are seen as
lik e ly  to y ie ld  as good or even b etter  r e su lts  for  OPEC, hence 
consumers are warned against th is  p o s s ib i l i l t y .  These conclusions  
seem to cover a l l  e v e n tu a lit ie s ,  hence th e ir  u sefu ln ess is  lim ited .
The above models were c la s s i f ie d  in  the same category of the 
wealth maximisation approach, that views OPEC as a c a r te l.  A model 
which a lso  assumes w ealth maximisation but o ffer s  a com petitive  
in terp re ta tio n  of the o i l  market is  the property r igh ts model
(Johany, 1978 & 1980, Mead 1979).
The property r ig h ts  model -  a com petitive in terp re ta tio n  
In th is  view the p rice regimes p reva ilin g  before and a fte r  1973-74 
are best explained by appealing to the change in  ownership patterns  
in  the early  1970s. Johany (1980) argues that OPEC is  not a c a r te l 
and that i t s  presence or absence has nothing to do with the high  
price of crude. B a s ic a lly , the de facto  n a tio n a lisa tio n  of crude o i l  
d ep osits  by in d iv id u a l OPEC countries has resu lted  in  'h igher-than- 
otherw ise' p rices because these governments work with longer time 
horizons for producing th e ir  o i l .
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P reviously  the Western o i l  companies as the con cession aires were 
never ab so lu te ly  cer ta in  that th e ir  property r ig h ts  on the crude o i l  
d ep osits  would be l e f t  untouched and consequently they tended to 
maximise production. The r e su lt  during the 1950s and 1960s was 
1low er-than-otherw ise' p r ic e s .
Using an a lgeb ra ic  model, Johany shows that an owner of any 
resource w il l  manage h is  stock  so as to maximise the discounted  
present value of the time stream of income from h is  holdings of the 
stock . The e f f e c t  of le s s  than 100% cer ta in ty  about future property 
r ig h ts  was to in crease the e f f e c t iv e  rates of discount that the o i l  
companies based th e ir  d ec isio n s on. The increase in  output then led  
to  decreases in  the world o i l  p r ice .
OPEC was formed in  1960 mainly to prevent the posted o i l  p r ices
from f a l l in g ,  at a time when they were s t i l l  la r g e ly  determined by
the majors. However, the A rab -Israeli c o n f lic t  accelerated  the 
tran sfer  of o i l  ownership from the companies to th e ir  host
governments. By the end of 1973 the o i l  producers had decided to  
determine the p rice of th e ir  o i l  u n ila te r a lly  rather than through
n ego tia tio n s with the o i l  companies.
According to Johany, " . . .  once one recognises that the ownership 
of crude o i l  dep osits has been sh ifte d  from the foreign  companies to  
the o i l  producing co u n tr ies , i t  becomes then obvious that the  
companies and th e ir  host governments have d iffe r e n t discount r a te s .  
And that im plies d iffe r e n t  ra tes of output which, in  turn, means 
d iffe r e n t le v e ls  of p r ices ."
The above quotation embodies the cru cia l point of Johany?s 
argument that OPEC cannot be considered as a c a r te l.  Because the 
OPEC countries have lower discount rates than the companies, th e ir  
o i l  output sin ce 1973 has been lower than what i t  would have been i f  
the companies were s t i l l  the owners of the crude. That led to higher  
o i l  p r ic e s .
Apart from the p o l i t i c a l  d ifferen ces  among OPEC members, the 
economic d ifferen ces  alone would preclude agreements on output and 
p rice w ith in  OPEC. Thus, Johany may be sa fe ly  described as a market 
economist who comes firm ly  down on the sid e  of the law of demand and 
supply. His in terp re ta tio n  of the transform ation of the world o i l
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market is  c o n s is te n t  w ith the o b serv a tio n  th at the world p r ic e  during  
the 1970s was not threatened by ch e a tin g . Furtherm ore, there i s  
evidence th a t the companies co n sid ered  the e x p ro p ria tio n  r is k  in  the  
1960s to be r e a l .
Non-wealth maximisation: the target revenue model
In i t s  pure form th is  model d ep ic ts  OPEC as a c o l le c t io n  of nation  
s ta te s  whose o i l  production d ec isio n s are made with reference to the 
requirements of the n ation a l budgets, which are in  turn a function  of 
absorptive cap acity . This i s  lim ited  where the economy is  sm all in  
r e la t io n  to o i l  revenues, or where the in frastru ctu re  is  inadequate 
to  support rapid e sc a la t io n  in  consumption and investm ent.
Assuming lim ited  absorptive capacity in  the short-run and the 
use of low discount rates in  production planning, the im p lication  i s  
that so long as o i l  revenues meet budgetary requirem ents, production  
p o lic ie s  are con serva tive . As long as o i l  revenues remain in to  the 
ta rg et revenue range, there i s  no d esire  for in d iv id u a l producers to 
cheat by expanding production. This is  d esp ite  the fa c t  that there  
may be an in cen tiv e  to do so i f  p rices are high and net wealth  
maximisation i s  the goa l.
On the other hand, i f  demand reduction or expansion of 
absorptive capacity  creates a s itu a tio n  in  which revenue needs are 
not met, then producers w i l l  expand output u n t il  revenue o b jec tiv e s  
are s a t is f ie d .  Thus the model allow s for behaviour which could lead  
to a co lla p se  of the c a r te l p r ice .
As mentioned e a r l ie r ,  i t  i s  a lso  p o ssib le  to ca tegor ise  models 
according to the way in  which they analyse the future of pric ing  
behaviour of o i l  producing co u n tr ies . E sse n tia lly  there are three  
main approaches in  the l ite r a tu r e :  the energy balances approach,
sim ulation  stu d ies  and optim isation  models.
In the energy balances approach the market is  analysed using  
d iffe r e n t  scen a r io s . Each scenario  i s  based on an assumption about 
the p rice path for crude and about factors such as world o i l  reserves  
and world economic growth which are exogenous. For each scenario  
demand and supply are projected and compared and i f  they balance then 
the scenario is  in tern a lly  co n sisten t otherwise the assumptions must 
be a lter ed .
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I l lu s t r a t iv e  examples of th is  approach are the stu d ies  by the 
workshop on A ltern ative  energy s tr a te g ie s  (1977), and by the OECD 
(1977). The consensus among these reports i s  that a major energy 
c r i s i s  i s  imminent by 1985 and consequently large and abrupt 
in creases in  world o i l  p r ices  are l ik e ly .  The extent of the c r i s i s  
was seen as being dependent on Saudi Arabia's o i l  p o lic y , which w i l l  
have v ir tu a lly  unchallenged control over o i l  prices as the productive  
ca p a c itie s  of other OPEC nations become fu lly  u t i l i s e d .
Although such analyses are d e ta iled  and e x p lic it  in  th e ir  
assumptions about the economic and p o l i t i c a l  environment incorporated  
in  d iffe r e n t scen a r io s , th e ir  major shortcoming is  that they are 
inform al and im p lic it  in  th e ir  fu n ction a l re la tio n sh ip s  among the
variab les and rather sp e c u la tiv e , thus making evaluation  and 
c r it ic ism  very d i f f i c u l t .
In the second approach, sim ulation s tu d ie s , the model has a se t  
of postu lated  f in i t e  price  tr a je c to r ie s  and a s e t  of assumptions on 
the value of parameters such as demand growth r a te s , d iscount rates  
and price e l a s t i c i t i e s  of demand and non-OPEC supply. Of the price  
tr a je c to r ie s  p ostu la ted , one or more are chosen according to some 
se le c te d  c r ite r io n  as the most l ik e ly  to occur and 'b est' of a l l
p r ice  paths.
Examples of th is  approach are the models by Kennedy (1974), 
Kalymon (1975), B litzer-M eeran s-S tou tjesd ijk  (1975) which are more 
formal and e x p l ic i t  than the energy balances approach but le s s  formal 
than optim isation  s tu d ie s .
In the la t t e r ,  the d ec isio n  maker derives the optimal price
tra jecto ry  which maximises some s p e c if ic  c r ite r io n  fu n ction . 
Examples of th is  approach are the models analysed e a r lie r  on by
Cremer-Weitzman (1976), Bohi-Russel (1975), Ben-Shahar (1976), 
H yilicza-P indyck (1976), o ffer in g  a m onopolistic in terp re ta tio n  and 
also  E z z a ti's  model which is  q u ite  d iffe r e n t from the other stu d ies  
and thus worth considering in  further d e ta il .
E zza ti’s study (1976) an alyses, OPEC's p rice and production  
s tr a te g ie s  w ith in  a dynamic sp e c ia l c a r te l theory, based on the 
a b il i t y  of in d iv id u a l member countries to absorb o i l  revenenues for
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the purpose of im porting, consuming and in v estin g  and a lso  based on 
th e ir  economic in fr a str u c tu r e , volume of o i l  reserves and p o ten tia l 
production.
The model i s  a dynamic, m u ltisec to r a l, lin e a r  programming model 
whose o b jec tiv e  i s  to maximise the jo in t ,  weighted so c ia l w elfare  
function  of OPEC member cou n tr ies . Each country's u t i l i t y  function  
i s  based on the present value of future consumption over the planning 
horizon. Thus, the model determines the crude o i l  production  
requirements of each OPEC country at d iffe r e n t price le v e ls ,  given  
that th e ir  goal i s  maximisation of the PV of consumption; such 
determ ination i s  made subject to each country's economic parameters.
At any given p rice the model determines how much production i s  
required by each country to s a t is fy  i t s  economic needs and here the 
a b i l i t y  to absorb o i l  revenues for the purpose of im porting, 
consuming and in v estin g  i s  of paramount importance.
The lim ited  absorptive capacity  of some countries is  as 
important as the unlim ited  absorptive capacity  of others * in  
determining OPEC price and production s tr a te g ie s .  Countries with  
lim ited  capacity  w i l l  exert an upward pressure on o i l  prices by 
cu ttin g  back production and those with higher absorptive capacity  
w ill  exert a downward pressure by ra is in g  production to s a t is fy  th e ir  
revenue needs.
Having determined each country's requirements, the next step  is  
to determine whether the sum of the exports of OPEC as a whole i s  
le s s  than or greater than what has been demanded from them by o i l  
im porters. The excess production, i f  any, over demand for  OPEC o i l  -  
a resid u a l demand -  i s  the d estru ction  gap, l ik e ly  to lead to ca r te l 
d is in teg ra tio n  and downward pressure on OPEC's o i l  p r ice . This 
s itu a t io n  would r e f le c t  the fa c t that d iffere n c es  among member 
countries have led the c a r te l to the opposite end of the spectrum -  a 
com petitive market -  rather than towards monopoly.
E zzati d ev ises production prorationing and sid e  payment schemes 
to counteract d is in te g r a tiv e  tendencies and bring the ca r te l towards 
a s itu a t io n  with zero gap, where supply and demand for OPEC o i l  are 
id e n t ic a l.
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On the other hand, the sum of the crude o i l  production generated  
by the model for any given le v e l  of price for each country may be 
le s s  than the to ta l volume of o i l  demanded from OPEC as a whole by 
o i l  im porters. This d e f ic i t  in  production over demand is  the 
s t a b i l i t y  gap, which i f  maintained for some time may lead to an 
upward pressure on OPEC p rices and to greater strength  and s t a b i l i t y  
for  the c a r te l.
The model takes in to  account s im u la r it ie s  and d ifferen ces  in  the 
economic in fra stru ctu res  of OPEC countries as w ell as the 
responsiveness of o i l  importing countries to changes in  crude o i l  
p r ic e s . I t  considers e x p l i c i t ly  OPEC members' foreign  a sse t holdings 
and a lso  recognises the in flu en ce  of OPEC dom estic o i l  consumption on 
o i l  p r ic in g . One novel fea tu re  i s  the macroeconomic models for each 
country which are used as in eq u a lity  co n stra in ts , a very appropriate 
sp e c if ic a t io n  given that they are developing countries and hence 
th e ir  economic in fra stru ctu re  i s  bound to change over time.
N everth eless, OPEC's equilibrium  is  not assumed to be general
enough to allow  m odelling of i t s  price behaviour. OPEC is  presumed
to -fo llo w  a certa in  p rice  p o licy  which is  exogenously determined and
th is  is  of course a weakness, s in ce  how much one country produces i s
going to a f fe c t  the p rice le v e l .  S t i l l ,  E zzati could e ith er  f ix  the
*
p rice to find  the q u antity , or f ix  the quantity in  order to determine 
the price co n sisten t w ith the cou n tries' f in a n c ia l requirements.
The framework i s  q u ite  novel, providing a link  between 
development and o i l  production and explain ing why, a fte r  f ix in g  a 
p rice le v e l ,  OPEC cannot rely  on output produced to be con sisten t  
with th is  p r ic e . As long as OPEC has no production p o licy  and each 
member's output i s  determined by absorptive cap acity , one cannot 
guarantee that OPEC's supply w il l  be below demand ( s t a b i l i t y  gap) so 
as to ensure higher p rices; only i f  there i s  a jo in t  agreement on 
to ta l  output i s  su rv iva l and s t a b i l i t y  guaranteed.
3 .3  THE HYPOTHESIS: EVALUATION AND SYNTHESIS
OPEC has been; described as a c a r te l by both academics and general 
observers and indeed i t  would seem that the natural tendency of 
producers towards c a r te lis a t io n  o ffers  a good explanation for the 
events of the 1970s.
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The market demand for crude o i l  is  in e la s t ic  w ith respect to  
p r ic e , except in  the long run, because of the absence of c lo se  
s u b s t itu te s . Reductions in  the use of o i l  in  response to a p rice  
increase r e la t iv e  to  other fu e ls  w i l l  take time because they require 
investment to e ith e r  in crease  e f f ic ie n c y  in  the use of o i l  or to 
su b stitu te  other fu e ls  for i t .  Therefore, increases in  the market 
price  of o i l  w i l l  r a ise  producers' revenues, s in ce  the percentage 
reduction in  the volume so ld  w i l l  be le s s  than the precentage 
in crease  in  p rice  -  by the d e f in it io n  of market demand price  
in e la s t i c i t y .
By co n tra st, in d iv id u a l crudes which d if fe r  w ith respect to  
g ra v ity , sulphur content or d istan ce from the market are good 
su b stitu te s  for each oth er. Thus the price e l a s t i c i t y  for in d iv id u a l 
crudes i s  high; even sm all p rice d ifferen ces  among d iffe r e n t crude 
o i l  producers w i l l  a f fe c t  sa le s  s ig n if ic a n t ly .  Therefore, producers 
are motivated to form groupings w ith the purpose of supressing  
com petition w ith in  the group so as to take advantage of the price  
in e la s t ic  market demand and r a ise  group p r o f it s .  Since only 13 
countries form OPEC, a c a r te l aimed at e x p lo itin g  market demand 
in e la s t i c i t y  seems easy to form and maintain, e sp e c ia lly  sin ce the 
members are governments and there is  no r isk  of d isso lv in g  the c a r te l  
by, for example, a n t i- tr u s t  laws.
OPEC was formed in  1960 and yet is  seems that the o i l  market was 
not dominated by any producers' c a r te l between 1960 and 1970, even 
though the e la s t i c i t y  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  of the market were there. When 
OPEC was formed i t s  main o b jec tiv e  was to stop reductions in  the 
posted p rice of crude o i l  and in  th is  respect i t  was su c c e ss fu l. At 
the same time there were some improvements in  the producing 
governments' take from o i l  operations. S t i l l ,  OPEC showed l i t t l e  
sign  of ex p lo itin g  th e ir  bargaining stren gth . Though th e ir  revenues 
per barrel increased somewhat and to ta l revenues rose much more due 
to rapid o i l  expansion, rea l per barrel revenues were improved very 
l i t t l e  in  the 1960s, as seen in  Table 3 .3 .1 .
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Table 3 .3 .1  OPEC Government Revenues per b arre l
Year Nominal revenues ($) Real Revenue (1950 = 100)
1950 0.28 0.28
1960 0.68 0.55
1965 0.81 0.63
1970 0.89 0.61
Source: C Robinson, 1975, p 15.
There was no evidence in  the 1960s of the output r e s tr ic t in g  -  
price  increasing  behaviour of a c a r te l.  Indeed, th is  was a time of 
o i l  surp lus, when the o i l  price  was d eclin in g  as crude supply was 
in creasin g  and as com petition among the companies was mounting. This 
o il-su r p lu s  period appears very odd given that a ca r te l was in  
ex isten ce . Even more strange i s  the sudden tr a n s it io n  from o i l  
surplus to o i l  sc a r c ity  in  the' 1970s, w ith OPEC appearing suddenly 
more a s se r t iv e .
One p o ssib le  explanation  i s  that OPEC was not very aggressive in
i t s  early  years because there were many doubts i f  i t  could hold
together given the d iv e r s ity  of members' in te r e s ts  so that i t  lacked  
confidence in  i t s  a b i l i t y  to e x p lo it  the market. E ventually , OPEC's 
confidence grew as i t  obtained more members and managed to hold 
together and as the LDCs' a tt itu d e s  towards the in d u str ia lise d  world 
were changing. The 1970s events can be seen as an attempt to  
compensate for the past e x p lo ita t io n  of the LDCs by challenging the
in d u str ia l n ation s. However, th is  explanation i s  not convincing
because, as argued below, OPEC has never behaved as a c a r te l.
Economic theory is  c lear  on the subject of a ca r te l and i t s  
fea tu res . The u ltim ate ob jectiv e  of any market in p erfec tio n  i s  to 
maximise and protect monopoly p ro fit  by b lunting the e f fe c t s  of 
com petitive s e l l in g  and regu lating  or preventing entry. In the case  
of a c a r te l i t  i s  important not only to agree on p rices but a lso  to  
regu la te  output and have market sharing arrangements among the c a r te l  
members. Neither of these elements is  to be found in  OPEC’s 
behaviour.
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On the question  of an output regu lating mechanism, th is  does not 
e x is t  for various reasons. F ir s t ,  market conditions up to 1982 were 
such that th is  mechanism was n eith er needed nor necessary. I t  was 
not needed because, as i t  was gen era lly  agreed, the combined output 
of OPEC countries exceeded the le v e l  required to finance ordinary 
budget and c a p ita l investm ent.
Second, the con v iction  has always been that the sovereignty  of 
the S tate i s  in  the f in a l a n a ly sis  the u ltim ate determinant of 
d ecision s that are v i t a l  to the economies of OPEC member cou n tr ies . 
The sharing w ith others of national d ecision  making i s  not something 
OPEC members w i l l  ever accept.
Third, the e x p e r ts ’ opinion has been that there w il l  develop a 
shortage and not a surplus of o i l  in  the fu ture. Output regu lation  
can only make sense under conditions of threatening excess cap acity . 
F in a lly , the c lea r  imbalance in  the d is tr ib u tio n  of reserves among 
members, i . e  Saudi A rabia’s dominant p o s it io n , w il l  make any attempt 
to  regu la te  output of no p r a c tic a l consequence un less the regu lating  
plan i s  endorsed by the Saudis.
The above observations in  turn means that the economic and 
p o l i t i c a l  o b jec tiv es  of a l l  the member countries must be 
sim ultaneously served by such a plan. Here, any plan to regu late  
output i s  bound to f a i l  because i t  seems that there i s  no way to 
reco n c ile  the d iverse  and often  c o n flic t in g  p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c ia l and 
economic in te r e s ts  of member cou n tries. This observation in  turn 
leads to a more important one: the attempt to la b e l an organ isation  
such as OPEC stems from trying to impose the behaviour of a firm  
whose s in g le  most important o b jec tiv e  is  p r o fit  maxim isation, on 
p o l i t i c a l  e n t i t i e s ,  each one of which is  pursuing a m ultitude of 
o b jec tiv e s  which are not n ecessa r ily  ranked according to ra tio n a l -  
in  the economic sense -  c r i t e r ia .
But even i f  one finds the above arguments inadequate, i s  i t  
s t i l l  p o ssib le  to form ulate a convincing case for  OPEC as a carte l?  
T rad itional c o llu s iv e  o ligop o ly  theory d istin g u ish es  two types of 
c o llu sio n : c a r te l and p rice leadersh ip . The most ty p ica l forms of
c a r te ls  are (1) those aiming at jo in t  p r o fit  maximisation, and (2) 
those aiming at the sharing of the market. In the former type of
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c a r te ls  firm s -  countries of OPEC -  appoint a cen tra l agency -  OPEC -  
which has the authority  to decide on to ta l  output to be produced, 
a llo c a tio n  of that output among the members and p r ice , the aim being 
jo in t  p r o fit  maximisaton. The argument advanced above about output 
regu la tion  s u f f ic e s  to conclude that th is  type of co llu sio n  does not 
apply to OPEC. So one has to examine whether OPEC is  a market 
sharing c a r te l.
In theory such a c a r te l uses e ith er  of two methods for sharing  
the market: determ ination of quotas and non-price com petition. The 
former i s  an agreement on the quantity that each member may s e l l  at 
the agreed p r ice . In OPEC's case sa le s  are a llo ca ted  on the b asis of 
producers' requirem ents. These, however, are d i f f ic u l t  to define and 
c le a r ly  depend on the cou n tr ies' bargaining stren gth . In ad d ition , 
th is  technique has never been in  ex isten ce  up to 1983 -  at le a s t  not 
su c c e ss fu lly .
With reference to the second method of sharing the market, 
members should agree on a common price at which they can s e l l  any 
quantity demanded. So i t  i s  necessary to examine whether OPEC does 
se t  the p r ice . To do so one has to take in to  account the physica l 
nature of crude o i l ,  which by i t s e l f  i s  not va luab le. I t s  value  
derives from the sa le  of refined  products obtained from i t .  Thus, 
the economic value i s  attached to products, ir r e sp e c tiv e  of th e ir  
crude o i l  o r ig in .
Therefore, the economic performance of a l l  crude o i l s  is  
measured by the same c r ite r io n , namely, market v a lo r isa tio n  
corresponding to a given demand pattern at p reva ilin g  product 
p r ic e s . Checked again st th is  common c r ite r io n , the r e la t iv e  values  
of a l l  crudes ought to be s e t  according to th e ir  r e la t iv e  economic 
performance.
Each OPEC member country produces one or more crudes whose 
products are h ighly su b stitu ta b le . This may create com petition among 
members, r e su ltin g  in  p rice  undercutting in  an e ffo r t  to increase  
s a le s .  To avoid th is  a cohesive pricing  system ought to be 
esta b lish ed , incorporating q u a lity  and lo ca tio n  d if f e r e n t ia ls ,  so 
that p rice d if f e r e n t ia ls  are in  a s ta te  of equilibrium  -  equilibrium  
here means that i f  a p articu lar  crude is  overpriced r'elative to i t s
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perform ance, the r e f in e r s  may tu rn  to o th e r, s im ila r  q u a lit y  crudes  
which are c o r r e c t ly  v a lu e d , so th at there i s  no in c e n t iv e  to 
o v e rp ric e .
In  th eo ry, th e re fo re , the p r ic e  a d m in istra to r ought to d e fin e  a 
refere n ce crude o i l ,  w ith w e ll known c h a r a c t e r is t ic s ,  on the b a s is  of 
w hich the r e la t iv e  v a lu e s  of other crudes w i l l  be s e t , depending on 
t h e ir  product y ie ld  and tra n sp o rt c o s ts .
A method th at can be used to develop such an o v e r a ll  p r ic in g  
p a tte rn  is  the netback form ula - concept. A ccording to t h is  the c i f  
p r ic e s  of a l l  crudes of s im ila r  g r a v ity  are e q u a lise d  in  a g iven  
m arket, ir r e s p e c t iv e  of t h e ir  g eo g rap h ical o r ig in .
Fo llo w in g  the m ajo rs, OPEC in  1973 chose A rab ian  L ig h t  34 ° API 
as the marker cru d e, a ch o ice j u s t i f ie d  by the amount of knowledge 
about t h is  s p e c if ic  crude and by the im portance of Saudi A ra b ia  as a 
producer. A lso  fo llo w in g  the m ajors OPEC e s ta b lis h e d  a co nstant 
b a s ic  g r a v it y  d i f f e r e n t ia l  of 6 ce n ts per degree API fo r  crudes above 
34 degrees and 3 cents per degree fo r crudes below the refere n ce  
g r a v it y .  The m ajors had been u sin g  a constant BGD of 2 cents per 
degree thus the OPEC system gave an advantage to l ig h t  cru d es. 
N e v e rth e le ss, the two systems did not d if f e r  s u b s t a n t ia l ly  except 
th at the companies used i t  as an accounting framework s in c e  a l l  
p r ic e s  were t r a n s fe r  p r ic e s  fo r the crude p a ssin g  through t h e ir  
v e r t i c a l ly  in te g ra te d  s t r u c t u r e s , w h ils t  OPEC used t h e ir s  to 
determ ine the p r ic e s  at which they would s e l l .
G iven  the 1973 system the p a tte rn  of fob p o stin g s (Quain Is la n d )  
in  the G u lf , a f t e r  adjustm ent fo r fr e ig h t  d if f e r e n t ia ls  and sulphu r  
content can be resp resen ted  as
X = aG + b . . .  3 . 1
where:
X = $ /b b l ( p a r it y  posted p r ic e )
G = degrees API -  crude o i l  g r a v it y  governing the f u l l  range of 1 degree 
b = $ /b b l -  p r ic in g  fa c to r
a = $ /b b l/d e g re e  ( b a s ic  g r a v it y  d if f e r e n t ia l)  and 
a = o ff
3 cen ts LG -  34° API < 0
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Assuming the v a l id i t y  of ( 3 . 1 )  in  a l l  areas in  the E a ste rn  
Hemisphere, to develop an o v e r a ll  p r ic in g  p a tte rn  u sin g  the netback  
form ula two s u c c e ss iv e  phases must be fo llo w ed : ( 1) s e t  the r e la t iv e  
p r ic in g  le v e ls  of the d if f e r e n t  areas w ith resp e ct to each other by 
determ ining the v a lu e s  of the referen ce p r ic e  corresponding to the 
refere n ce  g r a v it y  in  each a re a , and ( 2) determ ine the b a s ic  g r a v it y
d if f e r e n t ia l  (a) which a r t ic u la t e s  crude o i l  p r ic e s  in  each area on
the corresponding refere n ce  p r ic e .
L e t X0 stand fo r  the p r ic e  of the marker fob Quain Is la n d . Then 
the le v e l  of the referen ce p r ic e  in -a n y  g iven  export area o u tsid e  the 
G u lf (X) corresponding to a crude o i l  of the same market g r a v it y  i s  
d e rive d  from the marker (o r re fe re n ce ) p r ic e  X0 by adding the valu e  
of the fr e ig h t  d if f e r e n t ia l  (fo  -  f )  w ith resp e ct to a g iven market 
p la ce  where c i f  v a lu e s  (Y) are  e q u a lis e d , s in c e  we have
Y = X0 + fo = X + f  . . .  3 .2
or X = X0 + (fo  -  f )  . . .  3 .3
However, f r e ig h t  r a te s  ( f )  are g iven  in  terms of d o lla r s  per long ton 
( $ /L T )  whereas p r ic e s  are quoted in  d o lla r s  per b a r r e l ( $ / b b l) .  
A lso , h ig h er g r a v it y  crudes would represent more b a r r e ls  per ton to 
be tran sp o rted  fo r the same c o s t. Consequently,- the tra n s p o rta tio n  
co st per volume u n it  d ecreases fo r h ig h er g r a v it y  crude o i l s .  Thus 
g r a v it y  has an impact on tra n sp o rt co sts  and the magnitude of t h is  
impact i s  r e f le c te d  by the co n version  fa c to r  ( <|)) from $ /L T  in to  
$ /b b l ,  so that
f ( $ /b b l)  = 6 F ( $ /L T )  . . .  3 .4
where F i s  the tra n sp o rt co st fo r  a round t r ip  from a g iven  export 
te rm in a l to a g iven d isc h a rg in g  p o rt. With refere n ce  to $ t h is  i s  
not a l in e a r  fu n c tio n  of g r a v it y , so the f r e ig h t  component of c i f  
p r ic e s  in tro d u ce s a n o n -lin e a r  d is t o r t io n  even though fob p r ic e s  are  
governed by a l in e a r  p a tte rn  w ith  resp ect to g r a v it y . N e v e rth e le ss, 
a l in e a r  r e la t io n s h ip  between g r a v it y  and <|) can be considered over a 
l im ite d  range of g r a v it y  of most cru d es, from 20 ° to 45° A P I. The 
l in e a r  approxim ation of the co n versio n  fa c to r  versu s g r a v it y  can be 
expressed as
<J> = -0 .0 0 0 8 2  G + 0 .16 17 7  . . .  3 .5
20 ° API < G < 45° API
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F re ig h t  ra te s  are la r g e ly  determined by demand and supply fo rce s  
in  a co m p etitive  market and fo r a g iven  tra n s p o rta tio n  route f r e ig h t  
r a te  f lu c t u a t io n s  are in flu e n c e d  by co n tra ct type, tim ing of 
c o n tr a c t , ro u te , e t c . The m u ltitu d e of ra te s  and c o n d itio n s  would 
make the a c tu a l v a lu e s of f r e ig h t  ra te s  a poor im p r a c t ic a l c r it e r io n  
fo r  a s s e s s in g  the market s it u a t io n . So fr e ig h t  ra te s  are measured 
a g a in s t  permanent t h e o r e t ic a l  refere n ce  s c a le s  and expressed as a 
percentage of corresponding b a s ic  ra te s  given fo r round t r ip s  fo r  
each couple of lo a d in g  and d is c h a rg in g  p o rts . Thus F i s  made up of 
two components: ( 1 )  the corresponding b a s ic  ra te  (R) of a g iven  s c a le
( In t a s c a le ,  W o rld scale ) which i s  a f ix e d  sum acco unting fo r the
d ista n c e  and v a r ie s  w ith the g e o g rap h ical lo c a t io n  of the ports
co n sid e re d , ( 2) the average fr e ig h t  r a t e , which r e f le c t s  market
f lu c t u a t io n s  by r e t a in in g  an average valu e  that might vary in  time  
but i s  a p p lic a b le  to a l l  p o rts a t a g iven  moment; t h is  i s  represented  
as a percentage d isco u n t o ff  In t a s c a le  ra te s  ( 1  + i ) R  and as a 
percentage of W o rld scale ra te s  WR so th at
F = ( 1  + i ) R  (R = in t a s c a le  ra te ) . . .  3 . 6 . 1
or F = WR ( R — w o rld sca le  ra te ) . . .  3 .6 .2
U sing equatio ns ( 3 . 1 )  to ( 3 .5 )  and ( 3 . 6 . 1 )  the p r ic in g  p a tte rn  of c i f  
p r ic e s  can be expressed as fo llo w s:
Y = X + f
= aG + b + <f>F
= aG + b + <|> ( 1  + i ) R
= aG + b + (-0 .0 0 0 8 2G  + 0 .1 6 1 7 7 ) < 1  + i ) R
= aG + b -  0.00082G ( 1  + i ) R  + 0 .1 6 1 7 7  ( 1  + i ) R
= G[a -  0 .0 0 0 8 2 (1 + i) R ]  + b + 0 .16 17 7  ( 1  + i ) R
= a "G + b ' . . .  3 .7
where a" = a -  0.00082 ( 1  + i ) R
b" = b + 0 .1 6 1 7 7  ( 1  + i ) R
T h e refo re , not o n ly  are fob p r ic e s  (X) governed by a l in e a r  
p a tte rn  w ith resp e ct to g r a v it y  but c i f  p r ic e s  are too. However, the
v alu e  of the b a s ic  g r a v it y  d if f e r e n t ia l  governing c i f  p r ic e s  ( a ' )  i s
a ffe c te d  by the impact of g r a v it y  on the f r e ig h t  component, which 
r e s u lt s  in  d im in ish in g  the o r ig in a l  valu e (a) governing fob p r ic e s .  
The magnitude of the decrease a -  a '=  0 .0 0 0 8 2(1 + i) R  i s  
p ro p o rtio n a te  to the tra n s p o rta t io n  co st (F) so th at i t  v a r ie s  w ith
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the d is ta n c e  between lo a d in g  and d isch a rg in g  ports corresponding to 
d if f e r e n t  R valu e s and w ith market f lu c t u a t io n s  represented by 
d if f e r e n t  v a lu e s of average d isco u n ts  o ff In t a s c a le  ra te s ( i ) .  
C le a r ly ,  the impact of g r a v it y  i s  very s ig n if ic a n t  when one co n sid e rs  
how the l in e a r  p a tte rn  of fob p r ic e s  would be a ffe c te d  i f  transposed  
to c i f  v a lu e s  over long d is ta n c e s  such as G u lf to Western Europe or 
the USA.
U sing the same e q u a tio n s, the fr e ig h t  d if f e r e n t ia l  r e la t in g  
Quain Is la n d  and another export te rm in a l o u tsid e  the G u lf area w ith  
re sp e ct to the same d isc h a rg in g  port in  which c i f  v a lu e s are 
e q u a lise d  can be expressed as :
fo -  f  = ^ o ^1 + ~ <Kl + i ) R
where 8 i s  the Suez can a l t o l l  ( in  $ /L T ) .  The e x iste n c e  of an
o v e r a ll  p r ic in g  p a tte rn  in  the E a ste rn  Hemisphere is  s u b je c t  to the 
co n d itio n  th at the average fr e ig h t  ra te  should s im u lta n e o u sly  have 
the same v alu e  ( i  = i Q) so that the fr e ig h t  d if f e r e n t ia l  would be:
fo -  f  = ( ^ 0R0 -  <J> R ) ( l  + i )  +
Assuming th a t refere n ce crude o i ls  in  the d if f e r e n t  export areas have 
the same refere n ce  g r a v it y  ( <J> = ^0 ) i t  then fo llo w s th a t :
fo -  f  = <frQ( l  + i ) ( R 0 -  R) + 4>o8 . . .  3 .8
From ( 3 .8 )  one concludes th a t the netback form ula concept would 
guarantee e q u a lis a t io n  of the c i f  p r ic e s  of referen ce crudes in  an 
export market i f  these refere n ce  crudes have the same g r a v it y  (so  
th a t the same co n version  fa c to r  a p p lie s )  and i f  the same average  
f r e ig h t  ra te s  ( i  3 i Q or W = WQ) are used. However, these two 
co n d itio n s  are not s u f f ic ie n t  fo r an o v e r a ll  p r ic in g  p a tte rn  in  the 
E a ste rn  Hem isphere. S in ce  1973 the referen ce p r ic in g  p a tte rn  in  the 
G u lf has been governed by a co nstant BGD and the corresponding  
refere n ce  p a tte rn  of c i f  p r ic e s  has been governed by a BGD ( a 1 ) the 
v a lu e  of which i s :
P  a1 = 0.06 -  0 .0 0 0 8 2 [R0 ( 1  + i )  + g]
j fo r  G -34° API > 0
3 . 9 . 1  j and
a 1 = 0 .0 3  -  0 .00082[R o( l  + i )  + &]
I  fo r  G -3 4 °  API < 0
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I f  one w ishes the l in e a r  p r ic e  s c a le  of c i f  p r ic e s  governed by a* to  
be e q u a lly  re p re s e n ta tiv e  of a l l  p r ic in g  p a tte rn s in  the d if f e r e n t  
export areas -  which corresponds to the e q u a lis a t io n  of c i f  valu es of 
crude o i l s  from a l l  sources and a l l  g r a v it ie s  -  then the valu e of the  
BGD of fob p ric e s  in  each export area (a) should be re la te d  to the 
predeterm ined v a lu e  a^ - by:
a 1 = a -  0 .00082R(1 + i )  . . .  3 .9 .2
From ( 3 .9 .2 )  a = a 1 + 0 .00082R (1 + i )  . . .  3 .9 .3
S u b s t itu t in g  ( 3 .9 .3 )  in to  ( 3 . 9 . 1 )
a = 0.06 -  0.00082 ( 1  + i ) ( R 0 -  R) -  0.00082ft
fo r  G -  34 ° API > 0i
3 .9 .4  I and
a = 0 .0 3  -  0.00082 ( 1  + i ) ( R 0 -  R) -  0.00082ft
fo r  G -  34° A P I'< 0
S in ce  the o v e r a ll  p r ic in g  p a tte rn  i s  based on the same value of i  and
s in c e  each export area i s  c h a ra c te ris e d  by a s p e c if ic  v a lu e  fo r  R, i t
fo llo w s th at the BGD in  each and a l l  export areas has s p e c if ic  valu es  
d if f e r e n t  from each other and a l l  d if f e r e n t  from the refere n ce v a lu e  
of 0.06 and 0 .0 3  $ /b b l/d e g re e  p r e v a ilin g  in  the G u lf .
E q u a lis a t io n  of c i f  p r ic e s  in  a g iven  market fo r crude o i ls  of 
d iff e r e n t  g r a v it ie s  could o nly be achieved i f  the b a s ic  g r a v it y  
d if f e r e n t ia ls  ( a %  of the d if f e r e n t  se ts  of c i f  p r ic e s  re la te d  to the 
d iff e r e n t  export are as would have the same v a lu e . Such e q u a lis a t io n  
would only be p o s s ib le  i f  he BGD governing fob p r ic e s  would have
d iff e r e n t  v a lu e s  from one export area to ano ther. T h is  was untrue in
the a c tu a l p r ic in g  s tr u c tu r e  of the E a ste rn  Hem isphere, hence 
e q u a lis a t io n  of c i f  p r ic e s  was v a l id  only fo r crudes of the same 
refere n ce  g r a v it y  (G0 ) .  Thus, the use of a constant BGD which has 
been the p r a c t ic e  of the companies before 1973 and has been continued  
by OPEC, meant that there has never been an o v e r a ll  p r ic in g  p atte rn  
in  the E a ste rn  Hem isphere.
The id ea  of a co n stan t BGD is  in c o n s is te n t  w ith an o v e r a ll  
p r ic in g  p a tte rn , which re q u ire s  a v a r ia b le  BGD because ( 1 )  
tra n s p o rta t io n  i s  c a r r ie d  out on the b a s is  of long tons w hile  tra d in g  
in  b a r r e ls  and the co n versio n  depends on g r a v it y , ( 2) the co st of
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tra n sp o rt v a r ie s  from one area to another, so i  i s  not f ix e d . Had 
OPEC agreed th at the g r a v it y  d if f e r e n t ia ls  would be ( 3 . 9 . 1 )  some 
f l e x i b i l i t y  would have e x is t e d , s in c e  (a ) would vary w ith p ressu res  
in  the tra n s p o rta t io n  market and would take in to  account the nature  
of t h is  market in  terms of long to n s.
The o v e r a ll  p r ic in g  s tr u c tu r e  has never been e s ta b lis h e d  and 
in s te a d , the ta sk  of s e t t in g  the d if f e r e n t ia ls  has been l e f t  to each 
OPEC member's d is c r e t io n  and thus has become a fu n c tio n  of a c tu a l or 
p erce ived  demand p re s s u re s . In  other words, p r ic e  d if f e r e n t ia ls  have 
been market determ ined.
I t  would seem th a t OPEC has never behaved acco rd in g  to the 
c a r t e l  model sim p ly  because i t  d id  not f i t  th at model. R ecog nising  
the la c k  of evidence to support the view th at o i l  p r ic e s  have been 
ad m inistered  by OPEC's c o llu s iv e  p o l ic ie s ,  some authors suggest the 
dominant producer model, analysed in  s e c t io n  3 .2 .  Saudi A ra b ia  or 
the G u lf core are o ften  thought of as the le a d e r who would in c re a se  
output in  tim es of heavy demand and reduce i t  in  times of s la c k  
demand, to keep the p r ic e  s tr u c tu r e  s t a b le . Had that model been 
a p p lic a b le , Saudi or G u lf p ro d u ctio n  would be a sm a lle r  f r a c t io n  of 
t o t a l  OPEC p ro d u ctio n  at present as compared w ith  19 7 3 . Indeed, the 
way to te s t  t h is  h yp o th esis  i s  to look at the dominant p ro d ucer's  
share in  world o i l  p ro d u ctio n  in  the period of* the p r ic e  changes.
T h is  share should s h rin k  as long as p r ic e s  are r is in g  in  order to 
s u s ta in  the in c r e a s e , fa b le  3 . 3 .2  p ro vid es the re le v a n t in fo rm a tio n .
T ab le  3 .3 .2  Shares of Saudi A rab ia  and G u lf C o u n tries in  World O il  
O utput, 19 7 3 -8 4
Year Saudi A r a b ia 's  % Share G u lf 's  % Share
1973 1 3 . 1 22.0
1974 1 4 .7 22.8
1975 1 3 .0 2 0 .5
1976 14 .6 22.2
1977 1 5 . 1 22.2
1978. 1 3 .6 20 .7
1979 1 5 .0 2 2.4
1980 16 .3 2 2 .5
1981 1 7 . 1 2 2 .3
1982 12.0 16 .3
1983 9.6 14 .0
1984 8 .5
i
1 3 ,4
1
Source: BP S t a t i s t i c a l  Review of World Energy
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D uring both c r is e s  in  19 7 3 -7 4  and 19 7 8 -8 1 Saudi A r a b ia 's  share
in cre a se d  and so d id  the G u lf c o u n tr ie s ' sh a re . Furtherm ore, Saudi
output as a p ro p o rtio n  of OPEC p ro d u ctio n  a ls o  rose in  the p o s t -19 7 3  
p e rio d , reach in g  36 .8  per cent in  1980. The f a c t  th a t Saudi A r a b ia 's  
market share rose in  the years of the two p r ic e  in c re a se s  ca sts  doubt
on the argument th at i t  was the Saudis that engineered the p r ic e
in c r e a s e s .
Furtherm ore, the g e n eral s t ic k in e s s  of Saudi A r a b ia 's  shares and 
of the shares of o th e r ’ OPEC members appears to be a d d it io n a l evidence  
a g a in s t  the s h o r t-r u n  v a l id i t y  of the dominant producer view of the 
o i l  m arket. Market share v a r i a b i l i t y  ought to e x is t  under t h is  view , 
w ith  the S a u d is ' sh are  f a l l i n g  in  periods of d e c lin in g  OPEC demand 
and r is in g  w ith growing demand. As a p r ic e  le a d e r t h is  country
should reduce output in  a weak market and v ic e  v e r s a . The opposite
has been tru e of Saudi A ra b ia  whose output was 8 .5  mbd in  1974 and
9 .2  mbd in  19 7 7 . In  a d d it io n , w ith the tw o -t ie r  p r ic e  system Saudi 
A rab ia  chose to r a is e  output in  order to keep p r ic e s  from going up; 
the 'le a d e r ' was not only tr y in g  to in c re a se  p ro d uctio n  but was 
tr y in g  to dampen p r ic e  in c re a se s  by output expansion. I t  would seem 
from the arguments advanced above th at the dominant producer model 
has to be re je c te d  fo r the 19 7 3 -8 3  p e rio d .
S t i l l  another h yp o th esis that can be e n te rta in e d  in  support of
the c a r t e l  t h e s is  i s  th at OPEC d id  not cause the two p r ic e  in c r e a s e s ,  
but acted in  such a way as to s u s t a in  them. That argument c e r t a in ly  
does not apply to the p erio d  fo llo w in g  the f i r s t  o i l  shock sim ply  
because,* as seen in  s e c t io n  2 .5  (ta b le  2 .5 .3 )  there was alm ost no 
consumption cut a g a in st  which OPEC had to s u s t a in  the h ig h er o i l  
p r ic e .
For the second p r ic e  shock and the period fo llo w in g  i t  th in g s  
have been ra th e r d if f e r e n t . World o i l  consumption d id  f a l l  
s u b s t a n t ia l ly  and so d id  OPEC's production due to in cre a se d  non-OPEC 
o utp ut. In  the face of these developments OPEC in s t it u t e d  output 
quotas in  the London conference of March 1983, w ith  Saudi A ra b ia  
assuming e x p l i c i t l y  the r o le  of the swing producer. The r e s u lt  was 
th at the Saudis began to behave acco rd in g  to the dominant producer 
model: t h e ir  market share f e l l  sh a rp ly  from 17 per cent in  198 1 to 12
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p er cent in  1982 and 8 .5  per cent in  1984. S in ce  the end of 19 8 5 , 
however, Saudi A ra b ia  has stopped perform ing th at r o le  and thus the 
p r ic e  c o lla p s e  of 198 6.
I t  should be c le a r  by now th at OPEC up to 1983 does not f i t  any
model of c o llu s io n , c a r t e l  or p r ic e  le a d e rs h ip . I f  OPEC i s  not a 
c a r t e l  then c le a r ly  the changes of the 1970s must have t h e ir  roots in  
another e x p la n a tio n s and th at could be the property r ig h ts  model of 
Johany and Mead. I t  may be th a t the e v e n tfu l decade of the 1970s has 
been caused by market fo rce s a lo n e .
I t  i s  im portant a t t h is  stage to se t fo rth  the major 
in ad e q u acies of the th eo ry , the most obvious one being the fa c t  th at  
many o i l  producing c o u n trie s  in  the 1950s and 1960s were demanding 
th a t the companies expand p ro d u ctio n . T h is  i s  a t odds w ith the  
property r ig h t s  model. S t i l l  another o b je c tio n  i s  th at w h ile  t h is  
theory could presum ably e x p la in  a p o rtio n  of the 19 7 3 -7 4  p r ic e  
in c r e a s e , i t  o ffe rs  no obvious in te r p r e t a t io n  to the doubling of o i l  
p r ic e s  in  19 7 8 -7 9 . The tr a n s fe r  of ownership had long s in c e  occurred  
so th at fu rth e r  re d u ctio n s in  the. d isco un t ra te  are not apparent. 
S im ila r ly ,  the r a t io n a le  fo r changed exp ecta tio n s in  other fa c to r s  
which could allo w  co m p e titive  p r ic e s  to double i s  not apparent. I t  
i t  not obvious th at producers a lte re d  t h e ir  lo n g -ru n  exp e cta tio n s in  
19 7 8 -7 9  reg ard in g  fu tu re  re s e rv e s , fu tu re  demand growth and so 
fo r t h . R ath er, fo llo w in g  the r a t io n a le  of a co m p etitive  model, one 
would expect th a t fo llo w in g  the 19 78 -79  p r ic e  r is e  -  which was due to 
supply c o n s tr a in ts  -  th e p r ic e  would retu rn  to the i n i t i a l  p r ic e  
p ath , w ith an ea sin g  of these c o n s tr a in t s .
T h e refo re , th a t argument can ony be a p p lie d  to the f i r s t  o i l
shock and ag ain  i t  seems that i t  cannot be used to e x p la in  the shock
<
i t s l e f  but ra th e r  why o i l  p r ic e s  were su sta in e d  at a high le v e l  a f t e r
the shock. The property r ig h t s  model cannot be used to e x p la in  the
p r ic e  in c re a se s  of 19 7 3 -7 4  because the im p lic a t io n  is  th at the 
p ro d uctio n  cu ts of the p erio d  where due to economic fa c to rs  [the  
change in  property r ig h t s ]  when in  fa c t  they were due to p o l i t i c a l  
e v e n ts. The tr a n s fe r  of ownership and co n tro l from companies to 
governments cannot be s a id  to have e x a c tly  co in c id e d  w ith the p r ic e  
in c r e a s e s , as t h is  t r a n s fe r  was a ra th e r len g th y process th at had 
o r ig in a te d  in  the 1960s when the m ajors' u n c e rta in ty  had led to f a s t  
d e p le tio n .
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F i n a l l y ,  to base the e x p la n a tio n  of o i l  p r ic e  movements on the
market fo rce s alone seems to be ra th e r n aive  in  view of the fa c t  that
an o rg a n is a tio n  of producers was in  o p e ra tio n , ir r e s p e c t iv e  of the
p r e c is e  form of th at grouping and the p ercep tio n  c e r t a in ly  e x is te d  of 
%
th at grouping as a c a r t e l ;  in  a d d it io n  the major o i l  companies were 
a c to rs  w ith c o n sid e ra b le  power hence t h e ir  presence cannot be 
ig n o red .
I t  i s  obvious th at r e je c t io n  of the two extremes -  c a r t e l  and 
fre e  markets -  le a v e s  o n ly  one a lt e r n a t iv e  route open: an e x p la n a tio n  
ly in g  somewhere in  between, and in v o lv in g  a ro le  fo r a l l  a c to rs  in  
the in d u s tr y , though of course w ith the r e la t iv e  balance of power 
changing over tim e, s in c e  the m arket's s tr u c tu r e  i s  not s t a t i c  but 
dynam ic. Such an e x p la n a tio n  of p r ic e  form ation is  provided by the  
OPEC-companies mechanism which determ ines how the two a cto rs in t e r a c t  
in  the framework of the in t e r n a t io n a l o i l  market to determine output 
and p r ic e s .
A ccording to the a n a ly s is  o ffered  e a r l ie r  on in  t h is  s e c t io n ,  
the use of a co n stan t BGD on fob p r ic e s  by OPEC has meant th at an 
o v e r a ll  p r ic in g  s tr u c tu r e  has never been e s ta b lis h e d  and that  
th e re fo re  p r ic e  d if f e r e n t ia ls  have been market determ ined, in  the 
sense that they have r e f le c te d  OPEC members' p erce p tio n s about the 
s ta te  of the market fo r  t h e ir  s p e c if ic  crude type. T h is  hyp oth esis  
i s  fu r th e r  supported i f  one co n sid e rs the s ig n if ic a n c e  of g r a v it y  in  
the p r ic in g  of crude o i l .  The p h y s ic a l s ig n if ic a n c e  of g r a v it y  i s  
sim p ly  that h ig h er g r a v it y  crudes g iv e  r is e  to a h ig h er percentage  
y ie ld  of l ig h t  p ro d u cts. G iven that l ig h t e r  products are the le a s t  
s u b s t it u t a b le  and thus most v a lu a b le , l ig h t e r  crudes have a h ig h er  
economic v a lu e . In  f a c t ,  in v e s t ig a t io n  of the r e la t io n s h ip  between 
crude g r a v it y  and product y ie ld s  re v e a ls  that fo r a sim ple r e f in e r y  
y ie ld s  are l in e a r  fu n c tio n s  of g r a v it y .
Furtherm ore, the use by OPEC of a constant BGD has meant the 
p re s e rv a tio n  of a l in e a r  r e la t io n s h ip  between the fob p r ic e  of crude 
and g r a v it y  (see equation 3 . 1 ) .  S in ce  both crude p r ic e s  and product 
y ie ld s  are l in e a r ly  re la te d  to g r a v it y , c le a r ly  they are them selves 
re la te d  and t h is  r e la t io n s h ip  i s  c r u c ia l  to understanding the p r ic e  
fo rm u la tio n  mechanism.
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Crude o i l  and o i l  product p r ic e s  are o b v io u sly  the two fa c to r s  
determ ining the economic b alan ce of a r e f in e r 's  o p e ra tio n s. A model 
of crude o i l  p r ic e  d e te rm in atio n  which s tre s s e s  the interdependence  
of crude and product p r ic e s  has been developed by R if a i  ( 1 9 7 5 ) .  The 
model has been developed u sin g  the h yp othesis of in te g ra te d
o p eration s but i t  may y ie ld  v a lu a b le  in s ig h t s  fo r an in d u s try  which
i s  not n e c e s s a r ily  h ig h ly  in te g ra te d . T h is  ex ten sio n  of the m odel's 
a p p l ic a b i l i t y  i s  due to the fa c t  th at the demand fo r crude o i l  is  a 
d e rive d  demand, which in d ic a te s  the e x iste n ce  of only one se t of 
supply-demand fo rce s  in  the o i l  in d u s tr y , namely, the supply of crude  
o i l  and the demand fo r re f in e d  p ro d u cts.
The model assumes the e x iste n c e  of an in te g ra te d  operator who
has s u f f ic ie n t  p o te n t ia l fo r  l i f t i n g  crudes of d if f e r e n t
c h a r a c t e r is t s  from v a rio u s  o r ig in s ,  which are fu r th e r  tra n sp o rte d , 
r e f in e d , d is t r ib u t e d  and marketed to the f i n a l  consumers. The re fin e d  
products are so ld  to the f i n a l  consumer at a p r ic e  ( $ /b b l)  fo r  
each product i .  T o ta l revenues a f te r  tax are expected to cover the 
expenses in cu rre d  at the d if f e r e n t  sta g e s.
The operator fa ces a g iven  market demand fo r h is  re fin e d  
p ro d u cts, which is  s u b je c t  to f lu c t u a t io n s  beyond h is  in f lu e n c e .
In  order to comply w ith  the range of products demanded the operator  
r e f in e s  adequate blends of d if f e r e n t  crude o i l s  and each crude i s  
v a lo r is e d  acco rd in g  to i t s  r e la t iv e  c o n tr ib u t io n  to the processed  
blen d .
Each in te g ra te d  company has to meet a g iven  market demand both 
in  terms of t o t a l volume and in  terms of p ro d u cts' p a tte rn . Let the 
t o t a l  market demand to be met be Q ( b b l) ,  the t o t a l  volume of each 
product i  be (b b l)  and the t o t a l  volume of each crude o i l  j  making 
up the t o t a l  sup p ly be Qj ( b b l) .  Thus the o v e r a ll  m a te ria l balance  
i s
Q -  -  SQ1
i j
QjL and Qj are re la te d  through the p ro d u cts' y ie ld  ( (fy) which i s  a 
l in e a r  fu n c tio n  of g r a v it y  G. So
Qi = j ° i j Q  j  = j ^ ai Gj  + bi^Q j
= a i  i  Q jGj +  ^ i
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The market demand p a tte rn  fo r each product i  i s  predeterm ined
at a g iven  moment so we can re w rite  the above r e la t io n s h ip  between (%  
and Qj as :
Qi = a*1 Gi + b± . . .  3 . 1 0
Q J Q
The demand p a tte rn  commands the r e la t iv e  com position of the crude  
supply blend through eq uatio n  ( 3 . 1 0 )  . In  f a c t ,  rep re sen ts the
Q
r e la t iv e  share of each crude o i l  (Q-j) in  the t o t a l  su p p ly , so th a t :  
y  q .  J
J G4 = G* can be taken as the mean average
j Q
g r a v it y  of the b len d .
A ccording to ( 3 .1 0 )  fo r  g iven  a^, b^ and Gj changes in  the 
demand p a tte rn  ^  r e s u lt  from changes in  , the r e la t iv e
Q Q
sh are of each crude o i l  in  the blend.
The o v e r a ll  economic b alance of the in te g ra te d  r e f in in g  
o p eration s assumed sought can be w ritte n  a s :
£ XiQi + R = £ v 3 . U
j  i
i . e  the sum of crude o i l  p t ic e  times crude sup p ly (c o s t)  p lu s the  
r e f in e r y  m argin (R) eq u als t o t a l  product v a lo r is a t io n  (re v e n u e s).
Now crude p r ic e  i s  a l in e a r  fu n c tio n  of g r a v it y  -  whether fob or 
c i f  -  so:
Xj = aGj + b . . .  3 . 1 1 a
The r e f in e r y  m argin, R, com prises o p eratin g  co sts p lu s  p r o f it s .  I t s  
v a lu e  per b a r r e l [ R = r]  i s  assumed to be independent of crude
Q
g r a v ity  . . .  3 .11b
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Product v a lo r is a t io n  r e s u lt s  from the s a le  of products at e x -r e f in e r y  
p r ic e s  (X4 ) so
v i  = As seen above, Qx and Qj a re  r e la te d  through the
p ro d u c ts ’ y ie ld  (f$ )which i s  a l in e a r  fu n ctio n  of g r a v it y  i . e
Qi = ai ? QjGj + bx
so that V ±  = Xxax Z QjGj + X -j+ i . . .  3 . 1 1 c
G iven  co n d itio n s  ( 3 . 1 1 a )  -  ( 3 . 1 1 c ) ,  equation ( 3 . 1 1 )  would be:
Z (aG i + b)Q.j + r  = E X ± a ±  Z Qi Gi + Z X ^
j  1 j  i
= a S G i Qi +  b + r  = £ x i a i  z Qi Gi + Z X ^
j  i  j  i
and u sin g ( 3 .1 0 )
= a Z J l  Gi  + b + r  = Z X±a4 Z G1 + Z X-jbi . . . 3 . 1 2
j Q i  j Q i
G iven th a t ^ Qj Qj = G* we can w rite  ( 3 . 12) a s :
Q
a G *  + b  =  X . a  . G *  +  E X . b .  -  r  =  X *   3 . 1 3
i i x  i i  l
where X* = the average p r ic e  of the blend G*. Equation ( 3 . 1 3 )  should  
apply to a l l  markets and fo r  any and a l l  valu es of G* com patible w ith  
equaton ( 3 , 1 0 ) ,  Hence, i t  fo llo w s from ( 3 . 1 3 )  th a t:
a = ^  . . .  3 . 14a
i
and b = Z X^b^ -  r . . .  3 .14 b
i
By d e f in it io n  i t  holds th a t Z ai  ~ G and Z b4 = 1 ,
i  i
th e re fo re  by co n sid e rin g  a g iv e n  market demand p a tte rn  of n p ro d u cts,
the p r ic e  s tr u c tu r e  of these products at a g iven moment can be
represented by the r e la t iv e  d is t r ib u t io n  (X4 -  Xn ) of the n -1  p r ic e s
w ith resp e ct to the p r ic e  Xn , chosen as the refere n ce  p r ic e .
Consequ ently, i t  w i l l  hold th a t:
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n-1
% a^ = 0, an = ^ a^ •» a 3 . 1 5 a
i  i
n-1
Z b± « 1 ,  bn = 1 -  £ b^ . . .  3 .15 b
i  i
From ( 3 .1 4 a )  and ( 3 . 1 5 a )  i f  fo llo w s th a t:
n-1
a =  ^ xi ai  = Z x i ai  + ^nan
i  i
or e q u iv a le n t ly
n-1
a = Z ( xi ” Xn ) a i  « . . .  3 . 1 6
i
S im ila r ly ,  from ( 3 .14 b )  and ( 3 .1 5 b )  we have: 
n-1
b = Xn + Z (x±- Xn )b i  . . .  3 . 1 7
i
Taking the f i r s t  d iffe re n c e s  in  both ( 3 .1 6 )  and ( 3 . 1 7 )  we o b ta in :
n-1  n-1
A a = Z (X±-  Xn ) Aa + Z A (X^ -  Xn ) a ± . . .  3 . 1 8
i  i
and
n-1  n-1
Ab -  A ^  + Z (X±-  Xn) A b i + Z A ( x ±  -  Xn ) b ±  . . .  3 . 1 9
Assuming th at the p h y s ic a l c h a r a c t e r is t ic s  of the crude o i ls  in  the 
blend are known and s t a b le , i . e  Aa^ = 0 and Ab^ = 0 , then ( 3 .1 8 )
and ( 3 .1 9 )  become:
n-1
A a = Z A(X±-  Xn ) a± . . .  3 .2 0
i
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A b  = A X n + E A ( X i - X n ) b i . . . 3 . 2 1
i
From ( 3 .2 0 )  and ( 3 .2 1 )  the fo llo w in g  c o n clu sio n  about the  
interdependence of crude and product p r ic e s  is  d e riv e d : i f  product
p r ic e s  move c o l le c t iv e ly  w ithout any a lt e r a t io n  to t h e ir  s p e c if ic  
s tr u c tu r e  (X-j^  -  Xn ) ,  then A (X-  ^ -  Xn) = 0 and hence A a = 0 and 
A b = Axn . In  t h is  case (a ) rem ains constant so the s tru c tu re  of 
crude o i l  p r ic e s  w i l l  be u n a ffe cte d  except fo r a c o lle c t iv e  move of 
a l l  crude p r ic e s  by an ap p ro p ria te  change in  the v a lu e  of the p r ic in g  
fa c to r  (b ) .
On the other hand, i f  the market e v o lu tio n  i s  such as to a l t e r  
the r e la t iv e  product p r ic e  s tr u c tu r e  so that A (X ^ -  XjQ ^ 0 then
the BGD (a) w i l l  be a ffe c te d  by an e q u iv a le n t amount given by 
( 3 .2 0 ) .  S im ila r ly  such a d e v ia t io n  would a f f e c t  the p r ic in g  fa c to r  
(b) enhancing the impact of the c o lle c t iv e  v a r ia t io n s  ( A Xn ) on i t .
In  other words, the s t a b i l i t y  of crude o i l  p r ic in g  p a tte rn s i s  
governed by the s t a b i l i t y  of product p r ic in g  p a tte rn s .
T h is  im p lie s  th at i f  the change in  product p r ic e s  i s  sim ply a 
cum u lative  move, say an o v e r a ll  d e c lin e , so that the le v e l  of a l l  
product p r ic e s  f a l l s  but t h e ir  r e la t iv e  d is t r ib u t io n  around a 
refere n ce  product -  say g a s o lin e  -  remains unchanged, then the le v e l  
of a l l  crude p r ic e s  w i l l  f a l l  but r e la t iv e  crude o i l  p r ic e s  i . e  
d if f e r e n t ia ls  w i l l  rem ain unchanged. I f ,  however, the r e la t iv e  
d is t r ib u t io n  of product p r ic e s  changes, e .g  th ere is  a widening of 
the d if f e r e n t ia l  between l ig h t  and heavy p ro d u cts, then crude o i l  
p r ic e  d if f e r e n t ia ls  w i l l  change in  the same d ir e c t io n .
C le a r ly ,  faced  w ith changes in  demand p a tte rn s and thus product 
p r ic e s ,  the major o i l  companies would have to change t h e ir  l i f t i n g  
programmes. They would have to change the com position of t h e ir  
blends of crudes used in  an attempt to compensate fo r the a lt e r in g  
product p r ic e  s t r u c t u r e , and m a in tain  t h e ir  economic b a la n ce . S in ce  
the m ajo rs' c o n tr a c tu a l arrangements w ith the producing c o u n trie s  d id  
enable them to change t h e ir  l i f t i n g  programmes, the end r e s u lt  was 
th a t o i l  producers would e v e n tu a lly  have to change the p r ic e  of t h e ir  
crude -  r a is e  i t  i f  changed blends r e s u lte d  in  an in c re a se  in
n - 1
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l i f t i n g s  of th at p a r t ic u la r  crude and v ic e  v e rs a . T h is  mechanism of 
p r ic e  determ in atio n  o r ig in a te s  in  (a ) the d erived  nature of crude o i l  
demand, and, (b) the l in e a r i t y  of both crude p r ic e s  and product 
y ie ld s  w ith resp e ct to g r a v it y  and r e f le c t s  the process by which the 
cash flow  generated by the s a le  of products i s  a llo c a te d  to the
d iff e r e n t  crudes th at co n trib u te  to produce them.
Furtherm ore, the above mechanism ensures th a t OPEC c o u n trie s  
determ ine the p ro d u ctio n  c e i l in g ,  w hile the major o i l  companies se t  
the f lo o r .  The maximum p ro ductio n le v e l i s  determined by t e c h n ic a l  
l im it s  in  r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  the normal e x tra c t io n  ra te  th at depends 
on p r ic e  and a b so rp tiv e  c a p a c ity . So the OPEC co u n trie s  announce 
t h e ir  maximum a llo w ab le  production and the m arketing s tr a te g y , which 
are both decided upon w ith a view to r e t a in in g  co n tro l and
f l e x i b i l i t y  over t h e ir  crude output.
At the same time the companies inform  the a u t h o r it ie s  of the 
amount of crude they expect to l i f t  in  the coming year and how much 
of th a t output they want to be c o n tr a c tu a lly  committed to on the 
b a s is  of a lo n g -term  c o n tr a c t . The agreements allo w  the companies to 
a d ju s t  to changing market c o n d itio n s . So in  a d e c lin in g  market they 
can reduce t h e ir  l i f t i n g  by 10 per cent and i f  the d e c lin e  co n tin u es  
they can seek p r ic e  re d u c tio n s . I f  an agreement on p r ic e  i s  not 
reached, c la u s e  5 enables the companies to g ive  n o tic e  of the 
phase-down which e n t it le s  them to reduce l i f t i n g  in  th at q u a rte r by
an amount up to 20 per ce n t. The phasing down prodedure w i l l
continue u n t i l  a new agreement is  reached. Co n verse ly , in  a r is in g  
market the companies f i r s t  a c t iv a t e  the 10 per cent c la u se  and then 
re so rt to l i f t i n g  arrangem ents. C le a r ly ,  the com panies’ aim is  to 
guarantee minimum s u p p lie s  w h ils t  at the same time having enough room
fo r manouvre in  a changing market.
I t  would seem th a t the only way th at OPEC co u n trie s  could  
ach ieve c o n tro l over the s tr u c tu r e  of crude p r ic e s  is  through co n tro l 
of product p r ic e s , something th at they could never hope to a c h ie v e .
T h e refo re , i t  seems reasonable to argue that d if f e r e n t ia ls  have been
market determined w ith the m ajors p la y in g  a s ig n if ic a n t  ro le  in  the 
form ation of p r ic e s ,  s in c e  they had the power of d is p o s a l of OPEC's 
o i l .  The in cre a se d  volume of spot tra n s a c tio n s  has o b v io u sly  g iven
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the majors even g re a te r f l e x i b i l i t y  over s u p p lie s  and enabled them to 
a d ju s t  t h e ir  l i f t i n g s  of crudes between c o u n trie s  w h ils t  at the same 
time s u b je c t in g  the producers to d ir e c t  market p ressu re  in  t h e ir  
p r ic in g .
Indeed, there were examples in  the 1970s to support the above 
argument, th a t i s ,  case s where a p a r t ic u la r  crude was u n r e a l i s t ic a l l y  
p ric e d  by the producer and the companies com pletely refused to l i f t  
any o i l  u n t i l  a p r ic e  change was agreed upon. The above h yp o th esis  
re fe rs  to the r e la t io n s h ip  between crude o i l  p r ic e s  and there i s  
enough f a c t u a l evidence to support the id ea  th a t d if f e r e n t ia ls  are  
market determ ined. For example in  1977 Kuwait changed i t s  p r ic e  in  
response to the market w h ile  OPEC d if f e r e n t ia ls  remained u n a lte re d .  
Indeed OPEC never agreed on a p r ic e  s tr u c tu r e ; e x clu d in g  the 1973 o i l  
p r ic e  in c re a se  which can be 'conceived of as an OPEC (o r more 
p r e c is e ly  OAPEC) a c t io n , d e c is io n s  from 1974 to 1978 were 
n o n -d e c is io n s  as out of 12 m eetings only tw ice ( 1 9 7 5 , 1978) was there  
an agreement and between December 1976 and June 1977 the tw o -t ie r  
p r ic e  system p r e v a ile d . But even before t h is  s p l i t  members were 
changing p r ic e s  w ithout c o n s u lt a t io n ; so i t  was reported in  the press  
th a t Kuwait in  1975 was c u tt in g  p r ic e  through c r e d it  terms below the 
o f f i c i a l  le v e ls .  A cce p tin g  the hypothesis of a market determined  
p r ic e  s tr u c tu r e  -  r e la t iv e  p r ic e s  -  the q u estio n  s t i l l  remains as to 
whether a c t u a l p r ic e  le v e ls  in  a b so lu te  terms were ad m inistered  *by 
OPEC.
A c lo s e  exam ination of OPEC's p r ic in g  p r a c t ic e s  confirm s th at  
even at tim es of c r i s i s  the group was fo llo w in g  market trends as 
in d ic a te d  by the spot market fo r  both crude and p ro d u cts. The spot 
p r ic e  of crude can be taken to be a true market p r ic e , s in c e  t h is  i s  
a tru e  market in  the sense th at any d is t o r t io n  c re a tin g  an im balance  
generates an e q u ilib r iu m  r e s to r in g  p r ic e  adjustm ent. The spot market 
in  the 1970s was a very m arg in al market h an d lin g  an estim nated 1 0 -1 5  
per cent of world o i l  volum es; even so , the p r ic e s  at which these  
m arg in al b a r r e ls  were traded were in d ic a t iv e  of the s ta te  of the 
m arket. For example, a r is in g  spot p r ic e  would in d ic a t e  a shortage  
of o i l  -  a c tu a l or p e rce iv e d .
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An in t e r e s t in g  and im portant aspect of the r e la t io n s h ip  e x is t in g  
between o f f i c i a l  and spot crude o i l  p r ic e s  i s  th at spot p r ic e s  have 
always led  o f f i c i a l .  T h is  happened in  19 7 3 , in  1979 and a g a in  in  
198 3. The reason fo r  t h is  r e la t io n s h ip  i s  not hard to f in d .  
C le a r ly ,  OPEC le a d e rs  w i l l  not t o le r a t e  spot p r ic e s  g r e a t ly  exceeding  
c o n tra ct p r ic e s  in d e f in it e l y ,  because a company buying on o f f i c i a l  
p r ic e s  can im m ediately r e s e l l  on the spot market and reap the 
p r o f it s .  These revenues could be a ccru in g  to OPEC n a t io n s . In  the
o p p osite  d ir e c t io n , d e c lin in g  spot p r ic e s  in d ic a t e  a s u rp lu s  and 
g iven  the e x iste n c e  of non-OPEC s u p p lie r s , OPEC c o u n trie s  w i l l  
e v e n tu a lly  fo llo w , as they cannot a ffo rd  lo s in g  market sh are.
T h e re fo re , spot p r ic e s  do in flu e n c e  government s e l l in g  p r ic e s  
and thus the v a r i a b i l i t y  of world o i l  p r ic e s  and the p r ic e  le v e l  
i t s e l f  have been a ffe c te d  b y  t h is  r e la t io n s h ip  which l i t e r a l l y  
e x p la in s  the p r ic e  tren d s observed. I t  would th e re fo re  seem th at the 
spot market i s  of fa r  g re a te r im portance in  p r ic e  d eterm in atio n  than 
the volume of tra d in g  in  the 1970s would in d ic a t e . I t s  im portance in  
re ce n t years has been overwhelming g iven  th at the volume of trade  
p a ssin g  through i t  at spot or spot re la te d  p r ic e s  i s  estim ated at 
between 4 5 -7 5  per cent of the world t o t a l  (Petroleum  Economist 
f ig u r e s ) .
* C le a r ly ,  i f  the le v e l  of the referen ce crude p r ic e  has been 
a ffe c te d  by market tre n d s, so th a t a change in  demand has never been 
met by a c a r t e l  q u a n tity  adjustm ent -  designed to s u s ta in  the c a r t e l  
ad m inistered  p r ic e  -  but by a p r ic e  adjustm ent and i f  at the same 
time d if f e r e n t ia ls  have been, market determ ined, then any h yp oth esis  
r e s t in g  on the c o llu s iv e  powers of the OPEC c a r t e l  to e x p la in  the
p r ic e  movements s in c e  1973 has to be re je c te d  on both fa c t u a l and
conceptual grounds and in s te a d  the OPEC-com panies’ mechanism has to 
be accepted as the most r e a l i s t i c  view of the m arket.
A ccording to El-Mokadem (19 8 4 ) the s ig n if ic a n c e  of the o i l  
com panies' c o n tr ib u t io n  to t h is  mechanism of p r ic e  fo rm u latio n  
depends on the sh o rt and lo n g -term  o b je c t iv e s  of OPEC. In  that
re sp e ct M abro's ( 19 7 5 )  argument can be accepted as r e a l i s t i c ,  namely
th a t OPEC's sh o rt-te rm  o b je c t iv e s  are to in c re a se  -  ra th e r than  
maximise -  members’ revenues when circum stances are fa vo u ra b le  and to 
check a f a l l  in  per b a r r e l revenue when circum stances are ad verse.
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To achieve these o b je c t iv e s  OPEC r e l ie s  h e a v ily  on f i s c a l  and p r ic e  
measures ra th e r than p ro ra t io n in g . T h is  means th a t OPEC has no 
d ir e c t  c o n tro l over the d is t r ib u t io n  of g a in s  between producers  
r e s u lt in g  from a p r ic e  in c r e a s e ; t h is  d is t r ib u t io n  r e f le c t s  b u y e rs’ 
responses to product p r ic e s .
A cceptin g  t h is  view of OPEC's sh o rt-te rm  o b je c t iv e s  the 
com panies' r o le  can be very im portant in  a weak market w ith f a l l i n g  
demand, when p r ic e  m aintenance re q u ire s  ra p id  output adjustm ent. 
Under such circu m stan ces the com panies' in te g r a t io n  and knowledge of 
the market enables ra p id  tra n sm issio n  of in fo rm a tio n  upstream and 
hence enables q u ick  adjustm ent of p ro d u ctio n . At the same time they  
can c o n tr ib u te  towards the sh a rin g  of t o t a l  output among OPEC members 
-  and in  a weak market the sh a rin g  of lo s s e s  -  v ia  t h e ir  r e f u s a l to  
l i f t  uneconomic crudes acco rd in g  to the mechanism presented above. 
N e v e rth e le ss, in  a c o n tin u o u sly  f a l l i n g  market i t  i s  up to the  
stro n g e st OPEC members, Saudi A ra b ia , to m a in ta in  the group's  
cohesion by a c t in g  as the swing producer in  order to support the  
p r ic e  l e v e l .  Up to 1985 t h is  has been the ca se , but s in c e  then we 
have seen the r e f u s a l of the stro ng to hold up the market in  order to  
p r o t e c t t h e  weak and thus the c o lla p s e  of p r ic e s .  On the other hand, 
in  a strong market the com panies' r o le  i s  r e s t r ic t e d  to a id in g  OPEC 
d e cid e on t o t a l  output v ia  t h e ir  demand fo r e c a s ts , s in c e  under such  
co n d itio n s  sh a rin g  i s  not very  im portant as 'a c c e p tin g  s ig n if ic a n t  
g a in s , u n e q u a lly  d is t r ib u t e d  are b e tte r than no g a in s ' (Mabro).
W ith refere n ce  to OPEC's lo n g -term  in t e r e s t s ,  these may cover a 
p r ic e  in c re a s e  to maximise revenues or a p r ic e  f a l l  to r a is e  market 
sh a re . A f a l l  in  p r ic e  w i l l  only r a is e  OPEC's share i f  the world 
economy i s  helped by the f a l l  to re v iv e  and i f  such r e v iv a l  in c re a se s  
w orld o i l  demand. On the o ther hand, a p r ic e  r is e  may in c re a s e  
revenues due to the s h o r t -r u n  o i l  demand i n e l a s t i c i t y ,  but a high  
p r ic e  w i l l  a ls o  a f f e c t  the lo n g -ru n  e l a s t i c i t y  and w i l l  depress the 
world economy in  the sh o rt run. So both approaches r a is e  many 
q u e stio n s.
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In  M abro's (19 8 3 ) o p in io n  th ere i s  no need fo r an OPEC lo n g -te rm  
s tra te g y  because ’ a l l  o i l  exp o rting  co u n trie s  are in  the same boat 
w ith  s im ila r  in t e r e s t s  to defend’ . One such common in t e r e s t  i s  to 
r e t a in  c o n tro l over world o i l  p r ic e s , because w ithout a d m in is tra t io n  
p r ic e s  w i l l  c o lla p s e  towards e x tra c t io n  c o sts  -  an e v e n tu a lit y  
c a ta s tro p h ic  fo r  a l l  p ro d u cers, both those w ith low co sts  who want to  
r e t a in  t h e ir  rent and those w ith  h ig h er co sts  who want to p ro te ct  
t h e ir  in vestm en ts. The p ro d u cers' lo g ic  i s  to defend the o i l  rent  
and p ro te ct t h e ir  investm ents through p r ic e  a d m in is tr a t io n . T h is  is  
t h e ir  main o b je c t iv e  and th u s, acco rd in g  to Mabro, a l l  a tte n t io n  
should  be focused on sh o rt-te rm  p o lic ie s  aim ing at s t a b i l i s in g  world 
o i l  p r ic e s .
T h is  argument by Mabro i s  s im ila r  to the one advanced by F ra n k e l 
(19 6 4 ) about the o i l  in d u s t r y 's  tendency to o lig o p o ly  examined in  
s e c t io n  3 . 1  thus the same c r it ic is m s  can be made to prove t h is  t h e s is  
u n s a t is f a c t o r y . Furtherm ore, there is  a d iffe r e n c e  between sayin g  
th a t 'th e re  i s  no need' fo r  a lo n g -term  s tra te g y  as Mabro does -  a 
norm ative statem ent -  and in  observing what i s  happening in  r e a l i t y ,  
which i s  th a t OPEC c o u n trie s  are attem pting to reduce t h e ir  
dependence on the companies: in  1973 they took over co n tro l of the 
upstream , in  1979 they entered the m arketing phase and nowadays they 
are e n te rin g  the r e f in in g  stage as w e ll. At the same time there i s  a 
d iffe re n c e  between d e sc r ib in g  what 'sh o u ld ' happen -  p r ic e  
a d m in is tr a t io n  -  and what i s  a c t u a lly  happening, nam ely, that OPEC 
has never been a b le  to impose a p a r t ic u la r  p r ic e  regime on the market 
and a c t a p p ro p ria te ly  to s u s t a in  i t .  On the c o n tra ry , i t  seems that  
OPEC has always been a market fo llo w e r and . o v e r a ll  i t  probably  
e x e rc ise d  a moderating in f lu e n c e  on the m arket, la r g e ly  because i t s  
a c t io n s  have been dominated by Saudi A ra b ia 's  moderate p o l ic ie s ,  
e s p e c ia lly  between the two p r ic e  shocks, when th at country was in  
fe a r  of fu r th e r  o i l  p r ic e  in c re a se s  ag g ravatin g  the world re c e s s io n  
and weakening the d o l la r ,  in  which currency i t  h o lds most of i t s  
fo re ig n  a s s e t s .
Thus between 1973 and 1981 Saudi A rab ia  was e s s e n t ia l ly  the one 
d e cid in g  on the marker p r ic e , acco rd in g  to i t s  own m otives and th at  
p r ic e  was accepted by the OPEC meetings which then assigned to the 
o ther crudes p r ic e s  th at would be b earab le  by the m arket, on the 
b a s is  of in fo rm a tio n  coming from the companies on market demand,
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movements of d if f e r e n t ia ls  e t c . O v e rp ric in g  by a p a r t ic u la r  member 
was not a problem, g iven  the understanding th at the companies would 
then re fu se  to l i f t  and make up any d e f ic ie n c ie s  from the S a u d is 1 
excess c a p a c it y . In  p r a c t ic e  'th e  th re a t was s u f f ic ie n t  to keep the 
market in  l in e '  a cco rd in g  to Stevens ( 1 9 8 1 ) .  T h is  system c o lla p s e d  
in  1979 w ith  Saudi A ra b ia  step p ing  in  to help  f i l l  the gap, which 
meant th at i t s  excess c a p a c ity  had d isap p ea red , and so d id  p r ic e  
m oderation. The above should not be taken to in d ic a t e  th a t the
Sau d is were the le a d e rs  of the m arket. There was c e r t a in ly  an 
appearance of OPEC u n ity  because of the p erce p tio n  th a t Saudi A ra b ia  
was the le a d e r , but th ere  was no o v e r a ll  p r ic in g  p a tte rn  so OPEC's 
r o le  was in s ig n if ic a n t .
Between the Ir a n ia n  re v o lu tio n  and the Geneva conference  
( 1 9 7 9 -8 1 )  OPEC was ag ain  n o n -e x is te n t , s in c e  p r ic e s  were r e la te d  to 
the spot market as seen in  s e c t io n  2 .5  and OPEC was in  a d is a r r a y  
when the S au d is u n i la t e r a l ly  p r ic e d  t h e ir  crude at £ 2 4 /b b l from $ 1 8 ,  
and f a i le d  to a c t  as a swing producer. The cu rre n t s ta te  of the 
market as d e scrib e d  by Jensen (19 8 2 ) -  's u rp lu s  a r is in g  la r g e ly  from 
lessened demand a t t r ib u t a b le  both to co n se rv a tio n  and reduced 
economic growth’ -  can e x p la in  why OPEC a f t e r  May 198 1 does riot seek  
a coherent p r ic in g  s tr u c tu r e  but ra th e r the estab lish m en t of a 
p ro ra tio n in g  scheme -  achieved fo r  the f i r s t  time in  March 1983 in  
London.
T h e refo re , one has to accep t th at the im portance of the market 
fo rce s  has grown over tim e, from a p o s it io n  of n o n -e x iste n ce  back in  
the 1950s to a dominant r o le  today. The t r a n s it io n  has c e r t a in ly  not 
been smooth, n e ith e r  i s  i t  yet com plete, s in c e  the system has not yet  
s e t t le d  to a c le a r ly  id e n t if ia b le  s t r u c t u r e . T h is  t r a n s it io n a l  p erio d  
has w itnessed the appearance of new acto rs and, as mentioned e a r l ie r ,  
changes in  the r e la t iv e  power of those a c to rs  over tim e. The 
com panies' power d e c lin in g  as OPEC was attem pting to take over but 
not d isa p p e a rin g . The seven s is t e r s  were s t i l l  p la y in g  an im portant 
r o le  in  p r ic e  fo rm atio n , e s p e c ia lly  in  a weak m arket, p r im a r ily  by 
v ir t u e  of t h e ir  power of d is p o s a l. OPEC i t s e l f  unable to assume the 
m ajo rs' r o le  probably due to la c k  of e x p e r tis e , p o l i t i c a l  f r ic t io n  
and the d e -in te g ra te d  n ature of the in d u s tr y , which has meant the 
la c k  of c o n s tr a in ts  (su ch  as the APQ and 5 /7 th s  r u le )  p r e v io u s ly  
a v a ila b le  to the m ajors. N e v e rth e le ss, OPEC’ s r o le  was im p o rtan t,
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e s p e c ia lly  d urin g  the two c r is e s ,  not because of the taking of c a r t e l  
a c t io n  to r a is e  o i l  p r ic e s ,  but by v ir t u e  of p e o p le 's  p erce p tio n  th at  
t h is  was the case and of course by t h e ir  determ in atio n  of. maximum 
p ro ductio n le v e ls  -  though th at too was a ffe c te d  by the companies.
P r io r  to the 1983 London conference, the 1973 embargo was the 
o n ly  case of a c t io n  taken by the Arab members of OPEC, as most OPEC 
conferences s in c e  have ended, more often than n o t, in  disagreem ent. 
Furtherm ore, the tim in g  of the two c r is e s  can be ex p la in ed  p e r f e c t ly  
by p o l i t i c a l  events -  the A r a b - Is r a e l i  war and the Ir a n ia n  
r e v o lu t io n ; th e s e ' would have occurred independently of OPEC's 
presence or absence. Although i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to sp e cu la te  on the  
p o s s ib le  e f f e c t s  of OPEC's n o n -e x iste n c e , i t  seems reasonable to 
argue th at the boom of the in d u s t r ia l  n a tio n s in  the 1960s d id  not 
re q u ire  OPEC's e x is te n c e , that the USA would in  any case have to r e ly  
on imported o i l  and th at events such as the c lo su re  of the Suez ca n a l 
or the A r a b - Is r a e l i  war would have happened in  any case. These 
fa c to r s  have r a is e d  o i l  demand and d isru p te d  s u p p lie s . Assuming the 
co n tin u a tio n  of a c c e le r a t in g  in f la t io n  ra te s  a f t e r  19 7 0 , even- w ithout  
the f i r s t  o i l  p r ic e  shock, r e la t iv e  o i l  p r ic e s  would change. A ls o ,  
Q uadafi might have been s u c c e s s fu l due to the s p e c ia l  c ircu m stan ces  
in  L ib y a , in d ep en d en tly  of OPEC. So i t  seems th a t there were 
fundamental reasons fo r an in c re a se  in  o i l  p r ic e s  in  the 19 7 0 s. 
R is in g  demand, i n e l a s t i c  supply and the 1973 war would have secured  
the f i r s t  p r ic e  e x p lo sio n  even in  OPEC's absence, perhaps w ith a 
d iff e r e n t  tim in g . N e v e rth e le s s, as Penrose (19 7 9 ) argues w ithout 
OPEC i t  would have been d i f f i c u l t  fo r  the m ajors to prevent fu r th e r  
le a p -fro g g in g  as the two groups of co u n trie s  su p p ly in g  o i l  in  the 
G u lf and in  the M editerranean v ie d  fo r  p o s it io n .
Of course in  a co m p e titive  market system such d istu rb a n ce s as 
those produced by the 1973 and 1979 p o l i t i c a l  events would only la s t  
fo r  a short p e rio d , and p r ic e s  ought to f a l l  back soon afte rw ard s. 
T h is  has not happened because the market is  not p e rfe ct and i t  has 
been s u b je c t  to c e r t a in  s t r u c t u r a l  changes o c c u rrin g  co n cu rre n tly  
w ith the p o l i t i c a l  events which helped in  keeping p r ic e s  up.
A fte r 1973 p r ic e s  d id  not re tu rn  to t h e ir  p r e -in te r v e n tio n  le v e l  
probably because of the change in  property r ig h t s ;  t h is  seems a more 
s a t is f a c t o r y  e x p la n a tio n  than the one based on c a r t e l  b eh avio u r.
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However, as exp lain ed  b e fo re , Jo h an y’ s argument cannot be a p p lie d  to 
the 1979 s it u a t io n . The unexpected events of 1979 -8 0  caused  
e x p e cta tio n s of fu r th e r  sup p ly d is ru p tio n s  and hence p an ic  bu yin g . 
The e ffe c t  of these p erce p tio n s can e x p la in  p r ic e s  rem aining h ig h . 
At the same time fu r th e r  s t r u c t u r a l  chages were ta k in g  p la c e , namely 
OPEC c o u n trie s  e n te rin g  in to  d ir e c t  marketing of t h e ir  crude fo r  the 
f i r s t  time and a s h i f t  from long to sh o rt-te rm  c o n tr a c ts , w ith many 
NOCs going to the spot market and w il l in g  to pay a premium to secu re  
su p p lie s  thus pro lo nging the p erce ived  sh o rtag e. With the h igh p r ic e  
le v e ls  of the 1970s p ro d u ctio n  from h ig h er co st non-OPEC c o u n trie s  
has been encouraged and w ith  demand f i n a l l y  responding and s t a r t in g  
to d e c lin e  in  198 2, the market saw p r ic e s  d e c lin in g  fo r the f i r s t  
time in  the fa ce  of s u r p lu s .
Th erefo re i t  seems th at the OPEC-companies mechanism and the 
t r a n s it io n a l  p erio d  sc e n a rio  o ffe r  a p la u s ib le  e x p la n a tio n  of o i l  
p r ic e  movements. OPEC and non-OPEC, the m ajors and b u y e rs’ 
p e rc e p tio n s, unexpected p o l i t i c a l  events and t h e ir  e ffe c ts  on 
e x p e cta tio n s together w ith  s t r u c t u r a l  changes, a l l  combined to 
form ulate p r ic e s , in  a framework w ith in  which the m arket’ s im portance  
has been in c r e a s in g .
Nowadays, many experts agree on the importance of the market on 
o i l  p r ic in g  as i t  has become c le a r ,  e s p e c ia lly  s in c e  March 198 3, th at  
OPEC i s  indeed a fo llo w e r and not an a d m in is tra to r. Although t h is  
hyp oth esis can be w e ll supported by t h e o r e t ic a l arguments, there has 
been no attempt to e m p ir ic a lly  v a lid a t e  i t .  T h is  p ro vid es a 
j u s t i f ic a t i o n  fo r a q u a n t it a t iv e  stu d y, which has been undertaken in  
the hope th a t i t  would f i l l  at le a s t  part of the gap which c le a r ly  
e x is t s  between numerous u n s a t is f a c t o r y  models of the OPEC c a r t e l  on 
the one hand and only a q u a l it a t iv e  argument -  the one advanced here 
-  on the o th e r.
To in co rp o ra te  a l l  the fa c to r s  th at proved to be c r u c ia l  to the 
p r ic e  trend would have been an im p o ssib le  ta s k . At the same time any 
e m p ir ic a l t e s t in g  ought to take p la ce  in  such a manner that the b a s ic  
b e h a vio u ra l h yp o th esis used to e x p la in  the phenomenon under study  
w il l  be r e ta in e d . Given the com plexity and d iv e r s it y  of the fa c to r s  
shaping o i l  p r ic e s  a l l  th a t could be hoped fo r was the e m p ir ic a l
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in v e s t ig a t io n  of c e r t a in  asp ects of the system th at may pro vid e  
support fo r  trends th at would only e x is t  under the q u a l it a t iv e  
e x p la n a tio n  advanced.
T h is  in v e s t ig a t io n  has focused on two r e la t io n s h ip s  w hich, as 
argued above, are b e lie v e d  to be a key to understanding the o i l  
m arket:
( 1 )  The in t e r a c t io n  between spot and ad m inistered  crude o i l  p r ic e s ,
i . e  between market p r ic e s  and the OPEC p r ic e  and the extent to 
which one a f f e c t s  the o th e r. T h is  w i l l  enable us to deduce 
whether the market or the a d m in is tra tio n  body is  more 
in f l u e n t ia l  on p r ic e s .
(2 ) The r e la t io n s h ip  between crude o i l  and product p r ic e s , th at i s ,  
between the two s id e s  of the market (dem and/supply). Having  
decided to focus on these r e la t io n s h ip s , the next step i s  to 
determ ine the a p p ro p ria te  methodology.
SECTION II
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
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CHAPTER 4: THE METHODOLOGY
4 .1  JUSTIFICATION OF THE METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED
The concept of cause and e ffe c t  i s  fundamental in  any s c ie n c e  and the 
e lu c id a t io n  of c a u sa l r e la t io n s h ip s  among a se t of v a r ia b le s  i s  one 
of the major g o als of e m p ir ic a l re se a rch . However, when i t  i s  not 
p o s s ib le  to conduct a c o n tro lle d  experim ent, i t  becomes very  
d i f f i c u l t  to produce co n vin cin g  evidence that a cause and e f fe c t  
r e la t io n s h ip  a c t u a lly  e x is t s .
T h is  i s  almost in v a r ia b ly  the case in  economics and as a r e s u lt  
the t r a d it io n a l  approach in  econom etrics has been to set up a model 
on the b a s is  of p r io r  economic th eo ry. Not only i s  a cause and 
e ffe c t  r e la t io n s h ip  assumed to h o ld , but furtherm ore the d ir e c t io n  of 
c a u s a lit y  i s  a ls o  taken to be known.
L e t us suppose fo r s im p l ic it y ,  that a system co n ta in s only two 
v a r ia b le s ,  X and Y. G iven th at a cause and e f fe c t  r e la t io n s h ip  can 
be in  only one d ir e c t io n , say from X to Y , and s in c e  t h is  d ir e c t io n  
of c a u s a lit y  i s  taken fo r granted on the b a s is  of th eo ry, the only  
q u estio n  th at remains i s  whether such a r e la t io n s h ip  a c t u a lly  e x is t s .
The u su a l approach i s  to reg ress Y on X and t e s t  the c o e f f ic ie n t  
of X fo r  s t a t i s t i c a l  s ig n if ic a n c e . However, a h igh c o r r e la t io n  
between two se ts  of n on-experim ental o b se rv a tio n s, does not
c o n s t itu te  evidence fo r a c a u s a l r e la t io n s h ip . Thus f i t t i n g  a
re g re ss io n  model i s  p r im a r ily  an e x e rc ise  in  measurement.
C le a r ly ,  there i s  a lo g ic a l  gap in  the procedure of (a)
sp e c u la tin g  as to the t h e o r e t ic a l exp lan ato ry v a lu e  of a c e r ta in  
v a r ia b le  and (b) t e s t in g  e m p ir ic a lly  the p ro p o sit io n  by OLS or 
s im ila r  te ch n iq u e s. Because, d e sp ite  the fa’ct th at c a u sa l in fe re n ce s  
are e v e n tu a lly  drawn from such t e s t s ,  they are b a s ic a l ly
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c o r r e la t io n a l  te ch n iq u e s. R eg ressio n  equations can not be viewed as 
s t r u c t u r a l  equations d ir e c t ly  rep re sen tin g  c a u s a l p ro ce sse s. The 
f a c t  th at a p a ir  of v a r ia b le s  may be h ig h ly  c o rre la te d  does not 
n e c e s s a r ily  e s t a b lis h  the fa c t  th at there is  a c a u sa l p atte rn  between 
them.
I f  the v a r ia b le s  examined are connected through a n o n -lin e a r  
r e la t io n s h ip , then the ensuing low c o r r e la t io n  does not mean th at the 
v a r ia b le s  are f u n c t io n a lly  u n re la te d . At the other end, two 
v a r ia b le s  may be c a u s a lly  u n re la te d , d e sp ite  h igh c o r r e la t io n , i f  
they have a common a s s o c ia t io n  w ith a set of other v a r ia b le s .  
T h e refo re , one is  e s s e n t ia l ly  faced w ith an id e n t if ic a t io n  problem , 
s in c e  re g re ss io n  a n a ly s is  could r e je c t  the c o rre c t  v a r ia b le  or accep t  
the wrong one on the b a s is  of t h e ir  c o r r e la t io n s .
Moreover, re g re s s io n  may or may not g iv e  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s ig n if ic a n t  e s t im a te s , but in  e it h e r  case they could be b iased  and 
u n r e lia b le  u n le ss the v a r ia b le s  entered the re g re s s io n  acco rd in g  to 
t h e ir  tru e  ca u sa l s t r u c t u r e . Even worse, the re se a rch e r would not be 
aware of such u n r e l i a b i l i t y .  Acceptance of the c a r t e l  h yp othesis in  
the o i l  market w ould- n e c e s s it a t e  the s p e c if ic a t io n  of c a u s a lit y  
running from v a r ia b le s  re p re se n tin g  the OPEC ad m inistered  system to  
v a r ia b le s  rep re sen tin g  the spot market. * I f  the d ir e c t io n  of 
c a u s a lit y  assumed i s  wrong, e stim a tio n  of the s t r u c t u r a l  model would 
produce m islead in g  r e s u lt s .
Taking a sim ple example of feedback between two v a r ia b le s  X and
Y, the c a u sa l r e la t io n s h ip  can be denoted in  terms of path a n a ly s is  
as
a l
X < -----------------> Y
a 2
where the arrows show the c a u sa l d ir e c t io n  and a^ , a2 represent the 
tru e s t r u c t u r a l  c o e f f ic ie n t s  of the system. I f  the rese a rch e r  
wrongly assumes a one-way c a u s a lit y  from X to Y , and runs a 
re g re ss io n  such as Y t = bQ + + et » tben tbe c o e f f ic ie n t  tq
which may or may not be accepted on the b a s is  of i t s  s t a t i s t i c a l  
p r o p e r t ie s , i s  in  fa c t  an ir r e le v a n t  q u a n tity
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a i  + a2( a y2/  a x2) 
b = _____________________
(1 + a^a2) 
where the a 2 ' s are  v a r ia n c e s .
A re g re s s io n  jls in  f a c t  an attem pt to d esc r ib e  and q u an t ify  a 
causa l r e l a t i o n s h ip .  Yet, before  proceeding to  the  a c tu a l  e s t im a t io n  
two p r in c ip le s  should be borne in  mind: f i r s t l y ,  i t  must be
e s ta b l i s h e d  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  and em p ir ic a l ly  th a t  a causa l  r e l a t io n s h ip  
between endogenous and .p redeterm ined  v a r ia b le s  does e x i s t ,  and, 
second, th a t  the causa l p a t t e r n  i s  such th a t  i t  w i l l  allow fo r  a
re g re s s io n  to p ick  the r e la t io n s h ip  up. I t  i s  r e g r e t t a b l e  th a t  these  
p r in c ip le s  a re  u s u a l ly  assumed to  be s a t i s f i e d  im p l ic i t l y  and a t  a 
t h e o r e t i c a l  l e v e l  only . For although s p e c i f i c a t io n  of a hypothesis  
d e r ives  from economic theory  and f a i t h  has to  be p laced in  p r io r  
knowledge from th a t  theory , a t  the same time an em p ir ica l
in v e s t ig a t io n  should no t r e ly  on u n te s ta b le  f e a tu r e s  and prem ises, as 
th i s  would v io l a t e  an im portan t p r in c ip le  of s c i e n t i f i c  re sea rch .
The p r e r e q u i s i t e  of any economic; t e s t i n g  i s  to d iscover  the 
mechanism of c a u s a l i ty .  Yet, th e re  i s  a lack  of em p ir ica l  t e s t s  on 
c a u s a l i ty  in  econometrics and th e re  i s  a reason fo r  t h i s .  Such t e s t s  
a re  r e l a t i v e l y  new, they are  not c le a r  cut p rocesses  and they invo lve  
some cumbersome q u a n t i t a t i v e  work. ~ This, however, is  not a good 
excuse fo r  not a t tem p ting  to  t e s t  fo r  causa l p a t t e r n s .
C le a r ly ,  to ca rry  out such t e s t s  a t h e o r e t i c a l  framewrok i s
necessary  as to  th e  concept of c a u s a l i ty  th a t  w i l l  u n d e r l ie  the
a n a ly s i s .  The d e f in i t i o n  of c a u s a l i ty  is  e s s e n t i a l l y  a p h i lo so p h ic a l  
problem and a h igh ly  c o n t ro v e r s ia l  one and thus o u ts id e  the  scope of 
t h i s  work. N ev er th e less ,  i t  i s  in tended  to  adopt c e r t a in  p r in c ip le s  
which w i l l  provide an o p e ra t io n a l  'framework fo r  t h i s  s tudy . This 
framework w i l l  be governed by the  Granger concept of c a u s a l i ty ,  which 
i s  the only e m p ir ic a l ly  t e s t a b l e  one.
G ranger 's  (1969) d e f i n i t i o n  is  e s s e n t i a l l y  in  terms of 
p r e d i c t a b i l i t y :  a v a r ia b le  X causes Y, i f  p re s e n t  Y can be b e t t e r
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p re d ic te d  by using p a s t  va lues  of X than by not doing so. In the  
core of t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  one f in d s  the p a t t e r n  of ch rono log ica l  
sequence of events as i t s  v i t a l  f e a tu r e .  I t  seems th a t  by adopting 
the th e s i s  th a t  the fu tu r e  cannot cause" the p as t  and c a u s a l i ty  can 
only occur w ith  the  p a s t  causing the  p re sen t  or fu tu re  one sc a rc e ly  
in tro d u ces  d i s t o r t i o n s .  Assymetry in  time seems to be a necessary  
co n d i t io n  fo r  th e  d e f i n i t i o n  of a causa l r e l a t i o n s h ip .  Thus, 
movement through time can answer ques tions  about both the e x is te n c e  
and the  d i r e c t io n  of c a u s a l i ty .  Hence, the em p ir ica l  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
of lead and lag  r e la t io n s h ip s  between v a r ia b le s  i s  c r u c i a l  in
p rov id ing  support fo r  a h y p o th e s is .
C le a r ly  the a p p ro p r ia te  lags  cannot be known on the  b a s is  of 
theo ry .  Th is ,  coupled w ith  the lack  of any in v e s t ig a t io n  of the
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of the d a ta  in  conventional econometrics means, q u i te  
simply, th a t  th e re  i s  no method of id e n t i f y in g  the  lag  s t r u c t u r e s .
I t  would be p o s s ib le  to  s t a r t  o ff  w ith  f a i r l y  high lag  va lues  
and use a s tepw ise  re g re s s io n  technique to e l im in a te  redundant
v a r ia b le s ,  but t h i s  would be extremely w as te fu l  from the 
com putational p o in t  of view. The approach ty p i c a l l y  taken is  to 
sp ec ify  a p r i o r i  some co n d i t io n s  about the form of the d i s t r i b u t e d  
l a g  -  a geom etric lag  or a polynominal d i s t r i b u t e d  lag  -  which are 
b a s ic a l ly  chosen a r b i t r a r i l y  and as th e re  a re  no ru le s  of thumb 
a v a i la b l e ,  vary  the degree of the  polynomial or the  leng th  of the 
la g .  Such experim en ta tion  i s  dangerous, as an equation  g iv ing  a good 
f i t  -  as measured by a high R2 v a lue  -  may tu rn  out to  be a poor 
p re d ic t in g  equa t ion .
Given th a t  the  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of the mechanism of c a u s a l i ty  
r e l i e s  on the  d iscovery  of the leads  and lags  and in  tu rn  leads and 
lags  have to  be d iscovered  through a very thorough in v e s t ig a t io n  of 
the  d a t a 's  s t a t i s t i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s ,  the Box and Jenkins  methodology of 
time s e r i e s  a n a ly s i s  has been chosen as the ap p ro p r ia te  one, as i t  
aims a t  d iscovering  the  s t a t i s t i c a l  f e a tu re s  of a time s e r ie s  and 
modelling i t s  behaviour and i t s  r e l a t io n s h ip  to  o the r  time s e r i e s .
Within the  Box-Jenkins framework the d a ta  themselves a re  
p erm itted  in s o fa r  as p o s s ib le  to suggest the p a t te r n  of i n t e r ­
r e la t i o n s h ip s .  The way th a t  s e r i e s  are  r e l a t e d  i s  c lo se ly  connected
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w ith  the  concept of c a u s a l i ty  advanced by Granger. I n t u i t i v e l y  X 
causes Y i f  a f t e r  ex p la in in g  whatever of Y th a t  can be expla ined  on 
th e  bas is  of i t s  own p a s t ,  some more remains to be expla ined  by X. 
This sugges ts  r e l a t i n g  X to  th a t  p a r t  of Y which cannot be exp la ined  
by Y 's own p a s t .
Thus, one wishes to de r iv e  the  s o -c a l le d  pre-w hitened or 
f i l t e r e d  s e r i e s  fo r  v a r ia b le  Y, i . e  th a t  p a r t  of Y which i s  no t 
expla ined  by i t s  own p a s t .  To do so one has to  apply the Box-Jenkins 
u n iv a r i a te  s to c h a s t i c  method of ana lysing  the  s e r i e s ,  accord ing  to  
which one employs the  a u to c o r r e la t io n  and p a r t i a l  a u to c o r r e la t io n  
fu n c tio n s  of each time s e r i e s  in d iv id u a l ly  to  i n v e s t ig a t e  t h e i r  
s t a t i s t i c a l  behaviour. On the b a s is  of th i s  behaviour one then has 
to  i d e n t i f y ,  e s t im a te  and d ia g n o s t ic a l ly  check fo r  adequacy 
u n iv a r i a t e  ARIMA ( in t e g r a te d  a u to re g re s s iv e  moving average) models 
fo r  each s e r i e s  of i n t e r e s t .
These models e s s e n t i a l l y  'e x p la in '  a time s e r i e s  in  terms of i t s  
own p a s t ,  so they a re  a t h e o r e t i c a l  in  th a t  they have nothing to say 
about the  s t r u c t u r e  of the  system. V ariab le  Yt  i s  simply modelled as 
a fu n c t io n  of Yt _ji , Yt _2 > . . . . . .  Yt-n* N ev er th e less ,  th i s  i s  a
necessary  s te p  fo r  the performance of the c a u s a l i ty  t e s t s  and in  
a d d i t io n ,  c e t e r i s  p a r ib u s ,  i . e  in  the  absence of any changes in  the  
system 's  s t r u c t u r e ,  such models provide a powerful to o l  fo r  
s h o r t- te rm  f o r e c a s t in g .  Furtherm ore, the  e x e rc is e  i s  not a pu re ly  
m echan is tic  one as th e re  i s  a l o t  of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  involved when 
choosing the  a p p ro p r ia te  model. Box and Jenkins have ‘ t h e o r e t i c a l ly  
derived  the s t a t i s t i c a l  behaviour of a genera l c l a s s s  of models; what 
the  r e s e a rh e r  has to do i s  to compare the observed s e r i e s  behaviour 
w ith  the  t h e o r e t i c a l  p a t te r n s  and t r y  to  sp e c ify  ( id e n t i f y )  the 
a p p ro p r ia te  c la s s  of models -  which are  denoted by th ree  numbers: 
ARIMA (p, d, q) where p r e f e r s  to  the number of a u to re g re s s iv e  
param eters ,  q to the number of moving average param eters  and d i s  the 
degree of d i f f e re n c in g  req u ired  to  convert a n o n -s ta t io n a ry  in to  a 
s t a t io n a r y  s e r i e s .
The r e s id u a l s  from th e se  models ( innova t ions  or f i l t e r e d  or 
prewhitened s e r i e s )  a re  used in  the next s te p ,  the t e s t i n g  of 
c a u s a l i ty  in  the  Granger sense .  Confirmation of c a u s a l i ty  d i r e c t io n s
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through an exam ination of the  lag  s t ru c tu re s  enables the re s e a rc h e r  
to  proceed to  the  th i r d  s te p ,  namely, the modelling of s e r i e s  i n t e r ­
r e la t io n s h ip s  through the  Box-Jenlcins t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  approach -  
the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and e s t im a t io n  of dynamic models which d esc r ib e  
the  r e l a t io n s h ip  between an endogenous (Y) v a r ia b le  and one (o r  more) 
exogenous v a r ia b le s  (X). Such dynamic models e s s e n t i a l l y  d esc r ib e  
how a change in  X i s  t r a n s m it te d  or t r a n s f e r r e d  to  Y, hence th e  name 
t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n .
T ransfe r  fu n c t io n  models provide a powerful ex tens ion  to  
conven tiona l r e g re s s io n  a n a ly s i s ,  s ince  the t h e o r e t i c a l  s p e c i f i c a t io n  
i s  supplemented by the e m p ir ica l  s p e c i f i c a t io n  of l e a d s / la g s  and 
c a u s a l i ty  d i r e c t io n s  through a study of the s p e c i f i c  da ta  one i s  
concerned w ith ,  thus r e f l e c t i n g  the ' r e a l '  world b e t t e r .  In  
a d d i t io n ,  the  e r r o r  term i t s e l f  i s  modelled as a u n iv a r i a te  ARIMA 
model, s in ce  a u to c o r r r e l a t io n  i s  taken to be an in h e re n t  f e a tu r e  of 
time s e r i e s  r a t h e r  than  th e  'problem ' of conventional econom etrics, 
thus reducing the a re a  of u n c e r ta in ty  and enabling  b e t t e r  
p r e d ic t io n .  T ran sfe r  fu n c t io n s  models are b u i l t  pa rs im oniously , i . e  
w ith  the minimum p o s s ib le  number, of param eters , thus f a c i l i t a t i n g  
computation but a t  the  same time re p re se n t in g  the r e a l  world system 
much c lo s e r  than a b l in d ly  s p e c i f ie d  re g re s s io n  equa t ion ,  where i t  i s  
not known what the  fu n c t io n a l  form should be, which lags should be 
inc luded  and whether the c a u s a l i ty  d i r e c t io n s  assumed on the b a s is  of 
theory  r e f l e c t  r e a l i t y .
Within the  Box-Jenlcins framework, the  main f e a tu r e  of a time 
s e r i e s  i s  th a t  i t s  f u tu r e  behaviour cannot be p re d ic te d  ex a c t ly  as 
would be the  case fo r  a d e te r m in i s t i c  fu n c tio n  of time. A time 
s e r i e s  i s  th e re fo re  a s to c h a s t i c  p rocess ,  regarded as genera ted  by a 
s e r i e s  of random, independent shocks, which are normally d i s t r i b u te d  
about a zero mean.
Indeed, i t  i s  s e n s ib le  to d iscuss  c a u s a l i ty  only fo r  a group of. 
s to c h a s t i c  p ro cesses .  I t  i s  not p o s s ib le  to  d e te c t  c a u s a l i ty  between 
two d e te rm in i s t i c  p ro c e sse s .  We do seem to l i v e  in  a p r o b a b a l i s t i c  
r a th e r  than  a d e te r m in i s t i c  world, hence i t  can be s a fe ly  assumed 
th a t  economic v a r ia b le s  a re  s to c h a s t i c ,  i . e  no t pure fu nc tions  of 
time.
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Thus, p o s s ib le  values  of a time s e r i e s  a t  any g iven  time are  
assumed in  t h i s  approach to be described  by a random v a r ia b le  and i t s  
p ro b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  The a c tu a l  time s e r ie s  i s  regarded as only 
one of the  i n f i n i t y  of va lues  which the random v a r ia b le  might have 
assumed a t  th a t  tim e. The sequence of random v a r ia b le  values is  
c a l le d  a white n o ise  process  ( a t ) and i t  i s  supposed to  be 
transform ed to the  a c tu a l  time s e r i e s  (Yt ) by a l i n e a r  f i l t e r ,  as 
fo l lo w s :
w hite  n o ise  ^ LINEAR
at FILTER
___
The l i n e a r  f i l t e r i n g  o p e ra t io n  simply takes a weighted sum of 
previous opera t io n s  so th a t
Yt  = G0 + a t  + + ^2a t -2  + • • • = 0O + ^<B)at
where B i s  the lag  o p e ra to r :
Bat  -  at _i 
Bat-1  = a t -2
B(Bat ) = B2at  -  at - 2
0O i s  a param eter th a t  determ ines the le v e l  of the  s e r i e s  and 
iJj(B) = 1 + if* }B + 'IfyB2 + • • • •
i s  the l i n e a r  o p e ra to r  th a t  transform s at  in to  Yt  and i s  c a l le d  the 
t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  of the f i l t e r .  The sequence ifj i , \p2> • • •  formed
by the weights may be f i n i t e  or i n f i n i t e .  I f  th i s  sequence i s  f i n i t e  
or i n f i n i t e  and convergent, the  f i l t e r  i s  sa id  to be s ta b le  and the 
p rocess  Yt  to  be s t a t i o n a r y .  Then 0O is  the mean about which the 
process v a r i e s .  Otherwise Yt  i s  n o n -s ta t io n a ry  and 9 0 i s  only a 
re fe re n c e  p o in t fo r  the l e v e l  of the  p rocess .
In the fo llow ing  s e c t io n s  of th i s  chap ter  an attem pt i s  made to  
ex p la in  the  b as ic  f e a tu r e s  of the Box-Jenkins methodology. For th a t  
purpose u n iv a r i a t e  ARIMA models a re  d iscussed  f i r s t ,  followed by 
in te rv e n t io n  a n a ly s i s ,  c a u s a l i ty  t e s t s  and t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n s .  This 
is  the lo g i c a l  sequence of the  approach and the one adopted in  th i s  
s tudy.
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4.2  UNIVARIATE TIME SERIES MODELS (ARIMA)
4 .2 .1  S ta t io n a ry  p rocesses
Before the advent of the  Box-Jenkins approach in  the  1970s, time 
s e r i e s  modelling was c h a ra c te r i s e d  by a v a r ie ty  of ad hoc 
approaches. In g e n e ra l ,  the p re v a i l in g  approach was ' i f  i t  f i t s ,  use 
i t ' .  Apart from in tro d u c in g  a new c la s s  of models in  time s e r ie s  
a n a ly s i s ,  Box and Jenk ins  in troduced  a sy s tem atic  model b u ild in g  
s t r a t e g y .  A c e n t r a l  f e a tu r e  in  the  development of t h e i r  models i s  an 
assumption of some form of e q u i l ib r iu m . A s p e c ia l  c la ss  of 
s to c h a s t i c  p ro c e sse s ,  c a l le d  s ta t io n a ry  processes  i s  based on the 
assumption th a t  the  process  i s  in  a p a r t i c u l a r  s t a t e  of s t a t i s t i c a l  
eq u i l ib r iu m .
A process is  s t r i c t l y  s ta t io n a r y  i f  i t s  p ro p e r t ie s  are 
u n a ffec ted  by a change of time o r ig in  i . e  i f  the j o i n t  p r o b a b i l i ty  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  n observa tions  Yt ^, Yt 2 > . . . .  Ytn  made 
a t  any s e t  of times tj_, t 2 , t n i s  the same as th a t  a s so c ia te d
w ith  n o bse rva tions  Yt , Yt2+k> ••• •»  Ytn+ c^ made a t  times 
c l+k» t-2+k> ^tn+k*
Thus, f o r  a d i s c r e t e  p rocess to be s t r i c t l y  s t a t io n a r y  the j o i n t  
p ro b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of any s e t  of observa tions  must be 
u n a ffec ted  by s h i f t i n g  a l l  the  times of ob se rv a tio n  forwards or 
backwards by an in te g e r  amount K.
Usually  a s t a t io n a r y  time s e r i e s  can be u s e fu l ly  described  by
i t s  mean, va r iance  and a u to c o r r e la t io n  fu n c t io n .  Since only a s in g le  
r e a l i s a t i o n  of ob se rv a tio n s  i s  a v a i la b le  -  the time s e r i e s  examined -  
a t t e n t i o n  c e n tre s  to  the averaging  of observa tions  over time and th i s  
can only be done i f  the  mean, v a r ia n ce  and covariance of the  data  
g ene ra ting  p rocess a re  independent of time. I f  0 t  = 0O fo r  t = l , 2, 
. . .  n then 0 Q can be e s tim ated  by tak ing  the average of Y^, . . . ,  Yn .
The process i s  s t a t i o n a r y  when the  fo llow ing  con d it io n s  are  s a t i s f i e d
fo r  a l l  values of t :
E(Yt ) -  0O
E[(Yt  -  0O)2] _  Y (0)
and E[(Yt  -  0o)(Y t-k  -  0o) ] -  Y(K)
**• • • 4«X 
. . .  4 .2
. . .  4 .3
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In  a s ta t io n a r y  process  the  observa tions  f l u c t u a te  around 0Q, the 
mean, a n d . th e i r  spread ( i . e  v a r ia n ce )  is  co n s tan t .
The q u a n t i t i e s  4.1 -  4 .3  can be es tim ated  from a s in g le  s e r i e s  
of o b se rv a t io n s :
n
Z ' i t
0o = i  -  t ~ 1
^ m • « 4 • 4
Z ( Yt  -  Y)2 
Y (0) = t==1____________
. . .  4.5
n
y (K) =
z-
k+1
(Yt  -  Y)( Yt _k -  Y)
. . .  4.6
I f  the  p rocess i s  e rgod ic ,  i . e  observa tions  s u f f i c i e n t l y  f a r  a p a r t  
a re  almost u n c o r re la te d ,  th e n . th e  above s t a t i s t i c s  give c o n s is te n t  
e s t im a te s  of the  mean, v a r ia n c e  and au tovariance .  For the models 
considered  here  s t a t i o n a r i t y  im plies  e rg o d ic i ty .
The c o n d it io n s  4 .4  -  4 .6  de f in e  weak s t a t i o n a r i t y .  I f  a s e r i e s  
i s  weakly s ta t io n a r y  and normally d i s t r i b u t e d ,  i t  i s  a lso  s ta t io n a r y  
in  the  s t r i c t  sense .
When a s to c h a s t i c  p rocess  i s  s t a t io n a r y ,  i t s  time domain 
p ro p e r t i e s  are  summarised by p l o t t i n g  Y(K) a g a in s t  t .  This i s  the 
au tocovariance  fu n c t io n .  Since Y(K) = Y(-K) we p lo t  over 
p o s i t i v e  values of K only .
The au tocovariances  may be s ta n d a rd ise d  by d iv id in g  through by 
the v ar iance  of the  p ro cess ,  which y ie ld s  the a u to c o r r e la t io n s :
p (K) = y (K) , k - 0 ,  + 1,  + 2 . . .
Y ( 0 )
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A p lo t  of p (K) a g a in s t  p o s i t iv e  values of the lag K g ives  the 
a u to c o r r e la t io n  fu n c t io n .  Note th a t  by d e f in i t i o n
P ( 0 )  = y ( o ) « 1
y (0)
The a u to c o r r e la t io n  fu n c t io n  re v e a ls  how the c o r r e l a t i o n  between any 
two values of the  s e r i e s  changes as t h e i r  s e p a ra t io n  changes, and i t  
i s  the main to o l  employed a t  the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  s tag e  where an 
ap p ro p r ia te  model i s  s e l e c te d .  The p ro p e r t ie s  of such models in  the 
time domain a re  analysed  below.
4 .2 .2  THE GENERAL LINEAR PROCESS: TWO EQUIVALENT FORMS
As noted e a r l i e r  a time s e r i e s  can be rep resen ted  as a weighted sum 
of p re sen t  and p a s t  values of th e  w hite no ise  process a t  according  to  
the  genera l l i n e a r  p rocess
OO
y t  a t  J* $ l a t “ l ^ 2at - 2  * * * = at  ^ j  a t —j "* • •4 .7
j  = l
where y t = Yt  -  0Q
The w hite  no ise  p rocess  may be regarded as a s e r i e s  of shocks d r iv in g  
the  system, and c o n s is t in g  of a sequence of u n c o rre la te d  random 
v a r ia b le s .  Thus the a u to c o r r e la t io n  fu n c t io n  of w hite no ise  has the 
simple form
p (K)
A l te rn a t iv e ly ,  y t  can be w r i t t e n  as a weighted sum of pas t values of 
the y^-'s p lus an added shock at , th a t  i s :
yt = iriy t - l  + Tr2yt-2 + •••  + at =
OO
£  TT- iYt— i  +  a f  . . .  4 . 8= j=l 3 C 3 C
The a l t e r n a t i v e  form ( 4 . 8 )  may be thought of as one where the c u r re n t  
d e v ia t io n  yt  from the le v e l  0O i s  reg ressed  on p as t  d ev ia t io n s  y ^ - l > 
y t -n  of the p rocess .
For example, co n s id e r in g  the  model
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y t  = a t  “ 0at - l  = (1 “ eB)at
in  which ^  -  -  0 ,  = 0, fo r  j  > 1 ,  express ing  a t  in  terms of the
(y^)s  we ob ta in :
(1 -  0B)_1yt: = a t
hence fo r  J 0 j < 1,
(1 + 0B + e2B2 + . . .  )y t  = a t
and the  d e v ia t io n  yt  expressed  in  term of previous d ev ia t io n s  as in
(4 .8 )  i s
yt  = ” 0 Y t-i -  02Yt-2 “ 0 3yt -3  ~ *** + a t
so th a t  fo r  th i s  model fl- = -  0p
In genera l (4 .7 )  may be w r i t t e n
. OO
yt  = (1 + £ ^ jB J )a t
j  = l
or yt  = ip(B)at
• OO 00
where ^ (B) 1 + Z bj  = £
j =l j =0
w ith  = 1. As mentioned e a r l i e r  ip (B) i s  the . t r a n s f e r  fu n c tio n
of the  l i n e a r  f i l t e r .  I t  can a lso  be regarded as the gen e ra tin g  
fu n c t io n  of the ^ w eigh ts ,  w ith  B now t r e a te d  as a dummy v a r ia b le  
whose j t h  power i s  the  c o e f f i c i e n t  of ^ j .
S im i la r ly ,  (4 .8 )  may be w r i t t e n
CO
(1 -  Z FjBi )y t  = a t
o r  fr(B)yt  = a t  . . .  4 .9
00
Thus tt(B) = 1 -  % ^ jBl i s  the g en era tin g  fu n c t io n  of the it
r i
w eigh ts .
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A fte r  ope ra t ing  on both  s id e s  of (4 .9 )  by B) we o b ta in
if; (B) ir(B)yt  = if;(B)at “ Yt 
Hence ip(B) it (B) = 1
th a t  i s  tt(B) = 4>-l(B) . . .  4 .10
The r e l a t io n s h ip  (4 .10) may be used to  d er ive  the tt weights knowing 
the ip weights and v ice  v e rs a .
4 .2 .3  AUTOREGRESSIVE, MOVING AVERAGE AND ARMA PROCESSES
The r e p re s e n ta t io n s  (4 .7 )  and (4 .8 )  of the g en e ra l  l i n e a r  process 
would not be very u s e fu l  in  p r a c t i c e ,  i f  they con ta ined  an i n f i n i t e
number of param eters ip and tt . Box and Jenkins in troduce  parsimony
in to  these  models, th a t  i s  they r e t a i n  models which a re  adequate ly  
rep re sen ted  w ith  the  s m a l le s t  p o s s ib le  number of param eters .
A s p e c ia l  case of (4 .8 )  i s  considered in  which only the f i r s t  p
of the weights a re  non -zero .  This model may be w r i t t e n
yt = fyyt-1 + ^ Y t - 2  + • ••  + ^Yt-p + at . . .  4 .11
where the  symbols <%, . . .  <f>p in d i c a te  the f i n i t e  s e t  of weight 
param eters .  The process  defined  by (4 .11) i s  c a l le d  an 
a u to re g re s s iv e  p rocess  of o rder  p, or an AR(p) p rocess .  In 
p a r t i c u l a r ,  the  a u to re g re s s iv e  p rocesses  of f i r s t  (p=l) and of second 
(p=2) o rder  would be:
Yt = ^ lY t-1  + a t  •••  4.11a
Yt = ^ lY t-1  + ^ 2Yt-2 + a t  ••• 4.11b
W riting  (4 .11) i n  terms of the  lag  o p e ra to r :
(1 -  <j>iB -  (J^ B2 -  . . .  -  <j>pBP)yt  = at
or <KB)yt  = a t  . . .  4 .12
1 _ A
Since (4 .12 )  im plie s  yt  -  4>(B) ^
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th e  a u to re g re s s iv e  p rocess can be thought of as the output y from a 
l i n e a r  f i l t e r  w ith  t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  - 1 (B ), when the  inpu t i s  w hite  
n o ise .
The i n i t i a l  random shock s tay s  in  the process i n d e f i n i t e l y ,  
but i t s  impact d im in ishes ; a f t e r  one o bserva tion  the impact of aQ i s  
only a f r a c t io n  of i t s  i n i t i a l  im pact. By time t ,  the impact of aQ 
i s  almost ze ro .  Using the b lack  box in p u t-o u tp u t  analogy, a p o r t io n  
of the  random shock ' l e a k s '  out of the a u to g re ss iv e  black box as time 
passes .
This 'leak ' becomes obvious i f  we t rac k  a random shock through time 
fo r  th e  AR(1) model:
Let yQ = ao Then>
yi = hyo + ai = i^ao + ai
y2 = (J)1y 1 + a2 = $ 1  ( a0 + a 0  + a2
^l2a 0 + ^ l a j  + a2
4>iy2 + a3y 3 =
y t =
= + ^ l2al + ^ l a2 + a3
*1 a0 + •••  + ^ ia t —
Since-1  < <f> < +1, as expla ined  below, i t  is  obvious th a t  $ 1  ~ 0.
There fore ,  au to g re ss io n  r e f e r s  to  a s to c h a s t ic  behaviour in  which a 
random shock has an ex p o n e n t ia l ly  d im inishing impact over time. This 
aspec t of au to g re ss io n  i s  determined by the bounds placed on (j) :
-1 < <j) < + 1 which are  c a l le d  the  bounds of s ta t io n a r i ty  fo r  AR
param eters .  I f  an AR(1) process  i s  w r i t t e n  as (1 -  ^ B )  yt  = a t , 
the  im p lic a t io n s  of these  bounds become apparen t.
I f  cj) = 1, then (1 -  B)yt  = a t . This i s  a n o n -s ta t io n a ry  
model, whose behaviour i s  dependent on the po in t of time which i t  has 
reached. For s t a t i o n a r i t y  ^(B) must converge fo r  [B|< 1 [See 
Appendix 4 .1 ] .
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S im i la r ly ,  a s p e c ia l  case of (4 .7 )  i s  considered , when only the 
f i r s t  q of the ip weights a re  non-zero . This model may be w r i t t e n :
3^ t ~ a t  “ 9l a t - l  “ ®2a t -2  ” “ 09 a t —q •••  4.13
The symbols -  9 i ,  ~ 9 2> j 9 denote the f i n i t e  s e t  of weight
param eters .  The process  defined  by (4 .13) i s  a moving average 
process of o rder  q, o r  MA(q). In p a r t i c u l a r ,  the  MA(1) and MA(2) 
p rocesses  would be :
y t  = a t  -  0 l a t - l  «** 4 .13a
y t  = a t  -  0 l at - l  -  0 2at - 2  - 4.13b
In  the  f i n i t e  MA p ro cess ,  yt  i s  l i n e a r ly  dependent on a f i n i t e  number
of p rev ious ( a ) s .  We can a lso  w r i te  (4 .13) in  the eq u iv a len t  form.
y t  = (1 -  0j.B -  02B2 -  *... -  0 B9)at
or yt  = 0 (B )a t  . . .  4 .14
where 0(B) = 1 -  0^B -  0 2B2 -  . . .  -  0qB9
Hence, the  MA process  (4 .14 )  can be thought of as the output y t  
from a l i n e a r  f i l t e r  whose t r a n s f e r  fu n c tio n  i s  0(B) when the inpu t 
i s  white n o ise  a t . We have seen above th a t  the \fj weights of a 
l i n e a r  process must s a t i s f y  the co n d i t io n  th a t  \p (B) converges on or 
w ith in  the u n i t  c i r c l e  i f  the  process i s  to be s t a t i o n a r y .  We now 
cons ide r  a r e s t r i c t i o n  app lied  to  the 7T weights to  ensure 
i n v e r t i b i l i t y .  This co n d i t io n  i s  s a t i s f i e d  i f  the  s e r i e s  7T(B) , 
converges fo r  a l l  |B| 1, th a t  i s ,  on or w ith in  the  u n i t  c i r c l e .
So, the f i r s t  o rder  MA process converges i f  < 1, th a t  is
i 00 • •IT (B) = (1 -  0iB)_1 = E010B3
j =0
converges on, or w ith in  the  u n i t  c i r c l e .  This i s  eq u iv a len t  to  
saying th a t  the r o o t ,  B = of (1 -  0}B) = 0 l i e s  o u ts id e
the  u n i t  c i r c l e .  This is  th e  i n v e r t i b i l i t y  co n d i t io n  th a t  must be 
s a t i s f i e d  by the  param eters  0 , 0 2 , . . .  0q [See Appendix 4 .1]
The genera l  p r in c ip le  of MA processes  i s  th a t  a random shock 
p e r s i s t s  f o r  ex ac t ly  q o b se rv a tio n s  and then i s  gone. Using the  
b lack-box in p u t  output analogy we can th ink  of a f i r s t  o rder  MA 
process, as :
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at >  y t
oo
------------>  leakage (1 -  Qi)at _ i + E a t - l
i “ 2
The random shock a t  e n te r s  the  black box, i s  jo in e d  w ith  a p o r t io n  of 
the preceding  random shock, a t _{, and leaves the b lack  box as the  
time s e r i e s  o b se rv a t io n  yt . A p o r t io n  of the preceding  random shock, 
a t _ i , has a lread y  leaked out of the  system along w ith  a l l  p r io r  
random shocks back in to  the d i s t a n t  p a s t .
The f i n i t e  MA process yt  = (1 -  0}B)at  can be w r i t t e n  as an
i n f i n i t e  AR process
yt = -eiYit-i ~0i2yt-2 ~ •••• + at
Hence i f  the  p rocess  were r e a l l y  ma (1) we would o b ta in  an non-
parsimonious r e p re s e n ta t io n  in  terms of an a u to re g re s s iv e  model.
Conversely,, an AR(1) process  could be re sp re sen ted  by an i n f i n i t e  MA
process (see  s e c t io n  4 .2 .2 ) .  In  p r a c t ic e ,  to  o b ta in  a parsimonious
p a ra m e te r iz a t io n ,  i t  i s  sometimes necessary  to  inc lude  both AR and MA
terms in  the model. Thus
Yt = <hyt~l + • ••  + ^pYt-p + at “ 0 l at - l  “ -  0 q^ t - q
or (|) (k )y t  = 0(B )at  
9 (B)
Yt = a t
6 (B) . . .  4.15
(4 .15 ) i s  c a l le d  the mixed au toregressive-m oving  average process of 
order (p ,q )  or ARMA ( p ,q ) .  For example, th e  ARMA (1 ,  1) process i s
Yt ” cHYt-1 = a t  “ 6 l at - l  
The mixed ARMA process  can be thought of as the ouput y t  from a 
l i n e a r  f i l t e r ,  whose t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  is  the r a t i o  of two 
polynomials 0(B) and ^ (B ),  when the inpu t i s  w hite  no ise  a t .
(4 .15) w i l l  d e f in e  a s t a t io n a r y  p rocess ,  provided th a t  the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  equation
<Kb ) = 0 has a l l  i t s  ro o ts  ly in g  ou ts ide  the u n i t  c i r c l e .
S im i la r ly ,  the ro o ts  of 0 (B) = 0 must l i e  o u ts id e  the  u n i t  c i r c l e
i f  the  process  i s  to be i n v e r t i b l e .
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In many p r a c t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n s  the  assumption of s t a t i o n a r i t y  i s  too 
r e s t r i c t i v e .  A p lo t  of a time s e r i e s  w i l l  f r e q u e n t ly  show some kind 
of trend  in  the mean and p o ss ib ly  in  the v ar iance  to o .  Even so , most 
e m p ir ica l  time s e r i e s  e x h ib i t  homogeneity in  the sense  th a t  one p a r t  
of the  s e r i e s  behaves much l i k e  any o ther  p a r t  -  a p a r t  from lo c a l  
l e v e l  or lo c a l  l e v e l  and t ren d .
The ARMA framework may be extended to  handle n o n - s t a t i o n a r i t y . 
Models which d esc r ib e  homogenous, n o n -s ta t io n a ry  behaviour can be 
ob ta ined  by supposing some s u i t a b le  d i f fe re n c e  of the process to be 
s t a t i o n a r y .  Thus, by d i f f e r e n c in g  -  which rep la ces  g lo b a l  trend  by 
lo c a l  trend  -  a s t a t io n a r y  s e r i e s  i s  cons truc ted  which is  then 
modelled as an ARMA pro cess .
A simple example of a n o n -s ta t io n a ry  p rocess is  the  "random
w alk1
yt = yt - l  + a t  . . .  4.16
This model has e s s e n t i a l l y  the  same form as the f i r s t  order au to ­
re g re s s iv e  p rocess  (4 .11a ) but the  cond it ion  th a t  l i e s  w ith in  the 
u n i t  c i r c l e  i s  c l e a r ly  v io l a t e d .  The r e s u l t  i s  th a t  (4 .16) i s  not a 
. s ta t io n a ry  p ro cess .  Repeatedly s u b s t i t u t i n g  fo r  p a s t  values of y 
g ives
t-1
yt — z at—j "* y0>  ^ j 2 , . . .  t  
r o
The mean of yt  i s  th e re fo re  a fu n c tio n  of the i n i t i a l  va lue ,  y0 , as
E(yt ) = E(y0 ) .  I f  yQ i s  f ix e d ,  the f i r s t  requirem ent fo r
s t a t i o n a r i t y ,  namely th a t  the  mean be cons tan t over time, is  
s a t i s f i e d .  N ev er th e less ,  the  s e r i e s  is  n o n -s ta t io n a ry  s in ce
4.2.4 Non-stationary processes
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Var (y t ) = try2 
and Cov (y t , y t - k )  = | t - k | a 2
The random walk process th e re fo re  tends to meander away from i t s  
s t a r t i n g  v a lu e ,  but e x h ib i t s  no p a r t i c u l a r  tren d  in  doing so.
D esp ite  th i s  behaviour a s t a t io n a r y  process i s  very e a s i l y  ob ta ined . 
R e-arranging (4 .16) g ives
Ayt = Yt ” Yt-1 = a t  ••• 4.17
and so the  f i r s t  d i f f e re n c e s  folow a white no ise  p ro cess ,  y maybe 
d if fe re n c e d  any number of times and i f  d denotes the  degree of 
d i f f e r e n c in g ,  re p la c in g  (a)  by a genera l s t a t io n a r y  ARMA (p, q) 
p ro cess ,  the  r e s u l t i n g  model i s
0(B) A dy t  = e (B )a t  . . .  4 .18
This i s  known as an ARIMA (p, d, q) p rocess .  For th e  random walk
(4 .16) yt  isARXMA (0 ,  1, 0 ) .  S ta t io n a ry  ARMA processes  a re  a s p e c ia l  
case  in  which d = 0.
E qu iv a len t ly  th e  ARIMA process  i s  defined  by the two e q u a t io n s :
(f> (B)Wt  = 0 (B)at  . . .  4.19
and Wt  = A dy t  . . .  4.20
An a l t e r n a t iv e  way of looking a t  th e  process  fo r  d ^  1 r e s u l t s  from
in v e r t in g  (4 .20 )  to  give
y t  = SdWt  . . .  4.21
where S i s  the  i n f i n i t e  summation o pera to r  defined  by
t
SXt  = Z Xh = (j_ + B + B2 + . . . )  Xt
h~“ oo
-  <1 _ B )-l Xt  = A _1Xt
Thus
S = (1 -  B )"1 = A
The o p e ra to r  S2Xt  i s  s im i la r ly  defined  as
S2Xt  = SXt  + SXt  + SXt _2 + SXt _2 . . .
t  i
= Z I  xh
i= -  co h= —co
Equation (4 .21 )  im plies  th a t  the  p rocess (4 .18) can be obta ined  by 
summing (or  ' i n t e g r a t i n g ’ ) the  s ta t io n a r y  process (4 .19 )  d tim es, 
hence the name a u to re g re s s iv e  in te g ra te d  moving average (ARIMA) 
p rocess .
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The model (4 .18) may be extended by adding a co n s tan t  term 0O. This 
gives
Adyt  °o + (f>” 1(B) 0 ( B ) a t
Adding a co n s tan t  term to  a s t a t io n a r y  ARMA process  perm its  i t  to  
have a non-zero mean w ithou t m a te r ia l ly  a l t e r i n g  i t s  behaviour.
Adding a co n s tan t  to  the random walk process (4 .16 ) y ie ld s
A y t  =  0 O +  a t
This i s  known as a random walk w ith  d r i f t .  Repeatedly s u b s t i t u t i n g  
fo r  lagged va lues  of y t  and tak ing  ex p ec ta t io n s  gives
E ( y t ) =  y 0 +  Qot yo  i s  f i x e d .
Thus the le v e l  of yt  i s  governed by a l i n e a r  time t ren d .
4 .3  STOCHASTIC MODEL BUILDING
An ARIMA process  of o rder  (p ,  d, q) provides a c la ss  of models 
capable of re p re s e n t in g  time s e r i e s  which although not n e c e s s a r i ly  
s t a t io n a r y ,  a re  homogenous and in  s t a t i s t i c a l  eq u i l ib r iu m . The 
r e l a t i n g  of a model of t h i s  kind to  da ta  i s  visually b e s t  achieved by 
a th re e  s tage  i n t e r a c t i v e  procedure based on i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  
e s t im a t io n  and d ia g n o s t ic  checking.
By i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  we mean the  use of the d a ta  and of any 
in fo rm ation  on how the s e r i e s  was genera ted , to  suggest a subc lass  of 
parsimonious models worthy to  be e n te r ta in e d .  In o th e r  words, the  
p r a c t i c a l  problem i s  to  choose the  most ap p ro p r ia te  values fo r  p, d 
and q, th a t  i s ,  to  sp e c ify  the  ARIMA model.
By e s t im a t io n  we mean e f f i c i e n t  use of the da ta  to make 
in fe re n c e s  about param eters  c o n d i t io n a l  on the  adequacy of the 
e n te r ta in e d  model.
By d ia g n o s t ic  checking we mean checking the  f i t t e d  model in  i t s  
r e l a t i o n  to  the  d a ta  w ith  in t e n t  to  rev ea l  model inadequacies  and so 
to  achieve model improvement.
These s tag es  a re  d iscussed  in  the  fo llow ing  th re e  s e c t io n s .
4 .3 .1  Model I d e n t i f i c a t i o n
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  i s  n e c e s s a r i ly  in e x a c t ,  because the  ques tion  of what 
types of models occur in  p r a c t i c e  i s  a p roperty  of the  behaviour of
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th e  p h y s ic a l  world. In  a d d i t io n ,  because a t the  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  s tage  
no p re c i s e  fo rm u la tion  of the  problem is  a v a i la b l e ,  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
i n e f f i c i e n t  methods must be used. At th i s  s tag e  g ra p h ic a l  methods 
a re  very u s e fu l  and judgement must be ex e rc ised  in  the a ttem pt to  
id e n t i f y  an a p p ro p r ia te  su b c lass  of models from the  genera l ARIMA 
fam ily .  The approach taken c o n s is t s  of:
(a )  d i f f e re n c in g  yt  as many times as i s  needed to  produced 
s t a t i o n a r i t y ,  ho p efu lly  reducing  the process under s tudy to the mixed 
ARMA process .
(b) id e n t i f y in g  the r e s u l t i n g  ARMA process .
The p r in c ip le  to o ls  fo r  p u t t in g  (a) and (b) in to  e f f e c t  w i l l  be the  
a u to c o r r e la t io n  fu n c t io n  and the  p a r t i a l  a u to c o r r e la t io n  fu n c t io n .  
These a re  used not only to  help  guess the form of the model, but a lso
to o b ta in  approximate e s t im a te s  ‘of the param eters which w i l l  provide
the  s t a r t i n g  values  fo r  the  i t e r a t i v e  e s t im a t io n  procedures employed. 
Id e n t i fy in g  the  degree of d i f f e r e n c in g : A tendency fo r  the
a u to c o r r e la t io n  fu n c t io n  not to  d ie  out qu ick ly  i s  taken as an 
in d i c a t i o n  of n o n - s t a t i o n a r i t y , and suggests  th a t  d i f f e re n c in g  i s  
r e q u ire d .  (See Box-Jenlcin s ,  1976, Appendix AG.l) The number of 
times th a t  the o r ig i n a l  s e r i e s  must be d if fe re n c e d  before  a 
s t a t io n a r y  s e r i e s  r e s u l t s  i s  c a l le d  the o rder  of homogeneity. 
T y p ica l ly ,  i f  one i s  d i f f e re n c in g  a n o n - s ta t io n a ry  s e r i e s  one can 
t e s t  each succeeding d i f f e r e n c e  by looking a t  the a u to c o r r e la t io n
funcion (ACF). I f ,  f o r  example, the second round of d i f f e re n c in g  
r e s u l t s  in  a s e r i e s  whose ACF drops, o f f  r a p id ly ,  we can determine 
th a t  the o r ig in a l  s e r i e s  i s  second order  homogenous.
Figure 4 .3 .1 .2  below shows the  ACF of the time s e r i e s  fo r  the  
Middle E ast netback of Arabian L igh t crude, between 1982 (Jan) -  1985 
(March). The ACF does d e c l in e  as the number of lags  i s  in c re a s e d ,  
but no t r a p id ly .  One might su sp ec t  th a t  the  s e r i e s  i s  s t a t io n a r y .  
The s e r i e s ,  however, e x h ib i t s  a downwards trend  (so th a t  the mean i s  
not cons tan t  over time) -  f ig u re  4 .3 .1 .1  and thus we can conclude 
th a t  th i s  s e r i e s  has been genera ted  by a homogenous n o n -s ta t io n a ry
process .  To check we d i f f e re n c e  the  s e r i e s  and r e c a lc u la te  the  
sample ACF, shown in  F igure  4 .3 .1 .3 ,  which appears s t a t io n a r y  as does 
the  s e r ie s  i t s e l f  ( f ig u r e  4 .3 .1 . 4 ) .  The r e s u l t s  of f u r th e r  
d i f f e re n c in g  do not seem q u a l i t a t i v e l y  d i f f e r e n t  and thus the 
conclusion  would be t h a t  d i f f e re n c in g  once should be s u f f i c i e n t  to  
ensure s t a t i o n a r i t y .
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Figure 4 .3 .1 .1  A rabian L igh t -  Middle E as t Netbacks (1982-85)
O r ig in a l  S eries
D o l la r s /b b l
Figure 4 .3 .1 .2  A u to c o r re la t io n  fun c tio n  of o r ig i n a l  s e r i e s  
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Figure 4.3.1.3 ACF of series differenced once
0.003 
16 - 0.011
Figure  4 .3 .1 .4  S eries  d if fe re n c e d  once
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As seen above the  ACF can re v e a l  in fo rm ation  about the s t a t i o n a r i t y  
of a time s e r i e s  . In  a d d i t io n ,  i t  can rev ea l  in fo rm atio n  about the  
s e a s o n a l i ty  of a time s e r i e s ,  where s e a s o n a l i ty  i s  j u s t  a c y c l i c a l  
behaviour th a t  occurs on a' r e g u la r  ca lendar b a s is  i . e  in  cycles  w ith  
p e r io d i c i t y  th a t  i s  annual, q u a r t e r ly ,  monthly, e t c .  R ecognition of 
s e a s o n a l i ty  i s  im portan t ,  as i t  p rovides in fo rm ation  about r e g u la r i t y  
in  the  s e r i e s .  That r e c o g n i t io n  can be made e a s ie r  w ith  the help of 
th e  ACF. So i f  a monthly time s e r i e s  e x h ib i t s  s e a s o n a l i ty ,  the d a ta  
p o in ts  w i l l  be c o r r e la te d  w ith  the  corresponding d a ta  p o in ts  th a t  
lead  or lag  by 12 months. So y^ w i l l  be c o r r r e l a t e d  w ith  yt+12> 
yt+12 w ith  Yt+24» e t c. These c o r r e l a t i o n s  should m anifes t  themselves 
in  the sample ACF, which w i l l  e x h ib i t  peaks a t  lag s  K = 12, 24, 36, 
48,  e t c .  For seasona l d a ta  of t h i s  type , w hile  simple d i f f e re n c in g  
reduces the c o r r e l a t i o n s  in  g en e ra l  when the s e r i e s  i s  
n o n - s ta t io n a ry ,  a heavy p e r io d ic  component w i l l  remain, and simple 
d i f f e re n c in g  w ith  re s p e c t  to  period  twelve -  seasonal d i f f e re n c in g  -  
in  a d d i t io n  w i l l  markedly reduce c o r r e l a t i o n  throughout and w i l l  
ach ieve seasona l s t a t i o n a r i t y  as w e ll .
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of r e s u l t a n t  s t a t i o n a r y  ARMA process  
Having t e n t a t i v e l y  decided what d should be, we next s tudy the 
gen era l  appearance of the es tim ated  ACF and p a r t i a l  a u to c o r r e la t io n  
fu n c t io n  (PACF). The PACF i s  ano ther  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  s t a t i s t i c  which 
can be in t e r p r e te d  as any measure of p a r t i a l  c o r r e l a t i o n :  th e  lag-K 
PACF i s  a measure of c o r r e l a t i o n  between time s e r i e s  o b se rv a tio n s  K 
u n i t s  ap a r t  a f t e r  the  c o r r e l a t i o n  a t  in te rm ed ia te  lags  has been 
c o n t ro l le d  or ’p a r t i a l e d  o u t" .
I t  i s  u s e fu l  to  determ ine whether a p a r t i c u l a r  value of the  
sample ACF and PACF i s  c lo se  enough to  zero to  permit assuming th a t  
the t ru e  -  t h e o r e t i c a l  -  value i s  indeed equal to  ze ro .  For th i s  
purpose use can be made of the  fo llow ing  express ion  fo r  the va r iance  
of the  es tim ated  a u to c o r r e la t io n s  of a s ta t io n a r y  normal process 
given by B a r t l e t t  (1946).
1 q
Var [ rk J 1 + 2 Z p2y K > q 4.22
N v“l
- 132 -
The square ro o t  of (4 .22 ) i s  the s tandard  e r r o r  of the  sample au to ­
c o r r e l a t i o n s .
Q uenouille  (1949) has der ived  a formula fo r  the v a r ian ce  of the PACF.
Var kk ) a  —  
n
and thus s . e  [ 9 kkJ ***
/ n
I t  was shown by Anderson (1942) th a t  fo r  moderate n (sample s i z e )  the  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of an e s tim ated  a u to c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f i c i e n t ,  whose 
t h e o r e t i c a l  value  i s  ze ro , i s  approxim ately normal. Thus, on the  
hypo thesis  th a t  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  a u to c o r r e la t io n  i s  zero , the e s t im a te  
d iv ided  by i t s  s tan d ard  e r r o r  w i l l  be d i s t r i b u te d  as a u n i t  Normal 
d e v ia te .  A s im i la r  r e s u l t  i s  t ru e  fo r  the  PACF. Thus in  a sse ss in g  
the es tim ated  fu n c t io n s  i t  i s  h e lp fu l  to p lo t  ’c o n t r o l '  l i n e s  about 
zero a t  _+ s . e  or _+ 2 s .e .
At t h i s  s tag e  we have to appeal to  the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  behaviour 
of the t h e o r e t i c a l  ACF and PACF, derived  by Box-Jenkins (1976, 
chap te r  3 ) .  B r ie f ly ,  whereas the  ACF of an AR(p) process  t a i l s  o f f ,  
i t s  PACF has a c u to f f  a f t e r  lag  p. Conversely, the  ACF of an MA(q) 
p rocess  has a c u to f f  a f t e r  lag  q, while i t s  PACF t a i l s  o f f .  I f  both 
fu n c tio n s  t a i l  o f f ,  a mixed process i s  suggested .
Furtherm ore, the  a u to c o r r e la t io n  fu n c tio n  fo r  a mixed p ro c e ss ,  
co n ta in in g  a p th  o rd e r  AR component and a q th  o rder  MA component, is  
a mixture of e x p o n en tia ls  and damped s in e  waves a f t e r  the  f i r s t  q-p 
la g s .  Conversely the  PACF of a mixed process i s  dominated by a 
mixture of ex p o n en tia ls  and damped s in e  waves a f t e r  the  f i r s t  p-q 
la g s .
Table 4 .3 .11 below summarises the p ro p e r t ie s  of the  t h e o r e t i c a l  
a u to g re ss iv e ,  moving average and mixed ARMA p ro cesse s .
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Table 4.3.1.1 Summary of properties of AR, MA and ARMA
AR PROCESSES MA PROCESSES MIXED PROCESSES
Models in  terms 
of previous y ' s
0(B)yt  = a t 0 ~1(B)yt  88 a t 0 ” 1(B).cKB)yt:=
Models in  terms of 
p rev ious  a ' s
yt  = 0 “ 1 (B) a t y = 0 (B)a y = 0 " 1 (B)0(B)at
F w eights F in i t e  s e r i e s I n f i n i t e  s e r i e s I n f i n i t e  s e r i e s
ip w eights I n f i n i t e  s e r i e s F in i t e  s e r e i s I n f i n i t e  s e r i e s
S ta t io n a r i t y
co n d i t io n
Roots of $(B) = 0 
o u ts id e  the  u n i t  
c i r c l e
Always s ta t io n a r y Roots of +(B) = 0 
o u ts id e  u n i t  
c i r c l e
I n v e r t i b i l i t y
co n d i t io n
Always in v e r t i b l e Roots of 0(B) = 0 
o u ts id e  u n i t  
c i r c l e
Roots of 0 (B) = 0 
o u ts id e  u n i t  
c i r c l e
A u to c o r re la t io n
Function
I n f i n i t e  
t a i l s  o ff
F in i t e  
Cuts o ff
I n f i n i t e  
t a i l s  o f f
PACF Fin ite-  
cu ts  off
I n f i n i t e  
T a i ls  o ff
I n f i n i t e  
T a i ls  o ff
Box and Jenkins  have found th a t  the  AR and MA processes  of f i r s t  and 
second-order,  and the simple mixed ( 1 , d, 1 ) p rocess  are  of g re a t  p r a c t i c a l  
importance and t a b le  4 . 3 . 1 . 2  summarises the p ro p e r t ie s  of the  t h e o r e t i c a l  
ACF and PACF f o r  th e se  p ro c e sse s .
- 134 -
Table 4 .3 .1 .2  Behaviour of the ACF fo r  the  dth d i f f e r e n c e  of an 
ARIMA (p , d, q) p rocess
ORDER (1 , d , 0) (0 d ,  1)
Behaviour of ACF Decays ex p o n en t ia l ly Only pi non-•zero
Behaviour of PACF Only $ 1 1  non-zero Exponential dominates 
decay
P re lim ina ry <h - PI • -9 l
es t im a tes  from £ 1 1 + ©I2
Admissible reg ion -1 < $1 < 1 - 1 < 01< 1
ORDER (2 ,  d , 0) (0 d, 2)
Behaviour of ACF Mixture of exponen tia ls  
or damped s in e  wave
Only p j and 
non-zero
P2
Behaviour of PACF Only $ n  and 4 2 2  
non-zero
Dominated by m ixture of 
ex p o n en tia ls  or damped 
s in e  wave
P re lim ina ry fa =
P i (1 "  P2>
Pi
-  Q1 ( 1  - e2)
es tim a tes  from 1 -  p i2 1 + Q Q 2Z
cj)2 -
P2 “ P i2
p2 =
-  0 2
1 -  p i 2 0 1 + 0^ + 0 22
Admissible reg ion -1
$ 1
(J>2
< $2 < 1 
+ $ 2 < 1 
-  $ 12< 1
-1 < 0 2 
©1 + 0 2 
0 2 " © 1
< 1 
< 1
< 1
ORDER (1 ,  d, 1)
Behaviour of ACF Decays e x p o n en t ia l ly  from f i r s t lag
Behaviour of PACF Dominated by exponen tia l decay from f i r s t  la g
Pre lim inary  
e s t im a te s  from pi
(1 -  9i $ i ) (  $ 1  - 0 1>
P2 = Pi fa
1 + 6 i 2 -  2 <J>i 0 1
Admissible reg ion -1 < fa < 1 -1 < Sj < !
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As an example of model i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  l e t  us examine the d if fe re n c e d  
Middle East netback  s e r i e s  considered  e a r l i e r  on, which appears 
s t a t io n a r y .  The ACF (F igure 4 .3 .1 .3 )  has th ree  sp ikes  a t  lags K = 1, 
2, 3 w hile  the  r e s t  of the a u to c o r r e la t io n s  can be taken to be ze ro ,  
s ince  they a re  sm a lle r  than t h e i r  s tandard  e r r o r ,  as seen in  t a b le  
4 .3 .13  below.
Table 4 .3 .  L3: ACF and Standard E rro rs  fo r  Middle E as te rn  Netbacks
LAGS
0.241 -0 .304  -0 .306  -0 .038  0.004 -0 .128A u to c o rre la t io n s  
S tandard E rro rs
A u to co rre la t io n s  
S tandard E rro rs
1 -  6
0.17
7 - 9
( Continued)
0.185 0.197 0.198 0.198 0.20
-0 .09  0.002 -0 .028
0.201  0.201  0.201
A u to c o rre la t io n s  
Standard e r ro r s
10-14
0.027 0.154 0.086 -0 .0 5  -0 .073
0.205 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.206
A u to co rre la t io n s  
S tandard E rro rs
15-16
( Continued)
0.003 -0.011
0.206 0.206
The p a r t i a l  a u to c o r r e la t io n  fu n c t io n ,  shown in  f ig u re  4 .3 .1 .5  appears 
dominated by a damped s in e  wave.
F igure  4 .3 .1 .5  PACF of Middle E as t  Netback S eries  d i f fe re n c e d  once
LAG AGF- 1 .0-0.,8 -0 .6  -0^4 -0 .2  0.0 0.2 0«4 0.6 0 .8  1.0
1 0 .2 4 1 ' ______
2 -0 .384 _________
3 -0.141
i  -0 .0 2 ?  —
5 -0.159 "I -0.205-------------------------------------
7 -0 .100   —
£ -0.137 ----
9 -0.232
•j^ q —0.068 
0.008 
12 -0.129
13 -0 .09  j 
- 0.06
15 -0.09
16 -0 .14
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Thus, the  model s e le c te d  i s  an MA(3) fo r  the d if fe re n c e d  s e r i e s .
T here fo re ,  w ith  r e fe re n c e  to  the o r ig in a l  s e r i e s  an ARIMA (0 ,  1, 3) 
seem a p p ro p r ia te ,  which can be w r i t t e n  as
Yt -  Yt - 1  = 0O + a t  -  9 i a t - i  -  ®2at -2  " 0 3a t - 3
= + (1 -  0qB -  02®2 “ 33B0)a^
4 .3 .2  Model e s t im a t io n
Once a t e n t a t i v e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of the time s e r ie s  model has been 
made, i . e  once va lues  of p, q and d have been chosen fo r  th e  ARIMA 
model
0(B) A dyt  = <j> (B)Wt  = 9 (B)at
then  e s t im a te s  can be obta ined  f o r  the  p a u to re g re s s iv e  and the  q 
moving average param ete rs .  To db th i s  we u t i l i s e  the  f a c t  th a t  by 
assumption th e  at ' s  are  a l l  normally d i s t r i b u t e d  and independent, 
w ith  zero mean and c o n s tan t  v a r ian ce  CTa2 . Then the  c o n d i t io n a l  log  
l ik e l ih o o d  fu n c t io n  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  the param eter va lues  (0  , 9 , Oa ) 
i s  given by
L. ( + ,  8 ,  <V = -n  log O -
2 a a 2
We say t h a t  L* ( 0 ,  9 , <%) i s  the c o n d i t io n a l  lo g a r i th m ic  l ik e l ih o o d
fu n c t io n  because the  sum of squared e r ro r s  S*(0 ,0) depends on ( i . e  i s
9
c o n d i t io n a l  on) the  p a s t  and unobservable values of W and a. This can 
be seen by w r i t in g  th e  ARIMA model in  terms of a t .
a t  = Wt  -  b i W ^  -  02Wt _2 ” ••• ~ 0pWt - p + 0 1 % -!  + 02at - 2  +
. . .  + Q q^r—q . . .  4.25
The w 's cannot be s u b s t i t u t e d  immediately in  (4 .25) to  c a l c u la te  the  
a ' s  because of the  d i f f i c u l t y  of s t a r t i n g  up the d i f f e re n c e  equa t ion .  
However, suppose th a t  the  p values  W* of the W's and th e  q va lues  a* of 
the  a ' s  p r io r  to  the  commencement of the W s e r i e s  were g iven. Then the 
values  a i , a 2 , . . . . ,  an c o n d i t io n a l  on th i s  cho ice , could be c a lc u la te d  
in  tu rn  from (4 .2 5 ) .  Thus f o r  any given choice of param eters  ( cj) , 9) 
and of the s t a r t i n g  values  (W*, a*) we could c a lc u la te  su c c e ss iv e ly  a 
s e t  of values a t  and a l s o  S* (0 , 9 )  =  ^ a t 2 .The s t a r  s u b s c r ip ts  on
the  l ik e l ih o o d  and sum of squares fu n c tio n  are  used to emphasise th a t  
they a re  c o n d i t io n a l  on the  choice of the s t a r t i n g  v a lu e s .
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We n o t ic e  from (4 .24) t h a t  the c o n d i t io n a l  l ik e l ih o o d  L*involves 
the  da ta  only through the c o n d i t io n a l  sum of squares functim  S* . I t  
fo llow s th a t  fo r  any f ix ed  value of (Ta , the maximum l ik e l ih o o d  
e s t im a tes  of (j) and 0 a re  given by the m inim isation of the sum of 
squares  fu n c t io n  S* ( 6 , 0  ) .  So the maximum l ik e l ih o o d  es t im a tes  are 
the same as the l e a s t  squares e s t im a tes  and in  g e n e ra l ,  given 
no rm ali ty ,  we can study the  behaviour of the c o n d i t io n a l  l ik e l ih o o d  
by s tudy ing  the  c o n d i t io n a l  sum of squares .  In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  fo r  any 
f ix ed  < ,^ L* i s  a l i n e a r  fu n c t io n  of S*.
S e r ie s  i n i t i a l i z a t i o n : Because the sum of squares fu n c t io n  and thus
the  l ik e l ih o o d  fu n c t io n  a re  both c o n d i t io n a l  on th e  p a s t  unobservable 
values of Wt  and a t , the  l e a s t  squares es tim ates  th a t  we o b ta in  
depend on the choice of va lues  made. For th i s  reason  we must choose 
i n i t i a l  s t a r t i n g  values  to be used in  the m inim isa tion  of the 
co n d i t io n a l  sum of squares fu n c t io n .
One s o lu t io n  i s  to s e t  the elements of W* and of a* equal to 
t h e i r  u n co n d i t io n a l  e x p e c ta t io n s .  The uncond it iona l  ex p ec ta t io n s  of 
a* are  zero , and i f  the model con ta in s  no d e te r m in i s t i c  p a r t  [so th a t  
the mean of W i s  zero] the  un co n d it io n a l  e x p ec ta t io n  of W* w i l l  a lso  
be zero . This s o lu t io n  w i l l  provide a reasonably  good approximation 
to the c o r re c t  procedure i f  the  a c tu a l  values of a re  not c lo se  to  1 
and i f  the number of ob se rv a tio n s  n is  la rg e  r e l a t i v e  to  p and q.
An a l t e r n a t i v e  and, accord ing  to Box-Jenkins, more r e l i a b l e  
approxim ation procedure ,  and one we have employed, i s  to  use (4 .25 )  
to  c a l c u la te  the  a Ts from ap+i[ onwards, s e t t i n g  prev ious a ' s  equal to 
zero , so th a t  a c tu a l ly  o ccu rr ing  va lues  a re  used f o r  the  W's 
throughout. This p rocedure , th e re fo r e ,  determines c o n d i t io n a l  
expected values  f o r  W*, th a t  i s ,  values th a t  are  c o n d i t io n a l  on the 
observed va lues  of W. Using th i s  method we can sum the squares of 
only n-p-d values  of a t , but fo r  long s e r ie s  the  s l i g h t  lo ss  of 
in fo rm ation  w i l l  be unim portan t. Appendix 2 d e sc r ib e s  th i s  
a l t e r n a t i v e  method, w h ile  Appendix 4 d esc r ibes  the softw are  employed 
in  th i s  re se a rc h .
N on-linear e s t im a t io n
As seen above the  maximum l ik e l ih o o d  es t im a tes  are  c lo se ly
approximated by the  l e a s t  squares e s t im a tes  which make
£
S( cf> , 0) = t  a t 2 a minimum.
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In g e n e ra l ,  co n s id e ra b le  s im p l i f i c a t io n  occurs in  the
m in im isa tion  w ith  r e sp e c t  to  T of a sum of squares 
n
£  [ f  t C r  >  J 2
t= l
i f  each ffc(r) i s  a l i n e a r  fu n c t io n  of the param eters  F-We now show 
th a t  the  l i n e a r i t y  s t a t u s  of a^ i s  d i f f e r e n t  in  r e l a t i o n  to  the  
a u to re g re s s iv e  param eter (j) and to  the  moving average param eter 0 .
For the  pu re ly  AR process  a t  =* <J> (B)Wt  and to  minimise E a2 
the d e r iv a t iv e  must b e - s e t  equal to  zero:
~ Wt_! + <j£(B) 9Wt
3 (j) 3(j)
i  - i
T herefo re  a t  i s  l i n e a r  in  the  (j)Ts .  By c o n t ra s t ,  f o r  the  pure MA 
process a t  = 0~ 1(B)Wt  and
9 a t  = 0’*2(B)Wt _j  + 0Jl(B)
8 0. 8 9 J
J
so th a t  the  at 's  a re  always n o n - l in e a r  func tions  of the param eters .
To minimise the  sum of squares fu n c t io n  when the  process i s  
purely* a u to re g re s s iv e ,  i . e
Wt  = $lWt _x + . . . .  + $p wt - p  + a t
th e  e s t im a t io n  process  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a l i n e a r  r e g re s s io n  s in ce  the
model i s  of the  g en era l  form
Yt  = Yl x l + y 2x2 + • • •  + ut
Our e s t im a te  fo r  (j) would be g iven by 2 = (X"X)“ 1X"Y
where
X =
WT
Wp+i W.
Wp-1
p
Wi
w2
^ n —1 ^ n - 2  ^ n - i
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and
Y =
Wp+2
W„
Wp+1
th a t  i s ,  X i s  a (N-p)*p
m atrix  and Y is  a (n -p )* l  v e c to r .
The problem i s  more d i f f i c u l t  i f  the model con ta in s  a moving 
average component in  which case
a t  -  0 _1(B) 0 (B) Wt  . . .  4 .26
i s  the  ' r e g r e s s io n  e q u a t io n '  which is  non l i n e a r  in  the  param eters ,  
and has to be e s tim ated  by a g enera l i t e r a t i v e  non l i n e a r  e s t im a t io n  
ro u t in e .  Such a ro u t in e  uses the  f i r s t  two terms in  a Taylor s e r i e s  
expansion to  l i n e a r i s e  (4 .2 6 )  around an i n i t i a l  'g u e s s '  fo r  0 and 6 .
Let us denote by T the p + q = K param eters ( 0 , 0  ) .  We need 
then  to  minimise E-at 2 . Expanding a t 2 in  a Taylor s e r ie s  about i t s  
value corresponding  to  the guessed s e t  of parameter va lues  r o we have 
approxim ately
a t  t a t»o-l ~ E ?  i  yi> o)Xi> t  
i =l
. . .  4.27
where [a t , 0 ] = [a t |W,Y 0
and - = -  9 a t* i» t
T = To
In m atrix  n o ta t io n  (3 ,27 ) can be w r i t t e n  as
[a0 ] = x ( f -  r0> [a]
where [aG] and [a] a re  column v e c to r s .  The ad justm ents  (T ~ r o) 
which minimise
S(T) = S ( 0 , 0  ) = [a] ” [a]
may now be obta ined  by l i n e a r  l e a s t  squa res ,  th a t  i s  by ' r e g r e s s in g '  
the  [aQ] ' s  onto the  x ' s .  Because the  [a t ] ' s  w i l l  not be ex a c t ly  
l i n e a r  in  the param eters  T , a s in g le  adjustment w i l l  not immediately 
produce l e a s t  squares v a lu es .  In s te a d ,  the  ad ju s ted  values a re  
s u b s t i tu t e d  as new guesses and a new l i n e a r i z a t i o n  i s  made around
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th e se  e s t im a te s .  Again a l i n e a r  re g re s s io n  i s  performed and the  
p rocess i s  repea ted  i t e r a t i v e l y  u n t i l  convergence occurs -  when the  
e s t im a te s  of <f> and 0 do not change a f t e r  repea ted  i t e r a t i o n s .
Convergence i s  f a s t e r  i f  good guesses a re  used i n i t i a l l y ,  w hile
bad guesses may mean th a t  the  process  does not converge a t  a l l .
Hence, be fo re  n o n - l in e a r  e s t im ta t io n  can be performed, i t  is  
e s s e n t i a l  to  o b ta in  i n i t i a l  va lues  ((j>o >0o) fo r  the  param eters  and 
t h i s  may be ob ta ined  a t  the  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  s ta g e .
The Yule-Walker equations  (Yule, 1927) r e l a t e  the  a u to re g re s s iv e  
param eters to  the  a u to c o r r e la t io n  fu n c t io n  and can be solved fo r  
the <(> values in  terras of the sample ACF:
Pl = ( [ > ! +  $2P1 + •••• ^pPp-l
P2 = <HP1 + $ 2 + • • • •  <j> pPp-2
Pp = ^lPp-1 + ^2Pp-2 + • • • •  ^p
In a d d i t io n  as Box and Jenk ins  (ch ap te r  3) show the r e l a t i o n s h ip
between th e  ACF and th e  moving average param eters of an MA(q) process
i s  given by
Solving th e se  equations  we can g e t  u s e fu l  rough e s t im a te s  which can_ 
be used in  the i t e r a t i v e  e s t im a t io n  procedure.
With re fe re n c e  to  our example on Middle East netbacks fo r  
Arabian L ight (1982-85), an ARIMA (0 ,1 ,3 )  model has been id e n t i f i e d .  
There fore ,  to o b ta in  i n i t i a l  e s t im a te s  fo r  the 0 param eters  we have 
to  so lve  the  fo llow ing  equa t ions  s im ultaneously :
-  0 R + 01 9 k+1 + 92 9 k +2 +
Pk (K = 1 ,2 , . .q)
1 + 0 j2 + B22 + +  0 2 q
3 0.241
T + 0 p ~ T “ e + 932"
P2 = ~ 9 2 + 91 9 3 ________
I + 0^A ' +" ' " Y 0^2
= - 0 . 3 0 4
- 141 -
P3 "  _________  ~ e 3 ________  = -0 .306
I + 0 1 2  + 022 + 032
which y ie ld s  approxim ately  Gj = - 0 .2 ,  02  = 0 .3 ,  and 0 3  = 0.378.
Using th e se  i n i t i a l  e s t im a te s ,  the  i t e r a t i v e  n o n - l in e a r  e s t im a t io n  
ro u t in e  y ie ld s  a f t e r  th ree  i t e r a t i o n s :  9 1  = -0 .2 3 0 4 , 8 3  =
0.3094, 8 3  -  0 .324 . Hence the es tim ated  model i s :  
yt  = (1 -  0.2304B + 0.3094B2 + 0.324B3) a t
w ith  r e s id u a l  sum of squares of 21.58 as compared w ith  the i n i t i a l  
26.9 ( th e  e s t im a te  fo r  0 O i s  non s i g n i f i c a n t ,  confirm ing th a t  th$ 
mean of Wt  = y t  -  y ^ - i  i s  ze ro ,  i . e  th e re  i s  d r i f t  in  the s e r i e s  
but not a d e te r m in i s t i c  time t r e n d ) .
4 .3 .3  Model d ia g n o s t ic  checking
Having es t im a ted  the  param eters  of an ARIMA (p , d, q) model the 
qu es tio n  remains of d ec id ing  whether the model i s  adequate . I f  th e re  
i s  evidence of s e r io u s  inadequacy, we need to  know how the  model 
should be modified in  the next i t e r a t i v e  cyc le .  As Box and Jenk ins
put i t  "what we are  doing i s  only p a r t i a l l y  descr ibed  by the  words
" te s t in g  goodness of f i t " .  We need to d iscover in  what way a model 
i s  inadequate ,  so as to  suggest a p p ro p r ia te  m od if ica tion"  (p . 285).
Our f i r s t  concern i s  th a t  the es tim ated  param eters  should be 
s a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  and must l i e  w ith in  the bounds of
D
s t a t i o n a r i t y  and i n v e r t i b i l i t y . Any parameter whose es tim ated  value 
i s  not s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  than zero should be dropped from the 
te n t a t i v e  model. Furtherm ore, i f  the e s tim ates  do not s a t i s f y  the  
s t a t i o n a r i t y  -  i n v e r t i b i l i t y  co n d it io n s  then the t e n t a t i v e  model must 
be r e j e c te d .  I f  a s t a t io n a r y  time s e r i e s  has been d if fe re n c e d  
in c o r r e c t l y ,  or i f  a n o n - s ta t io n a ry  s e r i e s  has not been d if f e re n c e d ,  
AR and /o r  MA param eters  w i l l  in v a r ia b ly  exceed the  bounds of 
s t a t i o n a r i t y  or i n v e r t i b i l i t y .  Whatever the cause of the problem, 
the  model must be r e je c te d .
Having ob ta ined  s a t i s f a c t o r y  -  by the above c r i t e r i a  -  
e s t im a te s ,  the model i s  then diagnosed fo r  s t a t i s t i c a l  adequacy. The 
process involves two s t e p s .  F i r s t ,  the a u to c o r r e la t io n  fu n c tio n  fo r  
the s im ulated  s e r i e s  -  i . e  the  s e r i e s  generated by the model -  can be 
compared w ith  the sample ACF of the o r ig in a l  s e r i e s .  I f  the two
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ACF's seem very d i f f e r e n t  some doubt i s  c as t  on the v a l i d i t y  of the 
model and a r e s p e c i f i c a t io n  may be in  o rd e r .  I f  the  two ACF's a re  
not markedly d i f f e r e n t ,  a q u a n t i t a t i v e  a n a ly s is  of the  model 
r e s id u a l s  can be made, which c o n s t i tu te s  the second s tep  of 
d ia g n o s t ic  checking.
An adequate model i s  one whose re s id u a ls  resemble a w hite  no ise  
p rocess ,  i . e  they a re  u n c o r re la te d  w ith  each o th e r ,  so th a t  t h e i r  ACF 
i s  c lo se  to  zero . Therefore  s tudy of the r e s id u a l s  could in d ic a te  
the e x is te n c e  and n a tu re  of model inadequacy. In p a r t i c u l a r ,  
recogn izab le  p a t te rn s  in  the r e s id u a l  ACF could po in t to  a p p ro p r ia te  
m od if ica t ions  of the model.
I f  the model was c o r re c t  and we knew the t ru e  param eter values  
and 0 , then using  B a r t l e t t ’s and Anderson 's  (1942) r e s u l t s ,  the 
a u to c o r r e la t io n  of the  r e s id u a l s  would be u n c o rre la te d  and 
d i s t r i b u t e d  normally about zero  w ith  a s tandard  e r ro r  of 1/fcf We
can use th e se  f a c t s  to  a sse s s  approxim ately the  s ig n i f i c a n c e  of
apparen t dep a r tu res  of th e se  a u to c o r r e la t io n s  from zero  ( i . e  i f  a
p a r t i c u l a r  a u to c o r r e la t io n  exceeds i t s  s tandard  e r r o r  i t  can be taken  
to  be d i f f e r e n t  from zero  and th i s  i s  a departu re  from the p a t te r n  of 
white n o ise  p ro c e ss '  ACF).
Rather than co n s id e r  the  P k ( a ) *s in d iv id u a l ly ,  an in d i c a t io n  i s  
o f te n  needed of w hether, say , the  f i r s t  20 a u to c o r r e la t io n s  of the 
r e s id u a l s  taken as a whole in d i c a te  model inadequacy. Suppose th a t  
we have the f i r s t  K a u to c o r r e la t io n  p (a) from any ARIMA (p , d, q)
p rocess ,  then i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to show th a t
Q = n jr p2lc(fi)
k = l
has the X2(k -  p -  q) d i s t r i b u t i o n .  I f  the  model i s  in a p p ro p r ia te  
the value of Q w i l l  be i n f l a t e d .  This i s  a genera l or 'portm anteau ' 
t e s t  of the  hypo thes is  of model adequacy.
Another technique which can be used fo r  d ia g n o s t ic  checking i s  
o v e r f i t t i n g .  Having es tim ated  the model be lieved  to be c o r r e c t ,  we 
f i t  a more e la b o ra te  model, covering fea red  d i r e c t io n s  of
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d i s c r e p a n c y .■ I f  the a n a ly s i s  f a i l s  to show th a t  th e  a d d i t io n s  are 
needed, confidence in  our model i s  inc reased  but we have not proved 
i t s  c o r re c tn e s s .  This method of extending the model in  a p a r t i c u l a r  
d i r e c t io n  assumes th a t  we know the  kind of d isc rep a n c ie s  th a t  a re  to 
be fea red ,  which may not be the  case . The r e s id u a l  a n a ly s is
described  above does not re q u ire  such knowledge. N ev er th e less ,
o v e r f i t t i n g  can be performed as a means fo r  'm e ta d ia g n o s is ' f o r  
example, having i d e n t i f i e d  -  es tim ated  and accepted an ARIMA 
( 0 , 1 ,l)m odel,  we may f i t  an ARIMA (0 ,  1, 2) model. I f  the o r ig in a l .
(0 ,  1, 1) model has been judged adequate , we expect the  es tim ated  0 2
param eter to  be i n s i g n i f i c a n t .
R eferr ing  to our example, th e  es tim ated  param eters  were 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  as seen by t h e i r  s tandard  e r r o r s :
PARAMETER ESTIMATE STD. DEV. T-RATIO
0X -0 .2304 0.1601 -1 .4 4
02 0.3094 0.1560 ' 1.98
03 0.3240 0.1617 2.00
Furthermore they a re  a l l  w ith in  the bounds of i n v e r t i b i l i t y .  Hence 
we can proceed w ith* the  r e s id u a l  d ia g n o s is .  Their es tim ated  ACF and 
corresponding  s tan d ard  e r r o r s  a re  given below:
LAGS
A u to c o rre la t io n s  
S tandard E rro rs
A u to c o rre la t io n s  
S tandard E rro rs
A u to c o rre la t io n s  
Standard e r ro r s
A u to co rre la t io n s  
Standard E rro rs
1 -  5
-0 .038 -0.031 -0 .078 -0.137 -0.007
0.162 0.162 0,163 0.164 0.167
-0 .172  -0 .139  0.020 -0 .06  -0.0162
6 - 1 0  0.167 0.171 0.174 0.174 0.175
11 -15
16 - 20
0.1 0.047 -0 .058 -0 .060  0.08
0.175 0.176 0.177 0.177 0.177
-0 .1 2  0.281 -0 .096  0.0076 0.035
0.178 0.185 0.191 0.193 0.193
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The re s id u a l s  appear to  be w hite  n o ise  as a l l  a u to c o r r e la t io n s  a re  
c lo se  to  zero . One excep tion  i s  the lag  17, P1 7  = 0 .281, but then
even in  a pure ly  random process  i t  i s  expected th a t  one in  2 0  
a u to c o r re la to n s  may be s i g n i f i c a n t .  Examining the  ACF as a whole 
Q = 11.2. The value of X2 o . 0 5  w ith  K - p - g  = 2 0 - 3  = 17 degrees
of freedom i s  28.00. Hence, Q i s  i n s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from zero  
and thus we can accep t the  hypo thesis  of white n o ise  r e s id u a l s .
O v e r f i t t in g  a model (0 ,  1, 4) y ie ld s  Q4  = 0.122 w ith  a
s tandard  e r r o r  of 0 .171, which i s  indeed in s i g n i f i c a n t .  Furtherm ore, 
the  s im ulated  s e r i e s  has an ACF very s im i la r  to  th e  o r i g i n a l .  I f  the 
model were 'p e r f e c t '  i t  would reproduce the o r ig i n a l  s e r i e s  hence we 
would expect a p lo t  of a c tu a l  versus  sim ulated  values  to l i e  on the  
45 degree l in e  of p e r f e c t  f o r e c a s t s .  From the a c tu a l  p lo t ,  in  f ig u re
4 .3 .3 .1  though not p e r f e c t ,  the  model seems to perform adequa te ly .
At t h i s  f i n a l  d ia g n o s t ic  s te p  T h e i l ' s  u s t a t i s t i c  should a lso  be 
c a lc u la te d  to  enable s ta tem en ts  to  be made about the  model's 
p r e d ic t iv e  power, where
U =
N
E (P j -  A±)2 w ith  Pt = p re d ic te d  change 
At  a c tu a l  change
and benchmarks U = 0 fo r  a p e r f e c t  model, U = 1 fo r  a naive
no-change e x t r a p o la t io n  model and U > 1 in d ic a t in g  th a t  model 
p r e d ic t io n  i s  worse than a naive model.
Figure 4 .3 .3 .1  Actual versus  p re d ic te d  s e r i e s  from (0 ,  1, 3) model 
fo r  A rabian L igh t Middle E as t Netbacks, 1982-85
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4.4  ARIMA IMPACT ASSESSMENT
I t  i s  o f te n  the  case th a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  time s e r i e s  re p re s e n t in g  an 
economic event does not e x h ib i t  homogeneity in  mean and v a r ian ce  and 
th a t  i t  cannot th e re fo re  be transform ed in to  a s t a t io n a r y  s e r i e s  by 
ap p ro p r ia te  d i f f e re n c in g  or lo g a r i th m ic  t ra n s fo rm a t io n s .  The reason  
i s  th a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  event has taken place which has impacted the 
s e r i e s  in  such a way th a t  i t s  s t a t i s t i c a l  p ro p e r t i e s  a re  overwhelmed 
and d i s t o r t e d .  A ty p i c a l  example would be a war, o r  a s t r i k e ,  o r ,  in  
the c a s e 'o f  o i l  p r i c e s ,  the  1973 and 1979 c r i s e s  produced by two. 
unexpected p o l i t i c a l  events  and c re a t in g  a step-jump in  th e  s e r i e s .
In  such cases modelling w ith in  the  u n iv a r i a te  ARIMA framework i s  no t 
p o s s ib le .  In s te a d ,  an ex ten s io n  of the  b as ic  models has to  be 
employed, which i s  known as ARIMA impact assessment or in t e rv e n t io n  
a n a ly s i s .
Impact assessm ent a t tem pts  to answer the fo llow ing  q u es t io n :  
g iven  a known in t e r v e n t io n ,  i s  th e re  evidence th a t  change in  the 
s e r i e s  of the  kind expected a c t u a l l y  occurred and, i f  so , what can be 
sa id  of the n a tu re  and magnitude of the  change? An approach 
i n i t i a t e d  by Box and Tiao (1975) i s  to bu ild  a s to c h a s t i c  model which 
inc ludes  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of change of the form expected .
Impact assessm ent can be def ined  as a t e s t  of the  n u l l  
hypothesis  th a t  a p o s tu la te d  event caused a change in  the process  
measured as a time s e r i e s ;  the  a n a ly s i s  is  concerned w ith  the e f f e c t s  
of a p o s tu la te d  event on the  s e r i e s ,  events being rep re sen ted  by 
binary  v a r i a b le s .  The n u l l  hypo thes is  th a t  the  event caused a change 
can be t e s t e d  only because the time of the event i s  known a p r i o r i ;
so i t  i s  a confirm atory  r a th e r  than an e x p lo ra to ry  a n a ly s is  used to
t e s t  the  hypothesis  accord ing  to  a r igo rous  s e t  of v a l i d i t y  c r i t e r i a .
Impact assessm ent begins w ith  an ARIMA model fo r  the  time s e r i e s  
which d esc r ib e s  the  s to c h a s t i c  behaviour of th a t  s e r i e s .  An
in te rv e n t io n  component i s  then  added to  the model so
Yt  = f ( I t ) + Nt
where f ( I t ) denotes 'a  fu n c t io n  of the in te rv e n t io n  component1. The 
in te rv e n t io n  component i t s e l f  d esc r ib es  the d e te r m in i s t i c  
r e l a t io n s h ip  between an event and the  time s e r i e s .  The no ise  
component d e sc r ib e s  the  s to c h a s t i c  behaviour of the  s e r i e s  around the 
Y = f ( I t )  r e l a t i o n s h ip .
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The model b u i ld in g  p rocess  i s  again  i t e r a t i v e ,  proceeding by 
success ive  use of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  ( t e n t a t i v e  s p e c i f i c a t io n  of the 
model form ), f i t t i n g  and D iagnos tic  Checking. Using these  ideas  the  
fo llow ing  g enera l s t r a t e g y  a p p l ie s :
1. Frame a model fo r  change which d esc r ibes  what i s  expected to  
occur given knowledge of a given in te rv e n t io n .
2. E stim ate  the  model
3. I f  d ia g n o s t ic  checks show no inadequacy, make a p p ro p r ia te  
in fe re n c e s ;  i f  s e r io u s  d e f ic ie n c ie s  a re  uncovered, make a p p ro p r ia te  
model m o d if ica t io n  and r e p e a t  the  a n a ly s i s .
The a n a ly s is  begins w ith  c o n s tru c t io n  of an ARIMA model fo r  the  
time s e r i e s .  I f  the  impact of * the event considered  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  
then  th e  ACF and PACF w i l l  be d i s to r t e d ,  such d i s to r t i o n s  being 
s im i la r  in  n a tu re  to  d i s t o r t i o n s  a s so c ia te d  w ith  o u t l i e r s .  The 
change in  process l e v e l  caused by an event com plicates i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
of the no ise  component, because the change in  l e v e l  i s  a s i g n i f i c n a t  
propor'tion  of the  s e r i e s  v a r ian ce  which tends to  overwhelm the  ACF 
and PACF. To avoid b iased  e s t im a te s  of these  two fu n c tio n s  the 
a n a ly s t  has to  e s t im a te  them from the p r e - in t e r v e n t io n  p a r t  of the 
s e r i e s ,  and then i d e n t i f y ,  e s t im a te  and diagnose th e  ARIMA model of 
the  s to c h a s t i c  component of the  s e r i e s .  This model provides a 
s to c h a s t i c  benchmark a g a in s t  which in te rv e n t io n - in d u c e d  changes in  
the  s lope and /o r  l e v e l  of the  s e r i e s  can be determined.
The next s tep  i s  to  add the  in te rv e n t io n  component. A simple 
theory  of impact i s  one which c h a ra c te r i s e s  the  in te rv e n in g  event by 
two a t t r i b u t e s :  i t s  onse t (whether abrupt or g radual)  and i t s
.d u ra tio n  (whether permanent or tem porary). With th i s  simple theory  
of impact, four d i s t i n c t  e f f e c t s  a re  p o s s ib le ,  as shown in  f ig u r e  
4 .4 .1 .
DURATION 
PERMANENT TEMPORARY
GRADUAL
ONSET
ABRUPT
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Figure 4.4.1 A simple theory of impact
A gradua l permanent change in  process  le v e l  i s  im plied  by the f i r s t
o rder  t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n
w0
f d t ) = -----------------  i t
1 -fyB
where \  i s  c o n s tra in ed  to  the  i n t e r v a l  -1 < ^  < 1
( th e  bounds of system s t a b i l i t y ,  d iscussed  below). An ab rup t,
permanent s h i f t  in  p rocess  l e v e l  from pre to p o s t - in t e r v e n t io n  i s
in d ic a te d  by the  z e ro -o rd e r  t r a n s f e r  fu n c tio n  [ the  h ig h e s t  power of B
i s  ze ro .]
f ( I t ) = w0I t
An ab ru p t,  temporary response i s  im plied by the f i r s t - o r d e r  t r a n s f e r  
fu n c t io n  ap p lied  to  a pu lse  fu n c t io n
(1 -  B ) l t  defined  such th a t :
(1 -  B )I t  = 0 p r io r  to  the  event
= 1 a t  the onset of the event
= 0 t h e r e a f t e r
Thus, in  t h i s  case
f d t )  ■ ( i  -  B ) i t
In  genera l the  dynamic model fo r  the  e f f e c t s  of exogenous 
in te rv e n t io n s  i s  given by the  l i n e a r  d i f fe re n c e  equation  
Yt = 6 lYt - l  + • • •  + <5r Y t- r  + woTt-b ~ wl Ft - b - l  ~ Vs^t-b-s*** 4.28
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which can a lso  be w r i t t e n  as the r a t i o  of two polynomials B of degree 
S and r :
Yt ( l  -  <%B -  . . .  -  <%Br ) = (w0 -  wjL -  . . .  -  wsLs ) I t _b
Y = <wo “  wlB ~ W2 B2 -  . . . .  -  ws Ls ) ^
(1 - ^ B  -  d2Bz -  -  %Br ) t  b
where B i s  the  delay ( la g )  param eter and the  system i s  s ta b le .
S t a b i l i t y  r e q u ire s  the  ro o ts  of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  equation  
(1 -  6xb -  62B2 -  . . . Sr Br ) = 0
(w ith  B t r e a te d  as an a lg e b ra ic  q u a n t i ty )  to l i e  o u ts id e  the  u n i t  
c i r c l e ,  th a t  i s ,  the s o lu t io n s  B j , B2 j . . .  Br  must a l l  be g r e a te r  
than u n i ty  in  a b so lu te  va lue ,  which im plies  th a t  the  system 
e v en tu a l ly  converges to an eq u i l ib r iu m  l e v e l .  This ex a c t ly  p a r a l l e l s
the  s t a t i o n a r i t y  and i n v e r t i b i l i t y  cond it ions  fo r  th e  ARMA models and
means th a t  the ad m iss ib le  reg ions  fo r  the param eters a re  the  same.
So fo r  the f i r s t  o rder  t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  -1 < % < 1, fo r  the second
o rd e r  t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  -1 < <52 c 1; % + <S2 < 1; <$2 -  6 1  < 1
and so on.
S t a b i l i t y  im plies  t h a t  when the  in te rv e n t io n  i s  su s ta in e d  
i n d e f i n i t e l y  ( I t  = 1 f o r  a l l  t  > n ) , the e f f e c t  w i l l  ev e n tu a l ly
reach the  eq u il ib r iu m  or s teady  s t a t e  va lue . Since Yt  i s  a s t a b l e ,  
o r  s t a t io n a r y  p rocess  E(Yt ) = E(Yt „}) = . . .  = E(Yt _s ) equals a
c o n s ta n t ,  say Y*. Taking Y*  as the i n i t i a l  co n d it io n s  of (4 .28) 
gives
Y* — j_Y* . . .  — r Y* = Wq1e-.b . . .  — WgI^-_|j_gHence i f
I t  i s  held i n d e f i n i t e l y  a t  the va lue  +1, then
Y* = W? ~ * * * ws
i s  the  eq u i l ib r iu m  value of Yt . This i s  the  eq u iv a len t  of the  
long-term  m u l t ip l i e r  in  the  f i n a l  form of the  gen era l  econometric 
model.
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C le a r ly ,  the  g en e ra l  in te rv e n t io n  e f f e c t  model in  (4 .28) admits 
a wide range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s ;  h igher o rder  t r a n s f e r  f u n c t io n s ,  
m u l t ip le  or compound in te rv e n t io n s  a re  e a s i l y  accommodated w ith in  
t h i s  framework, as a re  a wide v a r ie ty  of e f f e c t  p a t te rn s  and seasona l 
or c y c l ic a l  movements in  a time s e r i e s .
Having s p e c i f i e d  a p la u s ib le  in te rv e n t io n s  fu n c tio n  ( in  
p r a c t i c e ,  s e v e ra l  a l t e r n a t i v e s  might be e n te r ta in e d )  i t  should be 
ad jo ined  to  th e  n o ise  model which has a lready  been e s ta b l i s h e d .  The 
param eters of the  complete model should then be es tim ated  
s im u ltaneously ,  and the  model should be su b jec ted  to the  d ia g n o s t ic  
checks o u t l in e d  in  s e c t io n  4 .3 .3 .
4.5  CAUSALITY TESTS
As argued in  th e  in t ro d u c to ry  s e c t io n  of th i s  ch ap te r ,  Granger 
c a u s a l i ty  i s  based on the  n o t io n  th a t  absence of c o r r e l a t i o n  between
p as t  values of one v a r ia b le  X and th a t  p a r t  of ano ther  v a r ia b le  Y
which cannot be p re d ic te d  from Y's own pas t  im plies  absence of causa l  
in f lu e n c e  from X to  Y, and v ice  versa.* More fo rm a lly ,  the  time 
s e r i e s  X i s  sa id  to  cause Y r e l a t i v e  to the  u n iv e rse  U [U being a 
v ec to r  time s e r i e s  in c lu d in g  X and Y] i f  and only i f ,  p re d ic t io n s  of 
*Y(t) based on U(s) f o r  a l l  s < t  a re  b e t t e r  than p re d ic t io n s  based on 
a l l  components of U(s) except X(s) f o r  s < t ;  th a t  is^. i f  pas t  values  
of X can be used to  improve the p re d ic t io n s  of f u tu re  Y. C au sa l i ty  
from Y to  X i s  de f ined  in  the  same manner. Feedback occurs i f  Xt  
causes Yt  and Yt  causes Xt . Ins tan taneous  c a u s a l i ty  occurs when th e  
cu rren t  value of Yt  i s  b e t t e r  p re d ic te d  i f  the p re se n t  value of Xt  i s  
inc luded  in  the  p r e d ic t io n  than  i f  i t  i s  no t.
Granger draws a t te n io n  to  th e  f a c t  th a t  spu rious  c a u s a l i ty  may
appear in  the case of inadequate  breakdown of the. d a ta .  I f ,  f o r  
example, X —o  Y w ith  a lag  of one pe r iod ,  but X and Y have been 
sampled in  tw o-period i n t e r v a l s ,  then t h e i r  causa l p a t te r n  w i l l  
appear to  be X---e> Y, s ince  re le v a n t  in fo rm ation  -  th e  m issing d a ta  -  
has been ignored in  U (s). A lso , P ie rce  and Haugh (1977) show t h a t ,  
i f  in s ta n tan eo u s  c a u s a l i ty  i s  p re se n t ,  then i t  i s  im possib le  to  
i d e n t i f y  a u n id i r e c t i o n a l  causa l p a t te r n .
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F in a l ly ,  a f o u r th  d e f i n i t i o n  r e f e r s  to  c a u s a l i ty  la g  (X-o k Y ), 
when the c u r ren t  value of X causes the value of Y a f t e r  k time 
p e r io d s .
Given two s t a t io n a r y  time s e r i e s  w ith  zero mean the  simple 
cau sa l  model i s
m
Xt = E ajX t—j +
j =l "
m
Yt  = E cjXt _j +
r i  •
where and nt  a re  two u n c o r re la te d  white n o ise  s e r i e s , i . e  E(et £ s )= 
0 = E(nt ns ) ,  s = t  and E[£t £g ] = 0, a l l  t , s
In  (4 .29) m can equal i n f i n i t y  but in  p r a c t ic e  due to  the  f i n i t e  
le n g th  of the a v a i la b le  d a ta ,  m w i l l  be assumed to be f i n i t e  and 
s h o r t e r  than  th e  time s e r i e s .
m
E d - jY ^  + _nt
j =l
. . .  4.29
The d e f in i t i o n  of c a u s a l i ty  given above im plies  th a t  Xt  i s  
causing Yt  i f  some of the Cj a re  not zero . S im i la r ly ,  Yt  causes Xt  
i f  some of the bj a re  not ze ro .  I f  both these  events  occur, th e re  i s  
a feedback r e l a t i o n s h ip  Xt< —c>Yt .
The more genera l model w ith  in s tan tan eo u s  c a u s a l i ty  i s
m m
Xt  + b0Yt  = a j X t . j  + b jY t . j  + et  
j " l  j =l
m m
Yt  + cox-t cj ^ t —j  + dj Yt~ j "** nt
j =l j =l
. . .  4 .30
I f  the v a r ia b le s  a re  such th a t  t h i s  kind of r e p re s e n ta t io n  i s  needed, 
then  in s ta n tan eo u s  c a u s a l i ty  i s  occurr ing  and a knowledge of Yt w i l l  
improve the  goodness of f i t ,  or p re d ic t io n  of the f i r s t  equation  fo r  
Xt .
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A number of s t a t i s t i c a l  procedures invo lv ing  the  Granger 
methodology have been proposed, one of them by Sims (1972), who 
proves th a t  when X causes Y we can expect th a t  no fu tu r e  values  of X 
would e n te r  the  r e g re s s io n  of Y on cu rren t  and p a s t  X. Hence, he 
provides a p r a c t i c a l  s t a t i s t i c a l  t e s t  fo r  u n id i r e c t i o n a l  c a u s a l i t y ,  
based on the  idea  mentioned e a r l i e r  on th a t  the  p as t  causes the 
p re se n t  and fu tu r e ,  bu t the  fu tu r e  cannot cause the  p a s t :  i f  X causes 
Y u n id i r e c t i o n a l l y ,  then re g re s s io n  of Y on p as t  and fu tu re  values  of 
X w i l l  give fu tu r e  X c o e f f i c i e n t s  which, as a group, are  
i n s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from zero .
This t e s t  re q u ire s  use of th e  F - t e s t  on groups of c o e f f i c i e n t s ,
and hence i t  i s  im portan t t h a t  the  r e s id u a ls  a re  w hite  n o ise .
T here fo re ,  a l l  v a r ia b le s  used in  the  reg re s s io n s  must be 
p r e f i l t e r e d .  Sims in  h is  1972 paper uses a r b i t r a r i l y  the same f i l t e r  
f o r  a l l  v a r i a b le s :  ( 1 -  1.5L + 0.56L2) arguing th a t  t h i s  f i l t e r  
'h o p e fu l ly  produces w h ite  n o ise  r e s id u a l s ,  by f l a t t e n i n g  the  s p e c t r a l  
d en s i ty  of the  time s e r i e s ' .  However, one cannot j u s t i f y  t h i s  
approach of p rew hiten ing . Of course ,  in  terms of s im p l ic i ty  and 
convenience i t  i s  a p r e f e r a b le  method. But i t  cannot be assumed th a t  
a l l  economic time s e r i e s  e x h ib i t  th e  same s t a t i s t i c a l  behaviour. 
Hence, i t  i s  necessary  th a t  each v a r ia b le  i s  f i l t e r e d  in d iv id u a l ly  on
th e  b a s is  of observed s e r i e s  behaviour using th e  u n iv a r i a t e  ARIMA
framework. In t h i s  way one ensures  th a t  the r e s id u a l s  a re  w hite 
no ise  hence th a t  the  F - s t a t i s t i c  i s  unbiased.
T here fo re ,  g iven  X and Y , th e  f i r s t  s te p  i s  to e s t im a te  a 
u n iv a r i a t e  ARIMA model f o r  each s e r i e s  . These models provide us 
w ith  the  innova tions  (o r  w hite  no ise  r e s id u a l s )  e t  from Xt  and u t  
from Y{.. Given e t  and u t , the  second s tep  i s  to perform the  
fo llow ing  r e g re s s io n s :
PAST
VALUES
ONLY
ut  = a Q + Z 8 i e t - i  + v t  
i =0
e t  = CQ + £ di ut - i  + f t
i ”o
4.31
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WITH
FUTURE
VALUES
ut  — ^ o E $ j[ + vt  (a)
i =-6
... 4.32
— C q  +  E d i u t— i -^ t (D)
i~ -6
I f  Xt  causes Yt  then  th e  F -va lues  fo r  the r e g re s s io n s  (4 .31a)  and 
(4 .32a )  w i l l  be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from zero ,  w hile  the  F -va lue  
f o r  the  s ix  lead  c o e f f i c i e n t s  ( i . e  fu tu re  la g s )  in  equation  (4 .32a)  
w i l l  be i n s i g n i f i c a n t  -  s in c e  the  fu tu re  cannot cause the  p a s t .  At 
the  same tim e, the  F -va lue  fo r  the  re g re s s io n  (4 .31b) w i l l  be 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t ,  the  F -value  f o r  (4 .32b) w i l l  be s i g n i f i c a n t ,  and the 
F -value fo r  the  s ix  lead  c o e f f i c i e n t s  in  (4 .32b) w i l l  a lso  be 
s i g n i f i c a n t  ( s in c e  fu tu r e  Y i s  a f f e c te d  by p re sen t and p as t  X 
v a lu e s ) .
Conversely, i f  Yt  causes Xt  then the  F-values f o r  the  
r e g re s s io n s  (4 .31b) and (4 .32b) w i l l  be s i g n i f i c a n t ,  and the  F-value  
f o r  the  s ix  lead  c o e f f i c i e n t s  in  (4 .32b) w i l l  be i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  
Furtherm ore, (4 .31a) w i l l  be i n s i g n i f i c a n t ,  w hile  (4 .32a )  w i l l  be 
s i g n i f i c a n t  o v e r a l l  and a l s o  the  s ix  lead c o e f f i c i e n t s  w i l l  be 
s i g n i f i c a n t  as a group.
Sims (1970) proves th a t  p r e f i l t e r i n g  may produce a perverse  
e f f e c t  on approxim ation e r r o r  when lag  d i s t r i b u t io n s  a re  s u b je c t  to  
p r io r  'sm oothness ' r e s t r i c t i o n s .  Therefore ,  no Koyck, Almon or 
r a t i o n a l  lag  r e s t r i c t i o n s  should be imposed a p r i o r i  and the le n g th  
of the  es tim ated  la g  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  should be kept generous, in  o rder  
to  avoid b ia s .
The problem w ith  t h i s  t e s t  i s  the choice of the number of -leads 
and la g s ,  s in ce  th e re  i s  no sa fe  way of guessing which lag  w i l l  be 
the  l a s t  s i g n i f i c a n t  one. This problem becomes more s e r io u s  when 
samples are  r e l a t i v e l y  sm all and one t r i e s  to  keep a high number of 
degrees of freedom a t  the  same tim e. In a d d i t io n ,  as Roberts and 
Nord (1985) show, a G ranger-type c a u s a l i ty  t e s t  i s  very s e n s i t i v e  to
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th e  fu n c t io n a l  form used and can be m islead ing , s ince  d i f f e r e n t  
fu n c t io n a l  forms w i l l  le ad  to  d i f f e r e n t  conclusions fo r  the same d a ta  
s e t .
T herefo re ,  i t  has been decided not to  r e ly  on Sim 's methodology 
a lone but to  employ a second t e s t  of c a u s a l i ty  proposed by P ie rce  and 
Haugh (1977), and P ie rc e  (1977). This t e s t  can be descr ibed  as 
c a u s a l i ty  d e te c t io n  v ia  c r o s s - c o r r e la t in g  u n iv a r i a te  r e s id u a l  
s e r i e s .  The f i r s t  s te p  here  i s  th e  same as w ith  the  e a r l i e r  t e s t ,  
namely, modelling the  s e r i e s  as ARIMA processes  and d e r iv in g  the  
w hite  no ise  r e s id u a l s .  Then the  c r o s s - c o r r e la t io n s  between the 
r e s id u a l  s e r i e s  a re  c a lc u la te d  and used to de r iv e  th e  P ie rce  
S - s t a t i s t i c  where
m
S = n ^ 3: e t u t+k 
k~-m
where n = number of terms in  the  s e r ie s
r2 = squared c r o s s - c o r r e la t io n s  between e t  and Ut+k 
m = a number la rg e  enough to exclude expected n o n -n e g l ig ib le  
non-zero c o e f f i c i e n t s
P ie rce  (1977) shows th a t  the  hypo thesis  th a t  s e r i e s  X and Y a re  
u n re la te d  would not be r e j e c te d  a t  s ig n i f ic a n c e  le v e l  a  i f  and only
i f
S < X2(K + 1)
P ie rce  (1977) a lso  e s t im a te s  a _ t e s t  s t a t i s t i c  fo r  u n id i r e c t i o n a l  
c a u s a l i ty  in  the  form:
Dl rt rt
S = n v rz X2(m) . . . .  4.334 et-uj-
k~l
As po in ted  out bo th  i n  P ie rc e  (1977) and Sims (1977) the  above 
s t a t i s t i c  (4 .33) i s  b iased  to  f in d in g  no s ig n i f i c a n t  c a u s a l i ty  i f  
some f 2 e t ut+k not in  the  t e s t  s t a t i s t i c  a re  non-zero . P ie rce  n o te s ,  
however, th a t  t h i s  b ias  w i l l  g e n e ra l ly  be sm all.  Moreover, Nelson 
and Schwert (1982) in d i c a te  t h e i r  r e s u l t s  show the b ia s  problem i s  
not s e r io u s  i f  the  c o r r e c t  t im e - s e r ie s  model i s  used to  determine the  
in n o v a tio n s .
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P ie rce  and Haugh prove th a t  e t  and u t w i l l  y ie ld  i d e n t i c a l  
conclusions as to  causa l d i r e c t io n  to  those th a t  the o r ig in a l  s e r i e s  
Xt  and Yt would , t h a t  i s ,  the  innova tions  are  c a u s a l i ty  p re se rv in g .  
Hence, the  P ie rc e  S - s t a t i s t i c  can be s a fe ly  employed in  the c a u s a l i ty  
t e s t s .  I t  was decided , g iven  the  above arguments, t h a t  in  case of 
c o n f l i c t  between the  two t e s t s '  r e s u l t s ,  we w i l l  r e ly  h eav ie r  on the  
P ie rce  t e s t ,  as i f  o f f e r s  c e r t a in  advantages over Sim 's methodology: 
i t  invo lves  no r e g re s s io n s  and hence no a p r i o r i  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on the 
number of lags  re q u ire d ,  and i t  i s  a lso  independent of the  fu n c t io n a l  
form. In a d d i t io n  the  problem of economising on degrees of freedom 
does not a r i s e .
The P ie rc e  S - s t a t i s t i c  r e f e r s  to  the  c r o s s - c o r r e la t io n  fu n c tio n  
as a whole, but of course in d iv id u a l  lag  c o r r e la t io n s  a re  as 
im portan t .  In  f a c t  one i s  aided in  decid ing  the c a u s a l i ty  p a t te rn s  
by the fo llow ing  ta b le  r e l a t i n g  the c ro s s - c o r r e la t io n s  to causa l 
d i r e c t io n s :
Table 4 .5 .1  Conditions on c ro s s - c o r r e la t io n s  fo r  c a u s a l i ty  events
CAUSALITY DIRECTION RESTRICTIONS ON r eu(K) (a)
(c )
X -----e> Y r eu (K) = 0 from some K > 0
x < ----- Y r eu (K) = 0 from some K < 0
x < ---- * Y reu (K) = 0 from some K < 0
Yb
and fo r  some K > 0
x reu (K) = 0 fo r  a l l  K
Notes: (a )  r ejK) i s  the  c o r r / e l a t i o n  of the f i l t e r e d  s e r i e s  e t  and 
u t  a t  lag  K
(b) -— -o " reads "causes"
<f ' —o "  reads "has feedback with"
*• r e a ds "u n c o rre la te d  to"
(c) r eu d i f f e r e n t  than  zero : s ig n i f ic a n c e  i s  judged by the
s tan d ard  e r r o r  given by B a r t l e t t ' s  (1955) formula.
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4.6  MULTIVARIATE ARIMA MODELS: TRANSFER FUNCTIONS
Having performed the  c a u s a l i ty  t e s t s  between, say, X and Y, one has 
f i r s t l y ,  confirmed or o therw ise  augmented the hypothesised  d i r e c t io n  
of c a u s a l i ty  and secondly , v i a  the  c r o s s - c o r r e la t io n  fu n c t io n ,  and 
Sim's re g re s s io n s  one has in v e s t ig a te d  and determined the  s i g n i f i c a n t  
leads and lags  in  the  r e l a t i o n s h ip .  Hence one is  ab le  to  proceed 
w ith  modelling th a t  r e l a t i o n s h ip  accord ing  to  a Box-Jenlcins t r a n s f e r  
fu n c t io n .
Let us assume th a t  Xt  causes Yt . Then X i s  the  in p u t  and Y the  
output of the  system. Suppose now th a t  the l e v e l  of in p u t i s  being 
v a r ie d .  To an adequate approximaton the  i n e r t i a  of the system can be 
rep re sen ted  by a l i n e a r  f i l t e r  of the  form:
Yt  -  V0Xt  + V ^ . }  + V2Xt „ 2 + . . .
= (VQ + VXB + V2B2 + . . . ) x t
= V(B)Xt  . . . .  4 .34
in  which the ou tpu t a t  some time t  i s  rep resen ted  as a l i n e a r  
aggregate  of in p u ts  a t  t im es , »t, t - 1 , . . . .  The o p e ra to r  V(B) i s  the 
t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  of the  f i l t e r .
The w eights  VQ, V}, V2 , . . .  i n  equation  (4.*34) a re  c a l le d  the  
impulse response fu n c t io n  of the system. We are  only concerned w ith  
s t a b l e  system s, where the  s e r i e s  V0 + V^ B + V2B2 + . . .
converges fo r  |B| ^  1, i . e  a f i n i t e  inc rem enta l change in  th e  in p u t
r e s u l t s  in  a f i n i t e  inc rem en ta l change in  the  ou tpu t .
D isc re te  dynamic systems are  o f te n  r e p re s e n te d ■by the gen era l  
l i n e a r  d i f f e re n c e  equation
(1 + £ i y + . . .  + £ r  Vr )Yt  = g ( l  + n x v + . . .  + ns y s )Xt - b
. . .  4 .35
which we r e f e r  to  as a t r a n s f e r  fu n c tio n  of o rder ( r ,  s ) .  The 
d i f fe re n c e  equation  (4 .35 )  may a lso  be w r i t t e n  in  terms of the 
backward s h i f t  o p e ra to r  B = 1 -  y as
(1 ~ ^ B  -  . . .  - ^ r Br )Yt  = (w 0-  W}B -  . . .  -  ws Bs )Xt _b . . .  4 .36
or as 6(B)Yt  = w(B)Xt _b
E q u iv a len t ly ,  w r i t in g
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ft(B) -  w(B)Bb = (Wq -  wiB -  . . .  -  wsBs )BbXt 
= (w0 — . . .  — ws Bs )X£_b 
the  model becomes
S'(B)Yt  = ' t i  (B)Xt  . . .  4.37
Comparing equations  (4 .37 )  and (4 .34) we see th a t  the t r a n s f e r  
fu n c t io n  fo r  t h i s  model i s
V(B) = 6 -1 (B) ft (B)  j
s in c e  from (4.34) V(B)Xt  = Yt  | ^  •••  4,38
from (4 .37) Q(B)Xt  = , S'(B)Yt |
= 6 ’X(B)fi (B)Xt  =■ Yt   J . . .  4.39
and thus from (4 .38) and (4 .39)
V(B) = 6 ~"1(B) (B)
i . e  the t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  i s  rep re sen ted  by the r a t i o  of two 
polynomials in  B. I f  we employ 'a t r a n s f e r  fu n c tio n  model defined  by 
the  d i f f e re n c e  equa t ion  (4 .36) then  s u b s t i t u t i n g  Yt  = V(B)Xt  in to  
(4 .36 ) we o b ta in  the i d e n t i t y
• 6(B)Yt  -  w(B)Xt _b 
Yt  = V(.B)Xt
6_1(B)w(B)Bb = v(B)
w(B)Bb = 6(B)V(B)
(wQ “ wLB -  . . .  -  ws Bs )Bb = (1 -  6XB -  <%B2 -  . . .  -  8 r Br )*
*(V0 + VXB + V2B2 . . . )  . . .  4 .40
On equating  c o e f f i c i e n t s  of B we f in d :
Vj -  0 j  b
Vj  = 5 l vj - l  + 62vj - 2  + •••  + 6r vj - r  + wo j  = b
4.41
Vj ^ 5l Vj “ l + 5 2vj - 2  + • ••  + 5r vj - r  “ wj - b  j= b+ l , b+2 , . . . ,b+s
Vj = 6 l Vj - l  + 6 2vj - 2  + •••  + 6r vj - r  J b + s
The w eights Vb+S, Vb+s+j , . . .  Vb+s_r+j^ supply r  s t a r t i n g  values fo r  
the  d i f f e re n c e  equation
6(B)Vj = 0 ,  j  > b + s
The s o lu t io n  Vj = f ( 6 , w, j )  of th i s  d i f fe re n c e  equa tion  ap p l ie s  to 
a l l  values  Vj f o r  which j ^ , b  + s -  r +  l
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Thus, in  g en e ra l ,  the  impluse response weights V c o n s i s t  of:
( i )  b zero values  VQ, Vj, . . .  V^-i
( i i )  a f u r th e r  s-r+1 va lues  Vb , Vb+i> . . . ,  Vb+S_r  fo llow ing  no 
f ix e d  p a t t e r n  ( i f  S < r  no such values occur)
( i i i )  va lues  Vj w ith  j  > b + s - r + l  fo llow ing  the  p a t t e r n  d ic ta te d  
by the  r tb  o rder  d i f f e re n c e  equa tion  which has r  s t a r t i n g  values  Vb+S 
Vb+S-1» •••  vb+ s-r+ l • S ta r t in g  va lues  Vj f o r  j  < b w i l l ,  of 
course ,  be zero . Given th a t  g en e ra l  c la s s  of t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  
models
Y -  (W° ~ MlB '  " •  ~ WsBS) Xt _b + n t
t  (1 -  faB -  . . .  -  6r B^)
where nt  i s  the  e r r o r  or n o ise  component one has to  fo llow  the  
i t e r a t i v e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  -  e s t im a t io n  -  d ia g n o s t ic  checking 
procedure. A p a r t i c u l a r  model w i l l  be s p e c i f ie d  com pletely by 
in d ic a t in g  the  in t e g e r  values  f o r  d, the degree of d i f f e re n c in g  Yt  
and Xt  ; r ,  s ,  b in  the  t r a n s f e r  p a r t  of the model; p, q the o rders  
of the polynomials in  the  no ise  model. Employing the  above c la s s  of 
models, we r e q u i re  a da ta  based i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  procedure y ie ld in g  
i n i t i a l  e s t im a te s  of in te g e r  values  fo r  (d , r ,  s ,  b , p, q ) . Such a 
procedure i s  o u t l in e d  below and c o n s is t s  of fo u r  s te p s ;
Step 1: The le v e l  of d i f f e r e n c in g  d, requ ired  fo r  the s e r i e s  Xt  and
Yt . This i s  in fe re d  by exam ination of t h e i r  in d iv id u a l  ACF's and 
t h e i r  j o i n t  c r o s s - c o r r e l a t i o n  fu n c t io n .  F a i lu re  of any of these  
fu n c t io n s  to  d ie  out a t  la rg e  la g s  i s  a s ign  of n o n - s t a t i o n a r i t y ,  and 
thus the  need fo r  d i f f e r e n c in g  a r i s e s .  When th ese  fu n c t io n  d ie  out 
qu ick ly  f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  d i f f e r e n c e ,  the ap p ro p r ia te  le v e l  of 
d i f f e re n c in g  has been reached.
Step 2: e s t im a t in g  the  impulse response w eights us ing  the c ro s s ­
c o r r e l a t i o n s  of the  pre-w hitened s e r i e s .  Before a t tem p ting  to  a ssess  
‘between* s e r i e s  s t r u c t u r e  one should remove the  ‘w i th i n ’ s e r i e s  
s t r u c t u r e  -  because a u to c o r r e la t io n  w ith in  each s e r i e s  contaminates 
th e  CCF. Thus, by a p p l ic a t io n  of the u n iv a r i a te  Box-Jehkins methods 
one a r r iv e s  a t  the  prewhitened in p u t and output s e r i e s  (which have 
a lread y  been used in  the  c a u s a l i ty  t e s t s ) .  These prewhitened s e r i e s  
a re  the  key to th e  d e te rm in a tio n  of the  impulse response w eigh ts .
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Box and Jenkins  dem onstrate th a t  the impulse response weight V i s  
simply lag-lt  c ross c o r r e l a t i o n  of the prewhitened s e r i e s  ( k) 
m u l t ip l ie d  by a s c a le  f a c to r  
vlc = 5ue(k ) cru
ere
where au and <je a re  the  s tandard  d ev ia t io n s  of the u^ and e t  s e r i e s  
re s p e c t iv e ly .
Step 3: Given the rough e s t im a te s  of the impulse response w eigh ts ,
as seen above, one can o b ta in  an express ion  fo r  in  terms of the 
6 1s and w 's and hence id e n t i f y  the p a t te rn s  in  V which w i l l  form 
th e  b a s is  fo r  the  c lues to the va lues  ( r ,  s ,  b ) .
Step 4: I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of (p, q) in  the  no ise  component: based on 
s te p  3, param eters f o r  the  t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  component a re  e s t im a ted ,  
and the r e s id u a l s  from th a t  e s t im a t io n  are  used to  i d e n t i f y  an ARIMA 
model fo r  the no ise  component.
Having id e n t i f i e d  the  model, one proceeds to e s t im a te  param eters 
fo r  the  t e n t a t i v e  model. I f  the -parameters of e i t h e r  component a re  
not s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  and otherw ise  acc ep tab le ,  a new 
component must be i d e n t i f i e d .  F in a l ly ,  one has to diagnose (a) the 
n o ise  component: i f  r e s id u a l s  of the  t e n ta t i v e  model a re  not w hite 
noi.se, a new n o ise  component must be i d e n t i f i e d ,  and (b) the t r a n s f e r  
fu n c t io n  component: i f  the r e s id u a l s  of the t e n t a t i v e  model are 
c o r r e la te d  w ith  the  prewhitened causa l  v a r ia b le ,  a new t r a n s f e r  
fu n c t io n  component must be i d e n t i f i e d  (see  Box-Jenkins, p. 392).
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CHAPTER 5 :  THE DATA -  DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES
5.1 OFFICIAL OPEC PRICES
The modern petroleum  market is  c h a ra c te r i s e d  by a p r ic in g  dichotomy: 
p r ic e s  defined  by OPEC and p r ic e s  th a t  evolve in  various  markets.
OPEC p r ic e s  a re  the government s e l l i n g  p r ic e s  (GSP) of member 
c o u n t r ie s ,  as a s e t  d i s t i n c t  from the o f f i c i a l  p r ic e s  of non-OPEC 
producers ,  and from market p r ic e s  -  spot market or fu tu re s  market 
p r i c e s .
In  tu rn  OPEC o f f i c i a l  p r ic e s  may be d iv ided  in to  two su b se ts :
(1) the  OPEC marker p r ic e  th a t  provides a re fe re n c e  to  the  whole
p r ic e  s t r u c t u r e ,  and (2) a l l  o th e r  OPEC o f f i c i a l  p r i c e s .
The marker or re fe ren c e  p r ic e  i s  the p r ic e  of Arabian L ight 34°
API as determined by OPEC. The f a c t  th a t  the marker crude i s
produced by a member country  in tro d u ces  com plica tions ,  s in ce  i t s  
p r ic e  a d m in is t ra t io n  b r ings  in to  p lay  two concepts of sovere ign ty  
t h a t  may lead  to  d isagreem ents: sovere ign ty  of OPEC and of Saudi
A rabia. Such disagreem ents as the  1976 (Doha) one have ty p i c a l ly  led  
to  the  emergence of a dual OPEC p r ic e  re fe ren c e  s t r u c t u r e :  the deemed 
marker p r ic e  f ix ed  by OPEC and the a c tu a l  marker p r ic e  f ix ed  by Saudi 
A rabia. The ro le  of the former i s  to  serve as the re fe ren c e  fo r  
d i f f e r e n t i a l s  but no t r a n s a c t io n  takes p lace  a t  the deemed marker 
p r ic e .  C le a r ly ,  exam ination of the OPEC marker p r ic e  i s  necessary .
The second su b se t  of OPEC p r ic e s  inc ludes  a l l  GSPs o the r  than 
the  marker. Since crude o i l s  d i f f e r  in  q u a l i ty  and d is ta n c e  from the 
main markets they f e tc h  d i f f e r e n t  p r ice s  as they are  im perfect 
s u b s t i t u t e s .  As a r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  sample from th i s  subse t th ree  o th e r  
crudes have been chosen: N igerian  L igh t,  as a r e p re s e n ta t iv e  of
A frican  l i g h t  crudes; Kuwait export crude as a r e p re s e n ta t iv e  of 
Middle E as te rn  heavy crudes and I r a n ia n  l i g h t ,  a crude of s im i la r  
q u a l i ty  of the marker.
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I t  i s  be l ieved  th a t  examination of the behaviour of a t  l e a s t  
th re e  OPEC crudes a p a r t  from the marker is  j u s t i f i e d  by the f a c t  th a t  
producers  tend to  vary t h e i r  behaviour. Small OPEC producers or 
producers of s p e c i a l i t y  crudes may tend to a d ju s t  t h e i r  GSPs more 
o f te n  than the  la rg e  e x p o r te r s .  Saudi Arabia u su a lly  s tands a t  the 
end of the l i n e ,  t r y in g  to  a b s ta in  from p r ic e  changes th a t  have not 
been c o l l e c t iv e l y  decided upon. I t  i s  be lieved  th a t  i t  i s  necessary  
to  take  the adm in is te red  GSPs as the s t a r t i n g  po in t of the attem pt to 
id e n t i f y  the ro le  of market fo rce s  as opposed to  th a t  of the 
c o n t ro l l in g  agen t.
The data  on th e  OPEC o f f i c i a l  p r ice s  of the  four crudes were 
c o l le c te d  from the  Petroleum  Economist. This source r e p o r ts  on OPEC 
p r ic e s  monthly s in c e  1976 which i s  the beginning of the per iod  
examined. This d a te  has been s e le c te d  on the  b as is  of two 
c o n s id e ra t io n s :  f i r s t l y ,  the  f a c t  th a t  the r e s t  of the data  on spot 
p r ic e s  and netbacks was not a v a i la b le  pre-1976; secondly , the f a c t  
th a t  due to changes in  tax  p o l i c i e s  in  expo rting  c o u n t r ie s ,  use of 
e a r l i e r  da ta  would probably have b iased  the r e s u l t s ,  s in ce  o f f i c i a l  
p r ic e s  fo r  pre-1976 years  were used to determine tax  and ro y a l ty  
payments but were not r e p re s e n ta t iv e  of the cos t  of o i l .
5 .2  SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
The spo t p r ic e  of a t r a n s a c t io n  i s  the p r ic e  a t  which a given cargo 
of crude o i l  changes hands. A spo t t r a n s a c t io n  i s  a o n c e - f o r - a l l  
d ea l f o r  a given amount of o i l  a v a i la b le  in  a s in g le  batch a t  a 
s p e c i f i c  lo c a t io n .  A deal in vo lv ing  d e l iv e r ie s  over a time period  i s  
a term c o n t ra c t ,  sh o r t  or long term and should be d is t in g u is h e d  from 
spot d e a ls .
The d i s t in g u is h in g  f e a tu r e  of spot p r ic e  da ta  fo r  crude o i l  i s  
th a t  th e re  i s  no o f f i c i a l  s e r i e s .  In s tead ,  in t e r e s te d  p a r t i e s  -  
producers or r e f in e r s  -  produce t h e i r  own f ig u r e s .  This has r e s u l t e d  
in  a m u l t i p l i c i t y  of e s t im a te s  fo r  the  same concept, caused p a r t l y  by 
the lack  of an agreed methodology and p a r t ly  by c e r t a in  f e a tu re s  of 
the  o i l  market.
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One of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of crude o i l  t ra d e  i s  th a t  th e re  is
no lo c a t io n  a t  which a l l  the dea ls  a re  made and a t  which the d a ta
might be c e n t r a l l y  r e g i s t e r e d .  In s te a d ,  dea ls  a re  in d iv id u a l ly  
r e g i s t e r e d  between agents  who a re  spread worldwide. Hence, da ta  must 
be c o l le c te d  by some form of survey approach. This leads  to a f i r s t  
source of v a r i a t io n  as i t  i s  not known whether an agent a t  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  time provides a p r ic e  a t  which o i l  has a c tu a l ly  changed 
hands or merely a p r ic e  o ffe re d  fo r  an o i l  t r a n s a c t io n  which may not 
have m a te r ia l i s e d .
T here fo re ,  th e re  i s  a source of ambiguity in  t h i s  aspec t of the 
d a ta .  I f  one i s  co n s id e r in g ,  say ,  January p r ic e s  one could focus on 
e i t h e r  of two concepts: (1) p r ic e s  ' i n  the m onth ',  th a t  i s ,  dea ls
made in  January which w i l l  be implemented, say , 2 months ahead, and
(2) p r ic e s  ' f o r  the  m onth ', th a t  i s ,  p r ice s  s e t  on or befo re  January 
th a t  w i l l  be payable on o i l  rece ived  in  January . I t  i s  p o s s ib le  th a t  
d i f f e r e n t  agencies may handle th e  d a t in g  problem in  d i f f e r e n t  ways. 
So, a t  any po in t in  time th e re  may be d i f f e r e n t  spot p r ic e s  f o r  a 
g iven crude v a r i e ty  depending on whether d e l iv e ry  i s  prompt or 
forward. For example, th re e  spo t p r ic e s  f o r  I r a n ia n  Light may be 
quoted on day D of month M: I r a n ia n  L ight a t  M, a t  M + 1, and a t  
M + 2. S t r i c t l y  speaking i t  would be c o r re c t  to say th a t  on day D
one spot and two forward p r ic e s  r a th e r  than  th re e  spo t p r ic e s  were
recorded .
In f a c t  th e re  i s  no c l e a r  s ta tem en t of the  p r in c ip le s  on which 
s e r i e s  on spot p r ic e s  a re  c a lc u la te d  by d i f f e r e n t  p r ic e  r e p o r t in g  
reviews, so i t  i s  no t p o s s ib le  to judge which s e r i e s  i s  more 
ap p ro p r ia te  fo r  em p ir ica l  work.
Data on spot crude p r ic e s  were a v a i la b le  from th re e  sources :
(1) The OPEC B u l l e t in :  t h i s  source r e p o r ts  on spot p r ic e s  on a 
weekly b a s i s ,  beginning in  January  1979
(2) The Petroleum Economist th a t  pub lishes  data  from January  1978 on 
a monthly b as is
(3) The Middle E ast Petroleum and Economic P u b l ic a t io n s ,  (MEPEP) 
th a t  provides weekly d a ta  from January 1976.
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The MEPEP and the  Petroleum Economist d a ta  were very c lo se  to  
each o th e r ,  so one f e e l s  f a i r l y  su re  th a t  both s e r i e s  would give 
f a i r l y  s im i la r  r e s u l t s .  The OPEC B u lle t in g  s e r ie s  was s ig n i f i c a n t l y  
g r e a te r  than the o the r  s e r i e s  and i t s  use could be expected to  lead 
to  d i f f e r e n t  r e s u l t s .
Given the agreement between the  MEPEP and the Petroleum
Economist da ta  and s in ce  the aim was to examine as long a per iod  as
p o s s ib le ,  the  MEPEP spo t crude o i l  p r ice  da ta  were s e le c te d  as the 
most a p p ro p r ia te ,  as they cover the longest period  -  January 1976 to  
March 1985. The weekly f ig u re s  were combined in to  -an average mid- 
month f ig u r e .
5.3 PRODUCT PRICES -  NETBACKS *
The netback i s  not a p r ic e  but an es tim ate  of what a c e r t a in  crude 
v a r ie ty  i s  worth to  a r e f i n e r  given the  re le v a n t  vec to r  of product 
p r ic e s ,  co s ts  and r e f in e r y  y ie ld s .  Thus the netback c a lc u la t io n  i s  
about product p r ic e s  and t e l l s  us what i s  the gross worth of a 
composite o i l  product b a r r e l .
The r e a l  spot market value of a crude b a r r e l  i s  determined in
the  spot market fo r  both crude and p roduc ts .  A v a l id  p r ic e  
comparison requir.es a s e r i e s  of c a lu c a t io n s .
F i r s t l y ,  one has to convert the range of various re f in e d  
products  in to  crude o i l  e q u iv a le n ts ,  by determ ining the p rop o r t io n  of 
each major re f in e d  product th a t  can be produced from a b a r r e l  of a 
given type of crude. The p ro p o r t io n a te  y ie ld  or mix ‘ of re f in e d  
products v a r ie s  not only w ith  the  q u a l i ty  of each o i l  but a l so  with 
the  reg io n a l  needs of each consuming a rea ,  w ith  s h i f t i n g  w in te r  and 
summer demand -p a tte rn s  and w ith  the te c h n ic a l  c a p a b i l i t i e s  of 
in d iv id u a l  r e f i n e r s .  Thus, to  perform the conversion mentioned above 
one has to  r e s o r t  to  y ie ld  p a t te rn s  which are  ' t y p i c a l '  or
' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e '  of the r e f in e ry  in d u s try  in  any s p e c i f i c  market. 
The y ie ld  p a t te rn s  of the  ty p ic a l  r e f in e ry  are  based on r e f in e r y  
c a p a b i l i t i e s  in  handling the  marginal b a r r e l  of crude o i l .
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Given th e se  y ie ld  p a t t e r n s ,  one has to  compute the weighted 
average value f o r  a l l  the r e f in e d  product components in  a b a r r e l  of 
crude a t  the  r e f in e r y  g a te .  This i s  known as the  Gross Product Worth 
(GPW). This GPW i s ’'determ ined by m u lt ip ly in g  the p re v a i l in g  spo t 
p r ic e  fo r  each product by i t s  percen tage  share  in  the  y ie ld  of the  
t o t a l  b a r r e l .
The value of the  f u e l  o i l  p o r t io n  of the  y ie ld  i s  l a rg e ly
determined by i t s  su lphur l e v e l .  Therefore ,  an ad justm ent must be
made where the  su lphur le v e l  in  the  fu e l  o i l  product from a given 
crude d i f f e r s  from the  p r e v a i l in g  q u a l i ty  of fu e l  o i l  so ld  in  the  
spo t market. G enera lly ,  a r e f i n e r  w i l l  blend fu e ls  of var ious
q u a l i t i e s  to  meet each m a rk e t 's  needs.
Following i s  a sample c a l c u la t io n  of the GPW of a b a r r e l  of 
Arabian Light r e f in e d  i n  Rotterdam with i t s  p roduct y ie ld  so ld  a t
November 1981 spot market p r i c e s .
Product Type Rotterdam Spot P r ic e  Product Yield Value of Y ield
Naptha $37.17 * 6.7% $2.49
Premium Gasoline 43.76 A 7.7 3.37
Regular G asoline 42.34 * 5.8 2.46
Gas o i l 43.13 A 36.6 15.78
Fuel o i l
1% sulphur 29.12
3.5% sulphur 26.2
* *  Adjusted
fu e l  p r ic e 26.39 A 38.5 10.16
TOTAL VALUE OF ARABIAN LIGHT'S PRODUCT YIELD (GPW) = $34.26
* *  Adjusted to  r e f l e c t  value  of 3.18% su lphur f u e l  o i l  y ie ld  of 
Arabian Light crude. Trade jo u rn a l s  such as PIW allow a 50% (or h a l f  
way) su lphur 'b le n d in g '  c r e d i t  or d e b i t  when the  su lphur l e v e l  
d ev ia te s  from grades norm ally  traded  on the spot market.
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The GPW of a r e f in e d  b a r r e l  i s  not s t r i c t l y  comparable w ith  spo t 
or o f f i c i a l  s e l l i n g  p r ic e s  of a crude a t  the o i l  p ro d u ce r 's  load ing  
p o r t .  To make i t  comparable, the  c o s ts  of t r a n s p o r t in g  crude to  the  
r e f in e ry  and of r e f in in g  i t s e l f  must be deducted. The marketing 
c o s ts  u su a l ly  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  s a le s  to end-user consumers a re  not a 
f a c t o r ,  s in ce  most spot dea ls  a re  w holesale  in  f a i r l y  la rg e  
q u a n t i t i e s  a t  the r e f in e r y  g a te .
Since spot product markets a re  mainly supp lied  by the  ' l a s t  
b a r r e l s '  of crude a r e f i n e r  hand les ,  t r a n s p o r t  and r e f in in g  co s ts  a re  
a lso  f ig u red  on a m arginal b a s i s .  For crude t r a n s p o r t ,  i t  i s  the 
cos t  of c h a r te r in g  an a p p ro p r ia te ly  s ized  tanker  on the spot market 
f o r  a s in g le  voyage. The t r a n s p o r t  cost y a rd s t i c k  i s  s e t  by 
Worldscale which as mentioned in. chap ter  3 pub lishes  a base f l a t  r a t e  
f o r  voyages between each load ing  and rece iv in g  p o r t .  Day-to-day 
tanker market f lu c tu a t io n s  a re  measured in  w orldsca le  p o in ts  which 
a re  a percentage of the s tandard  f l a t  r a t e .  The cos t  of c h a r te r in g  a 
sh ip  a t  W orldscale 20 would be 20% of the f l a t  r a t e  fo r  the spot co s t 
of t r a n s p o r t  to  Rotterdam.
F la t  r a t e  per long ton $31.66
* *  per b a r r e l  Arab L ight $ 4.23
Spot Cost f o r  200 ,000-ton  tanker  a t  Worldscale 
20% * $4.23 = $0.85 per b a r r r e l  co s t
* *  Converted a t  7.49 b a r r e l s  per ton fo r  34° g ra v i ty  crude.
R efin ing  co s ts  c o n s is t  of the opera ting  expenses involved in  the  
handling of the l a s t  b a r r e l  of crude by a r e f i n e r .  For example, PIW 
f ig u re s  on such c o s ts  a re  65 cen ts  a b a r re l  in  the  USA and 20 cen ts
e lsew here. A p o r t io n  of the crude o i l  y ie ld  i s  used as r e f in e ry  fu e l
and u su a lly  a lso  a sm all amount i s  l o s t  in  the  r e f in in g  p rocess .  I t  
i s  very hard to  o b ta in  th e se  f ig u r e s ,  so r a th e r  than p lace  a value on 
th e se  p o r t io n s ,  PIW simply s u b t r a c t s  the volume from the  f in ish e d  
product y ie ld .
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Thus, the  e n t i r e  c a l c u la t io n  now comes in to  focus . By • 
s u b t r a c t in g  f r e i g h t  and r e f in e r y  c o s t ,  downstream spo t product p r ic e s  
a re  t r a n s l a t e d  in to  an e q u iv a le n t  crude o i l  va lue  a t  the  loading  
p o r t ,  the s o - c a l l e d  fob ne tback .
T ota l Value of Arabian L ig h t ’ s Product Yield (GPW) $34.26
L e s s : Increm en ta l r e f in in g  co s t  -0 .2
Spot F re ig h t  Cost ( a t  Worldscale 20) -0 .8 5
Implied fob value of Refined A rabian Light • $33.21
Versus A rabian L i g h t ' s  O f f i c i a l  P r ice  $34.00
R e f in e r 's  p r o f i t  margin $-0.79
Versus A rabian L i g h t ' s  Spot P r ic e  $34.27
R e f in e r 's  p r o f i t  margin $-1.06
The spot product market i s  a winner or lo s e r  depending on each 
r e f i n e r ' s  crude o i l  supply c o s ts .  G enera lly ,  th e  spo t value of the 
re f in e d  crude b a r r e l  a t  the p ro d u ce r’s loading p o r t  i s  compared w ith  
e i t h e r  o f f i c i a l  or spot crude p r ic e s  to determine p r o f i t  or lo s s .
C le a r ly ,  the  c o n s t ru c t io n  of netback s e r ie s  re q u ire s  in form ation  
on four elem ents:
( i )  the  spot product p r ic e s  in  a p a r t i c u l a r  market;
( i i )  the  r e f in e ry  y ie ld s  in  th a t  market;
( i i i )  the running c o s ts  per b a r r e l  fo r  the r e f in e ry ;
( iv )  the t r a n s p o r t  and in su rance  cos ts  between the r e f in e r y  and the
export po in t  of the  crude considered
Data on spot product p r ic e s  a t  Rotterdam have been c o l le c te d  
from P l a t t ' s  Oilgram, the  aim being i n i t i a l l y  to  c o n s tru c t  the 
netback s e r i e s .  However,, the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  proved overwhelming: d a ta  
on running c o s ts  were i n e x i s t e n t ,  while da ta  on ' t y p i c a l '  r e f in e r y  
y ie ld s  were not a v a i la b le  fo r  the  period  as 'a whole a t  re g u la r  
monthly i n t e r v a l s .  Thus, c o n s tru c t io n  of the  netbacks would have to  
r e ly  on s im p l i s t i c  assumptions and a high degree of e x t ra p o la t io n  of 
the l im ite d  da ta  a v a i l a b l e .  The f i n a l  product would be very 
s u sp ic io u s .  T here fo re ,  i t  has been decided to  re ly  on f ig u re s  
published  by PIW.
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This source pub lish es  netback da ta  on the  fo u r  crudes examined 
from Rotterdam on a monthly b a s is  from the beginning of the per iod  
(January  1976). Four o th e r  c e n t r e s ,  the C arr ibean ,  the  Middle E a s t ,  
Singapore and I t a l y  were added i n  September 1976 and a s ix th  c e n t r e ,  
the  US Gulf in  January 1977 (ex cep t fo r  N igerian  L igh t in  the US).
A ll th e  PIW d a ta ,  w ith  the excep tion  of US netbacks assume the  
r e f in in g  to  be of the  b as ic  topp ing /refo rm ing  type . The y ie ld  
p a t te rn s  a re  v a r ie d  between w in te r  and summer. For the  US a r e f in e ry  
w ith  conversion  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  (upgrading h eav ie r  products  in to  
l i g h t e r )  i s  assumed throughout the  per iod .
C le a r ly ,  i f  th e re  i s  a u n i f i e d  worldwide spot market fo r
products  -  as most a n a ly s t s  argue -  then the netback s e r i e s  ought to  
fo llow  s im i la r  t r e n d s .  T here fo re ,  r e p e t i t i o n  of the t e s t s  fo r  a l l  
the  s ix  markets i s  not n ecessa ry .  In s te a d ,  i t  has been decided to  
examine th re e  main c e n t r e s :  Rotterdam, as the  most im portant in  terms 
of volume; th e  US Gulf, as a re p re s e n ta t iv e  of complex r e f in in g  and 
the  Middle E as t ,  t h i s  l a t t e r  choice being based on the  p o te n t i a l
importance of th a t  a re a  as an export p o r t  fo r  p ro d u c ts ,  given th a t  
OPEC c o u n tr ie s  have moved downstream in to  r e f in e r y  c o n s tru c t io n  in  
rece n t  y ea rs .
The da ta  is° p resen ted  in  APPENDIX 3 and i t  should be noted th a t  
th e  use of monthly f ig u re s  has been a cond ition  imposed by the  lack  
of f u r th e r  d isagg rega ted  d a ta ,  but th i s  should not be considered  a 1 
d isadvan tage . C le a r ly ,  p r ic e  f lu c tu a t io n s  occur on a day to  day
b as is  and th i s  can make i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  perce ive  a reason fo r  the
f lu c t u a t i o n .  P r ic e s  can sp u r t  because one buyer comes to the  market 
and does no t q u ick ly  f in d  a s e l l e r  or v ice  v e rsa .  Hence, market 
s h i f t s  on any g iven  day may have l i t t l e  to  do w ith  the fundamental 
demand and supply . So i t  has been decided to focus on p r ic e s  over a 
month-long period  f o r  a r e l i a b l e  a n a ly s is  of t re n d s .
F in a l ly ,  the tremendous d i f f i c u l t y  to the academic of c o l le c t in g  
the data  req u ire d  should be noted too .  In the  p a s t  the whole is su e  
of o i l  p r ic e s  was surrounded by a v e i l  of m y s t i f i c a t io n :  d a ta  was 
simply not a v a i la b le  o u ts id e  the o i l  in d u s t ry ,  and any in fo rm ation  
was hard to  o b ta in .  Nowadays, th e re  i s  a f lo u r i s h in g  in d u s try  fo r  
the computation and re p o r t in g  of netbacks and spo t p r ic e s  by sev e ra l  
s p e c ia l i s e d  f irm s; the  cos t i s  r e g r e t ta b ly  p r o h ib i t iv e .
SECTION I I I
THE RESULTS
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CHAPTER 6 :  UNIVARIATE MODELS
6.1 FILTERING
This chap ter  and the  next p re se n t  a r e s p re s e n ta t iv e  sample of r e s u l t s  
a r r iv e d  a t  by a p p l ic a t io n  of the  Box-Jenkins methodology to  crude o i l  
and product p r i c e s .  Having a r r iv e d  a t  a p la u s ib le  t h e o r e t i c a l  
framework of o i l  p r ic e  fo rm u la tio n ,  th i s  p a r t  of the r e se a rc h  i s  
concerned w ith  confirm ing c e r t a in  aspec ts  of th a t  framework.
A p r i o r i ,  on the b a s is  of the a n a ly s is  p resen ted  in  chap te r  
th r e e ,  one expec ts  th a t  OPEC ‘has been e s s e n t i a l l y  a market fo llow er  
r a th e r  than le a d e r .  This im plies  one way c a u s a l i ty  from both spot 
crude, p r ic e s  and netbacks to o f f i c i a l  crude o i l  p r ic e s ;  changes in  
the balance of supply and demand f i r s t l y  a f f e c t  spot p r ic e s  ( f o r  
crude and p roduc ts)  and only consequently  o f f i c i a l  p r i c e s .  
N a tu ra l ly ,  the  ad justm ent i n  OPEC p r ic e s  made by d i f f e r e n t  producers  
i s  expecte'd not to  be uniform.
With re fe re n c e  to  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  between spo t crude o i l  and 
product p r i c e s ,  t h i s  i s  expected to  be one of i n t e r a c t i o n  s in ce  we 
a re  dea l ing  w ith  the  supply and demand s ides  of the same market and 
th e re fo re  no s p e c i f i c  c a u s a l i ty  d i r e c t io n  can be p o s tu la te d .
The aim of the  em p ir ica l  t e s t i n g  i s  to  a ttem pt to  t e s t  the above 
hypotheses, through a thorough a n a ly s is  of the  s t a t i s t i c a l  f e a tu r e s  
of the da ta  and d e te rm in a tio n  of the ch rono log ica l  sequence of 
ev en ts .  Success in  these  ta sk s  would provide em p ir ica l  con ten t to 
the  t h e o r e t i c a l  arguments and would be the very f i r s t  but e s s e n t i a l  
s te p  to b u ild in g  a complete s t r u c t u r a l  model of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o i l  
market th a t  w i l l  no t s u f f e r  the drawbacks of conven tional models as 
p resen ted  in  chap te r  fo u r .
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Within the  methodology employed, the f i r s t  s tep  c o n s is t s  of a 
s tudy of the time s e r i e s  through t h e i r  a u to c o r r e la t io n  and p a r t i a l  
a u to c o r r e la t io n  fu n c t io n s .  For the  per iod  as a whole 1976-85 a l l  19 
time s e r i e s  have been s tu d ie d  but n e i th e r  fu n c t io n  p re se n ts  any 
c l e a r ly  i d e n t i f i a b l e  p a t t e r n  of ARIMA behaviour. Simple v i s u a l  
in s p e c t io n  of the  s e r i e s  re v e a ls  the reason: p r io r  to  October 1978 
( th e  I r a n ia n  re v o lu t io n )  the  le v e l  of a l l  s e r i e s  was s t a b l e .  The 
impact of th i s  event i s  s t r i k i n g :  the l e v e l  of the s e r i e s  r i s e s
profoundly . Given t h i s  la rg e  impact the change in  l e v e l  com plicates  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  by overwhelming th e  ACF through i t s  e f f e c t  on s e r i e s  
v a r ia n c e .
A second event occurred  in  October 1980 ( th e  I r a n - I r a q  War) 
which impacted the  s e r i e s  in  a s im i la r  way. Simple ARIMA models 
could not be f i t t e d  and in s te a d  the  s e r ie s  had to  be modelled using  
in te rv e n t io n  a n a ly s i s .
6 .1 .1  In te rv e n t io n  models
The in te rv e n t io n  component of the  s e r i e s  has to  be i d e n t i f i e d  
according to  the  simple theory  of impact, p resen ted  in  chap ter  fo u r ,  
whereby the  'e v e n t '  i s  c h a ra c te r i s e d  by two a t t r i b u t e r s :  onset and
d u ra t io n .  Focusing f i r s t l y  on the spot p r ic e  s e r i e s  ( sp o t  p r ic e s  nad 
n e tb ack s ) ,  v is u a l  in s p e c t io n  re v e a ls  th a t  the r e s u l t  of the two 
in te rv e n t io n s  has been a permanent change in  the s e r i e s  l e v e l  but 
th a t  t h i s  change has been g radua l o v e r a l l ,  w ith the  1980 event being 
very abrupt but sh o r t  l iv e d .  This in d ic a te s  th a t  a u s e fu l
r e p re s e n ta t io n  of the  second event would be the f i r s t  o rder t r a n s f e r
fu n c t io n  app l ied  to  a pu lse  (1 -  B)I which takes values 0 p r io r  to
the even t ,  1 a t  the onse t and 0 a f t e r  the impact.
Indeed, i f  th e  1980 sp ike  were not p re s e n t ,  we could d e sc r ib e
the  in te rv e n t io n  e f f e c t  as a g radua l permanent one. The system has 
c l e a r ly  been d is tu rb e d  from a s t a b l e  equ ilib r ium  le v e l  of $12.70/ bbl 
f o r  Arabian L igh t  spot p r ic e s  in  September 1978, ro se  over a period  
of 14 . months to  a h igh of $39 .96 /bb l in  November 1979 and then 
en te red  a g radual d e c l in e  over 10 months which was in te r ru p te d  in  
1980 by the war. This caused p r ic e s  to jump from $32.12/bbl in  
September 1980 to  $ 3 7 .5 /b b l  i n  October and $41 .25 /bb l in  December 
1980, to  s t a r t  d e c l in in g  soon afte rw ards  and to  reach the
p r e - in te r v e n t io n  le v e l  w i th in  6 months ($ 3 1 .8 /b b l  in  June 1981).
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The gradual o v e r a l l  d e c l in e  of the  s e r i e s  l e v e l  was by no means 
smooth, however. In f a c t  we observe many o s c i l l a t i o n s  u n t i l  October
1982 ($33.45 / b b l ) , s in ce  when the  d e c l in e  becomes very smooth. This
g radua l o s c i l l a t o r y  in  n a tu re  d e c l in e  suggests  a second order 
t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  fo r  the in t e r v e n t io n  component corresponding to  the 
I r a n ia n  R evolu tion . Here, the r a t e  of decay i s  determined by two 
param eters  which w i l l  account fo r  the o s c i l l a t o r y  movements. 
T here fo re ,  the in te r v e n t io n  component fo r  the spot p r ic e  and netback 
s e r i e s  i s  i d e n t i f i e d  as :
Yt  = . . W° I t  + W*° ( 1 — B ) I ,+n
1 -  -  62B 1 -  Si*B
where t  = 1978 and n = 2
E s tim ation  of the  i n t e r v e n t io n  component f o r  the  spo t p r ic e  
s e r i e s  leaves  us w ith  the s e r i e s  r e s id u a l s ,  which can then be 
modelled accord ing  to  a s tan d a rd  ARIMA model. I n d e n t i f i c a to n  of th i s  y  
'n o i s e '  component i s  ty p i c a l l y  based upon the  ACF and PACF of the 
s e r i e s  p r io r  to  the  in t e r v e n t io n s .  The r e s u l t in g  model c o n s is t s  of 
two components which have to  be e s tim ated  s im ultaneously  using  the  
INTV'programme given in  APPENDIX 4.
Following the  same procedure we have attem pted  to  model the 
o f f i c i a l  OPEC p r ic e s  of the  4 crudes examined in  a s im i la r  f a s h io n ,
i . e  in t ro d u c in g  two impacts in  1978 and 1980. E s tim ation  of th i s  
i n t e r v e n t io n  components has re v e a le d ,  however, th a t  the  1980 event hs 
been non s i g n i f i c a n t ,  which i s  not s u rp r i s in g :  g iven  th a t  the  e f f e c t  
of the  1980 war on the  spot market was very s h o r t  l iv e d  and given the 
i n e r t i a  c h a r a c te r i s in g  the  OPEC conference system, presumably th e re  
was not enough time fo r  o f f i c i a l  p r ic e s  to  respond, as the  spot p r ic e  
s t a r t e d  i t s  downward movement very soon a f t e r  1980. . OPEC did  a f t e r  
14 months r a i s e  p r i c e s ,  a t  a time when the temporary impact of the 
war on the  spot market was a lready  gone (December 1981) and 
rev e rsed .  The d e c is io n  to r a i s e  the m arker 's  p r ic e  to  $34/bbl cannot 
be a t t r i b u t e d  to  the  war. I t  was simply an OPEC d e c is io n  having 
noth ing  to  do w ith  the  a c tu a l  market s i t u a t i o n  a t  the tim e. 
N a tu ra l ly ,  i t  could not ho ld; indeed in  March 1983 they f i n a l l y  gave 
in  and followed the  s ig n a l s  of the  d r i f t i n g  spot p r ic e  by reducing 
o f f i c i a l  p r ic e s .
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The March 1983 d e c is io n  to reduce p r ic e s  has been chosen as the 
second impact on th e  o f f i c i a l  OPEC p r ic e s .  I t  rep re se n ts  an 
im portan t tu rn in g  p o in t  i n  OPEC’s- h i s to r y ,  as f o r  the very f i r s t  time 
they adm itted e x p l i c i t l y  the  dominance of the spot market in  the  
c u r ren t  in d u s try  environment. In a d d i t io n  i t  was a tu rn ing  po in t  
because i t  was co n tra ry  to one of the  main o b je c t iv e s  of OPEC's 
form ation  in  1960 -  to  p reven t any fu r th e r  p r ic e  re d u c t io n s .  Indeed, 
t h i s  second event was found to  be s i g n i f i c a n t .
The es tim ated  in t e r v e n t io n  models have to  be d ia g n o s t ic a l ly  
checked fo r  adequacy. The c r i t e r i a  ty p i c a l ly  employed are  two: the  
s t a t i s t i c a l  s ig n i f i c a n c e  of the param eters  (u s ing  the s tandard  e r ro r s  
and t - r a t i o s )  and the  adequacy of the model as judged by model f i t :  
exam ination of the r e s id u a l  ACF and PACF should re v e a l  white no ise  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  I f  th e re  a re  s i g n i f i c a n t  sp ikes  and the o v e r a l l  
s t a t i s t i c  re v e a l in g  ACF adequacy (Q) i s  very high and s i g n i f i c a n t ,  
then  the conclusion  i s  drawn th a t  the s e r ie s  has not been modelled 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  and th a t  th e re  a re  f e a tu re s  which have not been 
accounted f o r .  Thus, a new model i s  b u i l t  in c o rp o ra t in g  such 
f e a tu r e s  and ho p efu lly  producing a b e t t e r  f i t  as judged by w hite  
n o ise  r e s id u a l s .
The in te rv e n t io n  models i d e n t i f i e d  and es tim ated  fo r  a l l  the  
time s e r i e s  on p r ic e s  are  p resen ted  in  t a b le  6 .1 .1  where the 
es tim ated  param eter values  a re  p resen ted  to g e th e r  w ith  s tandard  
e r ro r s  and o th e r  key s t a t i s t i c s .  The performance of these  models can 
be seen in  f ig u re s  6 .1 .1 .1  -  6 .1 .1 .5  which are  a sample of a c tu a l  and 
sim ulated  p r ic e s  w ith  the  p a r t s  due to  the compound in te rv e n t io n  
component and the n o ise .  I t  can be seen th a t  th e re  is  a c lo se  f i t  
between the  a c tu a l  p r ic e  s e r i e s  and the s e r ie s  s im ula ted  on the  b as is  
of the es tim ated  models. Furtherm ore, looking a t  the in te rv e n t io n  
p a r t  of the s e r i e s ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  th a t  one i s  d ea l ing  w ith a t ru e  
market, which, a f t e r  the d i s ru p t io n  tends to  r e tu rn  to  i t s  
p r e - in te r v e n t io n  le v e l  (o f  1976-78) i . e  tends to r e s to r e  i t s e l f  to
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eq u i l ib r iu m  in  an o s c i l l a t o r y  manner. Though the lags  of the 
response to  the  e x c i t a t i o n  a re  long, n e v e r th e le s s  the  system is  
s t a b l e .
S t a b i l i t y  has to  be judged fo rm ally ,  however, and th i s  i s  
c a r r i e d  out by exam ination of the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  ro o ts  of the model, 
which determine the  s o lu t io n  p ro p e r t ie s  of the model. Taking as an 
example the  in t e r v e n t io n  model es tim ated  fo r  the s e r i e s  on US 
netbacks f o r  N igerian  L igh t  crude
________  11978 + W*° 11980
1 -  5 xb -  62B2 1 "  <$i*B
where <$]_ = 1.79, <52 = 0*8 and = 0 .97 ,
we have to  examine the  ro o ts  of the polynomials (1 -  1.79B + 0.8B2) 
and (1 -0 .97B ). The former i s  a q u a d ra t ic  equa tion  w ith  roo ts  given 
by
1.79 +
—  \| (1 .7 9 )2  _ 4 ( 0 . 8 )
2(0 ,8)
t h a t  i s  1.156 and 1.075 w hile  (1 -  0.97B) gives 1 .03 . A ll a re  
g r e a te r  than one and r e a l  which confirms th a t  the system is  s t a b l e  
and n o n - o s d i l a t o r y  ( n o n - c y c l i c a l ) .
The e s t im a t io n  of the impact assessment models serves  the 
primary purpose of f i l t e r i n g  the s e r i e s  so th a t  a u to c o r r e la t io n  i s  
n e u t r a l i s e d  thus enab ling  assessment of the t r u e  c a u s a l i ty  d i r e c t io n s  
in  the  system. In  a d d i t io n ,  of course , i t  enables us to assess  the 
magnitude of the  changes caused.
Thus, fo r  the second o rd e r  t r a n s f e r  fu n c tio n  employed fo r  the 
1978 impact, p r io r  to  the d is tu rb a n ce
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Y*t+1 = 
Also, Y* t + 2  =
Y*t+3 “
%Y*t  +
5l Y*t+l + 
6iw0 + w0
5l Y*t+2 +
2Y*t-l + w0It+i = 
62Y*t  + w0I t + 2
d2Y*t+l + Vo1 t+3
w r
6 i 2 w 0  +  (Sj Wq  +  ^ 2 W0  w c
For the f i r s t  o rder  t r a n s f e r  fu n c tio n w.
the  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  th a t  in  the  f i r s t  month fo llow ing  the impact 
th e  l e v e l  of the s e r i e s  changes by w0 . This amounts to  an in c re a se  
and in  success ive  months the  p rocess le v e l  con tinues  to r i s e .  Levels 
f o r  the  f i r s t  6 months fo llow ing  the in te rv e n t io n  a re  expected to  be:
Month 1 w o
Month 2 w o (1 + *1 >
Month 3 w o (1 + k  + 6i2)
Month 4 w o (1 + 61 + <5^2 + 6 i 3 )
»
Month 5 w 0 (1 + % + <5^2 + 6 1 3  + « i4)
Month 6 w o (1 + 6 i + & I 2 + <%3 + 5i 4 +
and so on.
The post in t e rv e n t io n  le v e l  of the process con tinues  to  r i s e  but 
by sm alle r  and sm alle r  inc rem ents .  The t o t a l  asym ptotic  change in  
le v e l  i s  given by
W0
1 -  6i
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which r e p re s e n ts  the  a rea  under the  decaying sp ik e .  So fo r  example 
in  the case of Arabian L igh t  spot p r ic e s
W° = $78.84
1 -  5 1
and the displacem ent in  process  le v e l  i s :
In  Oct 1980 u si o O
n = $7.89
Nov 1980 = wo Si = 7.102
Dec 1980 = Sx2 = 6.39
Feb 1981 58 w0 -  5.176
Oct 1981 = w0 6}12 = 2.22
A pril 1982 = w0 6 ^ 8 -  1.18
Oct 1982 = wQ Sx24 = 0.628
Oct 1984 = wQ 6X48 = 0.061
- 174 -
TABLE 6 .1 .1 .1  IMPACT ASSESSMENT RESULTS: INTERVENTION MODELS
U n iv a r ia te  Models fo r
1. OPEC o f f i c i a l  p r ic e A. Arabian L igh t
2. Spot crude p r ic e B. I ra n ia n  L igh t
3. Rotterdam Netback fo r C. N igerian  L igh t
4.
5.
US Netback 
Middle E ast Netback
D. Kuwait Export
Note: F igures  in  p a ren th eses  are  the s tandard  e r ro r s
A. ARABIAN LIGHT
1- OPEC OFFICIAL PRICE 1976 (Jan) -  1985 (March)
  1197-9 + wo*I 1983 + 60 + (1 -  0 iB - 0 2B2 - e 4B4)at
w,
W,
(1 -  & iB -c^B2) 
0 . 2 1 1  6
(0.018)
1.85
(0.016)
2 =  “  0 .8 6  
(0.01)
w,. -4.1
(0.568)
0O = 12.16 Gjl = -0.811
(0.191) 0.092)
)2 = -0.361(-0.122) 0,287(0.093)
Q20 = ’22.4 RSS =*40 DF = 100
2. SPOT PRICE 1976 (Jan) -  1985 (March)
W r Wr
W r
     I i979 + 12___ ( x "Q B ^ idso + 0O + (1 “ 01B) a.|
Ti — ^ B  —<52B4) (1 -dj^B)
0.646
(0.031)
7.8
( 0 . 68)
$1 = 1.87
(0.08)
&!* = 0.89
(0.013)
= -0.912 
(0.008)
vo 12.11
(0.315)
X = -0.692
(0.071)
Q24 “= 19 RSS =130 DF =104
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3. ROTTERDAM NETBACK 1976 (Jan) - 1985 (March)
Yt  ~ ^ _______  *1979 + W° (1 -  B)Ii980 + 0 o + O
(1 -  SjB - 5 2B2) (1 -5!*B)
wQ = 0.657 6 X = 1.84 6 2  = -0 .89
(0 .0 4 ) )  (0 .013) (0 .12)
wx* = 5.9 6 j* = 0.91
(0.649) (0.014)
Oo = 12.3 01 = -0.514
(0.3) (0.08)
Q24 = 22.4 RSS = 160 DF = 104
4. US NETBACK 1977 (Jan )  -  1985 (March)
. I 1979 +   I 1980 + 0o + 1 a i
(1 -  8j_B ) (1 -  S|*B) (1 -  (jjB)
w 0 = 2.05 8 X = 0.98
(0.25)) (0.01)
wQ* = 4.47 fij* ® 0.546
(1.58) (0.188)
o 13.168 ©!_ = 0.654
(0.925) (0.081)
Q24 = 16 RSS = 250 DF = 93
- 0 xB)at
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5. MIDDLE EAST NETBACK 1976 (Sept) - 1985 (March)
Yt  =   ....  W° 11979 + W°* (1 “ B )I1980 + 0Q + (1 -  0 XB -
(1 -  <S1B -  62B2) (1 - ^ B )
w, 0.708
(0 .06)
1.821
(0.2)
=  - 0 .8 6 8  
(0 .18)
wQ* 5.39
(0.614)
6 * 
1* 0.917
(0.015)
00 = 12.305 e x = -0 ,872
(0 .3 )  (0 .095)
2 = -0.385
(0.095)
Q24 = 24 RSS » ’76 DF = 95
02B2) a t
&
/b
b
l
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ARABIAN LIGHT : OFFICIAL PRICE 1976-1985
8 / b b l
ACTUAL SERIES, SIMULATED SERIES, PARTS DUE TO 
INTERVENTION & NOISE
FIGURE 6 . 1 . 1 . 1
35.
30.
25.
20 .
1 5 .
0 .
5.
0 .
1 1976 1 1977 ' ■ 1978 ' 1979 1 1980 1 1981 1 1982 1 1983 1 1984 1 1985 1
FIGURE 6 . 1 . 1 . 2
ARABIAN LIGHT : SPOT PRICE , 1976-1985
&/bbl
ACTUAL SERIES, SIMULATED SERIES, PARTS DUE TO 
INTERVENTION & NOISE
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Table 6.1.1.1 Continued
B. IRANIAN LIGHT
1. OPEC OFFICIAL PRICE 1976 (Jan) -  1985 (March)
Yt  = . W° ^1979 + wo*l-l 983 + 0o +
(1 - «iB -% B 2)
w0 0.307 5 x = 1.88 &2 = ~0.905
(0.021) (0 .009) (0.009)
WQ* = -3 .27 90 -  12.3 0X = -0 .68
(0 .54) (0 .34) (0 .07)
Q24 24 RSS = 54 DF = 105
2. SPOT PRICE 1976 (Jan) -  1985 (March)
Yt  = W° I IQ7^ + 0 (1 -  B )Ixq§0
(1 - 6XB - 6 2B% (1 --c5x*B)
1
(1 -  0lB)
( l  -  0 iB)
wQ = 0.72 = 1.854 6 2 = -0 .898
(0.071) (0 .02 )  (0 .018)
wQ* = 7.209 <5j* = 0.888
(1 .06) (0 .029)
= 12.14 0X = -0 .405  0X = 0.465
(0 .56) (0 .123) (0 .12)
Q23 = 18 RSS =190 DF =103
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3. ROTTERDAM NETBACK 1976 (Jan) - 1985 (March)
Yt = ______ ^2_______  Y1979 + WqV (1 *“ B )I198o + 0O + (1 -  0 lB)at
(1 - d^B - ^ B 2) (1 -di*B)
wr 0.785 -x 
(0 .061)
6,. „ 1.822
(0.019)
= -0 .873
(0.017)
w•ft = 5.6
(0 .74)
d 0.9 
(0 .019) -
lo = 12.42 0x = -0 .682
(0 .34 ) (0 .072)
Q24 -  24 RSS = 160 DF = 104
4 . DS NETBACK 1977 (Jan )  -  1985 (March)
I 1979 + W°* (1 “ B )I1980 + 0 O + ( 1 - 0 1B -  e 2B2) a t
(1 -  5xB - 62B2) (1 -dx*B)
wQ = 1.079 ©x = 1.789 d2 = -0.889
(0 .13) (0 .028) (0 .026)
w*0 = 6.87 dx^ = 0.97 e Q = 13.68
(0 .69) (0 .05 ) (0 .63)
>X » -0 .745 8 o  = -0 .2 6
(0.101) (0.1014)
Q23 = 8.7 RSS = 220 DF = 91
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5 . MIDDLE EAST NETBACK 1976 (Sep t) -  1985 (March)
Yt  “ ________2___ ____ x1979 +__ W° (1 “ B )I i 9sq + e 0 +
(1 -  6AB -  §B2) (1 - 6 x*b -  <%*B2)
wQ = 0,819 <5 i = 1-.76 82 ~ -0 .809
(0.156) (0 .05) (0 .051)
wA = O -0 ,518  6 j* = 1.84 $2 = “0.95
(0.318) (0 .04) (0.045)
= 12.09 cfj = 0.557
(0 .67) (0 .087
Q24 = 34 RSS = 260 DF = 95
1
_________ at
(1 -  <feiB)
S/
bb
l
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IRANIAN LIGHT : ROTTERDAM! NETBACK, 197G-1985
S/bbl
ACTUAL SERIES, SIS1ULATED SERIES, PARTS DUE TO 
INTERVENTION & NOISE
FIGURE 6 . 1 . 1 . 3
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Table 6.1.1.1 Continued
NIGERIAN BONNY LIGHT
1. OPEC OFFICIAL PRICE 1976 (Jan) -  1985 (March)
Yt  “ ______ W° I 1979 + wo*I 1983 + 0O + (1 -  01® -02B2) a t
(1 - §iB -<S2B4)
wG = 0.355 6 i  = 1.858 <S2 = -0 .874
(0.026)
w0* = -5 .5
(0.54)
Q23 = 23
(0 .01 2) (0 .11)
13.76 0 x = -0 .372  02
(0 .26 ) (0.093)
-0 .308
(0 .09)
RSS = 110 DF = 104
2. SPOT PRICE 1976 (Jan )  -  1985 (March)
Yt  “ ________   x1979 + „ ,W° C1 “ B ^ ^ O  + 0O + ( 1 9lB)a t.
(1 -  6xB -<S2B2) (1 -6x*B) (1 -  $xB)
w0 = 0.766 d x = 1.861 d 2 = “0.905
(0 .067) (0 .017) (0.015)
w0* = 7.51 <5X* = 0.903
(1 .07) (0 .023)
13.58 0 X = -0 .509  (j) x = 0.41
(0 .57) (0.112) (0 .12)
Q23 = 27 RSS = 200 DF = 103
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3. ROTTERDAM NETBACK 1976 (Jan) - 1985 (March)
1 2 ._______  I 1979 + W° (1 “ B)Ii980 + 6o +  i . a t
(1 -  SiB -S2B2 ) (1 -  6x*B ) (1 -  + lB)
wQ = 0.752 6i = 1.844 <S2 = -0 .889
(0.101) (0 .027) (0 .25)
w*0 = 5.13 6x* = 0.91
(0.106) (0 .033)
6° = 13.48 ^1 = 0.668
(0 .76) (0 .077)
Q24 = 28 RSS = 260 DF = 104
4. US NETBACK 1977 (Jan) -  1985 (March)
Yt  "  —   I 1979 + — ____  <1 ™ I 1980 + '9o +  -
(1 -  SjB - 6 2B2) (1 -S ^ B )  . " (1 -  I jB )
wQ = 1.024 6 i = 1.79 5 2 = "0.878
(0.177) (0 .04 )  (0.0342)
w0* = 7.55 6 i* -  0.97
(1 .004) (0 .006)
e o  = 14.8 <jfy = 0.601
(0 .93) (0 .088)
Q24 = 17 RSS = 320 DF = 92
5. MIDDLE EAST NETBACKS Data not a v a i la b le
S/
bb
l
NIGERIAN LIGHT : U.S. NETBACK , 1977-1985
S/bbl
ACTUAL SERIES. SIMULATED SERIES, PARTS DUE TO 
INTERVENTION NOISE
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FIGURE 6 . 1 . 1 . 4
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Table 6.1.1.1 Continued
D. KUWAIT EXPORT CRUDE
1- OPEC OFFICIAL PRICE 1976 (Jan )  -  1985 (March)
W° I 1979 + wo*lj983 + e0 + (1 ~
Tl $xB — 62B%
wQ = 0.292 6X = 1.852 S2 = -0.867
(0.022) (0 .013) • (0 .012)
Wq* = -4 .4 6  eo = 12.01 ex = -0 .657 02
(0.468) (0 .211) (0.089)
Q23 = 31 RSS = 4 5  DF = 104
2. SPOT PRICE 1976 (Jan )  -  1985 (March)
Yt  = ______ , W° _____ *1979 + W° d  " B) I 1980 + eo +
(1 -  6j_B -< $ p 7 ) ( i  - 6 x * B )
wQ* = 0.584 6 x = 1.872 62 -0 .908
(0.037) ' (0 .011) (0 .011)
wQ* = 7.11 &x* = 0.891
(0.775) (0 .02)
30 = 11.58 0X = -0 .549  02 = -0 .285
(0 .37) (0 .095) (0 .094)
Q23 = 12 RSS = 160 DF = 104
0xB - 0 2B2) a E
= -0 .401
(0.089)
(1 -  0xB -  02B2 ) a t
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3. ROTTERDAM NETBACK 1976 (Jan) - 1985 (March)
Wo w *
x1979 + ° (1 ~ B)Ii980 + Go +
(1 -  6XB - 62B2) (1 - 5i *B)
w0 = 0.748 \  = 1.803 62 = -0 .854
(0.066) (0 .022) (0 .02) -
w*0 = 5.28 dx* = 0.899
(0.63) (0 .019)
J,o 11.8 ^1 = 0.425
(0 .32) (0 .09)
Q24 = 25 RSS = 130 DF = 104
4 .  US NETBACK 1978 (Ju ly )  -  1982 (December)
 —    I 1979 + ____ !2______ ( J  “ B)!l980 + e o *
(1 -  dxB - d 2B4) (1 -dx*B -  <%*B2)
1.62 fa  = 1.41 d 2 = “° - 51
(0 .7 9 ) )  (0 .26) (0 .23)
wQ* = 1.84 ^x* = 1.06 8 *  = -0 .678
(0 .92) (0 .17 ) (0 .194)
)0 = 12.51 (j>x = 0.539
(1 .38) (0.113)
Q24 = 9.3 RSS = 120 DF = 46
__________ a t
(1 -  $xB)
1
1
__________a t
(1 -  $ x B>
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5. MIDDLE EAST NETBACK 1976 (Sept) - 1985 (March)
w,
Y t = _______  ° 11979 +
( 1 -  6iB - 6 2Bz)
(1 - B) 1x980 + 9 o + (1 - 9 xB “ 02B2)a t
wQ = 0.707
(0.068)
w*0 - 4.971
(0.519)
9o = 11.64
(0.31)
Q 23 = 27
5 X = 1.78
(0,026)
6 X* = 0.91
(0.015) .
0 X = -0.816
(0.099)
RSS = 64
S 2 = -0.833
(0.023)
9 2 = “0.269
(0.0993)
DF = 95
WIGUF.S 6 . 1 . 1 . 5
KUWAIT EXPORT CRUDE : DIDDLE EAST NETBACK 
1976-1985, S/bbl 
ACTUAL SERIES, SIMULATED SERIES, PARTS DUE TO 
INTERVENTION & NOISE
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The leng thy  per iod  1976-85 fo r  which da ta  i s  a v a i la b le  has w itnessed  
many changes, in c lu d in g  two p r ic e  ex p lo s io n s .  T here fo re ,  modelling 
the  period  as a whole should be complemented by study  of sub-periods  
each of which d isp la y s  an ap p are n tly  d i f f e r e n t  behaviour of the  
va r io u s  ac to rs  in  the  market.
Perhaps the  most obvious d i f f e re n c e  i s  to  be found in  the pre 
and post-1978 p e r io d s :  between 1976 and 1978, a lthough Saudi A ra b ia 's  
a c t io n s  did not conform w ith  the c a r t e l  model as argued in  chap te rs  
th r e e  and fou r  ( e .g  a 21 p e r  cen t in c re a se  of her  outpu t in  1976 to  
p reven t p r ic e  in c r e a s e s ) ,  n e v e r th e le s s  th e re  was a p e rce p tio n  of 
le a d e rs h ip  by th a t  country which was be lieved  to  have adequate 
cap ac ity  to  r e s t r a i n  h igher  p r i c e s .  Post-1978 th a t  b e l i e f  was proved 
m istaken and a t  l e a s t  up to  March 1983 the p ic tu r e  has been one of 
non-agreement w ith in  OPEC, w ith  member c o u n tr ie s  t r a d in g  fo r  th e  
f i r s t  time in  th e  spo t market which was p rov id ing  a l l  the s ig n a ls  
w ith re sp e c t  to p r ic e  changes.
I t  has been decided to  use  OPEC conferences as the c r i t e r i o n  f o r  
sub -period  d iv i s io n .  Thus, the  d a ta  have been d iv ided  in to  the 
fo llow ing  sub -p e r io d s :
1. January 1976-December 1978: a period  of r e l a t i v e  s t a b i l i t y ,  
culm inating  in  the  Abu-Dhabi meeting
2. January  1979 -  May 1981: the  period  between the  Abu-Dhabi and
Geneva conferences
3. June 1981 -  March 1983: Geneva to  London conferences
4. A pril  1983 -  March 1985: London conference to  the  p resen t
5. June 1981 -  March 1985: Geneva to the p resen t
6. In a d d i t io n  the  s h o r t  per iod  between the  Abu Dhabi and A lg ie rs
meetings was examined (Jan  1979 -  June 1980)- -  sh o r t  here  
r e f e r r i n g  to  the number of degrees of freedom req u ired  fo r  the 
e s t im a tio n  of ARIMA models.
6.1.2 ARIMA Models
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The methodology p resen ted  in  chap te r  four has been followed in  
o rd e r  to  model the  s e r i e s  accord ing  to an ARIMA model fo r  each 
subperiod namely: i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of a p la u s ib le  c l a s s s  of models v ia  
the  ACF and PACF w ith  t h e i r  s tandard  e r r o r s ,  e s t im a t io n  and 
d ia g n o s t ic  checking -  p r im a r i ly  v ia  use of t - r a t i o s  to  judge 
s t a t i s t i c a l  s ig n i f i c a n c e ,  s a t i s f a c t i o n  of the  con d it io n s  of 
s t a t l r + a r i t y / i n v e r t i b i l i t y ,  ACF of re s id u a ls  and comparison of a c tu a l  
ve rsus  model s im ulated  v a lu e s .  Any inadequacies found a t  the  l a s t  
s ta g e  of id e n t i f i c a t io n - e s t im a t io n - c h e c k in g .
Given the d iv i s io n  of th e  19 time s e r i e s  a v a i la b le  in to  6 
subperiods ,  in  t o t a l  114 ARIMA models have been f i t t e d .  Of th e se  a 
r e s p r e s e n ta t iv e  20% sample of 22 models i s  p resen ted  in  t a b le  6 .1 .2 .1  
w hile  f ig u re s  6 .1 .2 .1  -  6 .1 .2 .2  p re sen t  the performance of two such 
models.
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FIGURE 6.1.2.1
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FIGURE 6 . 1 . 2 . 2
NIGERIAN LIGHT: SPOT PRICE 1981-1985
$/ b b l
ACTUAL SERIES AND ARIMA SIMULATED SERIES
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6 .2  CAUSALITY TESTS
Having f i l t e r e d  th e  d a ta  v ia  use of the models p resen ted  in  the  
previous s e c t io n s  we were then ab le  to  employ the prewhitened s e r i e s  
in  t e s t i n g  c a u s a l i ty  p a t te r n s  v ia  use of the t e s t s  p resen ted  in  
s e c t io n  4.5
Since the s e r i e s  r e s id u a l s  a v a i la b le  a re  c a u s a l i ty  p re s e rv in g ,  
th a t  i s ,  they r e f l e c t  the  same c a u s a l i ty  p a t te rn s  as the  o r ig in a l  
s .e r ie s ,  the  P ie rc a  S - s t a t i s t i c  has been es tim ated  from the cros.s 
c o r r e l a t i o n  fu n c t io n  between (1) o f f i c i a l  and spot crude o i l  p r ic e s ,  
(2) o f f i c i a l  p r ic e s  and netbacks in  the various  m arkets, and (3) spo t 
crude o i l  p r ic e s  and ne tbacks .
For each of the  seven per iods  examined, g iven the  19 time s e r i e s  
a v a i l a b l e ,  26 cross  c o r r e l a t i o n  fu n c t io n s  y ie ld  78 S s t a t i s t i c s  on 
th e  above th re e  r e la t i o n s h ip s .  So a t o t a l  of 546 S s t a t i s t i c s  have 
been es tim ated  out of which a 20 per cent r e p re s e n ta t iv e  sample i s  
g iven in  ta b le  6 .2 .1  f o r  the  fo u r  crudes and fo r  var ious  p e r io d s .
Focusing f i r s t l y  on the  r e la t io n s h ip  between o f f i c i a l  OPEC 
priqes"  and spo t crude p r i c e s ,  the hypothesis  of independence i s  
r e je c te d  in  a l l  case s .  The r e s u l t s  in d ic a te  th a t  th e re  i s  a s trong  
and s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t io n s h ip  between spot and o f f i c i a l  
p r ic e s  fo r  a l l  the  crudes and a l l  the  periods  examined. However, 
whereas spot p r ic e s  a re  a s i g n i f i c a n t  lead ing  in d i c a to r  fo r  o f i c i a l  
p r ic e s  fo r  a l l  crude types ,  th e re  i s  no evidence of a lead  in d ic a to r  
r o le  from o f f i c i a l  to  spo t p r i c e s .  Thus the evidence i s  c o n s is te n t  
w ith  u n id i r e c t io n a l  Granger c a u s a l i ty  from spot to  o f f i c i a l  OPEC 
p r ic e s .
The excep tion  to  t h i s  g enera l conclusion  i s  the case of Arabian 
L igh t between th e  Geneva and London conferences (1981-83), when the 
above c a u s a l i ty  d i r e c t io n  i s  no t confirmed. This i s  not s u rp r is in g  
g iven  th a t  in  t h i s  p e r io d ,  when the  spot market was d e c l in in g  the  
m arker 's  p r ic e  was u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y  ra is e d  from ^32 to  $34/bbl in  the  
Geneva m eeting, when w ith  a l l  the  r e s t  of OPEC p r ic e s  f a l l i n g  sharp ly  
to  new le v e ls  around the  $34 marker, r e u n i f i c a t io n  of p r ic e s  was 
claimed.
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Indeed, comparing th e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  s t r u c tu r e  a t  the  end of 1981 w ith  
th a t  of 1978, which had evolved over two years  of r e l a t i v e l y  weak p r ic e s  and 
thus o f fe r s  a good benchmark fo r  a s se s s in g  the 1981 p r ic e  rea lignm en t,  one 
can see from ta b le  6 . 2 . IA a f a i r l y  c lo se  r e tu rn  to the s t r u c t u r e  of 1978, 
e s p e c ia l ly  in  percen tage te rm s, and in  comparison to  the  1982 s t r u c t u r e .  The 
d i f fe re n c e s  a re  sm all and they a re  a l l  in  the same d i r e c t io n ,  w ith  N ig e r ia  
ending 1981 w ith  a more favourab le  d i f f e r e n t i a l .
Table 6.2.1A O f f i c i a l  P r ic e  D i f f e r e n t i a l s  a g a in s t  Marker Crude
DOLLARS PERCENTAGE
Sept 1978 Dec 1981 Dec 1982 Sept 1978 Dec 1981 Dec 1982
I ra n 0.11 0.60 -2 .80 0.86 1.76 -8 .23
Kuwai t -0.4-8 -1 .00 -1 .70 -3.77 -2 .94 -5 .00
N ige ria 1.42 2.52 1.52 11.18 7.41 4.47
Source: Table A2, Appendix 3
In  1982 a g lu t  developed in  the market, w ith  demand and OPEC p rod u c tio n  
d e c l in in g  -  w hile  non-OPEC producers were a t  record  ou tpu t le v e ls  d e s p i te  
the  downturn in  demand. The s lack n e ss  was r e f l e c te d  in  spot market p r ic e s  
which showed a f a i r l y  c o n s is te n t  downward t re n d .  Such excess cap a c ity  p laced  
downward p re ssu re  on o f f i c i a l  p r i c e s .  The p ressu re  f o r  a gene ra l  red u c t io n  
in  a l l  o f f i c i a l  p r ic e s  was r e s i s t e d  w ith  Saudi Arabia defending the  $34/bbl 
marker p r ic e  d e s p i te  the  demand c o n t ra c t io n .  This might have r e f l e c t e d  i t s
b e l i e f  th a t  the  downturn was only a sh o r t - ru n  phenomenon, thus i t  was
prepared  to  s a c r i f i c e  revenues fo r  longe r- te rm  s t a b i l i t y .
Some adjustm ents  to  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  were agreed upon, the e f f e c t  being to  
take  the  s t r u c tu r e  away from the  1978 norm as seen in  the  above t a b le ,  and 
p lace  s t r a i n s  on the  p r ic in g  system. A se r io u s  problem was the d i f f e r e n t i a l  
between the  marker and th e  h igher  q u a l i ty  l i g h t  crudes of A frican  p roducers ;  
t h e i r  percentage d i f f e r e n t i a l  was lower in  1982 as compared w ith  1978, so 
the Saudis demanded th a t  th e  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  be r e s to r e d  to  reduce the  
p re s su re  on t h e i r  s a l e s .  However, the o f f i c i a l  $35.52 charged fo r  N iger ian  
L igh t was s t i l l  about $2 /bb l more expensive than  the  comparable F o r t ie s  
crude and so th e  A frican  members were u n l ik e ly  to  r a i s e  t h e i r  p r ic e s  in  the
face  of such com petit ion  from non-OPEC.
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S im i la r ly ,  th e re  were problems w ith  the d i f f e r e n t i a l s  of s im i la r  crudes 
such as I r a n ia n  L ig h t .  In  1982 I ra n  u n i l a t e r a l l y  cut a t o t a l  of $4 /bb l from 
i t s  p r ic e  to become 8 per cent cheaper a t  the  end of 1982 than th e  marker 
d e s p i te  a $ l / b b l  in c re a s e  in  June 1982. With I ra n ia n  output recovering  to
2,3 mbd, t h i s  u n d e rc u t t in g  of the  OPEC p r ic e  s t r u c t u r e  and the  rap id  r i s e  in  
outpu t placed the burden of ad justm ent to  the s lack  market on the c o u n t r ie s  
fo llow ing  the  OPEC p r ic e  l i n e .  With non-OPEC producers s e t t i n g  c o n t ra c t  
p r ic e s  below the marker, s e v e ra l  OPEC members began in  1982 to  undercut 
Arabian L igh t through va r io u s  techn iques .
So c o l l e c t i v e l y ,  OPEC under th e  Saudi le a d e rs h ip  attem pted to r e s to r e  
o rder  to  the market by accep ting  the  $34/bbl p r ic e  and by a p roduc tion  
sh a r in g  agreement reached a t  Vienna in  March 1982. This f a i l e d  and w ith  
in d iv id u a l  producers d isc o u n t in g ,  OPEC was forced  in  March 1983 to  accep t  
th e  market r e a l i t i e s  and reduce o f f i c i a l  p r i c e s .  Thus over th e  longer  
pe r iod  1981-85 the t ren d  of u n id i r e c t io n a l  c a u s a l i ty  from the spot to  the  
o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  of Arabian L ig h t  i s  confirmed using  th e  P ie rce  S s t a t i s t i c .
With re fe ren c e  to  the  r e l a t io n s h ip  between o f f i c i a l  p r ic e s  and 
n e tbacks ,  the  same conclusion  i s  reached, namely the  hypo thesis  of 
independence i s  r e j e c te d  in  a l l  cases as th e re  i s  a s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t io n s h ip  between the  two s e r i e s ,  w h i ls t  w ith  re fe re n c e  to  
the  d i r e c t io n  of c a u s a l i ty  the  overwhelming conclusion  i s  th a t  netbacks 
appear to  ’cause ' o f f i c i a l  p r ic e s  but the opposite  does not ho ld . Indeed, 
s in c e  crude o i l  i s  valued fo r  the  products  derived  from i t ,  i t  seems 
reasonab le  t h a t  OPEC c o u n tr ie s  s e t  t h e i r  o f f i c i a l  crude p r ic e  w ith  re fe re n c e  
to  product p r ic e s  as r e f l e c te d  in  netbacks.
This p a t t e r n  i s  v io la te d  in  the case of Kuwait export crude between 
1976 and 1978 ( t a b l e  6 .2 .1 ,  p a r t  5 ) .  Here, a lthough a s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t io n s h ip  e x i s t s  between the o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  and the  Rotterdam 
netback , the d i r e c t io n  of c a u s a l i ty  i s  not c l e a r .  N e ither  of the  two 
v a r ia b le s  appears to  be a s t ro n g ,  lead ing  in d i c a to r .  This can be 
in t e r p r e te d  as evidence th a t  the two s e r i e s  were e x h ib i t in g  a r e l a t io n s h ip  
of feedback or sum ultane ity  (each 'c a u s in g '  th e  o th e r ) ,  and the  q u es tio n  
a r i s e s  as to  the reasons f o r  th i s  t re n d .
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The spo t market f o r  crude o i l  between 1976 and 1978 had been 
f a i r l y  sm all;  i f  we take  the o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  to be the  ’su p p ly 1 p r ic e  
and netbacks the r e p re s e n ta t io n  of demand then c l e a r ly  i n t e r a c t io n  i s  
the expected s t r u c t u r e  of t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h ip .  The q u es tio n  then
a r i s e s  as to why was not th i s  the  p a t t e r n  found fo r  the  o the r  crudes,  
s in c e  the  sm allness of the  spot market was a genera l  phenomenon, not 
one s p e c i f i c  to  Kuwait crude.
The answer i s  to  be found in  th e  f a c t  th a t  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  even in  
t h i s  period  have been market determined, which im plies  th a t
ad justm ents  to  the o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  a re  l e f t  to  in d iv id u a l  producers to 
undertake in  response to  changing market c o n d i t io n s .  The f a c t  th a t  
Kuwait was quick enough to  respond to  a changing market (ne tbacks)  in  
1977 by c u t t in g  i t s  o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  by 10 cen ts  when the r e s t  of the 
OPEC p r ic e  s t r u c t u r e  was unchanged can account fo r  th i s  i n t e r a c t i v e  
r e l a t i o n s h ip .  For, c l e a r l y ,  the longer OPEC takes  to  respond to a
change, the  longer th e  lead  of a netback change over an o f f i c i a l
p r ic e  change and hence -the c l e a r e r  the  confirm ation  of the p a t te r n  of 
u n id i r e c t i o n a l  c a u s a l i t y .  On th e  o the r  hand, a quick in d iv id u a l  
r e a c t io n  by Kuwait coupled w ith  the co n t in u a l ly  changing spot market 
f o r  products  may appear to  be a r e l a t io n s h ip  of s im u l ta n e i ty  when of 
course i t  r e f l e c t s  the f a c t  th a t  the producer i s  a d ju s t in g  more
c lo se ly  to the changing value  ( i n  terms of product p r ic e s )  of i t s
crude.
The th i r d  r e l a t i o n s h ip  examined i s  th a t  between spo t p r ic e s  and 
n e tbacks ,  which as argued above i s  expected to  be one of feedback, 
s in c e  we cannot say th a t  supply 'c a u s e s 1 demand or v ice  v e rsa ,  as we 
are  dea l in g  w ith  a s im ultaneous r a th e r  than  a s in g le  equation  system.
I t  should be made c le a r  th a t  what is  meant here  i s  th a t  spo t
crude o i l  p r ic e s  a re  taken  to be a r e f l e c t i o n  of the supply of o i l :
any changes in  supply w i l l  immediately a f f e c t  the spo t p r ic e  of crude 
s in ce  the balance w i l l  change. S im i la r ly ,  netbacks are  taken to  
r e p re s e n t  the  s t a t e  of demand fo r  the  various  products  -  so as the 
demand f o r  HFO in c re a se s  so does i t s  p r ic e  -  and thus fo r  the various  
crudes too -  r i s i n g  HFO p r ic e s  imply a h ighe r  v a lu a t io n  being placed  
upon h eav ie r  crudes .  As b e fo re ,  the hypothesis  of independence 
between netbacks and spot p r ic e s  i s  always r e je c te d  s in ce  the P ie rce  
S - s t a t i s t i c  i s  always s i g n i f i c a n t  as seen in  t a b le  6 .2 .1
-  202 -
However, in  c o n t ra s t  to  the  previous cases where a s i g n i f i c a n t  
le ad in g  in d i c a to r  e x i s t s ,  here n e i t h e r  the  spot p r ic e  of crude nor 
netbacks in  the va r ious  markets appear to  be ’cau s in g ' the o th e r  
u n i d i r e c t i o n a l l y . For 1976-85 as a whole the  r e s u l t s  in d ic a te  th a t  
each one i s  causing th e  o th e r  s im ultaneously  -  a feedback s t r u c t u r e  
in  th e  Granger sense . For the  subperiods examined, very o f ten  
a l though independence i s  r e j e c te d ,  the u n id i r e c t io n a l  hypo thesis  
t e s t i n g  S s t a t i s t i c  i s  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  fo r  both v a r ia b le s  ( e .g  in  t a b le  
6 .2 .1 ,  p a r t s  5 to  8 ) .
Examination of the c r o s s - c o r r e la t io n  fu n c t io n s  fo r  the  
subperiods re v e a ls  the  reason : in  the  v a s t  m a jo r i ty  of cases the
s t r o n g e s t ,  most s i g n i f i c a n t  c o r r e l a t i o n  between the  two s e r i e s  occurs 
a t  lag  0 ( i . e  a contemporaneous re sp o n se ) ,  w ith  the  remaining lags  
d isp la y in g  sm all c o r r e l a t i o n s .  Since the u n id i r e c t io n a l -h y p o th e s i s  
t e s t i n g  S - s t a t i s t i c  invo lves  lags  1 through K excluding lag  0 , i t  i s  
only n a tu ra l  th a t  in s ig n i f ic a n c e  i s  in d ic a te d  (see  s e c t io n  4 .5  fo r  
the form ulae) .
D
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The second c a u s a l i ty  t e s t  employed i s  based on the F - s t a t i s t i c  
as suggested  by Sims ( s e c t io n  4 .5 ) .  Regressions have been run 
between the  th re e  f i l t e r e d  p r ic e  v a r ia b le s  u s ing ,  ty p i c a l l y ,  6 p a s t  
and 6 fu tu re  la g s ,  w ithou t any p r io r  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e  lag  
d i s t r i b u t io n s  which have been kept long enough and f r e e  enough to  
avoid any b ia s .  In the  few cases where the  c ro ss  c o r r e l a t i o n  
fu n c t io n  between the  p r e f i l t e r e d  s e r i e s  has in d ic a te d  th a t  a lag  
lo n g e r  than 6 months i s  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  the re g re s s io n s  have been run up 
to th a t  longer la g .
Tables 6 .2 .2  to  6 .2 .7  p re se n t  a sample of the r e le v a n t  key 
s t a t i s t i c s  obta ined by th e se  re g re s s io n s .  Focusing on the f i r s t  p a r t  
of t a b le  6 .2 .2  one observes th a t  the only n o n - s ig n i f i c a n t  runs a re  of 
th e  spot Arabian p r ic e  and netbacks on p a s t  lags  only of the o f f i c i a l  
OPEC p r ic e  ( r e g re s s io n  numbers 9 , .17, 21 and 25). Regression of the  
o f f i c i a l  marker p r ic e  on p a s t  and fu tu r e  lags  of both the  spo t p r ic e  
and netbacks in  the  th re e  markets a re  always s i g n i f i c a n t  as a re  the 
re v e rs e  re g re s s io n s  of the  spot p r ic e  and netbacks on pas t  and fu tu re  
lags  of th e  OPEC p r ic e .
Furtherm ore, from th e  second p a r t  of t a b le  6 .2 .2  the d i r e c t io n  
of c a u s a l i ty  i s  c l e a r ly  in d ic a te d :  fu tu r e  values of the  OPEC o f f i c i a l  
p r ic e  were h igh ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  in  ex p la in in g  the dependent v a r ia b le  
(whether the  spo t p r ic e  or netbacks) but fu tu re  values  of the spo t 
p r ic e  or netbacks were not s i g n i f i c a n t  in  ex p la in in g  the o f f i c i a l  
OPEC p r ic e ,  s in ce  the  F - s t a t i s t i c  on the fu tu r e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  of 
r e g re s s io n s  2, 4, 6 and 8 i s  no t s i g n i f i c a n t .  These r e s u l t s
correspond to  a p a t t e r n  of u n id i r e c t i o n a l  c a u s a l i ty  from the  f r e e  
market to  the  OPEC adm in is te red  system as re sp re se n te d  by the  
m arker’s p r ic e .  Indeed, th i s  i s  the  p a t te r n  ob ta ined  fo r  a l l  crudes 
fo r  the  period  as a whole (1976-85), thus confirm ing the r e s u l t s
t e s t s  agree our confidence in  these  r e s u l t s  i s  in c re a sed .
However, the  c a u s a l i ty  p a t te rn s  in d ic a te d  by Sims' t e s t  fo r  the  
v a r io u s  subperiods are  not q u i t e  as s t r a ig h t fo rw a rd .  Focusing on
a r r iv e d  a t  by use of the C le a r ly ,  s in ce  both  / \
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t a b le  6 .2 .3  which r e f e r s  to  Kuwait crude between 1976 and 1978, on 
the  bas is  of th e  F - t e s t  on fu tu r e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  the  c a u s a l i ty  p a t te rn s  
in d ic a te d  are  as fo l lo w s : a feedback r e la t io n s h ip  between th e  spot 
p r ic e  and netbacks and u n id i r e c t i o n a l  c a u s a l i ty  from spot to o f f i c i a l  
-  i n  agreement w ith  P i e r c e ' s  t e s t  -  but u n id i r e c t io n a l  c a u s a l i ty  from 
the o f f i c i a l  Kuwait p r ic e  to  the  Rotterdam ne tbacks .
S im i la r ly ,  t a b le  6 .2 .4  which r e f e r s  to the 1979 to  1981 pe r iod  
in d ic a te s  th a t  the  o f f i c i a l  I r a n ia n  l i g h t  p r ic e  i s  u n id i r e c t i o n a l l y  
'c a u s in g '  the  spo t p r ic e  and in  a feedback r e l a t io n s h ip  to th e  US 
netback , w ith  the  l a t t e r  'c a u s in g '  the spot crude p r ic e .  
Furtherm ore, th a t  th e  Rotterdam netback i s  causing the o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  
and i s  in  a s im u l ta n e i ty  r e l a t io n s h ip  to  the spot p r ic e  as shown 
below:
O f f i c i a l  P r ic e
Table 6 .2 .5  covers th e  1981-83 period  and shows the fo llow ing : 
f u tu r e  values  of the  spo t p r i c e ,  the  Rotterdam and US netbacks are 
no t s i g n i f i c a n t  in  ex p la in in g  the o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  of N igerian  l i g h t  
crude. Furtherm ore, f u tu r e  values  of the o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  a re :  
s i g n i f i c a n t  in  ex p la in in g  the  spo t p r ic e  and Rotterdam ne tbacks , but 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t  in  ex p la in in g  th e  US netbacks.  Hence, the  p a t t e r n  
emerging i s  th a t  the  spo t p r ic e  i s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  le ad ing  in d i c a to r  
f o r  th e  o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  -  caus ing  i t  u n id i r e c t i o n a l l y  -  the  Rotterdam 
netback i s  s im i la r ly  causing  the o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  u n id i r e c t i o n a l l y ,  but 
t h a t  th e re  i s  a feedback r e l a t io n s h ip  between the  o f f i c i a l  p rice  and 
th e  US netback . In  a d d i t io n  s im u l ta n e i ty  i s  found between the spot 
p r ic e  and netbacks a t  Rotterdam but one way c a u s a l i ty  from the spot 
p r ic e  to  th e  US ne tback .  These r e s u l t s  a re  shown below.
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O f f i c i a l  P r ice
Rotterdam Spot P r ice
Netback
n f  k f f  
US Netback
F in a l ly ,  no c le a r  p a t te r n s  of c a u s a l i ty  emerge from ta b le s  6 .2 .6  
(1983-85) and 6 .2 .7  (1981-85). At t h i s  po in t  we r e c a l l  an im portant 
p o in t  r a i s e d  in  s e c t io n  4 .5 ,  namely th a t  due to  the  drawbacks of
between the  two t e s t s '  r e s u l t s ,  we w i l l  r e ly  on P i e r c e ' s  t e s t .
Sims' methodology invo lves  OLS r e g re s s io n s ,  th e re fo re  th e re  i s  
always dependence upon the  fu n c t io n a l  form employed and, more 
im portan t ,  r e s t r i c t i o n s  are  p laced  upon the  t e s t  by the  number of 
lags  th a t  can be employed given the  ques tions  of (1) degrees of 
freedom and (2)* m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y . The 6 lag s  we have in co rp o ra ted  
in  the re g re s s io n s  a re  l i k e l y  to d i s t o r t  the p ic tu r e  on c a u s a l i ty  due 
to  high c o l l i n e a r i t y . On th e  o th e r  hand, the P ie rce  S - s t a t i s t i c  
r e l i e s  on the  c ro ss  c o r r e l a t i o n  fu n c t io n  which i s  u su a l ly  c a lc u la te d  
f o r  20-25 la g s  and th e re fo r e  more l i k e ly  to cap ture  the  t ru e  
c a u s a l i ty  d i r e c t io n s  than  a d i s to r t e d  re g re s s io n  re ly in g  on 6 lags  
a lone .
Hence, the  conclusions  we can draw from t h i s  s e c t io n  a re  those  
mentioned in  the  beginning: u n id i r e c t i o n a l  c a u s a l i ty  from spot p r ic e s  
and netbacks to  the  o f f i c i a l  OPEC p r ic e s  and feedbacks between the  
spot crude p r ic e  and n e tbacks ,  w ithout any doubt fo r  the  period  as a 
whole -  1976-1985 -  s in c e  both t e s t s  agree and, accord ing  to  our
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of the  t e s t s  a lso  fo r  the various  subperiods .
, /Sims met ho i t  has been decided th a t  in  case of c o n f l i c t
- 210 -
O f f ic ia l  p r i c e ,  Spot P r ic e ,  Rotterdam, Middle East and US Netbacks 
C au sa l i ty  Test B: Sim's Method
Table 6.2.2 Arabian Light 1976 (Jan) - 1985 (March)
E xis tence  of C ausa l i ty
REGRESSION F DW DF
1 O f f i c i a l  P = f ( s p o t  P***, A) 2.27* 2.03 99
2 O f f i c i a l  P = f ( s p o t  P***, B) 1.9* 1.93 93
3 O f f i c i a l  P = f(R otterdam  Netback, A) 2.44* 2.14 99
4 O f f i c i a l  P = f(R otterdam  Netback, B) 1.82** 2.18 93
5 O f f ic ia l  P = f(M iddle E as t Netback, A) 2.9* 2.03 91
6 O f f ic ia l  P = f(M iddle E as t Netback, B) 1.9* 2.05 85
7 O f f i c i a l  P = f(US Netback, A) 6.35* 1.93 87
8 O f f i c i a l  P = f(US Netback, B) 3.36* 1.92 81
9 Spot P = f ( o f f i c i a l  P, A) 0.49 1.98 99
10 Spot P = f ( o f f i c i a l  P, B) 1.88* 1.95 93
11 Spot P = f(R otte rdam  Netback, A) 14.5* 1.85 99
12 Spot P = f(R otterdam  Netback, B) 10.57* 1.87 93
13 Spot P = f(M iddle E ast Netback, A) 3.29* 2.14 91
14 Spot P = f(M iddle E as t Netback, B) 4.16* 2.08 86
15 Spot P = f(US Netback, A )‘ 7.13* 1.82 87
16 Spot P = f(US Netback, B) 7.55* 1.7 81
17 Rotterdam Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, A) 1.30 2.15 99
18 Rotterdam Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, B) 2.44* 2.19 93
19 Rotterdam Netback = f (S p o t  P , A) 13.19* 2.3 99
20 Rotterdam Netback = f (S p o t P, B) 8.84* 2.28 93
21 Middle E as t Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, A) 1.7 2.07 91
22 Middle E ast Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, B) 2.3* 2.05 85
23 Middle E ast Netback = f (S p o t P, A) 6.35* 2.4 91
24 Middle E as t Netback = f (S p o t P, B) 4.01* 2.32 86
25 US Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, A) 0.44 1.95 87
26 US Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, B) 3.38* 1.61 81
27 US Netback = f(S p o t P , A) 12.2* 1.62 87
28 US Netback = f (S p o t P, B) 7.29* 1.5 81
k Denotes s ig n i f i c a n c e  a t  the  5% l e v e l ;  ** a t the  10% le v e l
kk A = 6 pas t  l a g s ,  B = 6 p a s t  and 6 fu tu re lags
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Table 6.2.2 Continued
DIRECTION OF CAUSALITY 
F-Test on 6 Fu ture  Months' C o e f f ic ie n t s
EQUATION F-VALUE
2 1.37
4 1.04
6 0.74
8 0.28
10 3.15*
12 3.12*
14 4.28*
16 5.33*
18 3.41*
20 2.3*
22 2.0%
24 3.78*
26 6.59*
28 1.4**
Table 6 .2 .3  Kuwait Export Crude, 1976 (Jan) -  1978 (December) 
O f f i c i a l  p r ic e ,  Spot P r ic e ,  Rotterdam and Middle E ast Netbacks
C a u s a l i ty  T es t B: Sim's Method
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EXISTENCE OF CAUSALITY
REGRESSION F DW DF
1 O f f ic ia l P = f ( s p o t  P , A) 4.16* 2.00 29
2 O f f ic ia l P = f ( s p o t  P, B) 8.19* 2.00 23
3 O f f ic ia l P = f(R otte rdam  Netback, A) 0.34 2.17 30
4 O f f i c i a l P =. f(R otterdam  Netback, B) 2.7* 2.08 24
5 O f f i c i a l P = f(M iddle E ast Netback, A)
6 O f f i c i a l P = f(M iddle E as t Netback, B)
7 Spot P = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, A) 0.202 1.58 30
8 Spot P = f ( 0 f f i c i a l  P, B) 6.45* 3.00 24
9 Spot P = f(R otterdam  Netback, A) 5.86* 2.64 30
10 Spot P = f(R otterdam  Netback, B) 2.5* 2.44 24
11 Spot P = f(M iddle E ast Netback, A)
12 Spot P = f(M iddle E as t Netback, B)
13 Rotterdam Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, A) 0.56 2.26 30
14 Rotterdam Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, B) 4.23* 2.49 24
15 Rotterdam Netback = f (S p o t P, A) 2.89* 2.47 29
16 Rotterdam Netback = f(S p o t P, B) 2.84* 2.46 23
17 Middle E as t Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, A)
18 Middle E as t Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, B)
19 Middle E as t  Netback = f (S p o t P , A)
20 Middle E ast Netback = f (S p o t P , B)
DIRECTION OF CAUSALITY 
F-Test on 6 F u ture  Months' C o e f f ic ie n t s
EQUATION F-VALUE
2 0.815
4 3.32
6
8 16.57*
10 2.5*
12
14 4.8*
16 2.36*
18
20
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Table 6.2.4 Iranian Light, 1979 (Jan) - 1981 (May)
O f f i c i a l  p r i c e ,  Spot P r ic e ,  Rotterdam and US Netbacks
C a u s a l i ty  T es t B: Sim's Method 
EXISTENCE OF CAUSALITY -
REGRESSION F DW DF
1 O f f ic ia l  P = f ( s p o t  P, A) 1.8* 1.87 22
2 O f f i c i a l  P = f ( spo t P, B) 1.95* 2.07 15
3 O f f i c i a l  P = f(R otterdam  Netback, A) 1.9*- 2.02 22
4 O f f ic ia l  P = f(R otte rdam  Netback, B) 0.6* 1.93 15
5 O f f i c i a l  P = f(US Netback, A) 2.08* 2.4 23
6 O f f ic ia l  P = f(US Netback, B) 1.8* 2.2 16
7 Spot P = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, A) 0.44 2.02 22
8 Spot P = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, B) 1.4 2.10 16
9 Spot P = f(R otterdam  Netback, A) 1.9* 2.71 22
10 Spot P = f(R otterdam  Netback, B) 1.5 1.3 16
11 Spot P * f(US Netback, A) 1.4 2.22 22
12 Spot P = f(US Netback, B) 0.97 2.19 17
13 Rotterdam Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, A) 0.38 2.01 22
14 Rotterdam Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, B) 2.74* ■* 2.19 15
15 Rotterdam Netback = f (S p o t P, A) 3.24* 2.85 22
16 Rotterdam Netback = f(S p o t P , B) 0.7 1.90 16
17 US Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P , A) 1.68* 1.00 22
18 US Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, B) 3.98* 3.2 16
19 US Netback = f (S p o t P , A) 4.78* 1.79 22
20 US Netback = f (S p o t  P, B) 4.88* 2.34 16
DIRECTION OF CAUSALITY
F-T est on 6 Future  Months' C o e f f ic ie n ts
EQUATION F-VALUE
2 1.96*
4 0.54
6 1.85*
8 1.97*
10 1.27
12 0.82
14 4.44*
16 0.09*
18 4.25*
20 2.27*
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O f f i c i a l  p r i c e ,  Spot P r i c e ,  Rotterdam and US Netbacks
C au sa l i ty  Test B: Sira's Method
Table 6.2.5 Nigerian Light, 1981 (June) - 1983 (March)
EXISTENCE OF CAUSALITY
REGRESSION F DW DF
1 O f f ic i a l  P = f (S p o t P, A) 2.55** 1.20 16
2 O f f i c i a l  P = f(S p o t P, B) 4.02** 2.13 13
3 O f f i c i a l  P = f(R otte rdam  Netback, A) 3.12** 1.99 15
4 O f f ic ia l  P = f(R otte rdam  Netback, B) 1.3 2.56 12
5 O f f i c i a l  P = f(US Netback, A) 0.809 1.27 15
6 O f f i c i a l  P = f(US Netback, B) 0.76 2.11 12
7 Spot P -  f ( O f f i c i a l  P, A) 1.59 1.72 16
8 Spot P = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, B) 9.39* 3.3 12
9 Spot P = f(R otterdam  Netback, A) 6.18* 2.9 16
10 Spot P = f(R otterdam  Netback, B) 4.21** 2.91 13
11 Spot P = f(US Netback, A) 1.56 3.00 15
12 Spot P = f(US Netback, B) 71.4* 0.38 12
13 Rotterdam Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, A) 0.54 2.07 16
14 Rotterdam Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, B) 2.3 1.64 12
15 Rotterdam Netback = f(S p o t P, A) 5.41* 2.98 16
16 Rotterdam Netback = f (S p o t  P, B) 5.31** 3.11 13
17 US Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, A) 2.12 1.90 16
18 US Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, B) 1.63 3.46 13
19 US Netback = f(S p o t P, A) 2.45 2.70 16
20 US Netback = f(S p o t P, B) 2.085 3.5 13
Note: A = 6 p as t  la g s ,  B = 6 p a s t  and 3 fu tu re lags
DIRECTION OF CAUSALITY 
F-T est on 6 Future Months' C o e f f ic ie n ts
EQUATION F-VALUE
2 3.33
4 0.478
6 1.75
8 9.96**
10 1.07
12 27.36*
14 4.54**
16 0.696
18 1.4
20 0.44
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O f f i c i a l  p r i c e ,  Spot P r ic e ,  Rotterdam Netbacks 
C a u sa l i ty  Test B: Sim’s Method 
EXISTENCE OF CAUSALITY
Table 6.2.6 Arabian Light, 1983 (April) - 1985 (March)
REGRESSION F DW DF
1 O f f i c i a l  P = f (S p o t P, A) 2.96 2.16 14
2 O f f i c i a l  P = f (S p o t P, B) 1.32 2.5 12
3 O f f i c i a l  P = f(R otterdam  Netback, A) 1.6 2.46 15
4 O f f i c i a l  P = f(R otterdam  Netback, B) 0.49 3.3 12
5 Spot P = f ( O f f i c i a l  P , A) 0.58 1.94 21
6 Spot P = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, B)
7 Spot P = f(R otte rdam  Netback, A) 0.61 2.42 17
8 Spot P = f(R otterdam  Netback, B) 1.87 2.5 12
9 Rotterdam Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, A) 5.48 1.97 21
10 Rotterdam Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, B) 2.89 1.83 17
11 Rotterdam Netback = f (S p o t P, A) 2.15* 2.28 17
12 Rotterdam Netback = f (S p o t P, B) 1.5 2.52 12
Note: A = 6 or 8 p a s t  la g s ,  B = 3 fu tu re  lags
DIRECTION OF CAUSALITY 
F-Test on 6 Fu ture  Months' C o e f f ic ie n ts
EQUATION F-VALUE
2 2.23
4 0.709
6
8 3.2
10
12 0.098
Note: No values rep o r te d  fo r  equa tion  6 as o f f i c i a l  p r ic e s  a re  almost
unchanged, hence h igh  c o l l i n e a r i t y  when using  pas t  and fu tu re  lags  
r e s u l t s  in  f a i l u r e  of the e s t im a t in g  ro u t in e .
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O f f i c i a l  p r i c e ,  Spot P r ic e ,  Rotterdam Netbacks 
C a u s a l i ty  T es t B: Sim's Method
Table 6.2.7 Kuwait Export Crude, 1981 (June) - 1985 (March)
EXISTENCE OF CAUSALITY
REGRESSION F DW DF
1 O f f i c i a l  P = f(S p o t P , A) 1.91 2.17 39
2 O f f i c i a l  P = f(S p o t P, B) 0.96 2.26 33
3 O f f i c i a l  P = f(R otte rdam  Netback, A) 4.12 2.29 39
4 O f f i c i a l  P = f(R otte rdam  Netback, B) 3.58 1.49 33
5 Spot P = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, A) 1.07 2.44 39
6 Spot P = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, B) 1.06 2.53 33
7 Spot P = f(R otterdam  Netback., A) 3.31 2.7 16
8 Spot P = f(R otte rdam  Netback, B) 1.7 2.54 33
9 Rotterdam Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, A) 0.62 1.94 39
10 Rotterdam Netback = f ( O f f i c i a l  P, B) 2.51 2.28 33
11 Rotterdam Netback = f(S po t P, A) 3.56 2.65 39
12 Rotterdam Netback = f (S p o t  P, B) 1.81 2.53 33
DIRECTION OF CAUSALITY 
F-Test on 6 Fu ture  Months' C o e f f ic ie n t s
EQUATION F-VALUE
2 0.33
4 2.258
6 1.22
8 0.54
10 •4.3
12 0.64
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CHAPTER 7: LAG STRUCTURES AND MULTIVARIATE MODELS
7.1 LAG STRUCTURES
Tables 7 .1 .1  to 7 .1 .14  p re s e n t  a sample of the  es tim ated  lag  
d i s t r i b u t i o n s  between the  f i l t e r e d  p r ic e  s e r i e s ,  which form the b a s is  
of the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  s tag e  of the t r a n s f e r  fu n c tio n  models p resen ted  
in  s e c t io n  7 .2 .  Taking in to  account the  d i r e c t io n s  of c a u s a l i ty  
a r r iv e d  a t ,  we w i l l  examine the  lag  s t r u c tu r e s  of the  fo llow ing  th re e  
r e l a t i o n s h ip s  in  tu rn :  o f f i c i a l  OPEC p r ic e s  versus  spot crude o i l
p r i c e s ,  o f f i c i a l  p r ic e s  versus  ne tbacks ,  and spot p r ic e s  versus  
ne tbacks .
7 .1 .1  The OPEC o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  versus  the  spot p r i c e
P a r t  1 of t a b le s  7 .1 .1  -  7 .1 .14  r e f e r s  to  the  r e l a t io n s h ip  between 
the  spo t and th e  OPEC p r ic e  which has been found to be one of 
u n id i r e c t i o n a l  c a u s a l i ty  from the  former to  the  l a t t e r .
For th e  pe r iod  as a whole 1976-85 ( t a b l e  7 .1 .1 )  most of the 
impact of the  spot on the  o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  occurs a t  lag s  1 to  3 ( i . e  
w i th in  one q u a r te r  lag )  f o r  A rabian L igh t which i s  a lso  the  case fo r  
I r a n ia n  L ight -  no t s u r p r i s in g ly  as these  crudes a re  of s im i la r  
q u a l i ty .  For the  h ea v ie r  Kuwait crude, however, the  spo t p r ic e  only 
a f f e c t s  the o f f i c i a l  a f t e r  7 months -w hils t  f o r  th e  A frican  l i g h t  the  
e f f e c t  i s  f e l t  a f t e r  8 months.
For a l l  th e  crudes the  sum of the  c o e f f i c i e n t s  i s  always le s s  
than one -  in  f a c t  c lo se  to  zero  -  which i s  c o n s is te n t  w ith the  
hypo thesis  th a t  the  o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  does not f u l l y  r e f l e c t  changes in  
the  spot market given the  i n e r t i a  c h a ra c te r i s in g  the  OPEC p r ic e  
s e t t i n g  conference system. This conclusion  does not correspond to 
o the r  published  r e s u l t s  -  e .g  V erleger (1982).
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To be ab le  to  draw any u s e fu l  conclusions  about the sy s tem 's  
behaviour, i t  i s  im portan t to examine how the  response of th e  OPEC 
adm in is te red  p r ic e s  to  changes in  spot p r ic e s  has evolved through 
tim e. This can be achieved by a n a ly s is  of the var ious  subperiods , in  
p a r t i c u l a r  by comparing them to  the  1976-78 period  of r e l a t i v e  
s t a b i l i t y  which can se rv e  as our benchmark.
So looking a t  the  1976-78 period  ( ta b le s  7 .1 .2  -  7 .1 .4 ,  p a r t  1) 
we see  th a t  the average response occurs a t  lag  6. That i s ,  i t  takes 
6 months fo r  OPEC • c o u n t r ie s  to  a d ju s t  t h e i r  c o n t ra c t  p r ic e  to 
changing spo t market c o n d i t io n s ,  which corresponds to  t h e i r  r e g u la r  
b iannual confe rences .
More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  f o r  Arabian Light most of the response comes 
a f t e r  5 and 6 months w ith  th e  sum of the c o e f f i c i e n t s  being c lo se  to  
ze ro .  For N iger ian  L ight the impact occurs a t  lag  5 w ith  a sum of 
0.499 w h i l s t  f o r  Kuwait crude the o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  fo llows the spo t 
a f t e r  6 months w ith  the c o e f f i c i e n t s  adding up to  0.581. These sums 
would in d i c a te  th a t  the Saudis in  t h i s  time p e r iod  were slow to 
respond w h i ls t  producers of h eav ie r  crudes and A fr ican  Light crudes 
respond more c lo se ly  to  changing spot p r ic e s .
Examining next th e  c r i s i s  period  1979-81 ( t a b l e s  7 .1 ,5  -  7 .1 .8 )  
we observe th a t  he re  the  lags  become much s h o r t e r .  So fo r  the 
producers of Arab L igh t crude most of the e f f e c t  from the spot to  the 
o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  i s  concen tra ted  a t  lag  3 w h i ls t  f o r  Kuwait crude i t  i s  
lag  1. So th e  h e a v ie r  crude producer r e a c ts  again  more q u ic k ly .  For 
a l l  th re e  crudes the  o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  does not f u l l y  a d ju s t  to changing 
spo t market con d it io n s  s in ce  the  sum of the c o e f f i c i e n t s  i s  le s s  than  
u n i ty .
However, N igerian  L igh t d i f f e r s ,  fo r  a lthough the lags become 
s h o r te r  w ith  the  o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  a d ju s t in g  to  the changing spot a f t e r  
3 lags  w ith  the  e f f e c t  being spread over seven months (s in ce  la g s  3 
to  9 a re  th e  most s ig n i f i c a n t )  n e v e r th e le s s  the- sum of the  
c o e f f i c i e n t s  exceeds u n i ty  (1 ,2 4 5 ) .  That would suggest an 'o v e r -  
reac tion*  .
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The period  1979 to  1981 corresponds to  a s i t u a t i o n  in  which the  
spot p r ic e  of a l l  crudes was above the o f f i c i a l ,  in d ic a t in g  excess 
demand a t  the  p re v a i l in g  o f f i c i a l  p r ic e ,  where l im ite d  su p p lie s  meant 
th a t  buyers were w i l l in g  to  pay more than the o f f i c i a l  p r ic e .  This 
period  was c h a ra c te r i s e d  by w idespread u n i l a t e r a l  p r ic e  s e t t i n g  by 
OPEC member c o u n t r i e s ,  w ith  most of the p r ic e  d ec is io n s  being taken  
o u ts id e  conferences .
Although f o r  a l l  crudes o f f i c i a l  p r ic e s  were below sp o t,  a f t e r  
the  1979 c r i s i s  the moderate Saudi Arabia held  i t s  p r ic e  w ell  below 
spo t l e v e l s ,  w h i ls t  N ig e r i a ’s p r ic e s  were much c lo s e r  to  the spo t 
p r ic e .  A fte r  th e  1980 c r i s i s  the m arker’s p r ic e  exceeded the spot in  
only 3 months, w h i ls t  fo r  N iger ian  crude th a t  was the case in  11 
months. So N iger ia  responded to  r i s i n g  spot p r ic e s  much qu icker than 
the S audis ,  p o ss ib ly  o v e r - r e a c t in g ,  and indeed th e  da ta  appear to 
bear t h i s  ou t.  In  support of t h i s  view we c i t e  the  f a c t  th a t  fo r  the 
per iod  as a whole (1976-85) th e  p r ic e  of A frican  L igh t d ec l in e s  5 
times w hile the p r ic e  of A rabian Light d ec l in e s  only once.
The next period  examined . i s  1981-83 ( ta b l e s  7 .1 .9  -  7 .1 .1 0 )  a 
p e r iod  in  which th e  spo t p r ic e  was lower than the o f f i c i a l  and w ith  
demand d e c l in in g  excess supply was i t s  main f e a tu r e .  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  
to  e x p la in  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  in  a tw o - t i e r  p r ic e  system s ince  one would 
expect buyers to  tu rn  to  the  lower p r ic e  and buy a t  the spot market. 
However, i t  can be argued th a t  buyers make a p o r t f o l i o  type cho ice ,  
th a t  i s ,  buy some o f f i c i a l  even though i t  i s  more expensive i f  they 
f e e l  i t  i s  im portant to  pay the  h ighe r  p r ice  in  o rder  to ensure good 
r e l a t i o n s  w ith the p roducers .
The lag  s t r u c t u r e s  f o r  t h i s  period  in d ic a te  th a t  the o f f i c i a l  
p r ic e  con tinues  to  respond to  th e  spot more qu ick ly  than in  the  
p r e - c r i s i s  1976-78 period  thus confirming the t rend  found fo r  
1979-81, w ith  the  one month lag  c o n ce n tra t in g  most of the response .
Furtherm ore, N igerian  L igh t again  d isp la y s  o v e r - re a c t io n  with 
the  sum of i t s  c o e f f i c i e n t s  exceeding u n i ty ,  as opposed to values  
l e s s  than one fo r  the o th e r  th ree  crudes.
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I t  would thus seem th a t  1979-81 and 1981-83 are  f a i r l y  s im i la r  
in  terms of lag  s t r u c t u r e s .  Both were d is e q u i l ib r iu m  p e r io d s ,  the  
former one of excess demand and the  l a t t e r  of excess supply . During 
1979-81 OPEC c o u n tr ie s  r e g u la r ly  inc reased  p r ic e s  u n i l a t e r a l l y  and 
during  1981-83 they d iscounted  on o f f i c i a l  p r i c e s ,  again  
u n i l a t e r a l l y ,  in  o rder  to cap tu re  a la rg e r  market share  of the  
sh r in k in g  market s i z e .
However, th e re  i s  c l e a r ly  a d i f f e re n c e  between the  experiences  
of th e se  two p e r io d s .  In the  t i g h t  market of 1979-80 Saudi A rab ia ’s 
r o le  was very weak. The Saudis as in d ic a te d  by the  d a ta  were always 
the market fo l lo w e rs ,  w ith  p r ic e  changes being i n i t i a t e d  by almost 
every producer a t  some p o in t  and w ith  the  sm alle r  ones, such as 
Ecuador, o f ten  re a c t in g  more s w i f t ly  to spot p r ic e  movements. This 
s i t u a t i o n  was not d u p l ic a te d  i n '1982. I t  was then c l e a r  th a t  in  the 
d e c l in in g  market any downwards movement by the Saudis would be 
fo llow ed by a l l  o th e r  producers .  Hence, the u n i l a t e r a l  p r ice  s e t t i n g  
was a l l  done w ith in  s ig h t  of the m arker 's  p r ic e .  Thus the  S au d i 's  
in f lu e n c e  in  the  s lack  market was probably q u i te  s t ro n g .  The p r ic e  
c u t t in g  producers u s u a l ly  s e t  t h e i r  p r ic e s  j u s t  below the le v e l  s e t  
by the  le a d e r ,  thus in  a sense  they were p r ic e  ta k e rs  as opposed to  
p r ic e  makers in  the t i g h t  1979-80 market.
For the  1983-85 period  ( t a b l e  7 .1 .1 1 )  one observes a leng then ing  
of the la g s .  So fo r  Arabian L igh t  most of the response occurs a t  
lag s  7 and 8 with a c o e f f i c i e n t  of 0.786 in d ic a t in g  th a t  the  Saudis 
were r e s i s t i n g  the  f a l l  in  spot p r ic e s  but when they did follow  the 
d ec l in e  they did so more c lo se ly  than befo re .  Indeed, the red u c t io n  
in  o f f i c i a l  OPEC p r ic e s  in  March 1983 brought them c lo se r  to  spot 
p r i c e s ,  though again  not a l l  the  way down as the spot was below the 
m arker 's  p r ic e  by $1.30 in  December 1984 and 20 cen ts  in  March 1985.
In  e f f e c t  in  the period  fo llow ing  the 1979-81 events OPEC 
attem pted to c o n t ro l  the r a t e  of d ec l in e  of p r ic e s  w ith the quotas of 
1983 and thus  i t  would seem th a t  the  group has attem pted  to ac t  as a 
c a r t e l  only a f t e r  the  second p r ic e  shock by reducing p roduction . 
However, t h i s  by i t s e l f  i s  no t proof of c a r t e l  behaviour and thus 
e f f ic ie n c y  lo s e s .  Taking in to  account the p roduc tion  p o l i c ie s  of
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non-OPEC producers  which a re  l i k e ly  to y ie ld  e x t r a c t io n  r a te s  h ig h e r  
than what would p r e v a i l  in  a com petit ive  market -  given the debt 
problems of s e v e ra l  la rg e  p o p u la t io n  non OPEC producers -  i t  may be 
th a t  OPEC's reduced o i l  output i s  d es irab le*
7 .1 .2  The OPEC o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  versus  netbacks
Examination of the  lags  in  t h i s  r e l a t io n s h ip  fo r  the va r ious
subperiods confirms the  tren d  of s h o r te r  over time re a c t io n  on beha lf  
of the o f f i c i a l  p r i c e s .  Comparing the p a t te r n  of adjustm ent in  the
1978-81 per iod  of r i s i n g  p r ic e s  and in  the 1981-85 period  of f a l l i n g  
product p r ic e s  to  the  benchmark 1976-78 fo r  th e  Rotterdam netback in  
r e l a t i o n  to  the  m arker 's  p r ic e  ( t a b l e s  7 .1 .2 ,  7 .1 .6  and 7 .1 .4 ) ,  from 
lags  4 , 5 and 6 i n  1976-78, the  response moves to lag  2 in  1979-81 
and lag s  2 and 3 in  1981-85. Thus when the  period  as a whole i s  
examined ( t a b l e  7 .1 .1 ,  p a r t  2) the  average lag  i s  found to  be 2.
S im i la r ly ,  f o r  Kuwait crude lag  6 is  rep laced  by lags  1 to  4 fo r
1979-81 and 1981-85 ( t a b l e s  7 .1 .3 ,  7 .1 .7  and 7 .1 .1 3 ) .  The same tren d  
was found f o r  I r a n ia n  and N igerian  l i g h t  and a lso  w ith  re fe re n c e  to 
t e  netbacks in  the  Middle E as t  and US markets.
From the  a p p ro p r ia te  sums of the  c o e f f i c i e n t s  c e r t a in
conclusions  can be drawn. As w ith  the previous r e l a t io n s h ip ,  the
hypo thesis  th a t  the  OPEC response to  changing product p r ic e s  i s
one-to-one i s  r e j e c te d  s in c e  the c o e f f i c i e n t s  add up to  f ig u re s  below 
one. However, d ivergences  between producers can a lso  be found.
Saudi A ra b ia 's  moderation becomes ev iden t s in ce  in  both the
d is e q u i l ib r iu m  periods  the  sum of c o e f f i c i e n t s  i s  approxim ately the 
same ( fo r  the  Rotterdam netback  0.723 in  1979-81 from ta b le  7 .1 .6 ,  
and 0.79 fo r  1981-83 from ta b le  7 .1 .1 4 ) .  This country d id  r e s i s t  
r i s i n g  spo t product p r ic e s  but a l so  f a l l i n g  spo t product p r i c e s ,  
p o ss ib ly  a f a c t  confirm ing i t s  a ttem pts  to  s t a b i l i s e  the  market and 
avoid wide p r ic e  swings.
In c o n t r a s t ,  I r a n ia n  l i g h t  responds d i f f e r e n t l y  w ith  a sum of
0.574 in  1979-81 ( t a b l e  7 .1 .5 )  and 0.226 in  1981-85 ( t a b l e  7 .1 .1 2 ) .  
This i s  an a n t i c ip a te d  response to changing netbacks s in ce  in  the 
d e c l in in g  market of 1981-85 i t  would be r a t i o n a l  to  expect h ig h e r  
r e s i s t a n c e  i . e  lower responsiveness  as compared w ith  a r i s i n g
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m arket. The same holds fo r  Kuwait crude fo r  which the sum of 0.845 
in  1979-81 ( t a b l e  7 .1 .7 )  i s  reduced to  0.598 in  1981-85 ( t a b l e  
7 .1 .13 )  and a lso  fo r  the  N iger ian  l i g h t .
In  a d d i t io n  the  p r ic in g  of the h eav ie r  crude as compared w ith  
th a t  of the  marker sugges ts  th a t  the  producers of Arab heavy a re  
qu icker  to  respond to  a change in  netbacks in  a t i g h t  market but 
slower to  respond when demand and hence product p r ic e s  are  f a l l i n g .  
Again we no te  th a t  our r e s u l t s  do not correspond to ,  o th e r  published  
s tu d ie s .
7 .1 .3  Spot crude o i l  p r ic e s  versus  netbacks
Turning to  the  feedback r e la t io n s h ip  between spot crude o i l  p r ic e s  
and n e tbacks ,  the  major conclusion  drawn from the lag  d i s t r i b u t io n s  
i s  th a t  most of the  e f f e c t  from e i t h e r  a demand or a supply s id e  
change in  the  subperiods i s  f e l t  w ith in  the  c u r re n t  month ( i . e .  lag  
0 ) .  Thus whether u s in g  Sim's re g re s s s io n s  or the cross  c o r r e l a t i o n  
fu n c t io n ,  in  the  m a jo r i ty  of cases examined the  r e l a t io n s h ip  i s  a t 
i t s  s trongest: a t  lag' 0. I t  would th e re fo re  seem th a t  in  the spot 
market ad justm ents  take  p lace  very qu ick ly .
N ev e r th e le ss ,  th e re  i s  some dynamic d i s t r i b u t i o n  of the e f f e c t  
over tim e, the g en era l  p a t t e r n  of th a t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  confirming the  
in t e r a c t i v e  na tu re  of the r e l a t i o n s h ip .
The lagged response of one s ide  to the o th e r  i s  longer fo r  the  
c r i s i s  period  1979-81, when a supply s ide  change lead ing  to  an 
in c re a se  in  spot p r ic e s  causes an immediate in c re a s e  in  product 
p r ic e s  in  the c u r re n t  month, as r e f in e r s  obviously  a ttem pt to pass on 
the  cos t  in c re a se  to  consumers. For example Rotterdam netbacks in
1979-81 would in c re a s e  fo r  up to  one month a f t e r  the crude p r ic e  
in c re a s e  f o r  I r a n ia n  l i g h t  as seen from ta b le  7 .1 .5  -  p a r t  4 and up 
to  two months fo r  A rabian L ight ( t a b l e  7 .1 .6 )  and N igerian  l i g h t  
( t a b l e  7 .1 .8 ) .
From then onwards nega t ive  lags  s e t  in ;  c l e a r l y ,  as product 
p r ic e s  a re  r a is e d  th e re  must be a demand response -  a d ec l in e  -  which 
leads  to reduced crude purchases ,  hence reduced spot crude p r ice s  and 
in  tu rn  product p r ic e s  and thus ne tbacks.
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For the  su rp lu s  per iod  1981-85 the lags  a re  q u i te  s h o r t .  The 
d a ta  on Arabian l i g h t  and Kuwait crude ( ta b l e s  7 .1 .1 3 ,  7 .1 .14 )
suggest th a t  th e re  i s  no lagged e f f e c t  from netbacks to spot crude 
p r i c e s .  So a f a l l  in  demand t r a n s l a t e d  in to  product p r ic e  weakness 
i s  immediately r e f l e c t e d  in  reduced crude purchases and thus a 
d e c l in in g  spo t p r ic e  -  no t s u r p r i s in g ly  given the  excess supply 
co n d i t io n  which in  a f r e e  market l i k e  the  spot market i s  always 
expected to  lead to  a f a l l i n g  p r ic e  which in  t h i s  case occurs very 
qu ick ly .  Under co n d i t io n s  of excess supply , th e r e f o r e ,  (spo t p r ic e s  
below o f f i c i a l )  s h i f t s  in  demand have no la g  but are immediately 
t r a n s l a t e d  in to  spo t crude o i l  p r i c e s .
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Table 7.1.1 Arabian Light 1976-1985
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
1. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS SPOT PRICE
C o e f f ic ie n t  
on lag  o f :
O f f i c i a l  on spot 
p a s t  only
O f f i c i a l  on spot 
w ith  fu tu re
Spot on o f f i c i a l
6 -0 .049 -0 .054 -0 .105
5 0.034 0.058 0.249
4 -0 .065 -0.107** 0.3
3 0.133* 0.178* 0.045
2 0.071 0.054 -0.049 _
1 -0.126* -0.146* -0 .31
0 -0.0002 0.041 -0 .273
-1 - -0.129* -0.411*
-2 - 0.048 0.282
-3 - -0 .004 0.587*
-4 - -0 .013 -0 .072
-5 - 0.09 0.005
-6 -0 .08 -0.133
Sura of
C o e f f ic ie n ts  -0 .003  -0 .063  0.115
2. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o e f f ic ie n t  
on lag  o f :
O f f i c i a l  on Netback 
p a s t  only
O f f ic ia l  on Netback 
w ith  fu tu re
Netback on 
O f f i c i a l
6 0.04 0.031 0.119
5 -0.056 -0 .0 8 0.216
4 -0.056 -0.062 0.488*
3 -0 .028 -0.049 0.044
2 0.154* 0.137* 0.108
1 0.007 0.000 -0.296
0 -0 .023 -0 .034 -0.136
-1 - -0 .013 0.058
-2 - 0.059 0.726*
-3 - 0.022 -0.047
-4 - 0.1 -0 .206
-5 - 0.03 -0.369*
-6 — 0.03 0.145
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n t s  0.038 0.053 0.85
* Denotes s ig n i f i c a n c e  a t  the  5% le v e l ;  ** a t  the  10% le v e l
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Table 7.1.1 Continued 1
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
3. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS US NETBACKS (1977 Jan -  1985 March)
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on Netback O f f i c i a l  on Netback Netback on
on lag  of: p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re O f f i c i a l
6 -0.077* -0.087* 0.187
5 -0 .018 -0 .015 -0 .006
4 -0.069* -0.077* 0.413*
3 -0 .003 -0.009 0.228
'  2 0.106* 0.11 -0 .149
1 -0.191* -0.201* -0 .262
0 -0 .034 -0 .035 -0.493*
-1 - -0 .031 -1.053*
-2 - 0.0003 0.733*
-3 - -0 .012 0.241
-4 - -0 ,03 -0 .179
-5 - 0.016 -0.009
-6 — 0.006 -0.575*
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts -0 .286 -0 .364 -0.924
4. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS MIDDLE EAST NETBACKS
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on Netback O f f i c i a l  on Netback Netback on
on lag  o f : p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re O f f i c i a l
6 0.069 0.085 0.042
5 -0.081 -0 .098 0.102
4 -0 .094 -0 .078 0.224
3 0.055 0.047 0.107
2 -0 .0 2 -0 .022 0.097
1 0.156* 0.147* -0.217
0 -0.184* -0.182* -0.402*
-1 - -0 .076 0.309*
-2 - 0.085 0.054
-3 - 0.034 0.17
-4 - 0.065 -0 .142
-5 - 0.077 -0 .214
-6 ““ 0.04 0.167
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts -0 .099 0.124 0.297
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Table 7.1.1 Continued 2
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
5. SPOT PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o e f f ic ­ Spot on Netback Spot on Netback Netback on Spot Netback on
ie n t  on p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re p a s t  only spot
la g  of: w ith  fu tu r e
6 0.142* 0.155* 0.0122 0.016
5 -0.226* -0 .219 0.0109 -0.011
4 0.117 0.127** -0 .114 -0 .092
3 0.1-43* 0.122** -0.248* -0.273*
2 -0 .042 0.009 0.016 0.000
1 -0 .095 -0 .063 0.187* 0.201*
0 0.612* 0.601* 0.663*
'
0.606*
-1 - - 0.173 -0 .092
-2 - 0.007 - -0 .016
-3 - -0.178* - 0.071
-4 - -0 .043 - 0.16*
-5 - -0 .065 - -0.158*
-6 — 0.065 — 0.109
Sum of *
C o e f f ic ie n t s  0.651 0.691 0.527 0.521
6. SPOT PRICES VERSUS US NETBACKS (1977 Jan -  1985 March)
C o e f f ic ­ Spot on Netback Spot on Netback Netback on Netback on
ie n t  on p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re spot spot
la g  of: p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re
6 -0 .045 -0 .056 0.281* 0,298*
5 0.084 0.037 -0.196** -0.191
4 0.067 0.112* 0.094 0.021
3 -0.005 0.003 -0 .154 -0 .073
2 0.077 0.003 -0.493* -0.56*
1 -0 .035 -0 .012 0.081 0.094
0 0.462* 0.454* 0.684* 0.741*
-1 - 0.004 - -0 .084
-2 - -0 .217* - 0.257*
-3 - -0 .062 - -0 .11
-4 - -0 .202 - -0 .016
-5 - -0 .078 - 0.168
-6 0.081 — -0.111
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n t s  0.605 0.471 0.297 0.434
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Table 7.1.1 Continued 3
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
7. SPOT PRICE VERSUS MIDDLE EAST NETBACKS
C o e ff ic ­
i e n t  on 
la g  o f :
Spot on Netback Spot on Netback Netback on 
p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re  p a s t  only
.Netback on 
Spot 
w ith fu tu r e
6 0.186 0.169 0.031 0.034
5 -0 ,284 -0 .227 . -0 .027 -0 .044
4 -0 .034 -0 .132 -0 .084 -0 .039
3 0.097 0.132 -0.107 -0.158*
2 -0 .248 -0 ,173 -0 .157 -0.133*
1 -0 .047 0.01 0.293 0.299*
0 0.498 . 0.487 0.234 0.182*
-1 - 0.512 - 0.051
-2 - -0 .201 - 0.126**
-3 - -0.181 - 0.029
-4 - -0 .073 - 0.042
-5 - -0 .022 - -0 .114
-6 -0 .031 — 0.115**
Sum of 
C o e f f ic ie n t s  0.168 0.27 0.183 0.138
0
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Table 7.1.2 Arabian Light 1976-1978
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
1. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS SPOT PRICE
C o e f f ic ie n t  
on lag  o f :
O f f i c i a l  on spot 
p a s t  only
O f f i c i a l  on 
spot w ith  fu tu r e
Spot on o f f i c i a l
6 -0.322** -0.505* -0 .318
5 0.594* 0.83* -0 .152
4 -0 .087 -0.000 -0 .144
3 0.043 -0 .173 -0 .163
2 -0 .076 0.241 0.126
1 -0.109 -0 .136 0.174
0 -0 .039 -0 .413 0.253
-1 - 0.79* -0.082
-2 - -0 .10 -0 .171
-3 - -0 .03 0.13
-4 - -0 .106 0.012
-5 - -0 .09 0.316
-6 — -0.032 -0 .552
Sum of 
C o e f f ic ie n t s -0 .004 0.276 -0.571
2. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on Netback O f f ic ia l  on Netback Netback on
on la g  o f : p a s t  only with fu tu re O f f ic ia l
6 0.043 0.077* 0.144
5 0.214* 0.253* 0.222
4 -0.204* -0.216* -0 .082
3 0.126 0.13* -0 .382  •
2 -0 .127 -0.078* 0.579
1 0.027 0.028 0.856*
0 0.011 0.105* -0 .09
-1 - 0.216* -0 .14
-2 - -0.206* -0 .179
-3 - 0.054 0.233
-4 - -0.114* -0.241
-5 - -0 .009 0.432
-6 -0.011 1.892*
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts 0.09 0.229 2.086
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Table 7.1.2 Continued 1
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
3, OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS MIDDLE EAST NETBACKS
C o e f f ic ie n t  
on lag  o f :
O f f i c i a l  on Netback 
p a s t  only
O f f i c i a l  on Netback 
w ith  fu tu re
Netback on 
O f f i c i a l
6 0.37* -0 .162 0.192
5 0.272 -0.345 -0 .116
4 -0 .069 -0.113 0.06
3 0.067 -0.37 -0 .12
2 0.262 0.184 0.264
1 -0.011 0.13 -0 .261
0 -0 .184 -0.141 -0 .184
-1 - 0.602 -
-2 - -0 .426 -
-3 - 1.733 -
-4 - -0 .43 -
-5 - 0.22 -
-6 -0 .35 —
Sum of 
C o e f f ic ie n ts -0 .707 0.53 * -0 .06
4. SPOT jffiCE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o eff ic ­
i e n t  on 
la g  of:
Spot on Netback 
p a s t  only
Spot on Netback 
w ith  fu tu re
Netback on spot 
p a s t  only
Netback on 
Spot 
w ith  fu tu re
6 0.036 -0 .024 1.16* 0.268
5 -0.051 -0 .03 0.514 - 0.751*
4 -0 .025 -0 .078 0.418 0.414
3 -0.141 -0 .0 9 1.668* 0.451
2 0.129 0.049 0.196 1.188*
1 -0 .005 0.118 -0.511* -1.01*
0 0.262* 0.142** 2.55* 0.648
-1 - -0 .113 - 1.718*
-2 - 0.145 - -0 .108
-3 - 0.013 - -0 .458
-4 - 0.157* - -0 .003
-5 - 0.001 - -0 .245
-6 0.034 — 0.138
Sum of 
C o e f f ic ie n t s  0.205 0.324 5.99 4.44
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Table 7.1.2 Continued
5. SPOT PRICE VERSUS MIDDLE EAST NETBACKS
C o e f f ic ie n t  
on lag  o f :
Spot on Netback 
p a s t  only
Netback on Spot 
p a s t  only
6 0.113 0.242
5 -0 ,203 0.296
4 -0 .238 -0 .092
3 0.153 0.742*
2 -0.038 -0 .199
1 0.065 0.062
0 0.963* 0.684*
Sum of 
C o e f f ic ie n t s 0.815 1.735
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Table 7.1.1 Kuwait Export Crude 1976-1978
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
1. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS SPOT PRICE
C o e f f ic ie n t  
on lag  of:
O f f i c i a l  on Spot 
p a s t  only
O f f i c i a l  on Spot 
w ith  fu tu re
Spot on o f f i c i a l
6 0.081 0.251* -0 .000
5 0.066 -0 .092 . -0 .069
4 0.168 0.07 0.166
3 0.262 0.012 -0 .078
2 -0 .056 0.107 -0.011
1 0.031 0.043 0.704*
0 0.029 0.181 0.010
-1 - 1.24* 0.025
-2 - -0 .05 -0 .062
-3 - -0 .0 4 0.139*
-4 - 0.06 0.07
-5 - -0,22* 0.06
-6 — -0.003 0.015
Sum of 
C o e f f ic ie n t s 0.581 1.559 0.87
2. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o e f f ic ie n t  
on la g  o f :
O f f i c i a l  on Netback 
p a s t  only
O f f i c i a l  on Netback 
w ith  fu tu r e
Netback on 
O f f i c i a l  
w ith  fu tu re
6 -0 .079 -0 .044 0.134
5 -0 .047 -0 .086 -0.047
4 -0.031 0.02 -0 .083
3 0.04 0.022 0.05
2 -0.055 0.05 -0.84*
1 0.034 0.152 0.633*
0 0.064 0.305* 0.761*
-1 - 0.385* 0.063
-2 - -0.287* -0.225
-3 - 0.133 0.131
-4 - -0 .143 -0 .062
-5 - 0.063 -0 .122
-6 — -0.004 -0 .245
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts  -0 .074 0.566 0.148
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Table 7.1.3 Continued 1
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
3. SPOT PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o eff ic ­ Spot on Netbaclc Spot on Netback Netback on Spot Netback
ie n t  on p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re p a s t  only on Spot
la g  o f : w ith  fu tu re
6 -0.151* -0.214* 1.01 0.439
5 0.027 0.065 0.084 0.245
4 -0 .063 -0 .115 -0 .312 -0 .099
3 -0.057 0.008 0.197 -0 .073
2 -0.0008 -0.007 -0 .26 -0 .175
1 0.142* 0.177* -1.18* -0.908*
0 0.196* 0.262* 2.23* 0.86*
-1 - -0.251* - 1.05
-2 - 0.086 - 0.0007
-3 - -0 .114 - -0 .085
-4 - 0.077 - 0.001
-5 - -0 .001 - -0.157
-6 — 0.011 — -0.218
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n t s  0.093 -0 .016 1.77 0.88
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Table 7.1.4 Nigerian Light 1976-1978
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
1. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS SPOT PRICE
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on Spot O f f i c i a l  on Spot Spot on o f f i c i a l
on lag  o f : p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re
6 -0 .067 0.021 -0 .085
5 0.444** 0.633* -0.241**
4 -0 .084 -0 .092 -0.136
3 0.224 0.222 0.128
2 0.01 0.275 0.18
1 -0.035 0.136 0.473*
0 0,007 -0 .039 0.007
-1 - 0.797* -0 .153
-2 - 0.317 -0 .038
-3 - 0.454 0.037
-4 - -0 .273 -0.014
-5 - -0 .028 0.261*
-6 — 0.199 -0 .119
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts 0.499 2.622 0.3
2. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
•
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on Netback O f f i c i a l  on Netback Netback on
on lag  o f : p a s t  only w ith  fu tu r e O f f ic ia l
6 -0 .0 5 -0 .057 -0 .27
5 0.097 0.256** 0.076
4 -0 .104 0.233 -0.057
3 0.143 0.151 -0 .173
2 -0 .17 -0.026 -0.452*
1 0.033 -0.05* 0.568*
0 0.034 0.431* 0.875*
-1 - 0.382* -0.169
-2 - -0.291 -0.342*
-3 - 0.261 0.018
-4 - -0 .228 0.003
-5 - 0.057 0.066
-6 — -0.083** -0 .21
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts -0 .01 0.57 -0 .067
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Table 7.1.4 Continued 1
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
3. SPOT PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o eff ic ­
i e n t  on 
la g  o f:
Spot on Netback 
p a s t  only
Spot on Netback 
w ith  fu tu re
Netback on spot Netback on 
p a s t  only Spot 
only w ith  fu tu re
6 0.078 0.107 -0 .279 -0 .59
5 -0 .116 -0 .218 0.352 0.166 .
4 -0 .124 -0.146 0.331 0.069
3 -0 .035 0.074 0.429 0.106
2 0.021 0.006 -0 .034 0.203
1 0.057** 0.285** -0 .3 -0 .275
0 0.109* .0 .1 8 3 2.53* 0.316
-1 - -0 .109 - 0.8*
-2 - -0.001 - 0.374
-3 - -0 .083 - 0.108
-4 - -0 .045 - -0 .458
-5 - 0.002 - -0 .046
-6 . 0.034 — 0.426
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts  -0 .01  
4
0.089 3.029 1.73
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Table 7.1.5 Iranian Light 1979-1981
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
1. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS SPOT PRICE
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on spot O f f i c i a l  on spo t Spot on o f f i c i a l
on lag  o f : p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re
6 0.063 -0 .185 -0 .043
5 -0 .096 -0.536** -0 .286
4 0.279* 0.265 -0 .112
3 0.189** 0.277** -0 .167
2 . -0 .019 0.017 0.315
1 0.013 -0 .174 0.385
0 -0 .166 -0.407** -0.834*
-1 - -0 .238 0.67
-2 - -0.643* -0 .43
-3 - -0.515* -0 .463
-4 - -0.636* 2.041*
-5 - -0 .67* -0 .315
-6 0.11 -0 .773
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n t s 0.263 -3 .33 -0 .012
2. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on Netback O f f i c i a l  on Netback Netback on
la g  o f : p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re o f f i c i a l
6 -0 .27 -0.131 -0 .095
5 -0 .176 -0 .49 -0 .534
4 0.139 -0.259 0.413
3 0.158 0.123 -0 .488
2 0.268** 0.478 0.488
1 0.051 -0 .198 0.041
0 0.161 0.28 -0 .728
-1 - -0 .276 1.48
-2 - 0.177 -0 .81
-3 - -0 .594 -0 .573
-4 - -0 .361 2.56
-5 - -0.649** -0.577
-6 — 0.164 -0 .578
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts 0.574 -1 .736 0.599
Note: * Denotes significance at the 5% level,
** at the 10% level
3. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS US NETBACKS
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Table 7.1.5 - continued
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on N et- O f f i c i a l  on N et- Netback on
on lag  o f : back -  p a s t  only back w ith  fu tu re o f f i c i a l
6 -0 .055 -0 .043 -0 .086
5 -0 .038 -0.066 -0 .425*
4 0.045 -0.115 0.422
3 0.237* 0.288* -0.069
2 0.096 -0.071 0.585*
1 -0 .0 3 -0.027 -0 .1 4
0 0.118 -0.207 -0 .87*
-1 - -0 .216 1.401*
-2 - -0 .419 -0 .652
-3 - -0 .385 0.4
-4 - -0 .292 1.911*
-5 - -1.151* -0 .349
-6 — -0.166 0.454
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n t s 0.373 -2 .87 2.582
4. SPOT PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o e f f ic -  
i  ent on 
lag  o f :
Spot on N et-  
back 
p a s t  only
Spot on N et-  
back 
w ith  fu tu re
Netback on 
spot 
p a s t  only
Netback on 
spo t 
'w i th  fu tu re
6 -0 .012 -0 .203 0.05 0.031
5 0.208** 0.031 -0 .07 -0.035
4 -0 .053 -0 .258 0.06** 0.134
3 -0 .023 0.189 0.19** 0.019
2 -0 .196 -0 .005 -0 .003 -0 .396
1 -0.081 0.274 0.357* 0.366
0 0.552* 0.67* 0.6* 0.439**
-1 - 0.741* - -0.127
-2 - -0 .128 - -0 .2 5
-3 - 0.138 - 0.056
-4 - -0 .105 - -0 .125
-5 - - 0,018 - 0.066
-6 — 0.121 — 0.129
Sum of 
C o e f f ic ie n t s  0.395 1.483 1.184 0.307
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Table 7.1.5 Continued
5. SPOT PRICE VERSUS US NETBACKS
C o eff ic ­
i e n t  on 
la g  of:
Spot on Netback 
p a s t  only
Spot on Netback Netback on 
w ith  fu tu re  spo t p a s t
only
Netback on 
Spot w ith  
f u tu r e
6 0.072 -0.113 0.139 0.318*
5 0.243* 0.062 0.166 0.35*
4 -0 .068 . -0 .26 0.076 0.157
3 • 0.066 -0.127 0.266 0.132
2 0.006 0.084 0.296 0.168
1 -0 .022 0.031 0.492 0.615*
0 0.115** 0.4 0.663 0.95*
-1 - - 0.407 - -0 .082
-2 - 0.26 - 0.701*
-3 - 0.231 - 0.34
-4 - -0 .174 - 0.598*
-5 - 0.106 - 0.304
-6 — -0 .692 — 0.533*
Sum of 
C o e f f ic ie n ts  0.412 0.215 2.098 5.084
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Table 7.1.6 Arabian Light 1979-1981
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
1. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS SPOT PRICE
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on spot O f f i c i a l  on spot Spot on o f f i c i a l
on lag  o f : p a s t  only w ith fu tu re
6 0.0006 -0.183 -1 .09*
5 0.061 -0.056 0.188
4 -0 .055 -0.156 -0 .479
3 0.3* 0.36* -0.069
2 0.137 0.252 -0 .008
1 -0 .084 -0 .202 0.489
0 0.042 -0w 12 -0 .195
-1 - 0.029 0.499
-2 - -0.217 -0 .401
-3 - -0.337 1.742*
-4 - -0 .324 '-0 .784
-5 - -0 .08 1.046**
-6 -0 .184 0.193
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n t s 0.401 . -1 .218 1.131
2. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS "
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on N et- O f f i c i a l  on N et- Netback on
la g  of: back -  p a s t  only back -  w ith fu tu re o f f i c i a l
6 0.152 0.264 -0.208
5 0.085 0.46 0.186
4 0.026 0.303 0.407
3 0.093 0.409 -0.236
2 0.421* 0.752 -0.191
1 0.095 0.284 -0.058
0 -0 .149 0.09 -0 .583
-1 - -0.025 0.152
-2 - 0.336 0.591
-3 - -0 .214 0.442
-4 - 0.482 -0 .395
-5 - -0 .03 0.193
-6 — 0.245 -0 .174
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts 0.723 3.35 0.126
Note: * denotes significance at the 5% level,
** at the 10% level
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Table 7 .1 .6  -  continued
3. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS MIDDLE EAST NETBACKS
C o e f f ic ie n t  
on lag  o f :
O f f i c i a l  on Netback 
p a s t  only
O f f i c i a l  on Netback Netback on 
with fu tu r e  o f f i c i a l
6 0.113 0.247 -0 .2 4
5 -0 .0 5 -0 .235 -0 .183
4 0.184 -0 .512 -0 .083
3 0.109 -0.313 -0 .0 5  .
2 0.353* 0.353 0.142
1 0.202 0.042 -0 .055
0 -0 .19 -0.506 -0 .364
- I - -0 .058 0.137
-2 - 0.11 0.64
-3 - -0 .4 -0 .162
-4 - -0 .67 0.514
-5 - -0 .57 -0 .358
-6 — 0.24 0.269
Sum of 
C o e f f ic ie n ts 0.721 -2 .272 0.207
4. SPOT PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o eff ic ­ Spot on N e t- Spot on Net- Netback on Netback on
i e n t  on back back spot spo t
la g  of: p as t  only w ith  fu tu re p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re
6 0.195 0.025 -0.071 -0.059
5 0.023 0.03 -0.253* -0 .175
4 0.789* 0.13 -0 .072 -0 .085
3 -0.161 -0.809** -0.113 -0 .077
2 0.42** -0.041 0.014 0.107
1 -0.331 -0.761** 0.4* 0.417
0 0.965* 0.601 0.456* 0.489**
-1 - -0.789* - 0.089
-2 - 0.13 - -0-.064
-3 - -0.672** - 0.168
-4 - 0.057 - 0.132
-5 - -0.688** - 0.181
-6 — -0.913** — 0.072
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n t s 1.9 -3 .7 0.361 1.195
- 240 -
Table 7.1.6 - continued
5. SPOT PRICE VERSUS MIDDLE EAST NETBACKS
C o eff ic ­
i e n t  on 
la g  o f :
Spot on N et-  
back 
p a s t  only
Spot on N et- 
back 
w ith  fu tu re
Netback on 
spot 
p a s t  only
Netback on 
spot 
w ith  fu tu r e
6 0.466* 0.27 -0 .084 -0 .155
■5 -0 .06 -0 .6 9 -0 .003 0.004
4 0.108 0.49 -0 .009 -0 .169
3 0.326 1.1 -0 .0 4 -0 .034
2 0.001 0.416 -0.286* -0.021
1 0.691* 0.809 0.309* 0.297
0 0.379 0.862 0.276* 0.348**
-1 - 0.67 - 0.301
-2 - -0 .18 - -0 .21
-3 - -0 .29 - 0.331
-4 - -0 .059 - -0 .179
-5 - 1.09 - -0 .268
-6 — -0 .04 — 0.402**
Sum of 
C o e f f ic ie n ts  1.911 4.448 0.163 0.647
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Table 7.1.7 Kuwait Export Crude, 1979-1981
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
1. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS SPOT PRICE
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on spo t O f f i c i a l  on spot Spot on o f f i c i a l
on lag of: p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re
6 -0 .0 8 -0 .055 -1 .4 *
5 0.012 -0 .039 -1 .13*
4 0.116 0.11 -1.655*
3 0.026 0.009 -1.04*
2 0.047 0.167 -2 .06*
1 0.284** 0.342** -0.277
0 -0 .089 -0 .099 -0.691
-1 - 0.142 0.634**
-2 - -0 .296 0,889*
-3 - 0.251 0.269
-4 - -0 .124 -0 .261
-5 - 0.075 -0 .4 2
-6 0.334 -2.1-7*
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n t s 0.316 0.817 -9.312
2. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
*
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on N et- ‘ O f f i c i a l  on N et- Netback on
lag  o f : back -  pas t  only back -  w ith  fu tu re o f f i c i a l
6 -0 .017 0.061 0.022
5 -0 .022 0.196 0.215
4 0.195** 0.502 -0 .5
3 -0.007 -0 .242 -0 .174
2 0.12 0.215 -0.169
1 0.387** 0.208 -0 .734
0 0.189 0.105 0.128
-1 - -0 .466 0.287
-2 - -0.146 0.38
-3 - 0.365 0,326
-4 - 0.109 0.505
-5 - 0.663 0.21
-6 — -0.244 0.19
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n t s 0.845 1.326 0.686
Note: * denotes significance at the 5% level,
** at the 10% level
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Table 7.1.7 continued
3. SPOT PRICES VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o eff ic ­ Spot on N et- Spot on N et- Netback on Netback on
i e n t  on back back spot spo t
la g  of: p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re p a s t  only w ith  fu tu r e
6 0.052 -0.558* -0.026 0.265*
5 0.163 0.191 -0 .061 -0 .22*
4 -0 .058 0.474 0.025 0.119
3 -0 .2 2 -0 .46 0.08 -0.248*
2 -0 .015 0.414 -0 .065 0.142
1 0.492* 0.706* -0 .011 -0 ,017
0 0.879* 1.31* 0.552* 0.152
-1 - '0 .0 1 8 - 0.631*
-2 - 0.208 - -0 .63*
-3 - -0 .505 - 0.548*
-4 - 0.699* - -0.508*
-5 - 0.146 - 0.145
-6 — -0 .157 — -0.36*
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n t s  1.293 2.486 0.494 0.019
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Table 7.1.8 Nigerian Light 1979-1981
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
1. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS SPOT PRICE
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on spot O f f i c i a l  on spot Spot on o f f i c i a l
on lag  o f : p a s t  only w ith fu tu re
9 -0.427* -0.67* -
8 0.698* 0.661* -
7 -0 .04 0.053** -
6 0.167** 0.464* 0.211
5 0.147 0.141* -0.167
4 -0.081 -0 .066 0.037
3 0.615* 0.708* -0.186
2 -0 .102 0.322 -0 .194
1 0.076 0.015 -0.509*
0 0.192 0.205 0.016
-1 - 0.176* 0.019
-2 - 0.315* 0.531*
-3 - 0.157* 0.427
-4 — -0.045 0.209
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts 1.245 2.436 0.394
2. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACK
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on N et- O f f i c i a l  on N et- Netback on
lag  of: back -  p a s t  only back -  w ith  fu tu re o f f i c i a l
12 -0 .215* -0.633 -
11 0.02 - -
10 0.27** 0.031 -
9 -0.417* -0.071 -
8 0.037 - -
7 -0 .221 - -
6 0.109 0.169 0.057
5 -0.346** -0.267 0.045
4 -0 .29 -0.005 -0 .15
3 0.5* 0.03 -0 .254
2 -0.199 -0 .03 -0 .207
1 0.125 -0 .06 -0.459*
0 0.07 0.067 -0 .0 1
-1 - -0.527* 0.277**
-2 - -0 .24 0.147
-3 - -0 .93* 0.211
-4 — 0.416* -0.004
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts -0 .557 -2 .05 -0.347
Note: * denotes s ig n i f i c a n c e  a t  the 5% le v e l ,
** a t  the 10% le v e l
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Table 7.1.8 - continued
3. SPOT PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o eff ic ­ Spot on N et- Spot on N et- Netback on Netback on
i e n t  on back back spot spot
la g  o f : p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re
6 0.29* 0.018 -0.196* -0 .28*
5 -0 .27 -0 .138 -0,0004 -0 .007
4 0.781* 1.00* -0.167* -0 .134
3 -0 .416 -0 .25 -0 .055 0.091
2 0.111 0.409 0.019 -0 .0 9
1 -0 .105 0.01 0.246* 0.248
0 0.973* 1.54* 0.519* 0.501*
-1 - -0 .157 - 0.1
-2 - 0.427 - -0.218*
-3 - -0 .47 - -0.331
-4 — -0.584** — 0.197
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n t s  1.364 2.973 0.365 0.077
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Table 7.1.9 Arabian Light 1981-1983
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
1, OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS SPOT PRICE
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on spot O f f i c i a l  on spo t Spot on o f f i c i a l
on lag  of: p a s t  only w ith fu tu re
6 0.014
5 0.013 -0.331 0.226
4 0.009 -0.155* 0.145
3 0.008 -0 .082 0.189
2 0.005 -0.22* -1 .99*
1 -0 .003 -0.452* 0.424
0 -0.007 -0.368* -0.071
-1 - 0.321* 0.328
-2 0.854* 6.74
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n t s 0.039 -0.433 5.991
2. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on N et- O f f i c i a l  on N et- Netback on
la g  of: back -  p a s t  only back -  w ith  fu tu re o f f i c i a l
6 0.005
5 -0 .004 -0.563** 0.501
4 -0.0002 -0.053 0.356
3 -0.006 -0.211 -0 .4 2
2 -0.011 0.046 -1 .19
1 -0 .007 -0.371 0.165
0 -0 .012 -0.655* -0.08
-1 - 0.013 0.14
-2 “ -1.097* 2.78
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts -0 .035 -2.891 2.252
Note: * denotes s ig n i f i c a n c e  a t  the  5% le v e l ,  
** a t  the  10% le v e l
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Table 7.1.9 - Continued
3. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS US NETBACKS
C o e f f ic ie n t  
on lag  o f :
O f f i c i a l  on spot 
p a s t  only
O f f ic ia l  on spot 
w ith  fu tu re
Spot on o f f i c i a l
6 -0 .0 3 - _
5 -0.0065 0,027 0.4
4 -0 .006 -0.163 1.79*
3 -0 .01 -0 .078 0.031
2 -0.009 -0.008 -0 .5 2
1 -0.007 -0 .143 0.41
0 -0 .008 -0.019 0.342
-1 - 0.018 0.07
-2 -0 .173 —
Sum of 
C o e f f ic ie n t s -0 .076 -0 .539 2.523
4. SPOT RPICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o e ff ic ­ Spot on N et- Spot on N et- Netback on Netback on
i e n t  on back back spot spot
la g  o f : p as t  only w ith  fu tu re p a s t  only w ith  fu tu r e
6 -0 .278 ' - 0.071 " —
5 0.003 -0 .27 -0 .174 0.024
4 0.257 -0 .3 4 0.015 0.126
3 -0 .293 -0 .205 -0 .09 -0 .155
2 0.446* 0.359 -0.181 -0.159
1 -0 .232 -0.921* 0.191 0.293
0 0.898* 0.968* 0.822* 0.718*
-1 - -0 .093 - -0 .019
-2 -0 .574 — 0.035
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n t s  0.801 -1 .076 0.654 0.863
5. SPOT PRICE VERSUS US NETBACKS
C o eff ic ­ Spot on N et- Spot on N et- Netback on Netback on
ie n t  on back back spot spot
la g  o f: p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re p a s t  only w ith  f u tu r e
6 0.17 _ -0 .199 —
5 0.321 0.143 0.256 0.46*
4 0.119 0.005 -0 .085 0.055
3 0.416 0.26 -0 .086 0.054
2 0.061 0.134 -0 .555 -0.376**
1 0.213 0.13 0.181 0.362
0 0.551* 0.475* 0.451 0.56*
-1 - 0.192 - 0.252
-2 — -0.559* — 0.243
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n t s  1.851 0.78 -0 .137 1.61
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Table 7.1.10 Nigeria Light 1981-1983
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
1. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS SPOT PRICE
C o e f f ic ie n t  
on lag  o f :
O f f i c i a l  on spo t 
p a s t  only
O f f ic ia l  on spot 
w ith  fu tu re
Spot on o f f i c i a l
6 -0 .323 -0 .052 0.33
5 0.508** 0.123** -1 .16*
4 -0 .108 -0 .04 0.8
3 0.735* 0.'047 1.92*
2 -0 .045 0.055 0.188
1 0.791* -0.075 -5 .99*
0 0.042 0,027 1.34
-1 - -0 .085 1.99
-2 - -0 .064 6.75*
-3 — 0.137* 0.403*
Sum of 
C o e f f ic ie n ts 1.6 0.073 6.57
2. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o e f f ic ie n t  
la g  o f :
O f f i c i a l  on N et-  
back -  p a s t  only
O f f ic ia l  on N et-  
back -  w ith fu tu re
Netback on 
o f f i c i a l
6 -0 .149 -0 .069 * -0 .95
5 -0 .023 0.23 -2 .6 *
4 0.481** -0.016 1.24
3 0.267 0.117 1.99*
2 0.282 0.325* -1 .6 3
1 0.659* -0.122 -6.91*
0 -0 .074 0.238** 5.67*
-1 - -0 .037 7.18*
-2 - -0.017 10.05*
-3 — 0.065 0.36**
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts 1.443 0.714 30.17
Note: * denotes s ig n i f i c a n c e  a t  the  5% le v e l ,  
** a t  the 10% le v e l
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Table 7 .1 .10  -  continued
3. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS US NETBACKS
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on N et- O f f i c i a l  on N et- Netback on
on lag  o f : back -  p a s t  only back w ith  fu tu r e o f f i c i a l
6 0.024 0.094 1.12**
5 0.221 0.103 -0 .312
4 0.43 0.04 0.943
3 0.428 0.043 2.09*
2 0.47 0.019 1.09
1 0.046 -0 .083 -4 .01**
0 0.295 -0.007 -0 .204
-1 - -0 .0 2 -1 .41
-2 - -0 .014 2.89
-3 — 0.209* 0.36
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts 1.914 0.384 2.55
4. SPOT PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o eff ic ­ Spot on N et- Spot on N et- Netback on Netback on
ie n t  on back back spot spot
lag  of: pas t  only w ith  fu tu re p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re
6 0.205 0.086 0.018 -0 .245
5 -0 .1 3 0.26 0.044 0.514**
4 -0.279 -0.727* 0.354** -0 .019
3 0.084 0.259 -0 .029 0.497
2 -0.433** -0 .23 0.23 -0 .279
1 0.09 -0 .158 0.099 0.877**
0 0.701* 1.156* 1.089* 0.515*
-1 - 0.064 - 0.348
-2 - 0.16 - -0 .114
-3 — -0.20 — 0.055
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n t s  0.238 0.67 1.805 2.149
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Table 7,1.10 - continued
5. SPOT PRICE VERSUS US NETBACKS
C o eff ic ­ Spot on N et- Spot on N et- Netback on Netback on
ie n t  on back back spot spot
la g  of: p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re p a s t  only w ith  fu tu r e
6 -0.041 -0.198* -0 .116 0.188
5 0.115 -0 .023 0.257 -0 .096
4 0.066 0.027 -0 .381 0.041
3 0.133 0.002 0.267 - -0 .09
2 -0 .134 -0.186* -0 .4** 0.096
1 0.347 0.214* 0.236 -0 .274
0 0.668* 0.791* 0.521* 1.017
-1 - -0 .042 - 0.066
-2 - -0.415* - 0.104
-3 — -0.006 — 0.25
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts  1.154 0.164 0.384 1.302
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Table 7.1.11 Arabian Light 1983-1985
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
1. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS SPOT PRICE
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on spot O f f i c i a l  on spo t Spot on o f f i c i a l
on lag  o f : p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re
8 0.669*
7 0.337** - -
6 0.005 - 0.047
5 -0 .136 -0.272 0 .0
4 0.233 0.392 0.0
3 -0 .162 -0 .322 -0.217
2 0.36 0.289 -0 .255
1 -0.43** -0.317 0.139
0 -0 .09 0.298 -
-1 - -0 .305 -
-2 - 0.317 -
-3 -0 .179
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts 0.786 -0.099 -0 .286
2. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on N et- O f f i c i a l  on N et- Netback on
la g  o f : back -  p a s t  only back -  w ith fu tu r e o f f i c i a l
8 0.299*
7 0.193 - -
6 0.045 - 0.3*
5 0.133 -0.026 -
4 0.131 0.008 -
3 0.001 -0.0039 -1 .77*
2 0.08 -0.019 1.94*
1 0.01 0.022 0.44
0 -0 .13 -0.068 -1 .18*
-1 - 0.094 -
-2 - -0 .095 -
-3 — 0.046 —
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts 0.762 -0.041 -0 .27
Note: * denotes significance at the 5% level,
** at the 10% level
Table 7.1.11 - continued
3. SPOT PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACK
C o eff ic ­ Spot on N et- Spot on N et- Netback on Netback on
i e n t  on back back spot spo t
la g  of: p as t  only w ith  fu tu re p a s t  only w ith  fu tu r e
6 0.02 - -0 .565 —
5 0.03 0.047 0.465 -0 .8 5
4 -0 .055 -0 .163 -0 .238 0.095
3 -0.209** -0.288* 1.53* 1.89
2 -0.0004 -0 .016 -0 .1 5 0.14
1 -0.038 -0.048 1.3* 0.698
0 0.056 0.221** 0.504 0.732
-1 - -0 .017 - 0.41
-2 - -0 .022 - -0 .328
-3 - 0.398* — 0.35
Sum of
C o e f f i c i e n t s - 0 .196 0.112 2.846 3.137
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Table 7*1.12 Iranian Light 1981-1985
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
1. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS SPOT PRICE
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on spot O f f i c i a l  on spot Spot on o f f i c i a l
on lag  o f : p a s t  only w ith fu tu re
6 -0 .103 -0 .102 -0.311
5 -0 .078 -0 .072 0.39
4 -0 .029 -0 .054 0.656**
3 -0.031 -0.027 0.121
2 0.092 0.073 0.234
1 0.182* 0.144** -0 .558
0 0.14* 0.145 0.412
-1 - 0.001 0.802*
-2 - 0.062 0.664**
-3 - -0 .032  . -0 .033
-4 - 0.078 0.27
-5 - 0.059 0.285
-6 -0 .114 -0.011
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts 0.173 0.161 2.921
2. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS MIDDLE EAST NETBACKS
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on N et- O f f i c i a l  on N et- Netback on
lag  o f : back -  p a s t  only back -  w ith  fu tu re “o f f i c i a l
6 -0 .023 - -0 .028 -0.156
5 -0.107 -0.11 -0 .2 8
4 -0.102 -0 .072 -0 .167
3 -0 .086 -0 .109 0.055
2 0.185 0.187 -0 .124
1 0.401* 0.391* -0 .037
0 -0 .042 -0.034 -0 .128
-1 - 0.063 0.345*
-2 - -0 .04 0.147
-3 - -0 .001 -0 .143
-4 - -0 .003 -0 .039
-5 - -0 .137 -0 .246
-6 — 0.07 0,01
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts 0.226 0.177 -0 .763
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Table 7 .1 .12  -  continued 
3. SPOT PRICE VERSUS MIDDLE EAST NETBACKS
C o e f f ic ­
i e n t  on 
lag  of:
Spot on N et-  
back 
p a s t  only
Spot on N et- 
back 
w ith  fu tu re
Netback on 
spot 
p a s t  only
Netback on 
spot 
w ith  fu tu re
6 -0 .101 -0 .002 0.03 0.039
5 0.643* 0.818* -0 .0 2 -0 .086
4 -0.259 -0 .2 2 0.05 0.052
3 -0.524** -0.534 -0 .036 -0 .01
2 -0.641* -0 .52 -0 .039 0.03
1 0.764* 1.01* 0.137** 0.154**
0 -0 .046 0.033 0.043 0.024
-1 - * 0.667* - 0.176*
-2 - -0 .226 - -0 .134
-3 - -0 .282 - -0 .085
-4 - 0.151 - -0 .053
-5 - 0.223 - 0.092
-6 0.234 — 0.039
Sum of 
C o e f f ic ie n t s  -0 .164 1.352 0.165 0.238
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Table 7.1.13 Kuwait Export Crude, 1981-1985
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
1. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS SPOT PRICE
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on spo t O f f i c i a l  on spot Spot on o f f i c i a l
on lag  o f : p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re
6 -0.365* -0.465* -0 .03
5 -0 .002 0.055 0.054
4 0.157 0,109 0.012
3 -0 .065 -0 .1 3 0.295* .
2 -0 .031 0.003 0.117
1 0.36* 0.384** 0.083
0 0.331* 0.266 0.167
-1 - 0.005 0.316*
-2 - 0.249 0.042
-3 - 0.059 -0 .028
-4 - -0 .038 0.097
-5 - 0.093 -0 .029
-6 0.249 -0.287**
Sum of >
C o e f f ic ie n t s 0.385 0.839 0.809
2. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on N et- O f f i c i a l  on N et- Netback on
. lag  of: back -  p a s t  only back -  w ith  fu tu r e o f f i c i a l
6 -0 .322 -0.293* 0.15
5 -0 .115 -0 .25 -0.203**
4 0.287 0.358* 0.112
3 -0 .036 -0.111 0.058
2 0.243 0.271* 0.081
1 0.533 0.575* 0.083
0 0.008 -0.031 0.002
-1 - 0.147 0.512*
-2 - 0.115 0.211
-3 - -0 .155 -0 .027
-4 - 0.071 0.257*
-5 - -0 .158 -0 .076
-6 — 0.397* -0 .272
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n ts 0.598 0.936 0.888
Note: * denotes significance at the 5% level,
** at the 10% level
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Table 7,1.13 - continued
3. SPOT PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o eff ic ­
i e n t  on 
la g  of:
Spot on N et-  
back 
pas t  only
Spot on N et- 
back 
w ith  fu tu re
Netback on 
spot 
p a s t  only
Netback on 
spot 
w ith  fu tu re
6 0.055 0.039 0.032 0.046
5 . -0 .06 -0.081- 0.011 -0 .036
4 0.06 0,076 -0 .043 -0 .017
3 0.124 0.11 -0 .015 0.065
2 -0.037 -0 .016 -0 .135 -0 .179
1 0.131 0.133 0.178 0.142
0 0.601* 0.646* 0.641* 0.662*
-1 - 0.154 - 0.058
-2 - -0 .154 - -0 .2
-3 - -0 .021 - 0.184
-4 - -0 .07 - 0.388
-5 - -0.047 _ 0.041
-6 — 0.19 r* -0 .236
Sum of 
C o e f f ic ie n t s  0.874 0.959 0.67 0.918
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Table 7.1*14 Arabian Light, 1981-1985
Estimated Lag Distributions from Filtered Series
1. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS SPOT PRICE
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on spot O f f i c i a l  on spot Spot on o f f i c i a l
on lag  o f : p a s t  only w ith  fu tu re
6 0.07 0.165 -0 .05
5 0.195** 0.195 0.139 .
4 0.12 0.207 0.054
3 0.106 0.22 0.149
2 0.304* 0.631* -0.526*
1 0.094 0.303** 0.361**
0 0.021 0.113 -0.072
-1 - 0.341* 0.094
-2 - -0 .322 0.459*
-3 - 0.089 0.034
-4 - 0.126 0.097
-5 - 0.467** 0.263
-6 0.09 0.084
Sum of
C o e f f ic ie n t s 0.91 2.625 1.086
2. OFFICIAL PRICE VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
#
C o e f f ic ie n t O f f i c i a l  on N et- O f f i c i a l  on N et- Netback on
lag  of: back -  p a s t  only back -  with fu tu re o f f i c i a l
6 -0 .024 -0.027 . -0 .252
5 0.186* 0.3* 0.434*
4 0.049 0.091 -0 .194
3 0.207* 0.288* 0.065
2 0.392* 0.458* -0.415*
1 -0.009 0.06 0.254
0 -0.011 0.101 -0.047
-1 - 0.175 -0 .129
-2 - -0 .064 0.742*
-3 - 0.096 0.292
-4 - -0 .043 -0 .018
-5 - 0.228* 0.36**
-6 — -0.096 -0.077
Sum of •
C o e f f ic ie n ts 0.79 1.564 1.015
Note: * denotes significance at the 5% level,
** at the 10% level
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Table 7.1.14 - continued
3. SPOT PRICES VERSUS ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
C o e ff ic ­
i e n t  on 
la g  o f:
Spot on N et-  
back 
p a s t  only
Spot on N et-  
back 
w ith  fu tu re
Netback on 
spot 
p a s t  only
Netback on 
spot 
w ith  fu tu re
6 ' 0.029 0.029 0.019 -0.0005
5 -0 .01 0.008 -0 .1 2 -0 .177
4 0.058 0.088 0.017 0.097
3 0.093 0.096 -0.001 -0.051
2 -0.089 -0 .097 -0.001 0.044
1 0.027 0.032 0.22** 0.144
0 0.652* 0.693* 0.843* 0.854*
-1 - 0.143 - 0.129
-2 - 0.029 - -0 .235
-3 - -0 .041 - 0.338
-4 - 0.085 - -0 .071
-5 - 0.017 - -0 .086
-6 0.044 — -0.044
Sum of 
C o e f f ic ie n t s  0.76 1.068 0.977 0.941
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7.2 TRANSFER.FUNCTIONS
The next s tep  of the r e se a rc h ,  fo llow ing  from the  u n iv a r i a te  
Box-Jenkins models and study of the c a u s a l i ty  p a t te r n s  and lag  
d i s t r i b u t i o n s ,  was to  b u ild  m u l t iv a r ia te  t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  models 
r e p re s e n t in g  the  r e la t io n s h ip s  between the causor v a r ia b le s  (sp o t 
p r ic e s  and netbacks)  and th e  OPEC o f f i c i a l  p r ic e ,  as w ell as the  
r e l a t io n s h ip  between spot p r ic e s  and ne tbacks.
To do th a t  the  i t e r a t i v e  process  p resen ted  in  s e c t io n  4.6 has 
been followed s t a r t i n g  from the c r o s s - c o r r r e l a t i o n  fu n c t io n  (CCF) 
between the prewhitened s e r i e s .  I t  i s  u s e fu l  to  th in k  of au to ­
c o r r e l a t i o n  as w ith in  s e r i e s  c o r r e l a t i o n  and in  the same way as 
the  ACF i s  used to  i d e n t i f y  w ith in  s e r i e s  c o r r e l a t i o n ,  the CCF is  
used to  id e n t i f y  between s e r i e s  c o r r e l a t i o n .
A major d i f f e r e n c e ,  however, between the  ACF and CCF i s  th a t  the  
l a t t e r  need not be symmetrical about lag  zero , i . e  CCF(+ k) -  CCF(-k) 
g e n e ra l ly .  This assymetry in  the  CCF i s  in t e r p r e te d  as a measure not 
only of the  s t r e n g th  but a l so  of the d i r e c t io n  of a r e l a t i o n s h ip .  So 
when X causes Y evidence of the r e la t io n s h ip  i s  found in  the p o s i t iv e  
h a l f  of the  CCF.
As w ith  ARIMA model b u i ld in g ,  i t  i s  necessary  to  i n t e r p r e t e  the 
p a t t e r n s  found in  th e  CCF and ty p i c a l l y  a s in g le  sp ike corresponds to  
a w param eter w hile  decay from a sp ike  ( th e  ARIMA (d, d, 0) p a t t e r n )  
i s  i n t e r p r e te d  as a w param eter in  the  genera l model
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Yt  = '  ° 4 s '  Xf-h + n t-
(1 -  6xB -  . . . .  -  <5r Br )
Having e m p ir ic a l ly  s p e c i f i e d  c a u s a l i ty  d i r e c t io n s  we then had to  
i d e n t i f y  ( s p e c i fy )  the  form of the  t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  component in  the  
r e l a t i o n s h ip s .  To be su re ,  th e re  were many non-zero values in  both 
th e  p o s i t iv e  and n eg a t iv e  h a l f  of the CCF's a v a i la b le .  However, we 
were only concerned w ith  the  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  values of the  
CCF which suggested  th e  models f i n a l l y  employed. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of 
the t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  component has been followd by i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of 
the  ARIMA n o ise  model fo r  the nt - component which has been c a r r ie d  out 
from the t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  r e s id u a l s  -  t y p i c a l ly  an ARIMA (1 ,  0 ,  0) 
model.
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  has been followed by sim ultaneous e s t im a t io n  of 
both components of each r e l a t io n s h ip  and the b iv a r i a t e  models a r r iv e d  
a t  in  th i s  manner can be rep re sen ted  as
Xt-b
The sense of t h i s  diagram i s  th a t  two d i s t i n c t  inpu t p rocesses  
( th e  time s e r i e s  o b se rv a tio n  Xt _b and the shock a t )pass through two 
d i s t i n c t  f i l t e r s  (a  t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  and an ARIMA s t r u c t u r e )  and a re  
then  combined a d d i t iv e ly  in to  an output process ( th e  time s e r i e s  
o b se rv a tio n  Yt ) ,  Since we are  dea ling  w ith  two in p u ts ,  the 
s t a t i s t i c a l  adequacy of both must be diagnosed, according to the
I
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The models ob ta ined  a re  p resen ted  in  ta b le s  7 .2 .1  to  7 .2 .1 2 ,  
to g e th e r  w ith  the  es tim ated  c o e f f i c i e n t s ,  t h e i r  s tandard  e r ro r s  and 
o th e r  key s t a t i s t i c s .  The performance of those  models is  g e n e ra l ly  
very good as can be judged by the  r e s id u a l  sum of squares as w ell  as 
by v is u a l  in s p e c t io n  of f ig u re s  7 .2 .1  to  7 .2 .14  which p resen t  the 
a c tu a l  ou tput s e r i e s  (dependent v a r ia b le )  and the s e r i e s  s im ulated  on 
the  b a s is  of the es t im a ted  t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  model, w ith  i t s  
c o n s t i tu e n t  components (due to  the  in p u t and the  ARIMA p a r t ) .
At t h i s  s tag e  i t  was a l so  p o s s ib le  to t e s t  whether an assumption 
made e a r l i e r  on in  the  r e s e a rc h ,  a t  the f i l t e r i n g  s tage  was v a l id .  
As exp la ined  e a r l i e r ,  fo r  he 1976-85 period  we used in te rv e n t io n  
models to p re -w h iten  the  s e r i e s .  E s s e n t i a l l y ,  we got r id  of th a t  
p a r t  of the  s e r i e s  which was due to  the  in te r v e n t io n  and then te s t e d  
c a u s a l i ty  and examined la g  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  working w ith  the r e s id u a l
i . e  f i l t e r e d  s e r i e s .  On the  b a s is  of the lags  i d e n t i f i e d  from the  
CCF of the f i l t e r e d  s e r i e s ,  t r a n s f e r  fu n c tio n  models were b u i l t  us ing  
the o r ig i n a l  d a ta ,  in c lu s iv e  of the  in te r v e n t io n s .
»
The im p l ic i t  assummption has been, th e re fo r e ,  th a t  the  1979-80 
even ts  did  not have 'an  independent e f f e c t  on each s e r i e s  
in d iv id u a l ly .  R ather ,  we have assumed th a t  the e f f e c t  on the  OPEC 
o f f i c i a l  p r ic e s  came through the  spo t market. Hence the  assumption 
has been made th a t  the  lags  found between the  f i l t e r e d  s e r i e s  a re  
i d e n t i c a l  to  those  between the  o r ig in a l  d a ta .  I f  th i s  i s  not the  
case , then c l e a r ly  the t r a n s f e r  funcjion models i d e n t i f i e d  w i l l  have a 
very poor performance, and our assumption and the whole approach of 
p re-w hiten ing  v ia  impact assessment models w i l l  not be c o r r e c t .  
S ince the models thus b u i l t  have been diagnosed as adequate, i t  seems 
th a t  our approach has been confirmed as a p p ro p r ia te .
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Table 7,2.1 Arabian Light, 1976-85: Transfer Function Models
Output (Yt) = Official OPEC Price
1. INPUT = SPOT PRICE
Yt  -
(wQ -  wjB) 1
■ a t  + 0 o(1 - (1 “ (f>lB)
w0 = -0 .073
(-0 .0 3 8 )
wx - -0 .136
( -0 .0 4 )
<$X = 0.895 
(0.033)
$1 - 0.96
(0 .02 )
0 O = 8.17 
(2 .24)
RSS = 68 DF = 106 Q24 20
2. INPUT = ROTTERDAM NETBACKS -
Y = wo V + 1Xt (1 - 5 xB) t-_2 (1 - $XB) at
w -o 0.074
( 0 .0 26)
0.888
(0 .04)
$X = 0.98 
(0 .02)
RSS = 70 DF = 108 Q24 = 26
3. INPUT = MIDDLE EAST NETBACKS
Yt -
wo ' 1 at  + 0n
(1 ” 6xB) (1 “ $XB)
wQ = 0.063
(0.021)
61 = 
eo =
0.909
(0.031)
9.496
(2.321)
cf)! = 0.946 
(0 .037)
RSS * 74 DF 99 Q24 = 21
4. INPUT = US NETBACKS
Yt  “
Wo + 1 ■ + 9 n
(1 - SlB) (1 - $1B)
wQ = 0.066
(0.022)
6x = 
0 =
0.89
(0.034)
• 10.46 
(2 .34)
<J>X = 0.945 
(0 .038)
RSS = 73 DF = 95 Q24 = 19
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ARABIAN LIGHT: OFFICIAL P=RROTTERDAM NETBACK) 
TRANSFER FUNCTION MODEL, 1978-1985 
ACTUAL OFFICIAL SERIES, SIMULATED SERIES,
PARTS DUE TO INPUT AND NOISE
FIGURE 7 . 2 . 1
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ARABIAN LIGHT: OFFICIAL P .=F<DID .EAST NETBACK) 
TRANSFER FUNCTION DODEL, 1976-19S5 
ACTUAL OFFICIAL SERIES, SIMULATED SERIES,
PARTS DUE TO INPUT AND NOISE
FIGURE 7 . 2 , 2
S/
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FIGURE 7 . 2 . 3
ARABIAN LIGHT :OFFICIAL P,=F(US NETBACKS)
TRANSFER FUNCTION DODEL, 1977-1985
ACTUAL OFFICIAL PRICE SERIES, SIMULATED SERIES
S/
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ARABIAN LIGHT : OFFICIAL PRICE = F(SPOT PRICE) 
TRANSFER FUNCTION MODEL, 1976-19S5 
ACTUAL OFFICIAL SERIES, SIMULATED SERIES,
PARTS DUE TO INPUT AND NOISE
FIGURE 7.2.4
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Table 7.2.2 Iranian Light, 1976-85: Transfer Function Models
Output (Yt ) = O f f i c i a l  OPEC P rice
1 . INPUT = SPOT PRICE
Yt  " (Wo -  WlB) X(._, + 1 a t + 0 o
(1 -  S]B) ( 1  - <hs)
Wq = 0.136 wx -  
(0 .039)
0.049
(0.046)
6 1 = 0 . 8 8 6  
(0.040)
0.96 0O = 
(0 .03)
8.038
(3 .198)
RSS = 79 DF = 106 Q24 14
2 . INPUT = ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
Yt  =
Cw0  -  W1 B) x ^ _ 7 + ^ a t  + 0 O
( 1  -  (SlB) ( 1  - (f>lB)
W' = 
0 0 . 1 1 1  wx = 0.007 6 1 = 0.85
(0.046) (0.054) (0 .06)
(1 ) 1  = 0.96 0 O = 
( 0 . 0 2 )
10.08
(3.9-9)
RSS = 89 DF = 106 Q24 = 19
3. INPUT = MIDDLE EAST NETBACKS
Yt  = w° 1 ........a r
(1 -  <5 xB) ( 1  " (J)1 B)
Wq = 0.105 8 x = 0.901 *1 = 0 .9
(0.026) (0.032) (0 .031)
RSS = 82 DF = 100 Q24 = 3.4
4. INPUT = US NETBACKS
Yt = (wo
-  wxB -  w2 B2  -  w3 B3 -  w 4 B 4 )
Xf-3 + 8  +  n
( i  -  <sxB) ( 1  "
wQ = 0.14 wx = 0.066 w2  = -0.041 w3  -  0.066
(0 .04) (0 .055) (0 .05) (0.054)
W4  = -0 .086  = 0.809 0O = 9.8 <j>x = 0.96
(0.049) (0 .083) (4 .8 )  (0 .028)
RSS = 7 7  DF = 91 Q24 = 21
S/
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IRANIAN LIGHT : OFFICIAL PRICE=F<SPOT PRICE) 
TRANSFER FUNCTION MODEL, 1976-1985 
ACTUAL OFFICIAL SERIES, SIMULATED SERIES, 
PARTS DUE TO INPUT AND NOISE
FIGURE 7 . 2 . 5
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FIGURE 7.2.6
IRANIAN LI6HT-.OFFICIAL P .=F(ROTTERDAM NETBACK)
TRANSFER FUNCTION MODEL, 1976-1985
ACTUAL OFFICIAL SERIES, SIMULATED SERIES,
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Table 7.2.3 Nigerian Light, 1976-85: Transfer Function Models
Output (Yt) = Official OPEC Price
1. INPUT = SPOT PRICE
Yt  -
(w0 -  wxB -  w2 B )
Xt -8  + 1 a t  + 0
(1 ~ 6xB) (1 -  <f>lB>
W q  = 0.193
(0.063)
W1 = 0.26
(0.096)
Si N3 II
'-v 
1 
O 
O 
• 
•
O 
h-
OO N-/
6 1 « 0.828
(0.086)
* i  ■= 0.958 
(0 .038)
0O = 11.99 
(5 .00)
RSS = 180 DF = 105 Q24 = 27
2. INPUT = ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
v -  (wQ ~ wqB) 1 «
Yt  "       x t - 5  + __________  at  + 0 o
( 1 - 6  XB) (1 -  0 XB)
wQ = -0 .773 wx = -0 .183 = 0.85
(0 .058) (0 .062) (0 .52 )
% = 0.936 0O = 9.83
(0 .04) (3 .18)
RSS -  180 DF = 106 Q24 = 25
3. INPUT = MIDDLE EAST NETBACKS (1977 Jan -  1985 March)
Yt  = (Wq ~ Wt B -  W2b2 -  «3b3) Xt_4 + l  + a(. + 0
(1 " 6iB) (1 - 0xB)
wQ = 0.109 wX = 0.105 w2 = 0,028 w3 = -0
(0 .026) (0 .071) (0 .07 )  (0
5-1 = 0.697 (Jjjl = 0.95 60 = 13.07
(0.106) (0 .036) (4 .09)
.192
.057)
RSS = 170 DF = 92 Q24 - 24
FIGURE 7 . 2 . 7
NIGERIAN LIGHT : OFFICIAL PRICE=P(SPOT PRICE)
TRANSFER FUNCTION MODEL, 1976-1985
ACTUAL OFFICIAL PRICE SERIES,SIMULATED SERIES,
8/
bb
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FIGURE 7 , 2 . 8
NIGERIAN LIGHT:QFFICIAL PRICE^F(US NETBACKS)
TRANSFER FUNCTION MODEL, 1977-1985
ACTUAL OFFICIAL PRICE SERIES, SIMULATED SERIES
ACTUAL
SIMULATED
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Table 7.2.4 Kuwait Export Crude, 1976-1985
Transfer Function Models
Output (Yt) = Official OPEC Price
1. INPUT = SPOT PRICE
Yt  " W° x t-7 + 1 at- •
( l  " 6iB) (1 ~ <f> iB)
w0 = 0107 = 
(0 .031)
0.808
(0.067)
- 0.96 e0 = 
(0 .02 )
• 11.4 
(3 .4 )
RSS = 86 DF = 107 Q24 = 32
2. INPUT - ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
Yt  " W° Xk_7 + 1 a*.
(1 - 6lB) (1 - <PX B)
wo = 0.085 = 
(0 .031)
0.871
(0 ,054)
- 0.97 e0 -  
(0 .02)
10.19
(3 .6 )
RSS = 90 DF = 107 Q24 = 26
3. INPUT = MIDDLE EAST NETBACKS
Yt  = w° X^ft + 1 at-
(1 -  6 XB) (1 -  4JB)
wQ = 0.077 = 
(0 .32)
0.88
(0 .05)
h - 0.96 = 
(0 .03)
10.77
(3 .66)
RSS = 92 DF = 99 Q24 -  29
fl
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FIGURE 7 . 2 . 9
KUWAIT CRUDE OFFICIAL P .-F(ROTTERDAM NETBACK)
TRANSFER FUNCTION MODEL, 1976-1985
ACTUAL OFFICIAL SERIES, SIMULATED SERIES
FIGURE 7 . 2 . 1 0
KUWAIT CRUDE ^ OFFICIAL P.=F(MID. EAST NETBACK)
TRANSFER FUNCTION MODEL, 1976-I 985
ACTUAL OFFICIAL SERIES, SIMULATED SERIES
T?  1 9 7 7 '  1 9 7 8  ' 1 9 7 9  ' 1 9 8 0  ' 1 9 8 1  * 1 9 8 2  ' 1 9 8 3  I 1 9 8 4  1 1 9 8 5  r
1. INPUT = ROTTERDAM NETBACK 
Yt  = (w0 -  WlB)Xt  + (1  -  0 XB -  04B4 -  05B5 ) a t
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Table 7.2.5 Arabian Light, 1976-1985
Transfer Function Models
Output (Yt) = Spot Crude Oil Price
wQ = 0.909 wi = -0 .1 5
(0 .053) (0 .05)
0X = -0 .633 04 = -0 .314
(0 .097) (0 .107)
= 120 DF = 104 Q20
2. INPUT = MIDDLE EAST NETBACK
W0Xt
( 1  -  0jB -  faB2) 
(1 “ $lB -  ^ B 2)
wQ = 1.064 0x = -  0.255 fa =
(0 .025) (0 .107)
fa  = 0.278 $2 -  0.643
(0.103) (0 .083)
RSS = 150 DF = 98 Q21 = 32
3. INPUT = US NETBACKS
v y  . ( 1  ~ ©iB 02 B2 )Yt  = w0 Xt  +  £___f__ at
(1 -  $xB)
w0 = 1.035 ex = -0 .375  02 =
(0.0134) (0 .154)
$1 = 0.402
(0 .162)
■0.35
0.093)
0.735
(0.025)
-0,399
( 0 . 1 2 )
RSS = 140 DF = 95 Q22 = 18
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Table 7.2.6 Arabian Light, 1976-1985
Transfer Function Models
Input (Xt) = Spot Crude Oil Price
1. OUTPUT = ROTTERDAM NETBACK
Yt = (wQ -  w^ B -  w2B2 -  w3B3)Xt  + (1 -  0xB -  02B2 - e3B3 -  e4B
wQ = 0.808 wj
(0 .052)
-0 .117 w2 = -0 .099  w3 
(0 .055) (0 .052)
% = -0 .592
(0.093)
93 = -0 .261 
( 0 . 112 )
RSS = 98 DF
02 = -0 .242
(0 .107)
04 = -0 .261 
(0.112)
= 102 Q20
e5 = - o . 4
(0 .097)
= 26
2. OUTPUT = MIDDLE EAST NETBACK
/ ' n (1 -  0iB -  0oB2 -  0/B4)Yt  = (wQ -  wxB) Xt  + 1°_____ 2a______ 4 1 5  >
(1 -  0iB )
w0 = 0.544 wx = “ 0.273, ^x “ 0.89
(0 .052) (0 .045) (0 .06)
9o = 3.4 e l = 0.332 62 = 0.352 04 =
(1 .08) (0 .112) (0 .107)
RSS = 7 3  DF = 95 Q20 = 15
INPUT = US NETBACKS
Yt  = wQ Xt  + ( 1 ~ 8 lB -  92B2) a)_ + (
(1 " 0 xB)
wQ = 0.838 0 x -  0.273 0 O = 3.41
(0.029) (0 .178) (0 .826)
0X = -0 .393 02 = -0 .462
(0.161) (0.113)
i4 - e5B)at
0.084
(0.049)
-0 .318
(0.103)
RSS = 110 DF = 94 Q22 = 21
ARABIAN LIGHT :SPOT P ,=F(ROTTERDAM NETBACK) 
TRANSFER FUNCTION MODEL, 1976-1385 
ACTUAL SPOT SERIES, SIMULATED SERIES, PARTS 
DUE TO INPUT AND NOISE
FIGURE 7 , 2 . 1 1
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Table 7.2.7 Iranian Light, 1976-85: Transfer Function Models
Output (Yt) = Spot OPEC Price
1. INPUT = ROTTERDAM NETBACK
Yt = wo Xb + 1 a b
(1 "  4»iB)
w0 = 1.026 <J>x = 0.671
(0.016) (0.072)
RSS = 230 DF = 109 Q24 = 26
2. INPUT = MIDDLE EAST NETBACK
Yy = wo X|. + (1 ” 0XB “ 02fi2) a+. +
(1 -  6xB) - (1 -  6 XB)
w0 = 0.45 5 x -  0.506 e x = 0.51
(0 .092) (0 .097) (0.122)
0.364 y0 = 3.7 {pl  = 0.94
(0 .112) (2 .8 )  (0 .05)
RSS = 240 DF » 97 Q22 = 24
3. INPUT = US NETBACKS
Yt  = (wQ -  wxB) Xt
wQ = 0.765
(0.056)
(1 -  %B)
WX = -0 .233
(0.055)
= 0.69
(0 .07)
RSS = 190 DF = 96 Q24 - 16
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Table 7.2.8 Iranian Light, 1976-1985
Transfer Function Models
Input (Xt) = Spot Crude Oil Price
1. OUTPUT = ROTTERDAM NETBACK
= <wo "  wiB)Xt  + (1 ~ 9lB - 92B ) at + 0q
(1 -  'hB)
wQ = 0.509 wx -  -0 .203  <f>x = 0.976
(0 .067) (0 .057) (0 .026)
% = 5.893 0x = 0.218 02 = 0.344
(2 .69 )  (0 .099) (0 .092)
RSS = 120 DF = 105 Q20 = 23
2. OUTPUT = MIDDLE EAST NETBACK
Yt  = (w0  -  wxB -  w2 B2  -  W3 B3) Xt  + 1 a t  + 0Q
( l  -  ^ bT
wQ = 0,487 wx = “ 0.105 w2 = -0 .127
(0 .086) (0.088) (0 .089)
&
= -0 .109  90 = 3.31 $x = 0.588
( 0 .0 /6 )  (1 .11 )  (0 .085)
RSS = 260 DF = 97 Q24 = 31
3. OUTPUT -  US NETBACKS
Yt  = (w0 -  wxB)Xt  + 1 a t  + 6
(1 -  $xB)
W 0  = 0.724 wx = -0 .131
(0 .07 ) (0.062)
\  = 0.614
0
O 3.93
(0.084) (1 .07)
= 190 DF = 95 Q24 =
FIGURE 7 . 2 . 1 2
IRANIAN LIGHT:SPOT PRICE=F(MID. EAST NETBACKS) 
TRANSFER FUNCTION MODEL, 1976-1985 
ACTUAL SPOT SERIES, SIMULATED SERIES, PARTS 
DUE TO INPUT AND NOISE
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Table 7.2.9
1. INPUT =
Yt  = (w0 -
w 3
RSS = 150
2. INPUT =
Nigerian Light, 1976-1985
Transfer Function Models
Output (Yt) = Spot Crude Oil Price
ROTTERDAM NETBACK
w^B -  w2 B3 -  W3B3 ) Xb- 3  + _____ 1
(1 -  $]B)
0.734 wx -  “ 0.146 w2 = (
(0 .054) (0.0591) ((
-0 .202  <f>x = -0 .556
(0.052) (0 .084)
DF = 106 Q24 = 17
US NETBACKS
wo Xt  + 1 . at
(“  $Jb)
0.99 = 0.455
(0.008) (0 .092)
a t
'.056
1.058)
RSS = 210 DF = 97 Q24 = 30
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Table 7.2.10 Nigerian Light, 1976-1985
Transfer Function Models
Input (Xt) = Spot Crude Oil Price
1. OUTPUT = ROTTERDAM NETBACK
Yt  ~ (w0 -  w^B -  w2B2 -  w3B3) Xt  + _____ 1 a t
( i  -  % bT
wQ = 0.808 wx = -  0.218 w2 -  -0 .059
(0 .062) (0.066) (0.065)
w3 = 0.113 +x = 0.574
(0.058) (0 .084)
RSS = 160 DF = 106 Q24 = 25
2. OUTPUT = US NETBACK
Yt  ~ <wo ” wl 3 — w2B2 — w3B3) X^ ._3 + 1 a t  +
(1 -0xB -  %B3)
w0 = ’ 0.811 wx = -  0.194 w2 = 0.017 w3
(0 .065) (0 .069) (0 .07)
*1 = 0.483 % = -0 .255  0O = 2.06
(0.109) (0.109.) (0 .569)
RSS = 160 DF = 91 Q22 = 22
- 0.101
(0 .06)
S
'b
b
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-  2 8 3  -
NIGERIAN LIGHT: US NETBACK = F(SPOT PRICE) 
TRANSFER FUNCTION MODEL, 1977-1985 
ACTUAL NETBACK SERIES, SIMULATED SERIES, 
PARTS DUE TO INPUT AND NOISE
FIGURE 7.2,13
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Table 7.2.11 Kuwait Export Crude, 1976-1985
Transfer Function Models
Output (Yt) = Spot Crude Oil Price
1. INPUT = ROTTERDAM NETBACK
Yt  -  (wQ -  wjB -  w 2 B 2 )  Xt - i  + (1 9B) at
(1 -  &B)
,w0  = 0.464 wx = -  0.087 w2  = -0 .5
(0 .054) (0 .07 )  (0 .081)
X = -0 .33
(0 .106)
Px = 0.725
(0.094)
RSS = 290 DF = 106 Q2 3  -  44
2. INPUT = MIDDLE EAST NETBACK
Yt  wo Xt - 1  + 1  . at
(1 -  f<hB)
w0  = 1.04 =s 0.669
(0.026) (0 .09)
RSS = 460 DF = 101 Q24 = 18
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Table 7.2,12 Kuwait Export Crude, 1976-1985
Transfer Function Models
Input (Xt) = Spot Crude Oil Price
1 . '  OUTPUT = ROTTERDAM NETBACK
Yt = (w0 -  W]B) Xt  +   1 at
(1 - $i B -
w0 = 0.57 wx = -  0.36
(0.054) (0 .05)
$X = 0.62 $2 = 0*16
(0 .10) (0 .10)
RSS = 150 DF = 107 Q23 = 16
2. OUTPUT = MIDDLE EAST NETBACK
Yt  -  (wQ -.wxB) Xt
(T ”-  ““$xB)
0.57
(0.048)
-0.341
(0 .045)
0.841
(0 .064)
RSS - 120 DF = 100 Q24 - 26
S/
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KUWAIT CRUDEsfllDDLE EAST NETBACK-FCSPOT PRICE) 
TRANSFER FUNCTION MODEL, 1976-1985 
ACTUAL NETBACK SERIES, SIMULATED SERIES, PARTS 
DUE TO INPUT AND NOISE
FIGURE 7 . 2 . 1 4
- 287 -
I t  has been argued in  chap te r  th re e  th a t  ex p ec ta t io n s  have played an 
im portant r o l e  in  th e  1973 and 1979 c r i s e s  when panic  and 
o v e r - r e a c t io n  meant p r ic e s  r i s i n g  much more than the a c tu a l  
p roduction  cutbacks would j u s t i f y .  I t  i s  the purpose of th i s  s e c t io n  
to  cons ide r  the  way in  which such e x p ec ta t io n s  e n te r  p r ic e  
fo rm u la tion  and the mechanism forming them.
Inven tory  s p e c u la t io n  i s  an undeniable component of the world 
o i l  market and i t  i s  a normal market phenomenon which occurs in  
a n t ic ip a to n  of p r ic e  changes and i s  undertaken .for the purpose of 
making a p r o f i t .  P o s i t iv e  inven to ry  sp ecu la t io n  i s  advantageous when 
p r ic e  in c re a s e s  by more than the  opportun ity  cos t of money, w h i ls t  
when p r ic e  i s  expected to  remain s ta b le  or d e c l in e  th e re  i s  an 
in c e n t iv e  to draw in v e n to r ie s  down. However, the a d d i t io n a l  demand 
f o r  o i l  to  b u i ld  s to ck s  when o i l  markets a re  t i g h t  adds to the upward 
p ressu re  on p r i c e s .
T y p ica lly ,  o i l  p r ic e s  have inc reased  sh a rp ly  in  periods  of 
p o l i t i c a l  u n re s t  because of the i n f l e x i b i l i t y  of p roduction  and 
consumption and the  p e rv e rse  c h a ra c te r  of inven to ry  sp e c u la t io n .  
T o ta l  demand f o r  o i l  c o n s i s t s  of ac tu a l  consumption p lus  s tock  
changes in  a given p e r io d .  Consumption i s  cond itioned  by technology 
and h a b i t s  and tends to  be f a i r l y  s ta b l e  -  a p a r t  from seasona l  
v a r ia t io n s  -  th e re fo re  s to ck  changes are  very im portan t fo r  the le v e l  
and s t a b i l i t y  of o i l  p r ic e s .
Seasonal inven to ry  buying s t a b i l i s e s  world o i l  producton le v e ls  
and tends to  s t a b i l i s e  p r i c e s ;  so i t  i s  the s p e c u la t iv e  demand fo r  
o i l  which a f f e c t s  p r ic e s  most and th i s  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to ana lyse  
because th e re  can be no c l e a r  d i s t i n c t i o n  between o i l  held as working 
and p reca u tio n a ry  s tocks and . th a t  he ld  fo r  s p e c u la t iv e  purposes.
One measure i s  to  s e l e c t  a 'n o rm a l1 y ear  and assume o i l  s tocks  
would be adequate i f  they were p ro p o r t io n a l  to  the normal y ear .  Any 
s tock  le v e ls  above or below the  norm are then defined  as s p e c u la t iv e .
7.3 EXPECTATIONS
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Table 7 .3 .1  p re se n ts  a c tu a l  and h y p o th e t ic a l  1976-norm s tock  le v e l s .  
A ctual o i l  s tocks  in  excess of the  1976-norm are  defined  as p o s i t i v e  in v e n to ry  
s p e c u la t io n  and those  below the norm are  defined  as nega t ive  inven to ry  
s p e c u la t io n .
Table 7 .3 .1  Shortages and excesses  of o i l  s tocks  based on the  
1976-norm, la rg e  consuming c o u n t r ie s .
Q uarte r ly  1976 (1) -  1979 (1)
m i l l io n  b a r r e l s
A B C D E
ACTUAL OIL ACTUAL OIL 1976-NORM HYPOTHETICAL SPECULATIVE
CONSUMPTION STOCKS RATIO 1976-NORM STOCKS
STOCKS
1976 1 32474 2096 0.0645
2 28729 2225 0,0774 - -
3 28528 2433 0.0852 - -
4 33149 2338 0.0705 - -
1977 1 34668 2237 2236.08 0.92
2 30041 2421 2325.17 95.83
3 29912 2599 2548.5 50.5
4 32745 2589 2308.52 280.48
1978 1 35458 2310 2287.04 22.96
2 30372 2347 2350.8 (3 .8 )
3 31033 2433 2644.01 (211.01)
4 34418 2415 2426.46 (11 .46)
1979 1 36191 2172 2334.32 (162.32)
Note: D = What s tocks  would have been i f  the r a t i o  of s tocks  to consumption
were the  same as in  the  corresponding q u a r te r  1976 (column C)
E = A ctual minus h y p o th e t ic a l  1976-norm s tocks ;  shortage  ( in  
p a ren th eses )  or excess
Source: International Energy Indicators
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On the  b a s is  of the  above ta b le ,  la rg e  p o s i t i v e  inven to ry  
s p e c u la t io n  took p lace  between w in te r  1977 and w in te r  1978 (1977 [1] 
to  1978 [1]) w hile  n eg a t iv e  inven to ry  s p e c u la t io n  took place between 
1978 (2) and 1979 ( 1), F igure  7 .3 .1  shows the sho rtage  or excess 
compared w ith  1976 which i s  de f ined  as s p e c u la t iv e  s to c k s .  C le a r ly ,  
the  s p e c u la t iv e  b u ild -up  began in  1977 (1) and extended through 1977 
(4 ) .  The draw-down extended from 1978 (1) through 1979 (1 ) ,  w ith  
moderate re b u i ld in g  of s p e c u la t iv e  s tocks during 1978 (4 ) .
F igure  7 .3 .1  Stock shortage  or excess based on 1976-norm.
Large consuming c o u n t r ie s
Source: Table 7 .3 .1
This s p e c u la t iv e  a c t i v i t y  corresponds to  a h igh le v e l  of OPEC 
production  in  1977 and a low le v e l  in  1978 (see  ta b le  2 .5 .4 ) .  
T herefore  the pe r iod  1976-1979 provides a c l e a r  example of how p r ic e  
e x p ec ta t io n s  and inven to ry  s p e c u la t io n  based on them c o n t r ib u te  to  
th e  upward r a t c h e t  p rocess  and a lso  to  u n s ta b le  OPEC p roduc tion  
le v e l s .
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Following th e  s p l i t  l e v e l  p r ic e  in c re a s e  of December 1976, 
s tocks  were b u i l t  up in  a n t i c ip a t io n  of h igher p r ic e s  and the b u ild  
up continued through summer 1977. This c o n t r ib u te d  to  h igh OPEC 
production  and s t a b l e  p r i c e s .  S t a b i l i t y  of p r ic e s  led to  the  
e x p e c ta t io n  th a t  p r ic e s  would remain s ta b le  in  1978, consequently  
th e re  was a s to ck  drawi( down and hence s p e c u la t iv e  ( thus  t o t a l )  
demand was low, OPEC production  dec l ined  and o i l  p r ic e s  dec l ined  fo r  
most of 1978.
At the  end of summer 1978 o i l  s tocks  were very low. With the  
I r a n ia n  p roduction  cu tbacks between November 1978 -  March 1979, and 
d e sp i te  r i s i n g  t o t a l  o i l  producton , th e re  can be no doubt th a t  
inven to ry  s p e c u la t io n  c o n t r ib u te d  to the  shoo ting  up of p r ic e s  in  a 
t i g h t  market.
But even i f  one cons ide rs  the o i l  market o u ts id e  the c r i s e s  
p e r io d s ,  in  'normal* t im es ,  e x p ec ta t io n s  e n te r  the  p r ic e  fo rm ula ting  
mechanism by means of demand p re ssu re s  a r i s i n g  out of the seasona l -  
non s p e c u la t iv e  -  b u i ld  up of s tocks  in  a n t i c ip a t io n  of r i s i n g  
p ro d u c ts '  demand and hence p r i c e s ,  which in  tu rn  a f f e c t s  the  heavy 
versus  l i g h t  crude o i l  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  in  the sh o r t  run. T herefo re ,  
th e re  should be no doubt th a t  expected p r ic e  has a s u b s t a n t i a l  e f f e c t  
on a c tu a l  p r i c e .  I t  i s  c l e a r ly  im portan t ,  in  a t tem p ting  to  form an 
o v e ra l l  p i c tu r e  of the  p r ic e  fo rm ula ting  mechanism, to  t r y  and 
determ ine how ex p ec ta t io n s  a re  formed.
There a re  v a r io u s  hypotheses as to the  way people form 
ex p ec ta t io n s  but nowadays the dominant i s  the r a t i o n a l  e x p ec ta t io n s  
hypo thesis  (REH). This s t a t e s  th a t  in  a com petit ive  world economic 
agents  w i l l  e x p lo i t  a l l  a v a i la b le  in fo rm ation  to take  advantage of 
any perce ived  p r o f i t  o p p o r tu n i t i e s .  The im p l ic a t io n  i s  th a t  economic 
agents  do not make sy s tem a tic  m istakes when fo re c a s t in g  the fu tu re  
and th a t  the d r iv e  fo r  p r o f i t  w i l l  tend to  e l im in a te  any obvious 
o p p o r tu n i t ie s  fo r  abnormal ga in .
The b as ic  assumption of REH i s  th a t  people a c t  as i f  they knew 
the exact s t r u c t u r e  and o p e ra t io n  of the market. On a p r i o r i  grounds 
we expect th a t  t h i s  does not apply to  the o i l  market. The panic  of
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1979 when i t  was fea red  t h a t  the  OPEC c a r t e l  might cause f u r th e r  
p r ic e  in c re a s e s ,  when in  f a c t  Saudi Arabia was r a i s in g  i t s  p roduc tion  
to  th e  maximum s u s ta in a b le  10 mbd in  o rder  to  compensate fo r  the  
I ra n ia n  lo s s  and p reven t any f u r th e r  p r ic e  e s c a la t io n  would seem to  
c o n t ra d ic t  th a t  assumption, as indeed would the  genera l  p e rce p tio n  of 
OPEC as a p r ic e  ad m in is te r in g  c a r t e l .
Thus we would expect th a t  the market i s  c h a ra c te r i s e d  by 
in e f f i c i e n c y  caused by la ck  of in fo rm ation  and by d e s t a b i l i s i n g  
s p e c u la t io n .  We cannot assume th a t  the market in c o rp o ra te s  a l l  new 
in fo rm ation  in  th e  spo t p r ic e  in  a rap id  and unbiased manner, hence 
we expect i t  to  be an i n e f f i c i e n t  market.
The term e f f ic ie n c y  r e f e r s  to  two aspec ts  of p r ic e  adjustment to  
new in fo rm ation : the  speed and the  q u a l i ty  i . e  the  d i r e c t io n  and
magnitude of the ad justm en t.  An e f f i c i e n t  spot market fo r  crude o i l  
and o i l  p roducts  would be one where c u r re n t  p r ic e s  do c o r r e c t ly  
r e f l e c t  a l l  in fo rm ation  con ta ined  in  p a s t  p r i c e s .  In an e f f i c i e n t  
market th e re  a re  no o p p o r tu n i t ie s  fo r  making sp e c u la t iv e  p r o f i t s  by 
e x p lo i t in g  in fo rm ation  con ta ined  in  p a s t  p r ic e  changes. Traders a re  
th e re fo r e  precluded  from s y s te m a t ic a l ly  outperform ing an e f f i c i e n t  
market.
The i s s u e  i s  no t whether a s k i l l e d  sp e c u la to r  can outperform the 
m arket. This i s  c e r t a in ly  p o s s ib le .  The r e a l  i s s u e  i s  whether a 
s k i l l e d  s p e c u la to r  can outperform the market by v i r t u e  of h i s /h e r  
s k i l l  or by chance. Casual o bse rva tion  i s  im possib le  to  re so lv e  th i s  
q u es tio n  as i t  i s  im possib le  to  d i s t in g u is h  between chance r e s u l t s  
and sy s tem a tic  s k i l l .  The m a tte r  can only be reso lved  by s t a t i s t i c a l  
t e s t i n g .
I f  the  spo t market fo r  crude and products  i s  found to be an 
e f f i c i e n t  market then  we would have in d i r e c t l y  confirmed the REH. 
The e f f i c i e n t  market hypo thesis  -  i . e  th a t  p r ic e  changes a re  
unsystem atic  -  can be examined by the  use of a very simple t e s t :  
r e g re s s io n  of to d a y 's  p r ic e  change (as a per cen t)  on the p r ic e  
changes of 3 to  4 o r  more p e r io d s  (days or months) ago should y ie ld  
i n s i g n i f i c a n t  c o e f f i c i e n t s  and no a u to c o r r e la t io n  in  the e r r o r  term 
i f  indeed the market i s  e f f i c i e n t .
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Using spot crude o i l  p r ic e s  (monthly d a ta )  f o r  Arabian l i g h t ,  and 
both d a i ly  and monthly da ta  on g aso l in e  and g a s o i l  p r ic e s  a t  Rotterdam 
between 1967 and 1984 and f o r  va r ious  subperiods th i s  re g re s s io n  has 
been run. A sample of the  r e s u l t s  i s  given below, in  ta b le  7 .3 .2 .  The 
s t a t i s t i c a l  s ig n i f i c a n c e  of the  e s tim ated  a  s i s  eq u iv a len t  to  r e j e c t i n g  
the  e f f i c i e n t  market h y p o th e s is .  Throughout th e  1967-84 period  th e re  i s  
a s i g n i f i c a n t  p o s i t i v e  r e l a t io n s h ip  between the r e l a t i v e  p r ic e  change a t  
day and month t -1  and t  ( a x > 0)
Furtherm ore, th e re  i s  a l so  a c o r r e l a t i o n  between th e  change a t  t -2  
and t ,  which i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the 5% le v e l  f o r  1982 and 1976-85. 
The in d ic a t io n  of in e f f i c ie n c y  must be considered  s trong  based on the 
s iz e  of the  e s tim ated  param eters  and t h e i r  t - r a t i o s .  Furtherm ore, 
e x p la in in g  around 20% of the  v a r ian ce  of the  per cent change fo r  
1967-84 i s  no weak r e s u l t
Table 7 .3 .2  Regression  t e s t s  -  the e f f ic ie n c y  hypothesis  
Monthly p r ic e  changes
Period a o °1 Ofc 0 3 F R2 DW
1976 Spot p r ice 0.33
(1 .06)
0.65
(1 .57)
-0 .2  -0 .93  
( -0 .4 6 ) ( -1 .0 5 )
1 . 0 0 43.0 2.6
G asoline -0 .996
(-1 .2 2 )
0.489
(1 .59)
-0 .01  -0 .223 
( -0 .0 4 ) ( -0 .7 8 )
1.14 6 2.33
G asoil 2.98 -0 .85  
( 2 .9 3 ) ( -2 .2 6 )
-1 .2 2  -1 .08  
( -2 .9 1 X -2 .1 0 )
4.11 56.9 1.81
1982 Gasoline -0 .4
( -0 .2 4 )
0.836
(2 .26)
-0 .741 0.32 
( -2 .3 8 )  (0 .88)
3.43 51 2.5
G asoil 1.8 -0 .03  
(1 .4 7 ) ( -0 .0 8 )
-0 .7 5  -0 .14  
( -2 .9 2 ) ( -0 .3 6 )
4.97 63 2.15
76-85 Spot p r ic e 0.54
(0 .93)
0.414
(4 .74)
-0 .3 9  0.46 
( - 4 .4 )  (5 .26)
14.9 28.4 1.97
67-84 G asoline 0.936
(1 .93)
0.46
(5 .6 )
-0 .288  0.111 
( -4 .3 )  (2 .4 )
15.5 17.1 1.99
G asoil 1.17
(1 .90)
0.508
(7 .41)
-0 .314 0.108 
( -4 .2 5 )  (1 .58)
18.9 20 2.01
Note: Pt = aQ + a l p t - l  + a2pt -2  + a 3pt -3  + ut
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where Pb = per cen t p r ic e  change form t -1  t i l l  t .  (F igures  in  
paren theses  a re  the  t - r a t i o s ) .
I t  seems a p p ro p r ia te  to conclude th a t ,  as expected a p r i o r i ,  the  
hypo thesis  of e f f ic ie n c y  in  the  Rotterdam spo t market fo r  crude and 
products  has to be r e j e c te d ,  s in c e  w ith  a few minor excep tions during 
some sub -per iods  d a i ly  and monthly per cent p r ic e  changes tend to  be 
r e la t e d  to  p r io r  changes. The n a tu r a l  q u es t io n  i s  whether these  
r e s u l t s  can be u t i l i s e d  p r o f i t a b ly  and th i s  depends on the  s t a b i l i t y  
of the observed r e l a t i o n s h ip s ,  which in  tu rn  i s  dependent upon 
whether market agents  d isco v er  the r e l a t i o n s h ip s .  In  ad d i t io n ,  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  depends on co s ts  r e l a t e d  to  the tak in g  of p o s i t io n s  in  
the market. I t  would not be r e le v a n t  to develop t ra d in g  ru le s  here  -  
what i s  of i n t e r e s t  i s  the f a c t  th a t  the market i s  i n e f f i c i e n t  thus 
the  REH has been i n d i r e c t l y  r e j e c te d .  This confirms th a t  
e x p ec ta t io n s  a re  backwards looking  i . e  formed by some s o r t  of 
adap t ive  mechanism and th e  problem here i s  choosing a v a r ia b le  th a t  
w i l l  c o r r e c t ly  r e f l e c t  or a t  l e a s t  approximate such adap tive  
ex p e c ta t io n s .
A ty p ic a l  approach would be to  argue in  the Keynesian t r a d i t i o n  
th a t  th e re  i s  some 'norm al ' le v e l  of o i l  p r ic e s  in  p e o p le 's  minds 
towards which they expect a c tu a l  p r ic e s  to  move. Thus when the  
c u r ren t  p r ic e  i s  above th a t  normal l e v e l ,  people expect i t  to f a l l  
o r  converge towards i t .  The reason  could be th a t  as p r ic e  keeps 
r i s i n g  people envisage a po in t a t  which demand w i l l  respond and s t a r t  
d e c l in in g ;  e v e n tu a l ly ,  an excess supply s i t u a t i o n  might be viewed as 
the  f a c t o r  fo rc in g  p r ic e  to  converge to  i t s  normal. S im i la r ly ,  i f  
c u r re n t  p r ic e  i s  below i t s  normal and f a l l i n g  people th ink  th a t  a 
continuous f a l l  w i l l  a t  some po in t a c t  on demand, which w i l l  
th e re fo r e  have to  s t a r t  r i s i n g .  Such demand p re ssu re s  w i l l  cause 
p r ic e s  to  s t a r t  r i s i n g  towards t h e i r  normal l e v e l .
Thus on the convergent hypothesis  expected p r ic e  is  in v e rs e ly  
r e l a t e d  to the  d i f f e re n c e  between c u r re n t ,  a c tu a l  p r ic e  and some 
moving average of p a s t  p r i c e s ,  in tended  to  cap tu re  the  no tion  of the 
long-run  normal l e v e l .  A v a r ia b le  cap tu r ing  such convergent 
e x p ec ta t io n s  would be the d i f f e re n c e  of c u r ren t  p r ic e  from a long-run
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average of p r ic e s  -  r e p re s e n t in g  the  'normal* l e v e l .  C le a r ly ,  the  
c o e f f i c i e n t  of t h i s  v a r ia b le  i s  expected to be n eg a t iv e  s in ce  when 
c u r re n t  p r ic e s  a re  r i s i n g  people expect them to s t a r t  d e c l in in g  and 
v ice  v e rsa .  This seems to be happening a t  p re sen t  -  we have heard of 
a c o l la p se  to  $5/bb l -  and i t  c e r t a in l y  happened in  the 1979 c r i s i s  -  
fo r e c a s t s  of $100/bbl were made fo r  1990. Given the  'p a n ic '  f a c t o r  
ex p e c ta t io n s  may become e x t r a p o la t iv e ,  a t  l e a s t  in  the  sh o r t  run.
T here fo re ,  th e re  a re  two cand ida tes  fo r  c o n s id e ra t io n  as the 
e x p e c ta t io n a l  v a r ia b le :
1. The d i f f e re n c e  of c u r re n t  p r ic e  from a long-run  normal p r ic e  
l e v e l  and
2. the d i f f e re n c e  of c u r re n t  p r ic e  and very rece n t  p ic e s ,  
corresponding  to  e x t r a p o la t iv e  e x p e c ta t io n s .
Expected p r ic e  should be in v e rs e ly  r e la te d  to the f i r s t  and 
p r o p o r t io n a l ly  r e l a t e d  to  the  second.
C le a r ly ,  the  convergent hypo thesis  i s  a long-run  view of the 
mechanism and i t  seems p la u s ib le  to  assume th a t  both types w i l l  be in  
o p e ra t io n ,  though w ith  a d i f f e r e n t  t im ing . Thus once a s i g n i f i c a n t  
change in  th e  p r ic e  takes  p lace  e .g  the  rece n t  d e c l in e ,  people expect 
p r ic e s  to go on f a l l i n g  f o r  a s h o r t  period] as time goes by and the 
p r ic e  does f a l l  they r e a l i s e  th e re  i s  a l im i t  to  how f a r  i t  w i l l  f a l l  
and a t  th a t  p o in t  e x p ec ta t io n s  become convergent i . e  p r ic e  i s  
expected to  s t a r t  r i s i n g  ag a in  towards i t s  normal l e v e l  -  which i s  
no th ing  more than a s u b je c t iv e  view of what the o i l  p r ic e  'ought to  
b e ' .
Both e x p e c ta t io n a l  v a r ia b le s  have been co n s tru c ted  according to :
nJ- wPt _-x fo r  n = 6 and n = 18 months w ith 0 < w < 1
where Pt " = Y _^______
n
In p a r t i c u l a r ,  fo r  the v a r ia b le  corresponding to e x t ra p o la t iv e
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ex p e c ta t io n s  (n=6) a value  of w = 0.25 has been used so th a t
Pt '  = [ 0 .25Pt -x + (1 -  0 .2 5 )P t - 2 + (1 “ 0 .2 5 )2Pt -3 + . . . ] / 6
For n=18 (covergen t ex p e c ta t io n s )  a value of w = 0.8  has been used in  
o rder  th a t  the  e f f e c t  of p r ic e s  during the p a s t  18 months does not 
d ie  out very ra p id ly :
Pt " = [0 .8P t _x + 0 . 64Pt _2 + 0.512Pt _3 + . . . . ] / 1 8
These w eights have been chosen in  an a r b i t r a r y  manner, a f t e r  t r i a l s  
w ith  d i f f e r e n t  v a lu es ,  the  only o b je c t iv e  being to cap ture  some 
n o tio n  of the 'norm al ' p r ic e  l e v e l  and e x t r a p o la t iv e  ex p ec ta t io n s  -  
whose e f f e c t  d ies  out very q u ick ly .
Expected p r ic e s  have been in troduced  in to  the t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n s
of o f f i c i a l  OPEC p r ic e s  as fu n c t io n s  of spot crude p r i c e s ,  and the
r e s u l t s  a re  given in  t a b le  7 .3 .3 .  The e x p e c ta t io n a l  v a r ia b le s  
(Xx, X2) appear w ith the c o r re c t  s igns but ap a r t  from two cases they 
a re  i n s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from zero . Since, however, the m odel's  
performance i s  improved -  t y p i c a l l y  the RSS i s  lower -  i t  is  probably 
due to  high c o l l i n e a r i t y  th a t  the s tandard  e r ro r s  a re  too h igh.
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Table 7 .3 .3  E x p ec ta t io n s :  O f f i c i a l  OPEC P r ice s  as a fu n c tio n  of spot 
p r ic e s  and expected p r i c e s ,  1976 -  1985
Note: Yt  = OPEC p r i c e ,  Xi = e x t r a p o la t iv e  ex p e c ta t io n s
X2  = convergent e x p e c ta t io n s ,  X3  = spo t crude o i l  p r ic e
A. ARABIAN LIGHT
Yt " w'o*U + w"oX2t + <W° ~ ”lB) X3t-! + 0O +   at
- 0XB)
= -0 .136
(0 .04)
RSS = 6 5  DF 104 * Q2 4  = 20
(1 -  SqB) (1
w 'Q = 0.052 w” 0
(0 .061)
-0 .038  wc 
(0 .06)
-0 .075
(0 .04)
W1
% = 0.914 0O
(0.024)
8.22 0X = 0.95
(2 .4 )  (0.038)
B. IRANIAN LIGHT
« 'o X l t  + w“oX2t + (W° ~ ” lB) x3 t-3  +
(1 -  S jB) (1 ~ 01B)
w 0.024
(0.065)
w"Q = -0 .013
(0 .06)
0.137 wi 
(0 .04)
0.05
(0 .04)
6  ^ =  0 .8 8  0
(0.041)
7.98 \  = 0.96
(3 .26) (0 .03)
RSS = 76 DF = 104 Q24 - 14
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Table 7 .3 .3  (Continued)
C. NIGERIAN LIGHT
Y t = w'0Xit + w"0X2t + <” o -  WjB -  « 2B2) x 3c_8 + 0Q + 1 a t
(1 - 6-XB) (1 - $iB)
w"0 = 0 .072 w"0 = -0 . 0 5 3  wQ = 0 .19 9  wx = 0 .27
(0 .0 8 )  (0 .0 8 9) (0 .0 6)  (0 .0 9)
w2 = - 0 . 1 7 5  S x = 0 .8 1 5  0O « 10 .3 8  « 0.94
(0 .0 7 6 )  (0 .0 94 ) ( 4 .2 1 )  (0 .0 43)
RSS = 170 DF «  103 Q24 = 29
D. KUWAIT CRUDE
Y t = w'0X l t  + w"0X2t +
( 1  -  6 XB)
x t - 7  + e 0
(1 - (J,1B)
w"n = 0,004 w" n  = -0 .0 3 4  w,
(0 .0 3 ) (0 .0 4 )
0.028
(0 .0 3 )
5X = 0 .9 1
( 0 . 10)
1 0 .3 2
( 5 . 1 2 )
1  =
0 .96
(0 .0 4 )
RSS = 200 DF = 105 Q24 " 21
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS
The primary o b je c t iv e  of t h is  work has been the d e r iv a t io n  of a 
p la u s i b l e  hypothesis  as to the way the p r ic in g  of crude o i l  i s  being  
c a r r ie d  out. For th at purpose we have i n i t i a l l y  reviewed the b a s ic  
r e s u l t s  suggested by d e p le t io n  theory, from which the co n clu sio n  has 
emerged th at t h i s  theory only provides f a i r l y  general statements  
about the l i k e l y  trend of o i l  p r ic e s  under i d e a l i s e d  co n d it io n s  -  
such as the knowledge of u l t im a t e ly  recoverab le  reserves  and user  
c o sts  -  and under d if f e r e n t  market s t r u c t u r e s .  The judgement about  
the s p e c i f i c  s t r u c t u r e  under which the o i l  in d u s t r y  operates at any 
g iven  moment in  time i s  s t i l l  l e f t  to the a n a ly s t .
Thus as we have concluded from the review of the re le v a n t works 
i n  t h is  a re a , a n a ly s t s  have predominantly approached o i l  p r ic e s  as i f  
they have been ad m inistered  by the OPEC c a r t e l  i n  the past 25 y e a r s .  
However, there are fundamental reasons for disagreement w ith t h i s  
consensus view: the f a c t  th a t  any d e c is io n  on a l e v e l  of crude o i l
p r ic e s  by OPEC n e c e s s a r i ly  re q u ir e s  an agreement about output 
r e g u la t io n  i n  order to support th at l e v e l ,  something th at only  
m a t e r ia l is e d  i n  1983 and again  r e c e n t ly  (Summer 198 6). Given  
i n t e r n a l  OPEC disagreements a r i s i n g  out of c o n f l i c t i n g  in t e r e s t s  
between i t s  governments such agreements are very hard to achieve and 
m a in ta in . Furthermore, the f a c t  th a t  by the nature of crude o i l  i t s  
demand i s  a derived  one, a f a c t  th at makes the s t a b i l i t y  of any crude  
p r i c i n g  s tr u c t u r e  fundam entally, i n  the long run, dependent on the 
s t a b i l i t y  of the p ro d u cts' p r ic in g  s t r u c t u r e ,  hence the f a c t  th at  
d i f f e r e n t i a l s  can only be market determined which im p lie s  that OPEC 
cannot c o n tro l  a s p e c i f i c  s t r u c t u r e  s in c e  i t  cannot co n tro l the 
corresponding product p r i c e s .
On the other hand, to move to the other extreme and argue that  
o i l  p r ic e s  have been determined by a p erfect  market so that i n  the
long run the m arginal co st  -  m arginal revenue mechanism w i l l  be the 
b a s is  of o i l  p r ic e  l e v e l s  i s  s i m i l a r l y  an unacceptable argument. The 
o i l  market cannot be p e r fe c t  i f  only due to the asymmetric 
geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n  of re s e r v e s .
Examination of the o i l  i n d u s t r y 's  e v o lu t io n  has rev e a led  a 
t r a n s i t i o n  from a s t r u c t u r e  dominated by a l im it e d  number of o i l  
companies to one in  which p roduction and marketing are in  the hands 
of producing OPEC governments. T h is  t r a n s f e r  of c o n t r o l ,  however, 
has not sim ply been a s h i f t  of emphasis from one c a r t e l  to another
s in c e  OPEC i s  not a c a r t e l  and d i f f e r s  fundam entally from the o ld
m arketers, as the la c k  of any coherent v e r t i c a l  in t e g r a t io n  i n  the 
o i l  in d u s tr y  today has meant a permanent change in  s t r u c t u r e .
I n  the old  system, the APQ and f iv e -s e v e n t h s  r u le  have provided  
a production sh a rin g  system seeking to s t a b i l i s e  p r ic e s  and check 
overproduction. Today there i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  nothing that can be done 
to stop i n d i v i d u a l  OPEC c o u n tr ie s  from producing as much o i l  as they  
l i k e ,  nor to o f f e r  d is c o u n ts .  So as a u n it  OPEC has s u ffe re d
whenever i t s  c o l l e c t i v e  output bore no resemblance to market
c o n d it io n s ;  n e v e r t h e le s s , the in c e n t iv e s  fo r  i n d i v i d u a l  members to  
s e l l  as much o i l  as i s  needed to s a t i s f y  t h e ir  goals -  whether th at  
i s  the repayment of N i g e r i a ' s  fo re ig n  debt, or f in a n c in g  the 
I r a n - I r a q  War -  can be too great to r e s i s t .
With the red u ctio n s i n  concessions and the take over of s a le s  by
OPEC, crude buyers have begun to look elsewhere fo r  t h e i r  o i l ,
r e s u lt in g  in  an expansion of non-OPEC p roduction. Although many new
fin d s  have been in  h ig h er cost a re as, thus encouraging higher p r i c e s ,
s e l l e r s  have been prepared to o ffe r  d iscounts in  order to break in to  
the market. As a r e s u l t  OPEC's share of world output has co n tra cte d ,  
thus adding to i t s  i n a b i l i t y  to f i x  p r ic e s  through v a r ia t io n s  in  i t s  
s u p p l ie s .
Furthermore, w ith the end of the concession era many buyers came 
inj^the market thus com petition between buyers has in c re a se d  at times
of s c a r c i t y ,  a l lo w in g  producers to s e l l  to the h ig h est  b id d e r.
However, as seen i n  recent y e a r s ,  in  excess supply c o n d it io n s
producers are forced in  g re a te r  com petition to s e l l  to a wider range 
of customers who are ab le  to shop around.
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P r e v io u s ly  the c o n c e s s io n a ire s  could  a d ju s t  i n t e r n a l l y  to equate  
supply with demand through measures such as d e pletin g  in v e n t o r ie s  or  
r e d ir e c t in g  tankers in  shortage t im es, or b u i ld in g  up in v e n to r ie s  to 
w ithhold s u p p lie s  i n  times of g l u t .  T h is  has helped the market to 
remain s t a b le .  Now th at l i t t l e  crude passes from the m ajors, they  
cannot f u l f i l l  t h i s  fu n c t io n  and they are forced i n c r e a s in g l y  in  the  
spot market to deal w ith  d i s e q u i l b r i a .  T h is  has been the r a t io n a le  
fo r  the expansion i n  volumes traded i n  the spot market such that  
today i t  i s  regarded as an in d i c a t o r  of market tre n d s, and a ls o  a 
r e f le c t o r  of the reduced a b i l i t y  of the new marketers to deal w ith  
the l o g i s t i c s  problem.
Up to 1970 the companies could  arrange to get the r ig h t  amount 
and type of crude to the r ig h t  p la ce  at the r ig h t  time and now 
governments have to perform t h is  fu n c t io n .  The in s is t e n c e  by s e l l e r s  
th at t h e ir  own tankers be used fo r  tr a n s p o r t ,  and t h e ir  frequent  
im p o sit io n s  of d e s t in a t io n  co n tro ls  and r e s a le  p r o h ib it io n s  have 
hampered f l e x i b i l i t y  and le d  to l o g i s t i c a l  i n e f f i c i e n c i e s  as now more 
tankers from more p o in ts  of departure seek more d e s t in a t io n s .
Co n tro l of crude has always been a b a r r ie r  to entry fo r  new 
r e f i n e r s ,  even i f  they could  overcome the huge s c a le  economies 
enjoyed by the m ajo rs. ° P r e - 1 9 7 0  the o i l  companies could r e s i s t  entry  
i n  t h is  stage as they were in  r e c e ip t  of p l e n t i f u l  su p p lie s  of low 
c o s t ,  h ig h ly  p r o f i t a b le  o i l .  As a r e s u l t  t h e ir  r e f i n e r i e s  have been 
operating e f f i c i e n t l y  though they could a ffo rd  to make lo s s e s  s in c e  
these would be absorbed from another of t h e i r  v e r t i c a l l y  in te g ra te d  
a c t i v i t i e s .  N o n -in te g ra te d  r e f in e r s  were u n l ik e l y  to o b tain  crude  
o i l  at c o n c e s s io n a ire  p r i c e s ,  so entry in  r e f in in g  was l im it e d .  T h is  
changed in  the p o s t -19 7 0  p e rio d , when with p r ic e s  r i s i n g  and the 
majors lo s in g  t h e i r  comparative advantages and co n tro l  of the 
upstream, the chances of independent r e f in e r s  being s u c c e s s f u l  
in c re a se d  and so did t h e i r  numbers. The d e - in t e g r a t io n  of the majors  
has meant that they a cq u ire d  a strong in c e n t iv e  i n  seeing p r ic e s  f a l l  
to allow  r e f in e r y  margins -  which fo r  the f i r s t  time became r e a l  
f ig u r e s  and not acco unting e x e r c is e s  -  to be s u s ta in e d . On the other  
hand, producing c o u n tr ie s  have sought to r e s i s t  downwards p r ic e
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movements. Such supply and demand sid e  d iffere n c es , w hile allow ing  
for  greater com petition, have a lso  aggravated u n cer ta in tie s  and 
flu c tu a tio n s  in  the market.
W ithin  that changing framework of op eration, we have argued th a t  
p r ic e s  have been in f lu e n c e d  by ( 1 )  the OPEC group, which though 
unable to act  as a c a r t e l  has c e r t a i n l y  the p o t e n t ia l  to a l t e r
y
p r i c e s ,  i f  only h j f  v i r t u e  of the high proportion of reserves at i t s  
d is p o s a l  and p e o p le 's  p ercep tio n s that i t  can ad m in iste r  p r ic e s  -  and 
we have seen how important such p erceptions can be, e s p e c i a l l y  fo r  
s p e c u la t iv e  in v e n to ry  b u i ld in g ;  ( 2 ) the major o i l  companies which by 
v i r t u e  of t h e i r  downstream h an d lin g  of OPEC crude have not l o s t  t h e ir  
power and have c e r t a i n l y  been i n f l u e n t i a l  in  e n fo rcin g  changes i n  the 
OPEC p r ic e  s t r u c t u r e  d ic ta te d  by the demand-side of the equation; (3)  
consumers' a c t io n s  -  not only the obvious p an ic  r e a c t io n  to 
unexpected p o l i t i c a l  c r i s e s  a f f e c t in g  o i l  s u p p lie s  but more important  
t h e i r  energy p o l i c i e s  designed to reduce dependence on imported o i l  
through co n se rv a tio n  e f f o r t s  and a ls o  expansion of domestic energy 
s u p p lie s ;  t h is  l a t t e r  f a c t o r  has in cre a se d  membership of the fo u rth  
group of acto rs  (4) non-OPEC o i l  producers, thus causing in c re a se d  
h e t e r o -  gen eity  on the supply s id e  and fu r th e r  weakening OPEC's 
p o s it io n .
O i l  p r ic e s  rose s h a rp ly  in  the 1970s due to s c a r c i t y  -  
p a r t i a l l y  genuine, caused by p o l i t i c a l  events but a ls o  p a r t i a l l y  
p erceived  hence le a d in g  to exaggerated re a c t io n s  -  and have stayed  
hig h  ra th e r  than re tu rn  to t h e i r  p r e - c r i s e s  le v e ls  due to the v a r ie t y  
of s t r u c t u r a l  tran sfo rm atio n s mentioned above. The t r a n s f e r  of 
production c o n tr o ls  from companies to governments -  an event that  
i n d i v i d u a l l y  producing c o u n tr ie s  would have achieved even in  OPEC's 
absence given the d e s ir e  to c o n tro l  the s o le  source of t h e ir  w ealth -  
which has meant a r e v is io n  in  the fundamental fa c to r s  determining o i l  
e x t r a c t io n :  a lt e r e d  property r ig h t s  have r e s u lte d  in  lower d e p letio n  
r a te s  than would have been the case had the majors remained in  the 
d r i v e r ' s  s e a t .  Furthermore, consuming c o u n tr ie s '  exp ecta tio n s of 
f u r t h e r  p r ic e  c r i s e s  and t h e i r  consequent attempts to conserve energy
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have taken q u ite  a long time to b r in g  any e f f e c t s .  The demand s id e  
i n e r t i a  has f u r t h e r  supported high p r ic e  l e v e l s ,  as has the s h i f t  to 
short term c o n t r a c t s ,  by c o n tr ib u t in g  to the p r e v a i l in g  u n c e r t a in t y .
The attempt to provide e m p ir ic a l  support to the argument th a t  
OPEC has not operated as a c a r t e l  and that p r ic e s  have e s s e n t i a l l y  
been market determined has s t a r t e d  by employing the B ox-Jen kin s  
methodology in  order to f in d  a p p ro p riate  models and hence to .test  
c a u s a l i t y  and la g  s t r u c t u r e s  between the ' f r e e '  o i l  market on the one 
hand and the OPEC ad m inistered  system on the o th e r . The main 
co n clu sio n s drawn from t h is  e x e r c is e  are th a t  OPEC has t y p i c a l l y  been 
a market fo llo w e r w ith  any changes in  the supply-demand balance i n  
the spot market causin g  changes* i n  o f f i c i a l  p r ic e s  a f t e r  some time.  
The time lag s in v o lv e d  i n  t h is  response have been i d e n t i f i e d  and the 
fu n c t io n s  d e s c r ib in g  them have been estim ated.
The o l i g o p o l i s t i c  c o n tro l  over p r ic in g  by supply m anipulations  
and the smooth process w ith  which the movement of la rg e  amounts of 
o i l  from d isco ve ry  to t r a n s p o r t a t io n ,  r e f in in g  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  
could a l l  be achieved through the channels of j u s t  one company have 
disappeared. S in ce  the o i l  in d u s t r y  today i s  fragmented with buying  
and s e l l i n g  being* pursued by o r g a n is a t io n s  w ith d if f e r e n t  o b je c t iv e s ,  
the market mechanism p la y s  a c r u c i a l  r o le  and that im p lie s  th at  
p r ic in g  i s  much more prone to f lu c t u a t io n s  i n  supply and demand, even 
when these occur as the r e s u l t  of s p e c u la t io n  f u e l le d  by rumours. We 
have seen the o i l  market go f u l l  c i r c l e  from an era of su rp lu s  to one
of p erce ived  shortage and re tu rn  to su rp lu s  once a g a in . The
d is in t e g r a t io n  of the in d u s tr y  and the in c re a se d  volumes of o i l  
moving on s h o rt-te rm  arrangements with a c r u c i a l  r o le  fo r the more 
tran sp aren t yet v o l a t i l e  spot markets have a l l  le d  to p r ic e  
i n s t a b i l i t y  and a very important q u estio n  i s  what i s  l i k e l y  to happen 
to o i l  p r ic e s  in  the near fu t u r e .
Any s p e c u la t io n  about the fu tu re  of o i l  p r ic e s  re q u ire s
assumptions about the l i k e l y  trends in  demand and su p p ly . On the
demand s id e  s u b s t i t u t io n  of o i l  by other f u e ls  in  the OECD c o u n tr ie s  
s in c e  1979 has remained stro n g , given o i l ' s  h igher cost to f i n a l
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u s e r s .  I t  would seem th at the demand d e c lin e  has r e s u lt e d  more from 
s t r u c t u r a l  changes o ccu rin g  i n  response to the higher p r ic e  l e v e l s  
and l e s s  from the r e c e s s io n  experienced by i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n tr ie s .
Exam ination of the energy i n t e n s it y  of i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  co u n tr ie s  
re v e a ls  a 'c l e a r  s t r u c t u r a l  change. O i l  use per u n it  of GDP has 
c o n s is t e n t ly  decreased s in c e  19 7 9 , as re v e a le d  by E u r o s t a t .  
Furthermore, the a p p r e c ia t io n  of the d o l la r  i n  1983-84 has meant that  
the so ftn e s s  of o i l  p r ic e s  has not been passed through to f i n a l  
u s e r s ,  and t h is  trend has been re in fo rc e d  by the energy p o l i c i e s  of- 
consuming n atio n s which have t y p i c a l l y  prevented lower p r ic e s  to 
consumers by r a i s i n g  t a x a t io n .  T h is  l a t t e r  f a c t o r  lead s to the 
co n clu s io n  that even i n  periods when the d o l la r  i s  d e c l in in g ,  f i n a l  
users are not l i k e l y  to b e n e f it  from much lower p r i c e s .
These broad trends i n  the o il/G D P  r e la t io n s h ip  encompass v a r io u s  
s t r u c t u r a l  changes th a t  have been going on i n  the main se cto rs  of 
OECD economies. In  the t r a n s p o r t a t io n  se c to r  -  which accounts fo r  
n e a r ly  50 per cent of a l l  o i l  use -  the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  fo r  fu e l  
sw itch in g  are very l im i t e d .  O i l  use i n  t r a n s p o r ta t io n  has fo r  
decades accounted f o r  99 per cent of a l l  energy needs and t h i s  i s  
u n l ik e ly  to change. The bulk of o i l  consumption i s  fo r  road  
tra n sp o rt  where average c a r  consumption has improved with engines now 
being much more e f f i c i e n t .  That has meant lower o i l  consumption, and 
t h i s  trend i s  u n l ik e l y  to be reversed . N e v e rth e le ss, the f a c t  that  
more e f f i c i e n t  engines reduce the cost of energy per m ile  t r a v e l le d  
may mean in c re a se d  d r iv in g  and higher car  ownership, which may 
outweigh the f u e l  sa v in g  stemming from in cre a se d  e f f i c i e n c y .
In  the i n d u s t r i a l  s e c to r  of the OECD -  accounting fo r n e a r ly  30 
per cent of a l l  o i l  use -  s t r u c t u r a l  changes away from in te n s iv e  uses  
have occu d causing the d e c lin e  in  o v e r a l l  o i l  demand. In  the 
e l e c t r i c i t y  se c to r  there has been a prominent sw itch to c o a l ,  hydro 
and n u cle a r  power and as long as the importing c o u n t r ie s 1 p o l i c i e s  
are not to b u i ld  any new o i l - f i r e d  power p la n t s ,  demand may be 
expected to be low. S t i l l ,  the f a c t  that many of the new p la n ts  
m a in tain  dual or even m u lt ip le  f i r i n g  systems means that in  a 
prolonged environment of s o ft  o i l  p r ic e s  demand may in  f a c t  in c r e a s e .
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F in a lly , in  the r e s id e n t ia l sector  of the OECD again demand has 
declined s ig n if ic a n t ly  with the change in  heating systems to n o n -o il 
fu e ls  as w ell as improved house in su la tio n . These trends seem 
u n lik ely  to be r e v e r s ib le , even at times of high economic growth and 
thus on th is  s id e  low o i l  consumption i s  expected.
/
I n  c o n t r a s t  to OECD o i l  consumption trends and d e sp ite  the two %
o i l  shocks the LD Cs1 energy and o i l  demand appear dependent more on 
incomes and the economy’ s s t r u c t u r a l  changes r a t h e r  than energy 
p r i c e s .  LDCs have, shown f a r  l e s s  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  a d ju s t in g  energy  
requirements per u n it  of output than have the OECD c o u n tr ie s .
Indeed, any e f f o r t s  by LDCs to decouple the growth in  energy and 
the growth i n  GDP would c la s h  - w ith t h e ir  simultaneous e f f o r t s  to 
i n d u s t r i a l i s e .  Thus t h e i r  demand fo r energy has remained h ig h . Any 
red u ctio n s i n  o i l  use per u n it  of GDP that have occurred must have 
been m ainly due to the r e c e s s io n  and debt problems and t h is  would 
imply th at  i n  a l e s s  problem atic  economic environment LDCs’ o i l  
demand may grow f a s t e r  than GDP. T h is  view i s  fu r th e r  supported -by 
v a rio u s  s t r u c t u r a l  changes rep o rted , such a s : a gradual decrease i n  
LDCs* r e l i a n c e  on non-commercial fu e ls  due to h ig h er economic growth 
and d e fo r e s t a t io n ; the growth of heavy in d u s tr ie s '  i n  e it h e r  cheap 
energy c o u n tr ie s  (OPEC) or high p r o d u c t iv i t y ,  lo w -c o st  c o u n tr ie s  (SE 
A s ia )  and f i n a l l y ,  the underdeveloped nature of the t r a n s p o r t a t io n  
se cto r  which suggests th a t  c a r  o w n e r s h ip ,  maritime tr a n s p o r t ,  s (  
a v ia t io n  and r a i lw a y  s e r v ic e s  can in c re a se  in  the f u t u r e .
Turning next to the supply s id e  of the market we should f i r s t l y  
examine the prospects fo r  non-OPEC output. One important point to be 
made here i s  th at non-OPEC p roducers, l i k e  OPEC, should not be viewed 
as a m onolith. One has to d i s t in g u is h  between the US, other OECD 
i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  c o u n t r ie s ,  and LDC producers other than OPEC. US 
production i n  the 6 yea rs  19 7 8 -19 8 3  has s t a b i l i s e d  at around 1 0 .3  
mbd, w ith a s i m i l a r  p ic t u r e  f o r  S oviet o i l  p ro d u ctio n . In  the OECD 
re g io n , i t  has been North Sea production that has p r im a r i ly  b en e fited  
from h igher o i l  p r i c e s .  T h is  production was running at c lo s e  to 3 
mbd in  1983 w ith  peak production expected in  1986-87 and a grad ual  
d e c lin e  afterwards such th at by 1990 o i l  production may be about
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equal to 1983-84 l e v e l s .  I t  seems that the consensus of p r e d ic t io n s  
on OECD domestic pro d u ctio n  in d ic a t e s  a d e c lin e  from now to 1990, 
w ith t o t a l  OECD supply on th at  date at around 14 mbd.
The d e c lin e  envisaged fo r  OECD co u n tr ie s  w i l l  be more than 
counterbalanced by in c r e a s e s  i n  other sources such as Mexico and many 
s m a ll  A f r ic a n ,  A s ia n  and Middle Ea ste rn  c o u n t r ie s .  T h erefo re,  
o v e r a l l  o i l  p roduction from non-OPEC sources i s  p r o je c te d  to in c r e a s e  
by 1990 , but the in c r e a s e s  w i l l  probably be no more than 1 mbd 
compared with the 1983 l e v e l  of around 26 mbd.
With non-OPEC o i l  s u p p lie s  remaining f l a t  or in c r e a s in g  
s l i g h t l y ,  the main f a c t o r  th at w i l l  determine OPEC output i s  demand. 
As seen above the p ic t u r e  on demand i s  not q u ite  c l e a r .  O v e r a l l ,  one 
might be tempted to p r e d ic t  f l a t  consumption ra te s  but at the same 
time there are f a c t o r s  which could  work towards an in c r e a s e .
C l e a r l y ,  i n  a s i t u a t i o n  of s ta b le  or even in c r e a s in g  demand and 
f l a t  non-OEPC su p p ly , OPEC might be back in  the d r i v e r ' s  sea t  by 
1990, in  the sense th a t  they w i l l  be supplying a h ig h er proportion of 
the consumer c o u n t r ie s '  o i l  import requirem ents. Under such 
c o n d it io n s ,  and assuming the recent agreement on output r e s t r i c t i o n s  
i n  the summer of 1986 i s  m aintained and updated to whatever demand 
may be i n  the f u t u r e ,  one could argue that by 1990 o i l  p r ic e s  w i l l  be 
h ig h er than today, though the p r e c is e  f ig u r e  w i l l  be a fu n c t io n  of 
demand.
On the other hand, i t  i s  e q u a lly  p o s s ib le  to employ the
s t a t i s t i c s  and form ulate the fo llo w in g  argument of d e c lin in g  o i l  
p r i c e s :  assuming demand continues to f a l l  due to co n servatio n  e f f o r t s  
and the f a c t  th a t  LDCs* energy use i s  based on technology imported 
from the west -  hence, given the time l a g s ,  a more e f f i c i e n t
technology by 1990 -  and assuming th at OPEC f in d s  i t s e l f  t o t a l l y  
unable to hold on to t h e i r  production agreements due to the inherent  
c o n f l i c t  between low and high absorbers, then i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to
v i s u a l i s e  a s i t u a t i o n  of low and d e c l in in g  o i l  p r i c e s .  W ithin both
s c e n a r io s ,  exp ecta tio n s about o i l  p r ic e s  are l i k e l y  to prove 
c r u c i a l .  At the moment the consensus seems to be th at o i l  p r ic e s  
w i l l  remain low. That corresponds to the s h o r t -r u n  e x t r a p o la t iv e
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nature of e x p e c ta t io n s .  Sooner or l a t e r ,  that consensus i s  l i k e l y  to 
change, at which p o in t  and acco rd in g  to the convergent theory h igher  
o i l  p r ic e s  may be expected. I t  i s  c l e a r l y  not p o s s ib le  to determine 
p r e c i s e ly  when th a t  w i l l  o c c u r , or whether i t  has a lre a d y  occurred  
fo llo w in g  the OPEC agreement on output.
Assuming that indeed h ig h er p r ic e s  are expected, consumers w i l l  
r a i s e  demand and in v e n t o r y .  S u p p lie rs  may respond by h o lding o i l  o ff  
the market i n  order to take advantage of h ig h er expected p r i c e s .  
N e v e rth e le ss, as the p h y s ic a l  l i m i t s  to sto ck  h o ld in g  are approached, 
the r a t e  of a d d it io n s  to in v en to ry  w i l l  d e c l in e ,  so demand w i l l  f a l l  
and p r ic e  e x p e cta tio n s might a ls o  come down. Lower expected p r ic e s  
compared w ith  in t e r e s t  ra te s  w i l l ,  according to the simple d e p letio n  
model, cause red u ctio n s i n  sto ck  h o ld in g s ,  thus depress demand even 
f u r t h e r .  Producers w i l l  then s t a r t  f ig h t in g  fo r  market share to 
r a i s e  revenues, hence p r ic e s  w i l l  be fu r th e r  reduced. T h is  re d u ctio n  
may lead  to a s u b s t i t u t i o n  of o i l  for other f u e l s ,  thus demand may 
s t a r t  r i s i n g  again  and the c y c le  may be repeated once more.
The above e x e r c is e  should be adequate to prove how m a n ip u lation  
of f ig u r e s  and id ea s  may provide support to any sc e n a r io  about the 
fu tu re  of o i l  p r i c e s .  Low o i l  p r ic e s  are p o s s ib le ,  but then h ig h e r  
ones are a ls o  f e a s i b l e ,  and the p r o b a b i l i t y  of the inventory c y c le  of 
r i s i n g  p r ic e s  follow ed by f a l l i n g  ones i s  q u ite  high given our past  
e x p e rie n c e s .
The point i s  that i n  the end, however i n t e l l e c t u a l  the guess i s ,  
i t  s t i l l  remains a g uess. S u r e ly ,  that cannot help anyone in  the 
energy f i e l d  who i s  burdened w ith  pla n n in g .
What we are sayin g  i s  th a t  as a r e s u lt  of the o i l  in d u s t r y 's  
t r a n s i t i o n  to a m o r e -o r - le s s  market determined p r ic e  environment, 
u n c e r t a in t y ,  v o l a t i l i t y  and hence n e c e s s a r i ly  i n e f f i c i e n c y  are i t s  
main fe a tu re s  today.
I t  i s  th erefo re of paramount importance that steps are taken to  
ensure the phasing out of the present s t a t e  and the completion of the 
i n d u s t r y 's  t r a n s i t i o n  to an Environment of s t a b i l i t y  in  both crude 
and product markets. C l e a r ly  there are b e n e f its  to both •producers
-  307 -
and consumers of having a c e r t a in  degree of p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  in  energy  
markets, fo r  making investment i n  e x p lo ra t io n  and development or i n  
energy-consuming a p p l ia n c e s .
The q u estion  n e c e s s a r i ly  a r i s e s  as to whether there i s  a 
c o n tra st  between fre e  o i l  markets on the one hand which are  
n e c e s s a r i ly  v o l a t i l e ,  and s t a b i l i t y  of o i l  p r ic e s  on the o th e r, which 
re q u ire s  some degree of in t e r v e n t io n .  I t  i s  our b e l i e f  that one does 
not n e c e s s a r i ly  preclude the o th er.
The b a s is  of t h i s  argument comes fom o b se rv a t io n  of the money 
markets. We b e l ie v e  i t  i s  le g it im a t e  to compare these two markets  
s in c e  both 'p ro d u c ts ' share two important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  We 
g e n e r a l ly  t a l k  about 'money1 .and ' o i l '  and yet there are many 
c u r r e n c ie s  and many d if f e r e n t  q u a l i t y  crudes; so both are pseudo 
homogenous w ith the r e s u l t  being that the s tr u c tu r e  of p r ic e s  i n  each  
market i s  always im portant. In  a d d it io n ,  both are t y p i c a l l y  seen as 
an exp ressio n  of s t a t e  so ve re ig n ty  and p r e s t ig e .  Governments have to 
be seen to be in  co n tro l  of t h e i r  v a lu a b le  n a t u r a l  resource and they  
have to avoid  d e va lu a tio n s which are c o s t ly  in  p o l i t i c a l  terms.
Furthermore, there appears to be a p a r a l l e l  development of both 
markets, which have moved away from the t o t a l l y  adm inistered, system -  
the m ajors' c o n tro l i n  o i l  and the automatic gold standard with the 
f ix e d  exchange r a te  -  in t o  a more l i b e r a l  regime.
The gold sta n d ard  d ied  back in  1 9 4 1 ,  The B retton Woods system 
was an attempt to work w ith  s t a b i l i s e d  exchange r a te s  -  d e fin in g  
p a r i t i e s  of c u rre n c ie s  i n  terms of both gold and d o l la r s  -  and la s t e d  
fo r  about 25 years but i t  too was abandoned. No s t a t e  would accept  
i n f l a t i o n  because of f ix e d  exchange ra te  p a r i t i e s  or d e p re c ia t io n  in  
order to avo id  ch ro n ic  balance of payments d e f i c i t s .  Divergent  
trends i n  co sts  and demand between co u n tr ie s  meant that the f ix e d  
exchange ra te  system could not work.
When t h is  system broke down i n  the 1970s no p e rfe c t  new system  
was s u b s t it u t e d  fo r  i t .  In  f a c t ,  no agreement was reached on a
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system, r e p la c in g  B retto n  Woods. So the market moved on to a 
f l o a t i n g  exchange r a t e  system. No market can be p e rfe c t  and 
im p e rfectio n s have meant th a t  a f r e e l y  f l o a t in g  system without any 
attempt fo r  s u p e r v is io n  and s t a b i l i s a t i o n  would r e s u l t  i n  i n s t a b i l i t y  
due to s p e c u la t iv e  a c t i v i t i e s  r e s u l t in g  in  ups and downs which would 
serve no u s e f u l  purpose, but would cause i n e f f i c i e n c y .  The C e n tr a l  
Banks seem to have assumed that su p e rv iso ry  r o le ,  which e s s e n t i a l l y  
c o n s is t s  of l e t t i n g  the markets do the work as long as no major 
c r i s e s  are imminent, otherw ise in te rv en e to avert any such c r i s e s .
In a s im ilar  way, when the major o i l  companies' domination over 
o i l  came to an end in  the 1970s, the emerging stru ctu re was not a 
p erfec t system . C rises have occurred and may continue to occur.
Expectations on behalf of the consumers are very important, but then
so they are in  the money markets. I t  would seem to be im possible to
go back to the fu l ly  co n tro lled  system, s in ce  i t  is  not l ik e ly  that
the o i l  industry w i l l  r e - in te g r a te . Hence, the remaining 
a lte r n a tiv e s  are e ith e r  in  free  market or a mixed system. The 
textbook free  market system is  again im possible s in ce  no market can 
ever be p erfect i f  only because of im perfect inform ation. The mixed 
system seems to be the only v ia b le  so lu tio n .
Now some would argue th a t  what we see now i s  a mixed system in  
the sense th at a l l  a c to r s  -  OPEC, the m ajors, independents and 
consumers -  p la y  some r o le .  However, as mentioned above, the system 
i s  n e it h e r  s e t t l e d  nor s t a b le ,  and fo r  the t r a n s i t i o n  to be completed 
the requirement e x i s t s  fo r  someone to become the counterpart of the 
C e n tr a l  Bank i n  the o i l  market and assume a su p e rv is o ry  r o le .
I t  seems u n l ik e l y  that a common approach can ever be agreed  
upon between producers and consumers, given the high degree of 
hetero g e n eity  of the two groups and d if f e r in g  and often c o n f l i c t i n g  
o b je c t iv e s  even w it h in  each group (OPEC versu s  non-OPEC, low versus  
high absorbers w it h in  OPEC, e t c ) .
The f a c t  th a t  OPEC's power has d e c lin e d , w ith many non-OPEC 
producers appearing in  the market, means th at i t  i s  very u n l ik e ly  
that a p a r t i c u l a r  group of producers w i l l  have the reserves and power 
req u ire d  to a d m in iste r  th a t  market. On the c o n tra ry ,  as most
-  309 -
ex p o rting  c o u n tr ie s  are moving downstream in to  r e f i n in g ,  com petition  
in  both crude and p ro d u cts' markets i s  bound to i n t e n s i f y .
W ithin  that s t r u c t u r e  the group that might have the a b i l i t y  to  
assume a s u p e rv is o ry  r o le  seems to be the G u lf  c o u n t r ie s .  They are 
q u ite  homogeneous i n  terms of economic and c u l t u r a l  s tr u c tu r e s  and 
thus they would q u a l i f y  fo r  in te r v e n in g  when a c r i s i s  i s  imminent. 
The in t e r v e n t io n  would take the form of s e l l i n g  both crude and 
products on the spot market i f  a shortage i s  in d ic a t e d  by so arin g  
p r ic e s  and by c u t t in g  back production when the market i s  very weak, 
th at i s ,  e s s e n t i a l l y  becoming the swing producers at times of c r i s e s .
C l e a r l y ,  to do th at  some conception of what p r ic e  l e v e ls  q u a l i f y  
as ' c r i s i s '  would be re q u ire d  w ith o b v io u sly  an upper and a lower 
l i m i t  of a ccep ta ble  p r ic e  swings. At the same tim e, such a group of 
producers should not make these l i m i t s  known, s in c e  that knowledge 
would a t t r a c t  a l o t  of s p e c u la t iv e  a c t i v i t y  whenever these l i m i t s  
were approached and t h i s  would only worsen the s i t u a t i o n .
Such a scheme would not a v e rt  p r ic e  v o l a t i l i t y  s in c e  t h is  i s  
n e c e s s a r i ly  a fe a tu re  of fre e  markets e s p e c i a l l y  today when the spot  
and fu tu re s  markets are so im portant. I t  would, however, provide  
some confidence th at a p r ic e  c o l la p s e  or ex p lo sio n  would not o ccu r,  
thus i t  would f a c i l i t a t e  p la n n in g .
To in c re a se  s t a b i l i t y  something d if f e r e n t  i s  re q u ire d . S in ce  
the demand fo r  crude i s  a d erived  demand, any attempt by OPEC or any 
other producers' group to enforce a p r ic e  u n re la te d  to the market 
fundamentals i s  bound to f a i l .  In  th a t  d i r e c t io n ,  the recent  
p r a c t ic e  of netback d e a ls ,  i . e  l in k i n g  the p r ic e  of crude to i t s  
v a lu e  i n  terms of products i s  a p o s it iv e  move on behalf of the  
producers. Netback p r ic in g  i s  bound to reduce i n s t a b i l i t y  s in c e  i t  
reduces the r i s k s  to both producers and r e f in e r s  and thus f a c i l i t a t e s  
lo n g e r-term  c o n tra c ts  and hence the s h r in k in g  of spot t r a n s a c t io n s .
One can c e r t a i n l y  v i s u a l i s e  a s i t u a t i o n  where netback deals are  
the standard p r a c t ic e  b r in g in g  in  a new change in  market s tr u c tu r e  in  
which o i l  p r ic e  trends would r e f l e c t  end u s e r s '  preferences fo r
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products and p la n n in g  would be p r im a r i ly  a fu n c t io n  of l i k e l y  demand 
trends ra th e r  than of the l ik e l i h o o d  of a p erceived c a r t e l  e x e r c is in g  
i t s  m o n o p o listic  powers. S in ce  the demand fo r crude i s  d e rive d , such 
a development would c l e a r l y  represent an improvement.
T h is  work has attempted to provide a framework of p r ic e  
determ ination which i s  supported by the e m p ir ic a l  evidence. The 
e m p ir ic a l  framework should be viewed as only a p r e l im in a r y  step to 
b u i ld in g  a complete, s t r u c t u r a l  model of the o i l  market. I t  i s  
necessary  to have some e m p ir ic a l  proof to the q u a l i t a t i v e  hypotheses  
advanced before one proceeds to model both the demand and supply  
s id e s  of the market and fo r  th at purpose t h is  study has intro d uced  
the use of a r e l a t i v e l y  recent methodology.
N e v e rth e le s s ,  the fu n c t io n s  a r r iv e d  at i n  t h is  way are e m p ir ic a l  
fu n c t io n s  and to the extent that they represent one r e s e a r c h e r 's  
in t e r p r e t a t io n  of the data, an element of u n c e r ta in t y  u n d e rlie s  t h e i r  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  A l t e r n a t iv e  in t e r p r e t a t io n s  and thus s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  
might be p o s s ib le .  Furthermore, to the extent that they are  
e m p ir ic a l l y  i d e n t i f i e d ,  the c r i t i c i s m  that they in v o lv e  a degree of 
t r i a l  and e r r o r  may a p p ly .
I d e a l l y ,  the m o delling ought to take p la c e  from a detached, 
v a lu e -f r e e  p o s it io n .  In  r e a l i t y ,  the f a c t  that a c e r t a in  theory  
u n d e r l ie s  the e m p ir ic a l  t e s t in g  u s u a l ly  means that one i s  not 
completely detached but one has d e f in it e  exp ecta tio n s from the data.  
That i n  i t s e l f  makes the s u b je c t iv e  in t e r p r e t a t io n  of the r e s u l t s  
l i a b l e  to a degree of b i a s .
One d e f in it e  drawback from which t h is  work s u ff e r s  i s  th at  
although we have recog n ised  the importance of the emerging fu tu re s  
markets which b rin g  tran sp aren cy in t o  spot markets, la c k  of the 
r e le v a n t  data has meant th a t  such markets could not be in c lu d e d  i n  
the t e s t in g .  I f  we take the simple depletio n  model of the r versus  
p" r u le  to be a r e a l i s t i c  r e p re s e n ta t io n  of production d e c is io n s  and 
thus of a c t u a l  p r i c e s ,  then c l e a r l y  exp ecta tio n s formed on the b a s is
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of fu tu re s  p r ic e s  p la y  an important r o le .  To complete the t r a n s f e r  
fu n c t io n s  in c o r p o r a t in g  e x p e c ta t io n s ,  th erefo re, fu tu re s  p r ic e s  ought 
to have been in c lu d e d .
A .f u r t h e r  drawback i s  the frequency of the data employed. With 
the response often o c c u r r in g  w ith in  the month, use of monthly f ig u r e s  
i s  a disadvantage. I d e a l l y ,  weekly data ought to have been in c lu d e d  
as t h is  would enable c le a r e r  d e te ctio n  of c a u se -a n d -la g g ed  e f f e c t s .  
As more a t t e n t io n  i s  focused on rep o rtin g  p r ic e s  that should not be a 
problem i n  the fu t u r e .
In  a d d it io n ,  the c o n c lu s io n  that one way c a u s a l i t y  from the spot  
crude o i l  p r ic e  to the OPEC - o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  im p lie s  market determined  
p r ic e s  may be c r i t i c i s e d  as premature. To be ab le  to support that  
co n clu s io n  with a high degree of confidence, one ought to in co rp o ra te  
e x p l i c i t l y  the demand and supply s id e s  of the market. That would 
in v o lv e  b u i ld in g  a s t r u c t u r a l  model of the market which represents  
demand and supply by t h e ir  determ ination f a c t o r s .  Such a model ought 
to be d isaggregated enough to account fo r  the v a r i e t y  of acto rs in  
the market and i t  ought to be co n stru cted  on thfe b a s is  of the Box-  
Jen k in s  methodology. W ith in  t h i s  model a v a r ie t y  of s im u la t io n s  
aimed at supporting the present framework could be run. So the 
b e l i e f  that n e t b a c k -r e la t e d  p r ic in g  would have reduced -  or even 
e lim in a te d  -  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  the market can be proved by s im u la t in g  
demand and supply as fu n c t io n s  not of o f f i c i a l  OPEC p r ic e s  but of 
n e t b a c k -r e la t e d  p r ic e s  and comparing the outcome to the a c t u a l .  Such 
experiments may be worth undertaking by other r e s e a rc h e rs .
As argued here there are b a s ic  s i m i l a r i t i e s  between the o i l  and 
money markets with the l a t t e r  more developed than the former. T h is  
enables one to p r o je c t  forward the e v o lu t io n  of exchange ra te s  from 
f ix e d  to f l o a t i n g  in t o  an image of the o i l  markets as they, may be. 
Here, the new framework of netback p r ic in g  i s  an important
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development l i k e l y  to enhance o i l  p r ic e  s t a b i l i t y .  The r e la t io n s h ip  
between crude o i l  and p ro ducts' markets has been p a r t i a l l y  
in v e s t ig a t e d  here, with the fu n c t io n s  d e sc r ib in g  the dependence of 
one on the other having been d e rive d  fo r  a long-term  period i . e  on 
the assumptions th at the s t a b i l i t y  of one i s  a fu n c t io n  of the 
s t a b i l i t y  of the other. N e v e rth e le s s, the present attempt i s  o nly  a 
p r e lim in a r y  one. More rese a rch  i s  req u ired  on that r e la t io n s h ip  
which could co ncentrate on a study of d i f f e r e n t i a l s .  The speed and 
form of the adjustment of crude o i l  p r ic e  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  to netback  
d i f f e r e n t i a l s  would be a p o s s ib le  d ir e c t io n  of fu r t h e r  rese arch  in  
that are a .
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STATIONARY STOCHASTIC PROCESSES: AUTOCOVARIANCES, STATIONARITY AND
IN VERTIBILITY CONDITIONS
The s t a t i o n a r i t y  assumption im p lie s  that the j o i n t  p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  p ( y t l>  Y t 2 ) i-s the same fo r a l l  times t j ,  t 2 which are a 
constant i n t e r v a l  a p a r t .  I t  fo llow s that the nature of t h is  j o i n t  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  can be in f e r r e d  by p lo t t in g  a s c a t t e r  diagram u sin g  
p a ir s  of v a lu e s  ( y t , y t +k) ° f  the time s e r i e s ,  separated by a 
constant i n t e r v a l  or lag  K.
F ig u re  A l . 1  i s  a s c a t t e r  diagram fo r la g  K = 1 ,  obtained by p lo t t in g  
yt + l  versus y t , fo r  the spot p r ic e  of Arabian l i g h t  crude ( 1 9 7 6 -8 5 ) .
FIGURE A l . l
S c a t t e r  diagram at la g  1 fo r  the spot p r ic e  data of A rabian L i g h t .
APPENDIX 1
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We see th at neighbouring v a lu e s  of the t im e -s e r ie s  are c o r r e la t e d ,  
the c o r r e la t io n  between y t and y b+ l  appearing to be p o s it i v e .  The 
co varian ce  between y t and i t s  v a lu e  yt+k» separated by K i n t e r v a l s  of 
tim e, i s  c a l le d  the a u to cova ria n ce at lag  K and i s  defined by 4 .3
The covarian ce m atrix  a s s o c ia te d  with a s t a t io n a r y  process fo r  
o b servatio n s ( y i ,  y2 > ••• yn) made at n s u c c e ss iv e  times i s :
Y o Y1 Y2 . . . • • •  Yn-1
•Yi Yo Yi . . . . . .  Yn- 2
y2
•
Y1
»
Y0 . . . Yn-3
Y n -1 Yn -2 Yn- 3 Yo
=  cr
1
P1
p2
pn - l
P 1
1
P 1
Pn--2
p2 .............  pn - l
pl .............  pn-2
1 .............  pn -3
•  • • • • » «  «
•  • • • • • •  •
p/ 3 : : : : : :  i
— 2 pcr yr n . . . . A . 1 . 1
A co varian ce m atrix  rn of t h i s  form, which i s  symmetric with  
constant elements on any d ia g o n a l,  i s  c a l le d  an auto cova ria n ce m atrix  
and the corresponding c o r r e la t io n  m atrix  Pn i s . c a l l e d  an 
a u t o c o r r e la t io n  m a trix .
C o n sid erin g  any l i n e a r  fu n c t io n  of the random v a r i a b l e  
Yt> Yt~l>  ••• t - n +1
L t = l x y t  + l 2 Y t - l  + ---------- + I ny t -n + 1
s in c e  Cov[y4y j ]  = yj j - i |  f o r  a s ta t io n a r y  p ro cess,
the v a r ia n c e  of L t i s  v a r [ L t ] = n n
E E |
1=1 j = l 13 X|
which i s  n e c e s s a r i ly  g re a te r  than zero i f  the l ' s  are not a l l  zero.  
I t  fo llow s that both an auto covarian ce m atrix  and an a u t o c o r r e la t io n  
m a trix  are p o s i t i v e - d e f i n i t e  fo r  any s ta t io n a r y  p rocess.
-  A3 -
The p o s it iv e  d e f in it e n e s s  of the a u t o c o r r e la t io n  m atrix  ( A . 1 . 1 )  
im p lie s  that i f s  determinant and a l l  p r i n c i p a l  minors are g re a te r  
than zero . In  p a r t i c u l a r  fo r n = 2
1' P i 
P1 1
so that  
and hence
1 — x > 0 
•1 < Px < 1
S i m i l a r l y ,  fo r  n=3 we must have
1 P1 1 p2 j
p l 1
> 0
% 1
> 0
1 < Pi < p2
P l <  1 < p l > 0
2 < P1 < 1
which im p lie s
- 1  < Px < 1
- 1  < P2 < 1
, P2 -  P x2- 1  <___ z_____ 1 < 1
1 -  P x2
and so on. S in ce  Pn must be p o s it iv e  d e f i n it e  fo r  a l l  va lu es of n,  
the a u to c o r r e la t io n s  of a s t a t io n a r y  process must s a t i s f y  a very  
la rg e  number of c o n d it io n s .  For a l in e a r  process these c o n d it io n s  
can be embodied i n  the s in g le  c o n d it io n  that the s e r ie s  ip ( B ) , which 
i s  the generating fu n c t io n  of the ip w eights, must converge fo r  
|B [ ^  1 , th at  i s ,  on or w it h in  the u n it  c i r c l e ,  as d iscussed  
below.
-  A 4  -
The au tocovariance at lag K of the l i n e a r  process
CO
y  =  2  i p  a
j  = o j  t - j
w ith  $  o ” 1 i s  given by
A .  1 . 2
y ( K )  = E [ y t y t +kJ
= E
OO 00
E ' E ip ip a a 
j  =o h-o j  h t - j  t+ k -h
= Q z
j  = 0  $ J  $  J  + k A . 1 . 3
u s in g  the property Y(K) = E [ a t at+ k] =
o 2a k=0 
o k^0
fo r  the au tocovariance fu n c t io n  of white n o is e .  In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  by 
s e t t in g  K=0 i n  ( A . 1 . 2 )  we f in d  that i t s  v a r ia n c e  i s
OO
Y (o )  = a2 y  = a 2a j - o  $ 2j  . . .  A. 1 . 4
I f  follow s that i f  the process i s  to have a f i n i t e  v a r ia n c e ,  the 
weights j£j must decrease f a s t  enough fo r the s e r ie s  on the r ig h t  of 
( A . 1 . 4 )  to converge.
The r e s u lt  ( A . 1 . 3 )  may be s u b s t it u te d  in  the au to va rian ce generating  
fu n c t io n
Y(B) = Z YC k ) Bk
k = —oo
to g ive  a? g>
Y(B) = a2a k = -c o  j= o  $ j  $ j + k Bk
CO OO
$4 -LI, Bk= cTa j -0  k = - j  v j  V kB*
lin ce = 0 fo r  h < 0. W rit in g  j  +  k = h, so that K = h -  j ,
Y (B)
CO OO
z z
a j "0  h~0 $j ^h fih“3
" P 2 a  h“ 0 $ h  Bh j “ 0 %  B 3 
that i s  Y(B) = a 2a $ ^ B) ^ (B- 1 ) = CT2a ^ (B) i|; (F) . ••• A . 1 . 5
For example, suppose
y t  = a t  “  0 a t - i  = (1 ~ 0B)at
-A 5 -
so that ip (B) = 1 -  0B. Then, s u b s t i t u t in g  in  (A. 1 . 5 )
Y(B) = a 2a ( 1  -  0 B) ( 1  -  0B_ 1 )
= a 2a [ “ 0 + (1 + 02 ) -  0 B]
Comparing with the auto covarian ce generating fu n c t io n
Y(B) = r rO O  B^ ( A . 1 . 6 )
k ~ ~ °°
The au tocovariances are  
Y ( 0 )  -  (1 +02) a 2a
Y ( 1 )  = -  6 ° 2a
Y (k )  = 0 fo r  K ^  2
Now i f  we s u b s t i t u t e  B = e--*-2 71 Y and F = B~1 = e^ 2 tt f
in  the au to ca ria n ce  generating fu n c t io n  ( A . 1 . 6 )  we o b ta in  h a lf
the power spectrum.
Hence, the power spectrum of a l i n e a r  process i s  
P ( «  -  2 o 2a * ( e 12 ,r  f ) * ( e i2 lr  f )
= 2  a2a | 'I' (e - l2 7 T f) | 2 0 (  f  (  i
I t  fo llow s that the v a r ia n c e  of the process i s
1 j,
2 2
o  2 y  = p (f  )df = 2 a 2a ip (e ~^2 ^ ^) ip (e d2 tt- )^
0 0
Now i f  the above i n t e g r a l  i s  to converge, i t  may be shown that the  
i n f i n i t e  s e r ie s  ^ (B) must converge fo r  B on or w it h in  the u n it  
c i r c l e .  (See U. Grenander and M. R o s e n b la tt ,  1 9 5 7 ) .
NOTE: The power spectrum i s  the F o u r ie r  co sin e  transform of the
a u to cova ria n ce fu n c t io n ,  so knowledge of the spectrum i s  
m athem atically  e q u iv a le n t  to knowledge of the auto­
co v a ria n ce  fu n c t io n  and v ic e  v e r s a .  The choice between 
the two as a to o l in  model b u ild in g  depends upon the
nature of the models and fo r  Box and Jen kin s the models 
found u s e f u l  are sim ply descr ib ed  in  terras of the auto­
c o r r e la t io n  fu n c t io n , so i t  i s  t h is  to o l which i s  employed 
fo r  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .
IN V E R T IB IL IT Y : To i l l u s t r a t e  the b a s ic  idea of i n v e r t i b i l i t y ,
c o n sid e r  ag a in  the model
y b = ( 1  - 0 B )a b A. 1 . 7
Ex p re ssin g  the a ' s  in  terms of the y Ts
a t = ( 1  -  0 B ) ’ 1y t = ( 1  + 0B + 0 2B2 + . . . .  +C^Bk ) ( i  _0k + l Bk + l ) - l yt
th a t  i s
y t  * ~ 0 Y t - i  -  02y t -2  -  . . . .  - 0 ky t - k  + a t _ 0 k + la t - k - i  a . i . 8
and i f  | 0 | < 1 , on l e t t i n g  k tend to i n f i n i t y  we o b tain  the i n f i n i t e  
s e r i e s
yt ° - 0yt-i “ °2yt- 2  " •••• + at
and the v weights of the model i n  the form ( 4 .8 )  are tt = “ ^
Whatever the v a lu e  of 0 , ( A . 1 . 7 )  d e fin e s  a p e r f e c t ly  proper s t a t io n a r y
p ro c e ss . However, i f  | q | ^  1 ,  the current d e v ia t io n  y t in  ( A . 1 . 8 )
depends on y ^ - i ,  y t - 2 » ••••> y t -k >  wi tb weights wfiich in c r e a se  as k
in c r e a s e s .  We avoid  t h is  s i t u a t i o n  by r e q u ir in g  that | 0 j < 1 .
We s h a l l  then say that the s e r ie s  i s  i n v e r t i b l e .  We see that th is
c o n d it io n  i s  s a t i s f i e d  i f  the s e r ie s
T OO
tt.(B) = (1  -  0 B) ” 1 = £ a iB J
r o
converges fo r  a l l  | B | ^  1 ,  that i s ,  on or w ith in  the u n it  c i r c l e .
I t  can be shown (See B ox-Jenlcins, 1976, chapter 6 ) that a convergent
expansion fo r at i s  p o s s ib le  when | 0 | >,  1 , but only i n  terms of
present and fu tu re  v a lu e s  of the p rocess. The requirement of 
i n v e r t i b i l i t y  i s  needed i f  we are in te r e s t e d  i n  a s s o c ia t in g  present  
events w ith past happenings.
- A 6  -
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APPENDIX 2
INITIALIZING THE TIME SERIES
As seen i n  s e c t io n  4 . 3 . 2  the sum of squares fu n c t io n  i s  c o n d it io n a l  on 
the past unobservable v a lu es  of W* and a * . The choice of v a lu e s ,  
th e re fo re ,  w i l l  determine the l e a s t  squares e s t im a te s .  One procedure 
i s  to use u n c o n d it io n a l  expected valu es  fo r  W* and a* , that i s ,  se t  
them to zero.
The a l t e r n a t iv e  i s  to f in d  valu es  fo r  W* c o n d it io n a l  on the observed 
valu es  of Wt and the estim ated valu es  of at . One i n i t a l l y  s e ts  W* 
and a* to zero , estim ate the ARMA model by m in im is in g  S( <j), Q ) 
c o n d it io n a l  on these 0 va lu es  and then p ro je c t  the model backwarkds to  
generate new l e v e l s  fo r  W*. S ince the s e r ie s  Wt i s  s t a t io n a r y ,  the 
ARMA process
$ (B)Wt = 0 (B )a t
can be baclccast i . e  turned around i n  time, so i t  i s  e q u iv a len t  to ,the 
process
<J>(F)Wt = 0 ( F ) a t
where F i s  the forward la g  operator
FWt = Wt +xj F 2Wt = Wt + 2 and so fo r t h .
Therefo re Wt = ^“ ^(F) 0 ( F ) a t can be used to s o lv e  for W* in  terms
of the estimated v a lu e s  of at . These estimated a ' s  are the r e s id u a ls  
formed by s u b tr a c t in g  the a c t u a l  s e r ie s  fo r Wt from the p red icted  
s e r ie s  generated by the i n i t i a l l y  estimated model. We can o b ta in  new 
l e a s t  squares estim ates fo r  <J> and 0 by m inim ising S( (j) , 0 ) 
c o n d it io n a l  on W4 . A new round of estim ates fo r  W* can then be 
computed and the process i s  repeated u n t i l  convergence has been 
ach ieved .
-  A8 -
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TABLE A2
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TABLE A4 
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APPENDIX 3 
THE DATA
Spot Crude O i l  P r i c e s ,  Weekly Data ( 19 7 6 -8 5 )
O f f i c i a l  Government S e l l i n g  P r i c e ,  Monthly Data  
( 1 9 7 6 -8 5 )
Rotterdam Netbacks, Monthly Data ( 1 9 7 6 -8 5 )
M iddle East n etbacks, Monthly Data ( 1 9 7 6 -8 5 )
US Netbacks, Monthly Data ( 1 9 7 7 -8 5 )
Monthly B ulk  P r ic e s  fo r  G a so lin e  and G a s o i l ,  
fob Rotterdam, 19 6 7-8 5
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Y e ar
1976
$ / b b l ,  Weekly Data 
Jan uary 1976 -  March 1985
TABLE Al: SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
Month Week A ra b ia n
L i g h t
I r a n i a n
L i g h t
N i g e r i a n
L i g h t
K uw ait
J a n
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
June
1 1 .4 7
1 1 . 5 1
1 1 . 5
1 1 . 4 8
1 1 .4 9
1 1 . 5 6
1 1 . 5 1
1 1 . 5 8
1 1 . 5 2
1 1 . 5 5
11 .6
1 1 . 5
11.51
1 1 . 5 6
1 1 . 6 0
1 1 .4 9
1 1 . 5 5
1 1 .6 0
1 1 . 5 6
1 1 . 5 9
1 1 . 6 1
1 1 . 6 2
11.58
1 1 . 8 1
1 1 . 8 7
1 1 . 1 7
12 .9 0
12 .8 4
12 .9 2
13.0 0
13 .0 0
13 .0 5
1 3 . 1 0
13.00
13.03
1 1 . 1 9
1 1 . 1 7
1 1 . 1 5
11.20
11.22
1 1 . 2 4
1 1 . 2 7
11.20
-  A10 -
Y e ar
1976
TABLE Al: SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
(Continued 1)
Month Week A r a b ia n  I r a n i a n  N i g e r i a n  K uw ait
L i g h t  L i g h t  L i g h t
J u ly
Aug
Sept
Oct
Nov
Dec
1 1 . 5
1 1 . 5 1
1 1 . 5 1
1 1 . 5 2
1 1 . 5 1
1 1 . 5 3
1 1 , 5 5
11.68
1 1 . 7 5
11.8
1 1 . 8 1
1 1 . 9 3
1 1 . 9 7
1 1 . 5 8
1 1 . 5 9
1 2 .9 1
1 1 . 5 6
1 1 . 5 8
1 1 . 6
1 1 . 6 2
11.88
1 1 . 9 5
1 1 . 9 8
1 3 . 1 0
1 3 . 1 8
1 3 . 1 2
1 3 .2 0
1 3 .3
1 3 . 2 8
1 1 . 1 7
1 1 . 1 8
1 1 . 1 5
11.20
11.20
11 .21
1 1 . 2 3
1 1 . 3 2
1 1 . 4 2
1 1 . 4
1 1 . 3 8
- A l l -
Y e ar
1977
TABLE Al: SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
(Continued 2)
Month Week A r a b ia n  I r a n i a n  N i g e r i a n  K uw ait
L i g h t  L i g h t  L i g h t
Apr
May
June
J u ly
Aug
Sep
1 2 . 6
12.2
1 2 . 5
1 2 .7 0
12 .6 9
1 2 .6 5
12 .6 0
12.58
1 2 .7 7
1 2 .7  
1 2 .7 5
12.8
1 2 .7
1 2 .7 2
12 .6 5
1 2 .6 7
12.65
14 ,60
14 .6 2
14 .6
14 .3 5
14 .3 5
14 .3
1 4 .2 5 .
14.20
14.25
1 2 .3 0
1 2 .3 0
1 2 .3 3
1 2 .3 5
1 2 .2 7
1 2 .2 7
12.11
1 2 .2 1
-  A 1 2  -
Year
1977
1978
TABLE Al: SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
(Continued 3)
Month Week A r a b ia n  I r a n i a n  N i g e r i a n  K uwait
L i g h t  L i g h t  L i g h t
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
12 .5 8
12 .6 0
1 2 .7 0
12.66
1 2 .7 0
12 .68
1 2 .7 0
1 2 .7 3
12 .6 5
1 2 .7 0
1 2 .6 5
1 2 .7 0
12.65
12.67
12.69
12 .6 5
12.68
1 2 .7 0
12 .7 0
1 2 .7 0
1 2 . 7 1
12 .6 5
12.68
12 .7 0
12 .6 5
12 .7 0
12.63.
12.65
13 .8 5
13 .9 5
14 .0 5
14.00
1 4 . 1 5
14.00
14.-10
14.08
14.00
12 .0 8
12.10
1 2 . 1 5
12 .0 9
12. 12
12.00
1 2 . 1 5
1 2 .10
1 2 . 1 5
1 2 . 1 7
12.12
-  A 1 3  -
Year
1978
TABLE Al: SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
(Continued 4)
Month Week A r a b ia n  I r a n i a n  N i g e r i a n  K uw ait
L i g h t  L i g h t  L i g h t
Apr
May
June
J u ly
Aug
Sep
12 .6 7 12 .5 9
1 2 .7 2
1 2 .7 3
1 2 .7 2
1 2 .7 4
1 2 .7 7
1 2 .7 9
12 .7 9
1 2 . 8 1
12.80
12 ,5 8
1 2 . 6 1
12 .6 2
12 .6 2
12 .6 5
1 2 .6 7
12.68
1 2 .6 5
1 2 .6 7
12.68
1 2 .7 0
1 2 .7 3
12.75
12.78
13 .8 0
13 .8 5
1 2 .0 5
13 .9 0
1 3 .9 0
13 .8 7
13 .8 9
1 3 .9 3
13 .9 5
13 .9 6  
14.00
14,09
12 .0 8
12 .10
12.10
12.12
1 2 . 1 4
12 ,0 8
1 2 . 1 5
12.1
1 2 . 1 3
12.17
-  A l4  -
Year
1978
1979
TABLE Al: SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
(Continued 5)
Month Week A r a b ia n  I r a n i a n  N i g e r i a n  K uw ait
L i g h t  L i g h t  L i g h t
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
1
2
3
4
5 
1 
2
3
4
5 
1 
2
3
4
5 
1 
2
3
4
5 
1 
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
5
1 2 .8 5
1 3 .2 0
14.48
14 .7 5
13 .9 0
14 .0 5
14 .2 0
1 4 .7 0
15 .0 0
16.00  
1 7 .3 8  
17 .9 3  
20.00
23.00
23.00
24.00
20.50
20.00
1 2 .8 5
1 2 .9 5
14 .3 5 1 2 .2 7
13 .2 0
13 .4 0
1 4 . 1 0
14 .20
16.00
18 .00
19 .2 5
19 .2 5
14.90
15 .0 0
17 .3 0
24.00
24.00
23.00  
2 3 .5 0
12 .4 5  
1 2 .5 7  
1 2 .6 2
1 3 .4 5
13 .4 9  
1 3 . 1 0
1 3 .5 0
1 3 .7 5
14 .8 5
16 .5 0
17 .0 0
18.00
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Year
1979
TABLE Al: SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
(Continued 6)
Month Week A r a b i a n  I r a n i a n  N i g e r i a n  K uw ait
L i g h t  L i g h t  L i g h t
Apr
May
June
J u ly
Aug
Sep
2 0 .4 5
21.00
2 2 .8 0
2 4 .0 0
3 2 .0 0
3 6 .0 0
3 7 .0 0
3 5 .0 0
3 4 .0 0
3 2 .0 0
3 0 .0 0  
3 0 .7 5
3 1 .0 0
2 9 .0 0
3 1 .5 0
3 2 .5 0
3 4 .0 0
3 5 .0 0
3 5 .0 0  
34 .2 5
3 5 .0 0
21.00
2 0 .5 0  
2 1 .2 5
20 .5 0
2 3 .5 0
26 .5 0
3 1 .0 0
3 0 .5 0
3 4 .0 0
3 5 .0 0
3 3 .0 0
3 2 .00
3 4 .5 5
3 1 .0 0
3 1 .0 0
3 3 .0 0
3 4 .0 0
3 5 .0 0
3 6 .0 0  
3 5 .6 5
20.00
2 2 .6 5
2 4 .0 0
2 4 .0 0
2 6 .0 0  
2 8 .5 0
3 5 .00
4 0 .0 0
3 6 .0 0
3 5 .0 0
34 .6 5
3 3 .0 0  
3 4 .8 5
3 5 .0 0
35 .5 0
19 .2 0
19 .5 0
3 2 .0 0
3 1 .7 5
2 9 .75
3 1 .5 0  
3 1 .0 0
3 0 .5 0
3 1 .5 0
3 2 .0 0
3 4 .2 5
-  A 1 6  -
Year
1979
1980
TABLE Al: SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
(Continued 7)
Month Week A ra b ia n
L i g h t
I r a n i a n
L i g h t L i g h t
Nigerian Kuwait
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
36.00
36.00  
3 6 .7 5  
39.80  
39 .70
39.00
4 1 .0 0  
39.90  
39 .3 5
39.00  
38.50
38.00
3 7 . 1 5
35.00
35.00
36.00  
3 6 .5 0
36.00
36.50
36 .75
38.00
38.00
40.00
4 1 .0 0
40.00
39.00  
38.50
37.00
36.00
35.00
35.00
3 5 .5
36.00
35.00
42.00
4 2.50
4 1.0 0
37 .50
38.50
38 .30
34.50
3 4 .7 5  
34.65
37.00  
36 .8 5  
38.40
38.00
3 8 .50
3 8 .7 5
37.00
36.50
33.0 0
34.00
3 4 ,2 5
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TABLE Al: SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
(Continued 8)
Y e ar  Month Week A r a b ia n  I r a n i a n  N i g e r i a n
L i g h t  L i g h t  L i g h t
1980 Apr 1
2 3 5 . 1 0  3 5 .50
3 3 5 .5 5  38.50
4
5
May 1 36.00 ' 36.00 38 .75
2 3 5 .5 0
3 3 5 .8 5  38.25
4 36 .5 0  36.50
5
June 1 3 6 . 1 5
2 36 .20  3 7 .00
3 * 35.90
4
5 35.J00 3 5 .5 0
J u l y  1 35 .00  3 5 .2 5  3 7 .2 5
2 35 .0 0  3 5 .2 5  3 6 .7 5
3 3 4 .2 5  34.50 36.50
4 34.00 3 4 .2 5  36.00
5
Aug 1 3 3 .5 0  3 3 .7 5  34.50
2 3 2 .7 5  33 .0 0  • 33.00
3 32 .0 0  3 2 .2 5  33.00
4 3 1 . 2 5  3 1 . 2 5  32.00
5 3 1 .0 0  3 1 .2 5  3 1 . 7 5
Sep 1 . 3 1 . 2 5  3 1 .5 0  3 2 .2 5
2 3 1 .5 0  3 1 . 7 5  3 2 .5 0
3 3 1 . 7 5  32.00 3 2 .50
4 34.00 3 5 .5 0
5
Kuwait
34.00
3 3 .2 5
34.50
35.0 0
3 4 .2 5
3 4 .2 5
34.00
34.00
3 3 .2 5
33.00
3 2 .5 0
3 1 . 7 5
3 1 .0 0
30 .25
30.00
3 0 .2 5
30.50
3 0 .7 5
3 2 .5 0
-  A 1 8  -
TABLE Al: SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
(Continued 9)
Y e ar  Month Week A ra b ia n
L ig h t
1980 Oct 1 3 6 .0 0
2 3 7 .0 0
3 3 7 .5 0
4 3 8 .0 0
5 3 9 .0 0
Nov 1 4 0 .0 0
2 4 1 .0 0
3 4 2 .5 0
4 4 1 .5 0
5
Dec 1 4 0 .0 0
2 3 9 .2 5
3 3 8 .5 0
4 3 9 ,5 0
5
1981 J a n  1 3 9 .5 0
2 3 9 .2 5
3 39 .2 5
4 3 8 .7 5
5 3 8 .0 0
Feb 1 3 7 .5 0
2 3 7 .0 0
3 3 6 .5 0
4 3 7 .0 0
5
Mar 1 3 7 .0 0
2 3 6 .7 5
3 3 6 .5 0
4 3 6 .5 0
5
3 6 .5 0  3 7 .0 0  3 4 .5 0
3 8 .0 0  3 5 .5 0
3 8 .5 0  3 6 .0 0
3 9 .0 0  3 6 .5 0
3 9 .2 5  3 7 .0 0
4 0 .5 0  4 0 .5 0  3 8 .5 0
4 2 .0 0  3 9 .5 0
4 4 .0 0  4 1 .0 0
4 2 .0 0  4 0 .0 0
3 9 .5 0  3 8 .5 0
3 9 .0 0  3 8 .5 0  3 8 .0 0
3 8 .7 5  3 7 .2 5
4 0 .5 0  3 8 .0 0
4 2 .0 0  3 8 .0 0
4 0 .5 0  37 .7 5
4 0 .2 5  3 7 .7 5
4 0 .0 0  3 7 .5 0
38 .0 0  3 9 .5 0  3 6 .7 5
3 7 .0 0  3 8 .5 0  3 6 .2 5
36 .5 0  38 .0 0  3 5 .7 5
3 6 .0 0  3 8 .0 0  3 5 .2 5
3 6 .5 0  3 8 .2 5  3 5 .7 5
36 .5 0  3 8 .0 0  3 5 .7 5
36 .2 5  38 .0 0  3 5 .5 0
36 .0 0  38 .0 0  3 5 .2 5
3 6 .0 0  3 8 .0 0  3 5 .2 5
Iranian Nigerian Kuwait
Light Light
-  A 1 9  r-
Year
1981
TABLE Al: SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
(Continued 10)
Month Week A r a b ia n  I r a n i a n  N i g e r i a n  K uw ait
L i g h t  L i g h t  L ig h t
Apr
May
June
J u ly
Aug
Sept
36 .50
36.50
3 5 .7 5
35.00
34.50
33.00
33.00
3 3 .7 5
3 3 .5 0
3 2 .2 5
32.00
3 1 .5 0
3 1 .5 0
3 1 .5 0
32.00
32.00
32.00  
3 1 .7 0
32.0 0
3 2 .2 5
3 2 .2 5  
3 2 .3 5
3 1 .9 0
3 1 .9 0
32.00  
3 2 .1 0
36.00
36.00
35.00
34.50
34.00
3 2 .5 0
32 .5 0  
3 3 .2 5  
33.30
32.00
3 1 .5 0
3 1 .0 0
3 1 .0 0
3 1 .0 0
3 1 .5 0
3 1 .5 0
3 1 .5 0  
3 1 .2 0
3 1 .5 0
3 1 .7 5
3 1 . 7 5  
3 1 .8 0
3 1 .5 0
3 1 .5 0
3 1 .5 0  
3 1 .7 0
38.00
3 7 .7 5
3 7 .2 5
36.25
36.00
35.00
35.50
3 5 .7 5
34.75
34.25
34.25
3 3 .7 5
33 .50
3 3 .7 5
35.00
3 5 .7 5
35.00
35.00
3 5 .2 5
36.00
36.00
36.00
35.80
3 5.50
3 5.50  
36.05
35.00
35.0 0
34.50
34.00
3 3 .5 0
32.00
3 1 . 7 5
32.00  
3 1 . 5
30.50
30.25
30.00
30.00
30.00
3 0 .2 5
30.25
30 .2 5
30.00
29.75
2 9 .7 5
2 9 .7 5
29.2 5
29.00
29.00
29.00
29.00
-A 20 -
TABLE Al: SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
(Continued 11)
Y e ar  Mouth Week A r a b ia n
L i g h t
1981 Oct 1 3 2 .2 5
2 32*35
3 3 2 .6 0
4 3 3 .2 0
5 3 3 .7 5
Nov 1 34 ,2 5
2 3 4 .2 5
3 3 4 .4 0
4 3 4 .2 0
5
Dec 1 3 4 .1 5
2 3 4 .1 0
3 3 4 .1 5
4 3 4 .1 5
5
1982 J a n  1 34 .1 5
2 3 4 .3 0
3 3 4 .5 0
4 3 4 .0 0
5 3 3 .2 5
Feb 1 3 1 .8 0
2 3 0 .5 0
3 2 8 .8 5
4 2 9 .5 0
5
Mar 1 29 .00
2 2 8 .2 5
3 2 8 .0 0
4 2 8 .5 0
5
3 1 .7 5  3 6 .0 0  2 9 .0 0
3 1 .9 0  3 6 .5 0  2 9 .2 5
3 2 .0 0  3 6 .7 5  29 .2 5
3 2 .7 0  3 6 .4 0  2 9 .5 0
3 3 .2 5  3 6 .7 5  3 0 .2 5
3 3 .7 5  3 7 .0 0  3 1 .2 5
3 3 .7 5  3 7 .5 0  3 1 .7 5
3 3 .8 5  3 7 .5 0  3 2 .0 0
3 3 .7 0  3 7 .0 0  3 2 .2 5
3 3 .6 0  3 6 .7 5  3 2 .2 0
3 3 .6 0  3 6 ,6 5  3 2 ,2 0
3 3 .6 0  3 6 .6 0  3 2 .0 0
3 3 .6 0  36 .5 0  3 2 .0 0
3 3 .6 0  36 .5 0  3 2 .0 0
3 3 .7 5  3 6 .5 0  3 2 .0 0
3 4 .0 5  3 6 .0 0  3 2 .0 0
3 3 .6 5  3 5 .8 0  3 1 .7 0
3 2 .9 0  3 4 .8 0  3 0 .6 0
3 1 .5 0  3 4 .0 0  2 8 .5 0
3 0 .0 0  3 3 .0 0  2 7 .5 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .5 0  2 6 .7 5
2 8 .5 0  3 1 .0 0  2 7 .2 5
28 .00  30 .2 5  2 6 .7 5
2 8 .0 0  2 8 .7 5  2 6 .2 5
2 7 .0 0  28 .7 5  2 6 .2 5
2 7 .0 0  2 8 .7 5  2 6 .2 5
Iranian Nigerian Kuwait
Light Light
-  A 2 1  -
Year
1982
TABLE Al: SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
(Continued 12)
Month Week A ra b ia n
L i g h t
I r a n i a n
L i g h t L i g h t
Nigerian Kuwait
Apr
May
June
J u ly
Aug
Sep
29.00
30 .25
30 .50
3 1 .5 0
32.00
3 2 .7 5
34.00
33.50
3 3 .50
33.00  
33.50*
33.0 0
32.00
3 1 . 7 5
32.00
32.00
3 1 .5 0
3 1 . 2 5
3 1 . 2 5
3 1 .0 0  
30.80
32.0 0
33.00
3 2 .7 5
3 3 .2 5  
33.40
2 7 .5 0
28.50
28 .75
30.50
3 1 .0 0
3 1 .0 0
3 2 .2 5
3 2 .2 5
3 2 . 1 5
3 2 .1 5
32.00
3 1 .5 0
3 1 .0 0
30.75  
3 1 .2 0  
3 1 . 1 0
3 1 .0 0
3 1 .0 0
30.50
30.00
29.50
29.00
29.00
28 .75
29.25
29.75
29.50
3 1 .0 0
33.00
35.00
34.50
35.00
35.50
3 5.50
35.00
34.75
3 5 .2 5
35.00
34 .75
34.50
34.25
34.25
34.00
34.00
3 3 .7 5
3 3 .50
33 .50
3 3 .7 5
34.00
34.00
35.00
35.00
2 6 .50
26 .75
2 7 .2 5
28.25
2 9 .2 5
29.25
30 .25
29.75
29.75
2 9 .7 5
30.00
29.50
29.50
29.50
2 9 .7 5
2 9 .7 5
2 9 .7 5
2 9 .7 5
29.00
28.50
28.50
30.00
30.00
30.00
30.50  
30 .70
-  A22‘ -
TABLE A l: SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
(Continued 13)
Year Month Week A r a b ia n
L i g h t
I r a n i a n
L i g h t L i g h t
Nigerian Kuwait
1982 Oct
Nov
Dec
1983 Jan
Feb
Mar
3 3 .6 0
3 3 .5 0
3 3 .5 0  
33.40
3 3 .2 5
3 2 .7 5
3 2 .2 5
3 1 . 2 5
30 .50
2 9 .7 5
3 0 .7 5  
30 .3 0
30 .25
30 .25
30 .25
30.50
3 1 . 2 5
29.75
29.60
29.50
29.50  
28.00
28.00
28.00
28.00
28.00
32.00
32.00
3 2 .7 5
32.00  
3 1 .4 5
3 1 .0 0
30.00
29.75
29.00
2 8 .75
29.50
29.00
29.00
29.00
29.00
29.00
30.00
28.50
28.20
28.00
2 7 .7 5
27.00
27.00
27.00  
26.80
27.00
35.00  
3 5 .1 5
35.00  
3 5 .1 0
3 5 .3 5
35.00
34.50
34.00
3 3 .50
3 2 .2 5
3 2 .5 0
32.50
3 2 .5 0
32.00
32.00  
3 1 .6 5
32.00
3 1 .0 0
30.00
30.00  
29.75
28.00
28.50
28.25
28 .25
28.35
30.90
30.90  
30.80  
3 0 .70
3 0 .7 5
3 1 .0 0
3 0 .50
30.00
29.50
2 9.50
30.00
29.25
2 9.25
29.25
29.25
29.25
30.00
29.00
28.30
28.00  
28.00
2 7 .5 0
2 6 .75
2 6 .7 5
2 6 .7 5
26.25
-  A23 -
TABLE Al: SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
(Continued 14)
Year Month Week Arabian Iranian Nigerian Kuwait
Light Light Light
1983 Apr
May
June
J u l y
Aug
Sep
28.00
28.50
2 8 .75
28.85
28.90
28.90
28.50  
28.35  
28.60
28.70
28 .75  
28.95
28.90
28.90
28.85  
29.00
29.05
28.90
29.05
29.05
28.90
28.85
28 .75
28.70
28.65
28.65
28.50
27.00
2 7 .7 5
28.00  
28.20
28.25  
2 8 .10
2 7 .7 5
27.60  
27.80
2 7 .7 0
28.00
28 .25
28.50
28.50
28.50
28.60  
28.60
28.50
28.50  
28.40  
28.30
28.25
2 8 .15
2 8 .1 5
2 8 .15  
28.35  
2 8 .10
28.50  
29.25
30.00
29.80
30.00
29.75
2 9.75
29.75
29.80
29.90
30.00  
30.20  
30.40
30 .35
30.50  
30.65
3 1 .0 0
30 .7 5
3 1 . 1 0
3 1 . 1 0
3 1 . 1 0
3 1 .0 0
3 1 .0 0
30.90
30 .7 5  
30.70
30 .35
26 .2 5  
2 6 .7 5
2 7 .2 5
2 7 .2 5
2 7 .2 5
2 7 .1 0
27.0 0
27.00
2 7 .1 0
27.00
27.00
2 7 .1 0  
2 7 .2 0
2 7 .3 0
2 7 .3 5
2 7 .4 5
2 7.4 5
2 7 .3 0
2 7 .3 5
2 7 .3 0
2 7 .3 0
27.40
2 7 .4 5
27.40
2 7 .3 5
27.40
2 7 .3 0
-  A24 -
Year
1983
1984
Month Week
Oct 1
2
3
4
5
Nov 1
2
3
4
5
Dec 1
2
3
4
5
Jan 1
2
3
4
5
Feb 1
2
3
4
5
Mar 1
2
3
4
5
TABLE Al: SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
(Continued 15)
A ra b ia n  I r a n i a n  N i g e r i a n  Kuw ait
L i g h t  L i g h t  L i g h t
28.40
28.70
28.70
28.65
28.45
28 .35
28.05
28.05
28 .35  
28.25  
28.20  
2 8 .15
28 .35  
28.60  
28.60
28.65
28.70
28.65
28.50
28.40
28.50
28.65
28.70
28.50
28 .35
28.45
28.00
28.20
28.20
2 8 .10
27.95
2 7.90
27.80
27.80
2 8 .10
28.00
27.80
2 7 .7 5
27.80  
28.00  
28.00  
2 8 .10  
2 8 .15
2 8 .10
28,00
28.00
28.00
28.00
28.00
27.85
2 7 .7 5
27.90
29.75
30.00  
29.95
29.85
29.70  
29.60  
29.50
28.85
29.05
28.90
2 8 .75
28 .75
28.85  
29.40  
29.30  
29.55
2 9 .7 5
29.80
29.70
29.70
29.70
29.80
29.90
30.05
30.00  
3 0 .10
2 7 .3 0
2 7 .4 5
27.4 0
27.40
27.4 0
2 7.4 0
2 7 .2 5
2 7 .1 0
2 7 .3 0  
2 7 .2 0
2 7 .1 0  
27.00
2 7 .2 5
2 7 .3 0
2 7 .3 0
27.40
27.40
27.40
2 7 .3 0  
2 7 .3 5
27.40
27.40
27.40
27.40
27.40
27.4 5
-  A25 -
TABLE Al: SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
(Continued 16)
Year Month Week Arabian Iranian Nigerian Kuwait
Light Light Light
1984 Apr 1 2 8 .4 0
2 2 8 .4 0
3 2 8 .4 0
4 2 8 .3 5
5
May 1 28 .2 5
2 2 8 .3 0
3 28 .55
4 2 8 .4 0
5
Ju n e  1 2 8 .5 0
2 2 8 .3 0
3 2 8 .2 0
4 2 7 .7 0
5 2 7 .6 5
J u l y  1 2 7 .8 0
2 - - 2 7 .6 5
3 27 ,2 5
4 2 7 .0 0
5
Aug 1 2 7 .3 0
2 2 7 .8 0
3 2 7 .6 5
4 27 .80
5 2 8 .0 0
Sep 1 2 7 .5 0
2 2 7 .7 5
3 27 .9 0
4 2 8 .1 0
5
2 7 .9 0  3 0 .1 0  2 7 .4 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .1 0  2 7 .4 0
2 7 .9 0  3 0 .0 5  2 7 .4 5
28 .00  3 0 .0 5  2 7 .4 5
2 7 .9 0  2 9 .8 0  2 7 .4 0
2 7 .5 0  2 9 .6 0  2 7 .4 0
2 7 .5 0  3 0 .1 5  2 7 .4 5
2 7 .5 0  2 9 .9 0  2 7 .3 5
2 5 .0 0  3 0 .0 5  2 5 .0 0
2 5 .5 0  2 9 .9 5  26 .0 0
2 5 .5 0  2 9 .6 0  2 6 .0 0
2 5 .5 0  2 9 .0 0  2 6 .5 0
°2 5 .0 0  2 8 .4 0  2 6 .5 0
2 5 .0 0  28 .5 0  2 6 .6 0
2 5 .5 0  28 .40  2 6 .6 0
2 5 .5 0  2 8 .3 0  2 6 .5 0
2 5 .5 0  2 7 .5 0  2 6 .4 0
2 6 .0 0  2 7 .6 0  26 .3 0
2 6 .5 0  2 8 .5 0  2 6 .5 5
2 6 .4 0  28 .55  26 .5 5
2 6 .5 0  2 8 .6 0  2 6 .7 5
2 6 .5 0  2 8 .6 0  2 6 .9 0
2 6 .5 0  2 8 .3 5  2 6 .9 0
2 7 .0 0  2 8 .5 0  2 7 .0 0
2 7 .0 0  2 8 .6 0  2 7 .2 0
2 7 .0 0  2 8 .7 0  2 7 .2 0
-  A26 -
TABLE Al: SPOT CRUDE OIL PRICES
(Continued 17)
Year Month Week A r a b ia n
L i g h t
I r a n i a n
L i g h t L i g h t
Nigerian Kuwait
1984 Oct
Nov
Dec
1985 Jan
Feb
Mar
27.80
27.95
27.00  
28.05
28.20
28.40
27.85  
2 7 .6 5  
2 7 .5 0
27.80
27.4 5
27 .4 5
28.00
27.80  
28.30
27.9 5  
2 7 .7 0
27.8 0
27.85  
2 7 .7 5
Monthly 27.80  
Averages
26.90
26.90
26.30  
26.85
26.50
26.50
26.50
2 6 .1 5  
26.00
26.25
26.25
26.25
26.25
2 6 .15  
26.20  
26.00  
26.00
26.30
27.05
27.05
2 7 .1 0
28.65
28.65
2 7 .6 5  
28.20
28.20
27.9 5
27.9 5  
27 .7 0  
2 7 .3 5  
27.45  
2 7 .2 5
27.00
27.30
26.40
27.00
27.30
2 7.20
28.20  
28.20  
2 5 .5 0
28.00
2 7 .1 0
2 7 .1 0  
26.90
2 7 .2 0
27.40
27.40  
2 7 . 1 5  
27.00  
2 6.70  
2 6 .7 5
26.45
26.45  
26.65
26.80
27.20
27.20  
2 7 .3 5
27.40
27.40
27.40
Source: ’ I n t e r n a t io n a l  Crude O i l  and Product P r i c e s :  A B iannual Review 
and A n a ly s is  of O i l  P r ic e  Trends in  World M arkets'
Middle Easfr Petroleum and Economic P u b l ic a t io n s ,  MEES
-  A 2 7  -
Y ear
1976
1977
1 9 7 8
TABLE A2: OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT SELLING PRICES
? / b b l , Monthly D ata, January 1976-March 1985
Month A r a b ia n I r a n i a n N i g e r i a i
L i g h t L i g h t L i g h t
J 1 1 . 5 1 1 1 . 6 2 12 .7 6
F 1 1 . 5 1 1 1 . 6 2 ’ 12 .8 0
M 1 1 . 5 1 1 1 . 6 2 12 .8 0
A 1 1 . 5 1 1 1 . 6 2 12 .8 0
M 1 1 . 5 1 1 1 . 6 2 12 .8 0
J 1 1 . 5 1 1 1 . 6 2 12 .8 0
J 1 1 . 5 1 1 1 . 6 2 12 .8 0
A 1 1 . 5 1 1 1 . 6 2 12‘. 80
S 1 1 . 5 1 1 1 . 6 2 1 3 .0 1
0 1 1 . 5 1  * 1 1 . 6 2 1 3 .0 1
N 1 1 . 5 1 1 1 . 6 2 1 3 . 1 6
D 1 1 . 5 1 1 1 . 6 2 1 3 . 1 6
J 12.0 8 6 1 2 . 8 1 1 4 .3 5
F 12 .0 9 1 2 .8 1 14 .2 2
M 12 .0 9 1 2 . 8 1 14 .2 2
A 12 .0 9 1 2 .8 1 1 4 .3 3
M 12 .0 9 1 2 .8 1 1 4 .3 3
J 12 .0 9 1 2 .8 1 14 .3 3
J 1 2 .7 0 1 2 . 8 1 1 4 .6 3
A 1 2 .7 0 1 2 .8 1 14 .6 3
S 1 2 .7 0 1 2 .8 1 14 .6 3
0 1 2 .7 0 1 2 .8 1 14 .6 3
N 1 2 .7 0 1 2 . 8 1 14 .6 3
D 1 2 .7 0 1 2 .8 1 14 .63
J 1 2 .7 0 1 2 .8 1 1 4 .3 3
F 1 2 .7 0 1 2 .8 1 14 .3 3
M 1 2 .7 0 1 2 . 8 1 14 .3 3
A 1 2 .7 0 1 2 .8 1 14 .3 3
M 1 2 .7 0 1 2 .8 1 1 4 . 1 2
K uwait
1 1 . 3 0
1 1 . 3 0
1 1 . 3 0
1 1 . 3 0
1 1 . 3 0
1 1 . 3 0
1 1 . 2 3
1 1 . 2 3
1 1 . 2 3
1 1 . 2 3
1 1 . 2 3
1 1 . 2 3
1 2 .3 7
1 2 .3 7
1 2 .3 7
1 2 .3 7
1 2 .3 7
1 2 .3 7
1 2 .3 7
1 2 .3 7
1 2 .2 7
1 2 .2 7
1 2 .2 7
1 2 .2 7
1 2 .2 7
1 2 .2 7
1 2 .2 7  
12.22 
12.22
-  A28 -
Y ear
1978
1979
1980
$ / b b l ,  Monthly D ata, January 1976-March 1985
TABLE A2: OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT SELLING PRICES
(Continued 1)
Month A r a b ia n  I r a n i a n  N i g e r i a n  K uw ait
L i g h t  L i g h t  L i g h t
J 1 2 .7 0 1 2 .8 1 1 4 . 1 2 12.22
J 1 2 .7 0 1 2 .8 1 1 4 . 1 2 12.22
A 1 2 .7 0 1 2 .8 1 1 4 , 1 2 12.22
S 1 2 .7 0  * 1 2 .8 1 1 4 . 1 2 12.22
0 1 2 .7 0 1 2 .8 1 12.12 12.22
N 1 2 .7 0 1 2 .8 1 1 4 . 1 2 12.22
D 1 2 .7 0  * 1 2 . 8 1 1 4 . 1 2 12.22
J 13 .3 4 ' 13 .4 5 14 .8 2 1 2 .8 3
F 13 .3 4 13 .4 5 14 .8 2 1 2 .8 3
M 13 .3 4 13 .4 5 14 .8 2 1 2 .8 3
A 14 .5 5 13 .4 5 14 .8 2 1 5 .3 0
M 1 4 .5 5 16 .5 7 18 .5 2 16 .4 0
J 1 4 .5 5 1 7 . 1 7 20.96 1 9 . 3 1
J 14 .5 5 1 7 . 1 7 20.96 19.49
A 18 .00 22.00 23.49 19.49
S 18.00 22.00 23.49 19.49
0 18 .00 22.21 23.49 20.49
N 18.00 23.50 23.49 20.49
D 24.00 2 3 .5 0 26.26 2 5 .5 0
J 24.00 28.50 34.50 2 7 .5 0
F 26.00 30.00 29.99 2 7 .5 0
M 26.00 32.8 7 34.20 2 7 .5 0
A 26.00 3 2 .8 7 34.20 2 7 .5 0
M 26.00 3 5 .3 7 3 4 .7 1 29.50
J 28.00 3 5 .3 7 3 6 .7 1 29.50
J 28,00 3 5 .3 7 3 6 .7 1 3 1 .5 0
A 28.00 3 5 .3 7 37.02 3 1 .5 0
S 28.00 35 .3 7 37.02 3 1 .5 0
0 30.00 3 5 .3 7 37.02 3 1 .5 0
-  A 2 9  -
Y ear
1980
1981
1982
1983
$ / b b l ,  Monthly D ata, January 1976-March 1985
TABLE A2: OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT SELLING PRICES
(Continued 2)
Month A r a b ia n  I r a n i a n  N i g e r i a n  K uw ait
L i g h t  L i g h t  L i g h t
N 30.00 3 5 .3 7  3 7 .0 2  3 1 .5 0
D 30.00 3 5 .3 7  37 .0 2  3 1 .5 0
J  3 2 .0 0  3 5 .3 7  40.02 3 1 .5 0
F 32 .0 0  ' 37.00 40.02 3 5 .5 0
M 32.00 37.00 40.02 3 5 .5 0
A 32 .0 0  37.00 40.02 3 5 .5 0
M 32.0 0  37 .0 0  40.02 3 5 .5 0
J  32.00  37.00  • 40.02 3 5 .5 0
J  32 .0 0  37.00  40.02 . 3 5 .5 0
A 32.00* 37.00 40.02 3 5 .5 0
S 32 .0 0  37.00  36^02 3 5 .5 0
0 32 .00  37.00 36.02 3 5 .5 0
N 32.0 0  37.00  3 4 .52  33.00
D 34.00 34.60 3 6 .52  33.00
J  34.00 . 34.20 3 6 .5 2  3 2 .3 0
F 34.00 34.20 36 .52  3 2 .3 0
M 34.00 3 2 .2 0  3 6 .5 2  3 2 .3 0
A 34.00 30.20 3 5 .5 2  32 .3 0
M 34.00 30,20 3 5 .5 2  3 2 .3 0
J  34.00 30.20 3 5 .5 2  3 2 .3 0
J  34.00 3 1 .2 0  3 5 .5 2  32 .3 0
A 34.00 3 1 .2 0  3 5 .5 2  3 2 .3 0
S 34.00 3 1 .2 0  3 5 .5 2  3 2 .3 0
0 34.00 3 1 .2 0  3 5 .5 2  3 2 .3 0
N 34.00 3 1 .2 0  3 5 .5 2  32 ,3 0
D 34.00 3 1 .2 0  3 5 .5 2  3 2 .3 0
J  34.00 3 1 .2 0  3 5 .5 2  32.30
F 34.00 3 1 .2 0  3 5 .5 2  3 2 .3 0
-  A 3 0  -
$ / b b l ,  Monthly D ata, January 1976-March 1985
TABLE A2: OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT SELLING PRICES
(Continued 3)
Y e a r  Month A r a b ia n
L i g h t
1983 M 34.00
A 29.00
M 29.00
J  29.00
J  29.00
A 29.00
S 29.00
0 29.00
N 29.00
D 29.00
1984 J  29.00
F 29.00
M 29.00
A 29.00
M 29.00
J  29.00
J  29.00
A 29.00
S 29.00
0 • 29.00
N 29.00
D ' 29.00
1985 J 29.00
F 28.00
M 28.00
I r a n i a n  N i g e r i a n  K uw ait 
L i g h t  L i g h t
3 1 .2 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  3 0 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  2 8 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  2 8 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  2 8 .0 2  2 7 .3 0
2 8 .0 0  2 8 .0 2  2 7 .5 5
28 .05  28 .6 5  2 7 .3 0
29 .1 1  2 8 .7 0  2 7 .2 0
Source: The Petroleum Economist
-  A31 -
TABLE A3: ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
$ / b b l ,  Monthly Data 
Values fob Port of Loading, January 1976-March 19S5
Y e ar  Month A r a b ia n  I r a n i a n  N i g e r i a n  K uw ait
L i g h t  L i g h t  L i g h t
1976 J  1 0 .8 1
F 1 1 . 2 3
M 1 1 . 2 2
A 1 1 . 3 4
M 1 1 . 5 0
J  1 1 . 5 0
J  1 1 . 3 0
A 1 1 . 3 0
S 1 1 . 4 2
0 11 . 68
N 1 1 . 4 5
D 1 1 . 6 5
1977 J  1 2 .7 3
F 13 .4 4
M 12 .4 0
A 12 .4 8
M 12 .4 7
J  12 .4 0
J  1 2 . 5 1
A 1 2 .7 2
S 12 .4 9
0 12 .4 6
N 1 2 .4 3
D 12 .8 0
1978 J  1 2 . 8 1
F 12 .4 9
M 1 2 . 8 1
A 12.81
10 .6 9  1 1 . 8 4  1 0 .3 2
1 1 .0 4  12 .2 4  1 0 . 7 1
1 1 . 0 7  1 2 , 1 6  1 0 .7 3
1 1 . 1 2  1 2 .6 1  1 0 .7 2
1 1 . 2 5  12 .6 6  10.89
1 1 . 2 8  12 .5 8  10 .89
1 1 . 1 1  1 2 . 3 1  1 0 .7 3
1 1 .0 9  1 2 .5 4  1 0 .7 3
1 1 . 3 3  1 2 .7 7  1 0 .9 1
*11.60 12 .9 3  1 1 . 2 0
1 1 . 3 7  12 .6 7  1 1 . 0 3
1 1 . 5 8  1 2 .7 7  1 1 . 2 5
1 2 .7 5  1 3 .9 5  1 2 . 1 8
13 .4 0  14.49  12 .8 6
12 .4 2  1 3 .8 7  1 1 . 7 6
1 2 .5 0  13 ,8 8  1 1 . 8 7
1 2 .5 0  13 .8 8  1 1 . 7 8
12 .4 3  13 .8 0  1 1 .6 9
1 2 .5 2  1 3 . 7 1  1 1 . 9 0
1 2 .7 0  13 .8 3  1 2 . 1 4
12 .4 7  1 3 .5 7  1 1 . 9 4
12 .3 6  13 .4 4  1 1 .9 6
12 .3 9  1 3 .4 5  1 1 . 9 2
1 2 .7 2  13 .8 0  1 2 .2 7
1 2 .7 5  1 3 .7 0  1 2 . 3 1
12 .4 6  1 3 .5 5  1 1 .9 4
12 .7 9  14 .0 7  1 2 . 1 5
12 .8 3  1 4 , 1 4  1 2 . 1 8
-  A3 2 -
Year
1978
1979
1 9 8 0
TABLE A3: ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
(Continued 1)
$ / b b l ,  Monthly Data  
V alues fob Port of L o ad in g , January 1976-March 1985
Month A r a b ia n  I r a n i a n  N i g e r i a n  K uw ait
L i g h t  L i g h t  L i g h t
M 1 3 .0 3  1 3 .0 3  14 .3 8  1 2 .3 0
J  1 2 .7 7  1 2 .7 7  14 .04  12 .0 9
J  1 2 . 7 3  1 2 .7 0  14 .06  1 2 .0 5
A 1 3 .0 5  - 1 3 . 0 1  14 .46 1 2 .3 5
S 1 2 .9 4  1 2 ,8 7  14 .6 2  1 2 . 1 2
0 1 3 .5 5  13 .4 6  1 5 .5 8  1 2 .6 1
N 1 7 . 1 0  1 7 .0 8  19 .7 9  1 5 .7 2
D' ' ’ • 14 .9 4  14.84 17 .4 5  1 3 .8 3
J 1 6 .8 3  16 .8 2  19 .7 4  1 5 .2 7
F 24.69 24.60 2 8 .8 1  2 2 .2 5
M 22.44 2 4 .3 1  2 5 .6 3  2 0 .7 1
A 24.09 23.8 7 2 7 .4 3  ■ 2 1 .9 8
M 2 6 .3 1  2 6 .1 5  29.88 2 4 .12
J  3 4 .2 2  3 3 .8 2  3 9 .1 2  30.86
J  3 2 .9 0  3 2 .5 7  38.82 2 9.32
A 30.69 30.49 34.90 2 8 . 1 3
S 3 0 .3 5  29.96 34.25  27.96
0 3 2 . 1 8  3 1 .8 0  3 5 .8 5  29.83
N 3 4 .74  34.29 3 8 .19  3 2 .3 9
D 36.50  36.20 40.59 3 4 . 1
J  34.09 3 3 .8 5  38.45 3 1 .5 9
F 3 1 . 1 7  3 1 .0 6  3 5 .7 7  28.65
M 3 1 .2 9  3 1 .2 8  3 6 .1 2  28 .74
A 3 2 .2 0  3 2 .0 3  35.96  29.93
M 3 2 .9 6  32 .78  3 6 .7 3  30.64
J  3 1 .2 8  3 1 . 1 8  3 5 .3 0  28.97
J  30.95 30 .8 5  34.85 28.80
A 28.59 28.50 3 1 .6 6  26.88
-  A3 3 -
Year
1980
1981
1982
TABLE A3: ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
(Continued 2)
$ / b b l ,  Monthly Data
Values fob Port of Lo ad in g , January 197 6’-March 11
Month A r a b ia n I r a n i a n N ig e r ia !
L i g h t L i g h t L i g h t
S 2 8 .1 5 27.97 3 1 .3 5
0 3 2 .4 3 32.24 34.96
N 35.49 35.29 3 7 .5 1
D 3 5 .4 2  ' 35.28 3 7 . 1 6
J 34 .53 34.49 36.80
F 3 5 . 1 7 3 5 .1 5 3 7 .3 2
M 34.92 34.85 37.29
A 33.0 5 32.95 3 5.79
M 30.96 30.85 3 3 .5 1
J 2 9 .5 1 29.47 3 2 .6 3
J 30.90 30.80 33.98
A 30.92 30.85 34.60
S 3 1 . 3 5 3 1 .2 0 35.24
0 3 1 .6 0 3 1 .5 0 35.26
N 3 1 .6 0 3 1 ,5 5 3 5 .2 2
D 3 1 .6 0 3 1 .6 0 3 5.30
J 3 1 ,8 5 3 1 .6 6 3 5 .3 1
F 29.78 29.60 3 2 .2 8
M 2 8 .10 27.94 3 0 .1 7
A 29.97 29.87 3 2 .3 3
M 3 1 .7 0 3 1 .6 2 3 5 .0 1
J 3 1 .0 0 30.89 3 3 .9 2
J 29.6 5 29.50 32.24
A 29.60 29.44 32.59
S 3 1 .6 2 3 1 .4 0 34.79
0 3 2 .3 2 32.09 3 5 .2 2
N 30.05 29.87 33.02
D 29.44 2 9 .19 3 1 .8 3
26.50  
3 1 .0 6  
34 .3 7
34.64  
33.47
3 4 .1 4
3 3 .7 5
3 1 .8 4  
29.90  
2 7.9 7
2 9 .14  
28.99  
29.30
29.50  
29.60
29.65  
29.70  
28,25
26.84  
28.49  
29.80  
2 9 .3 2  
2 8 .1 3
27.76  
29.67  
30.44  
2 8 .2 1  
27.86
-  A34 -
Y ear
1983
1984
1985
TABLE A3: ROTTERDAM NETBACKS
(Continued 3)
$ / b b l ,  Monthly Data  
Values fob Port of L o ad in g , January 1976-March 1985
Month A r a b ia n  I r a n i a n  N i g e r i a n  Kuw ait
L i g h t  L i g h t  L i g h t
J
F
M
A
M
J
J
A
S
0
N
D
J
F
M
A
M
J
J
A
S
0
N
D
J
F
M
2 9 .14
2 5 .95
26.05  
28.28
2 7 .5 5
2 8 .17  
2 8 .10  
28 .72  
2 7 .6 2  
27.59  
2 7 .7 0
2 7.0 5
2 7 .2 8
2 7 .1 7  
27.80  
2 7 .9 1  
2 7 .7 6  
26.42
2 5.56  
26.24  
26.58 ' 
25.54
26.29  
25.44  
2 5 .7 5
27.04
26.05
29.07  
25.88  
2 6 .0 1  
28.05  
2 7 .3 8  
28,03  
27.97  
28.54  
2 7.6 2
27.58  
27.67  
2 7 .0 1  
2 7 .3 2  
27.28  
2 7 .8 3  
27.74
2 7 .6 1  
26.25  
2 5 ,4 2  
2 6 . 1 1
2 6 .6 1
26.59  
26 .35  
2 5 .5 1  
25.80
27.07
26.07
32.04  
28.24
28.04  
30.26  
29.56  
30.42  
3 0 .19  
30.80
29.97  
29.70
3 0 .16  
29.22  
29.34  
2 9.32
29.60  
29.02
2 8 .6 1  
27.67  
26.58  
2 6 .9 1
27.46  
2 7 .0 1
26.97
25.93
26.46
2 7.9 3
2 7 .1 6
2 7 .7 8
24.93
2 5 .1 8
26.84
26.24  
26.59  
26.68  
2 7 ,3 0
26.64  
26.69  
26.74  
26.20
26.45  
26 .27  
26.99  
2 7 .0 1  
26 .9 7  
2 5 .5 7  
24.83
25.45  
2 6 . 1 1  
26.20  
2 5 .9 1
25.24
25.49
26.65
25.49
Source: Petroleum I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly
-  A3 5 -
Y e ar
1976
1977
1978
$ / b b l ,  Monthly Data  
Values fob Port of Loading, September 1976-March 1985
TABLE A4: MIDDLE EAST NETBACKS
Month A r a b ia n  I r a n i a n  Kuw ait
L i g h t  L i g h t
J
F
M
A
M
A
M
J
J
A
S
0
N
D
J
F
M
A
M
J
J
A
S
0
N
D
J
F
M
1 1 . 3 4
1 1 . 3 5  
■11.42  
1 1 . 6 5  
1 2 . 1 8
12 .4 3  
12 .4 9
12 .4 3
12 .4 4
12 .4 6  
1 2 .5 3
12 .4 6  
1 2 .5 6  
1 2 .5 5  
12 .2 9  
1 2 .2 3  
1 2 .3 9
12 .4 4
12.4 4
1 1 . 2 3
1 1 . 2 4  
1 1 . 3 2  
1 1 . 5 5  
12 .0 8  
1 2 .5 4
1 2 .3 7
1 2 .3 4
1 2 .3 5
12 .3 8
1 2 .4 5
12 .3 8
1 2 .4 5  
12 .4 4  
1 2 . 1 7  
12.10 
12 .2 6  
1 2 . 3 1  
12 .2 9
1 0 .8 1
1 0 .8 1
10 .9 2  
1 1 . 1 8  
1 1 .6 9  
1 1 . 9 1
1 1 . 9 5  
1 1 . 9 0
1 1 . 9 3
1 1 . 9 6
12 .0 4  
1 1 . 9 5
1 2 .0 5  
12 .0 4  
1 1 . 7 6  
1 1 . 6 7  
1 1 . 8 2  
1 1 . 8 0  
1 1 . 7 5
-  A3 6 -
Year
1978
1979
1980
$ / b b l ,  Monthly Data 
Values fob Port of Loading, September 1976-March 1985
TABLE A4: MIDDLE EAST NETBACKS
(Continued 1)
Month A r a b ia n  I r a n i a n  K uw ait
L i g h t  L i g h t
A 12 .2 6 1 2 . 1 6 1 1 . 6 3
M 1 2 .3 5  ‘ 1 2 .2 3 1 1 . 6 7
J 12 ,4 5 1 2 .3 3 1 1 . 7 4
J 12 .4 5 1 2 .3 3 1 1 . 7 3
A 12 .6 5 1 2 . 5 1 1 1 . 8 7
S 1 2 . 7 1 1 2 .5 4 ♦ 1 1 . 8 5
0 12 .8 0 12 .6 2 1 1 . 9 1
N 1 3 .7 2 1 3 .5 6 12 .8 4
D 1 4 . 2 1 1 4 .0 1 1 3 . 1 6
J 14 .3 4 1 4 . 1 1 13 ,1 4 '
F 19 .3 4 19.00 17 .5 9
M 2 1 .5 2 2 1 . 1 6 19 .6 6
A 22.08 2 1 .7 6 20,20
M 2 5 . 1 2 24.69 2 2 .7 3
J 2 9 ,1 0 28.67 26.67
J 3 2 .2 2 3 1 .8 8 3 0 .23
A 30.30 2 9 .9 1 28,05
S 30.47 29.92 2 7.8 5
0 3 1 .8 2 3 1 .2 4 2 9 .14
N 33.47 3 2 .8 1 3 0 .4 1
D 35 .34 34.67 32 .2 0
J 33.79 3 3 .1 8 30.85
F 30 .3 5 2 9 .9 1 2 8 . 1 2
M 29.67 2 9 .2 1 2 7 .39
A 3 1 .4 5 3 1 . 1 1 29.56
M 3 1 . 3 2 30.93 2 9 .16
-  A3 7 -
Y e ar
1980
1981
1982
$ / b b l ,  Monthly Data 
V alues fob Port of Loading, September 1976-March 1985
TABLE A4: MIDDLE EAST NETBACKS
(Continued 2)
Month A r a b ia n  I r a n i a n  K uw ait
L i g h t  L ig h t
J  2 9 .7 2  2 9 .3 3  27.68
J  2 9.55  2 9 .19  27.68
A 2 9 . 1 5  ' 28.84 27 .5 5
S 2 9.55  2 9 .19  27.96
0 34.02 3 3 .7 6  32.92
N 3 6 .3 2  3 6 .1 3  35.47
D 3 5 .6 1  3 5 .3 8  34.63
J 3 5 .3 0  3 5 .0 1  34.04
F 3 5 .7 6  35.44 34.30
M 3 5 .3 9  35.0 5  33.87
A 3 4 .7 1  34.44 3 3 .2 7
M 3 1 .9 8  3 1 . 7 5  30.69
J  2 9 .3 1  2 9 .10  2 8 .1 3
J  29.83 29.00- 28.42
A 29.98 28 .70  28.45
S 3 1 .8 5  28.90 30.03
0 30.00 29.00 29.00
N 3 1 .0 0  30.00 30.00
D 3 1 .5 0  3 1 .0 0  30.30
J  3 1 .7 4  3 1 . 3 1  2 9 .7 2
F 3 0 ,3 6  29.97 28.60
M ' 28.30 27.97 26.79
A 28.84 28.58 27.42
M 30.59 30.27  28.77
J  3 1 .7 8  3 1 .4 6  29.90
J  30 .2 5  29.98 28.70
-  A 3 8  -
Y e ar
1982
1983
1984
$ / b b l ,  Monthly Data 
V alues fob Port of Lo ad in g , September 1976
TABLE A4: MIDDLE EAST NETBACKS
(Continued 3)
Month A ra b ia n  I r a n i a n
L i g h t  L i g h t
A 3 0 .7 5  30.47
S 30.90 30 .52
0 3 1 .2 0  ' 30.85
N 3 1 .3 4  30.98
D 30.60 3 0 .2 3
J  29.86 29,56
F 28.38 2 8 . 1 1
M 2 7 .4 1  2 7 . 1 7
A 27 .8 4  2 7 .7 3
M 27.84 2 7 .7 3
J  2 7 .4 1  2 7 .29
J  27,88 2 7 .74
A 28.45  28.34
S 28.88 28,70
0 28 .62 28.46
N 28.24 28.08
D 26.89 ' 26 .70
J  2 7 .2 7  27.07
F 2 7 . 1 1  2 6 .9 1
M 2 7 .3 5  2 7 .1 6
A 28.07 2 7 .9 7
M 28.54 28.44
J  28.38 28.29
J  26.87 26.78
A 2 5 .2 4  2 5 ,2 2
S 25.99 25.89
0 26 .6 5  2 6 .5 1
■March 1985
Kuw ait
2 9 .19
2 9 .19
29.63  
29.70  
28.89  
2 8 .4 1  
2 7 . 1 3  
2 6 .3 1  
27.09
27.0 5  
2 6 .6 1
26.97
27.64
28.05  
2 7 .9 1  
2 7 .5 3  
26.04  
26.37  
2 6 .2 2  
26.49  
27.44
27.98  
27.82  
26 .35
24.99  
25.60  
2 6 .1 2
-  A 3 9  -
$ / b b l ,  Monthly Data 
Values fob Port of Loading, September 1976-March 1985
TABLE A4: MIDDLE EAST NETBACKS
(Continued 4)
Y e ar  Month A r a b ia n  I r a n i a n  Kuw ait
L i g h t  L i g h t
1984
1985
N
D
J
F
M
2 6 .1 5
26.22
2 6 .3 5
26.88
26.80
26.02  
26.08  
2 6 .18  
26.70  
26.64
25.6 5
25.66  
25.6 5  
2 6 .1 5  
2 6 .1 7
Note: Data fo r  N ig e r ia n  L ig h t  not a v a i l a b le
Sou rce: Petroleum I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly
-  A40 -
Year
1976
°1977
1978
TABLE A5: US NETBACKS
$ /b b l, Monthly Data
Values fob Port o f Loading, January 1977-March 1985
Month A ra b ia n I r a n i a n N i g e r i a n
- L i g h t L ig h t  ' L i g h t
J
F
M
A
M
J N.A. N.A. N.A.
J
S
0
N
D
J 1 3 .6 2 13 .8 8 15 .0 6
F 1 3 .6 5 13 .9 8 1 5 .3 5
M 14 .0 3 14 ,3 2 1 5 .7 4
A 14 .2 5 14 .5 5 15.89
M 13 .9 6 14 .2 5 15 .4 9
J 13 .9 5 1 4 .2 3 15 .4 0
J 1 3 .7 5 1 4 .0 1 1 5 . 1 3
A 13 .8 4 14.06 15 .0 3
S 13 .8 4 14 .0 5 14 .9 2
0 1 3 .7 8 14.00 14.99
N 1 3 .4 7 1 3 .7 2 1 4 .8 1
D 13 .5 9 1 3 .8 7 1 5 .7 0
J 1 3 .2 7 13 .5 4 14.68
F 12 .8 2 13 .0 7 1 4 . 1 7
M 12.88 1 3 . 1 5 14 .3 2
A 13 .4 6 1 3 . 7 1 14.80
N.A.
N.A.
-  A 4 1  -
TABLE A5: US NETBACKS
(Continued 1)
$ /b b l, Monthly Data
Values fob Port o f Loading, January 1977-March 1985
Y ear  Month A r a b ia n
L i g h t
M 13 .87
J  13 .75
J  13 .35
A 14.27
S 14 .25
0 14 .09
N 14 .88  '
D 14 .26
1979 J  1 4 .4 9
F 18 .04
M 19 .9 6
A 2 3 .8 2
M 3 0 .1 3
J  35 .3 5
J  25 .7 1
A 27 .4 5
S 30 .3 1
0 33 .3 1
N 3 7 .1 3
D 3 7 .0 8
1980 J  3 2 .9 1
F 3 3 .0 3
M 3 1 .6 1
A 3 3 .4 7
M 3 3 .9 6
J  3 3 .1 2
J  3 4 .0 0
I r a n i a n  N i g e r i a n  K uw ait
L i g h t  L i g h t
1 4 .1 0  15.11
1 4 .0 0  15 .03
13 .67  15 .04  12 .20
14 .63  16 .22  12 .89
1 4 .6 0  16 .16  12 .94
14 .42  16 .22  12 .73
15 .30  17.21 13 .27
14 .62  16 .78  12 .76
14.95  16 .9 6  1 2 .7 4
18 .60  2 0 .8 8  15 .92
20 .45  22 .7 1  18 .12
2 4 .5 0  27 .17  2 1 .2 4
3 1 .3 8  3 5 .8 3  2 4 .9 8
36 .7 2  4 1 .7 5  29 .7 9
2 6 .4 3  3 0 .0 9  2 2 .7 3
28 .20  3 1 .2 6  24 .51
3 1 .1 9  35 .07  2 6 .5 7
34 .2 3  38 .11  2 9 .5 9
3 8 .2 3  4 2 .7 6  3 2 .6 3
38 .19  4 2 .8 6  3 2 .5 2
33 .6 9  3 7 .2 8  29 .8 1
3 3 .9 1  37 .4 8  29 .61
3 2 .5 9  36 .45  2 7 .5 8
3 4 .6 0  3 8 .9 4  2 8 .8 6
3 4 .8 8  3 8 .3 5  30 .3 7
3 3 .9 5  3 7 .2 3  2 9 .7 9
3 4 .6 8  3 7 .6 5  31 .4 0
-  A 4 2  -
Y e ar
1980
1981
1982
TABLE A5: US NETBACKS
(Continued 2)
$ /b b l, Monthly Data
Values fob  Port of Loading, January 1977-March 1985
Month - A r a b ia n I r a n i a n N i g e r i a n
L i g h t L i g h t L i g h t
A 3 2 .5 6 3 3 .1 6 35 .81
S 3 1 .8 5 3 2 .5 0 35 ,67
0 3 2 .8 8  ' 3 3 .4 7 3 6 .0 3
N 3 4 .5 8 35 .0 9 37 .5 5
D 3 4 .5 1 3 5 .0 3 3 7 .5 2
J 3 5 .8 3 36 .5 3 3 9 .4 9
F • 3 4 .7 9 35 .58 38 .7 9
M 3 4 .5 0 35 .2 7 38.31
A 3 4 .0 0 3 4 .7 3 3 7 .7 3
M 3 3 .2 2 33 .9 1 3 6 .7 2
J 3 2 .1 5 33 .0 0 3 6 .2 3
J 3 3 .7 2 3 3 .9 0 3 7 .7 3
A 3 3 .2 3 3 3 .0 0 37 .59
S 3 2 .0 9 3 2 .5 0 36 .51
0 3 1 .8 0 3 2 .6 0 36 .0 0
N 3 1 .2 0 3 2 .1 0 3 5 .6 0
D 3 0 .8 0 3 1 .5 0 3 5 .4 0
J 3 0 .9 9 3 1 .8 6 3 5 .3 6
F 29 .4 8 30 .23 33 .3 3
M 27.69 28 .32 3 0 .8 6
A 3 0 .2 1 3 0 .8 4 33 .2 9
M 3 2 .7 3 3 3 .4 5 3 6 .2 2
J 3 3 .1 8 3 3 .9 2 3 6 .7 9
J 3 1 .6 2 32 .3 1 3 5 .0 5
A 3 1 .6 3 32 .38 35 .21
S 3 2 .2 8 3 3 .0 4 3 6 .0 3
0 3 2 .2 2 3 3 .0 3 36 .22
K uw ait
3 0 .3 3
2 9 .2 6
3 0 .7 8  
3 2 .8 3  
3 2 .6 8  
3 3 .4 2
3 2 .0 1  
3 1 .8 2
3 1 .4 4  
30 .81
2 8 .9 5
3 0 .7 9  
2 9 .9 3  
2 8 .7 4  
3 0 .0 0
3 0 .9 0  
3 0 .5 0  
27 .5 3  
26 .55  
25 .36
2 7 .9 5  
30 .17
3 0 .4 4
2 9 .0 2
2 8 .9 0
2 9 .4 4  
2 9 .0 9
-  A43 -
Y e ar
1982
1983
1984
1985
Month A r a b ia n  I r a n i a n  N i g e r i a n  K uw ait
L i g h t  L i g h t  L i g h t
N 3 1 .3 4  32 .0 5  34.90 28.65
D 29.20  29.85  32.40 26 .75
J  2 7 .7 7  2 7 .5 2  29.78
F 26.94 26.69 28.84
M 2 5 .7 5  * 25.54 27,39
A 28.69 28 .35  30.56
M 28 ,33  2 8 .0 1  30 .27
J 29.00 28.66 3 1 . 1 3
J  29.22  28.93 3 1 . 1 8  N.A.
A 28.96 28.65 30.94
S 28.79 28.59 3 0 .5 3
0 28.07 27.89  29.69
N 2 7 .8 1  27.6 2  29.52
D 26.09 25 .9 3  2 7 .9 2
J  27 .8 3  27.66 29.74
F 2 7 .9 5  27.80  2 9 .8 1
M 27.66 2 7 .50  29.32
A 28 .23  28.02 29.64
M 27,90 2 7 .7 2  2 9 .2 1
J  26.44 26.26 28.06
J  25.8 7 25.69 2 7 .5 3  N.A.
A 26 .79  26.60 28.03
S 27.29  2 7 . 1 7  28 ,52
0 26.84 26.76 27.89
N 25.59  2 5 .5 3  26.57
D 24 .57  2 4 .52  25.49
J  24.29 24.23 2 5 .38
F 2 5 ,5 3  25.46 26.55
M 26.30 26.20 27.48
TABLE A5: US NETBACKS
(Continued 3)
$ /b b l, Monthly Data
Values fob Port of Loading, January 1977-March 1985
Source: Petroleum I n t e l l i g e n c e  Weekly
-  A44 -
TABLE A6 : MONTHLY BULK PRICES -  GASOLINE, GASOIL
fob Rotterdam, $ / tonne 
January 1967-May 1985
Y ear Month G a s o l i n e G a s o i l Y ear Month G a s o l in e G a s o i l
1967 J 2 9 .5 21 .5 1970 J 2 5 .0 2 2 .0
F 2 9 .5 2 1 .0 F 2 4 .5 2 1 .0
M 29 .5 2 0 .0  - M 2 4 .0 2 0 .0
A 3 0 .0 17 .5 A 2 3 .5 20 .5
M 3 0 .0 17 .5 M 2 3 .5 2 1 .3
J 3 2 .5 22 .5 J 2 5 .0 21 .5
J 4 1 .5 3 1 .5 J 2 7 .5 2 4 .0
A 5 0 .0 3 0 .5 A 3 2 .0 29 .5
S 4 3 .0 2 8 .0 - - - • S ' 3 1 .5 3 1 .5
0 4 0 .5 2 8 .5 0 3 1 .5 33 .0
N 3 9 .0 30 .0 N 3 1 .0 3 4 .0
D 3 8 .0 3 0 .5 D 3 1 .5 3 4 .0
1968 J 3 8 .0 3 2 .5 1971 J 3 3 .0 3 5 .5
‘ F 3 6 .5 3 1 .5 F 3 4 .0 3 5 .0
M 3 3 .0 2 7 .0 M 3 5 .0 3 4 .0
A 3 2 .0 2 5 .0 A 3 5 .0 3 2 .0
M 3 1 .0 22 .5 M 3 5 .0 3 1 .0
J 3 0 .0 2 3 .0 J 3 5 .0 2 9 .0
J 3 0 .0 22 .5 J 3 4 .0 2 7 .0
A 3 0 .0 24 .0 A 3 3 .0 2 6 .0
S * 2 9 .5 2 4 .5 S 3 2 .0 2 7 .0
0 2 9 .5 2 4 .5 0 3 2 .5 24 .0
N 2 9 .0 2 5 .5 N 3 2 .0 2 3 .0
D 2 7 .5 2 6 .0 D 3 2 .5 2 7 .5
1969 J 2 7 .0 25 .5 1972 J 32 .5 26 .5
F 2 5 .5 22 .5 F 3 2 .5 2 4 .0
M 2 5 .0 2 1 .0 M 32 .5 23 .5
A 2 5 .0 2 0 .0 A 3 2 .0 25 .0
M 2 5 .5 2 0 .5 M 3 5 .5 2 4 .0
J 2 5 .0 19.5 J 3 7 .5 2 3 .5
J 2 4 .5 19 .5 J 4 1 .0 24 .0
A 2 4 .5 19 .5 A 4 3 .5 25 .5
S 2 5 .0 20 .0 S 4 3 .0 27 .0
0 2 4 .0 2 0 .0 0 4 3 .0 2 7 .0
N 2 4 .5 19 .0 N 4 4 .0 3 2 .5
D 2 5 .0 2 0 .0  , D 4 8 .0 3 6 .0
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TABLE A6: MONTHLY BULK PRICES -  GASOLINE, GASOIL
(Continued 1)
f o b  R o t te rd a m ,  $ / to n n e  
J a n u a r y  1967-May 1985
Year Month Gasoline Gasoil Year Month Gasoline Gasoil
1973 J 5 3 .0 6 3 7 .4 9 1976 J 137 .8 8 103.41
F 5 5 .0 5 4 1 .8 8 F 144 .5 102 .95
M 6 2 .1 8 4 2 .1 3 M 150.36 104 .22
A 7 3 .6 8 4 3 .9 2 A 160.31 105 .65
M 96 .01 5 4 .7 1  - M 164 .23 105 .16
J 1 11 .95 6 6 .6 5 J 163 .24 105 .97
J 102 .47 7 2 .4 3 J 157.04 104.07
A 8 3 .8 8 71 .39 A 152 .5 108.3
S 8 5 .7 3 79 .46 S 147 .42 111 .06
0 102 .02 121.21 0 149 .68 109.58
N 150 .2 0 186 .52 N 148 .44 105.91
D 186 .77 185.91 D 144 .62 1 12 .25
1974 J 150 .81 131 .92 1977 J 143 .27 1 16 .16
F 153 .3 5 103 .49 F 141.97 119 .33
M 185 .4 8 100.37 M 141.93 115 .62
A 1 81 .05 8 3 .6 2 A 148 .76 117 .4
M 173 .9 8 . 9 0 .5 4 M 147.71 118 .5
J 148.28* 8 8 .5 4 J 141.34 118.41
J 124 .5 7 9 2 .8 9 J 141.21 119.71
A 115.25 9 2 .2 8 A 140.52 117 .27
S 113 .59 9 3 .1 7 S 139.29 115 .92
0 109 .45 92 .29 0 139 .43 116 .93
N 1 1 1 .0 4 8 9 .8 4 N 139 .3 118.06
D 1 1 5 .6 2 92 .0 1 D 137 .8 120.23
1975 J 118 .8 4 8 7 .2 1978 J 137 .48 .1 1 7 .8 5
F 120 .28 8 1 .6 8 F 141 .4 119 .63
M 120 .6 8 82 .6 1 M 148.8 122 .56
A 127 ,27 8 8 .4 1 A 1 48 .14 126.67
M 135.1 94 .56 M 151.36 122 .64
J 141 .56 106 .13 J 154.23 121 .09
J 128 .73 9 9 .2 9 J 160 .28 122.5
A 126 .45 109.48 A 181.86 122.69
S 125 .44 115.77 S 188 .39 126 .92
0 128 .63 117.76 0 200 .81 133 .85
N 134 .09 111.71 N 220 .77 155.5
D 1 3 8 .0 4 105 .47 D 210 .0 8 151 .64
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TABLE A6: MONTHLY BULK PRICES -  GASOLINE, GASOIL
(Continued 2)
fob Rotterdam, $ /tonne  
January 1967-May 1985
Year Month Gasoline Gasoil Year Month Gasoline Gasoil
1979 J 2 19 .2 6  ’ 1 9 4 .3 1 1982 J 3 3 9 .6 1 3 1 4 .7 9
F 3 2 2 .4 1 2 8 9 .16 F 316 .6 6 280.36 •
M 295.0 2 2 5 1 . 2 M 297.62 2 6 1 .7 3
A 3 0 8 .14 265.82 A 324.89 278 .35
M 368.66 3 19 .9 3 M 363.8 7 295.42
J 39 7.4 362.28 . J 368.99 284.72
J 380.34 35 6 .5 5 J 3 5 8 .7 1 2 7 4 .17
A 3 5 7 .0 5 3 16 .8 8 A 348.0 285,94
S 345.4 3 3 2 5 .9 1 S 360.85 30 3.35
0 355.48 3 3 0 .22 0 360.75 3 1 3 . 7 1
N 3 9 2 .1 3 362.45 N 3 3 1 .6 5 293 .52
D 4 16 .2 4 356.08 D 3 1 7 .2 8 289.76
1980 J 400.56 3 4 4 .17 1983 J 3 14 .0 295.0
F 386.36 307.24 F 3 14 .0 284.0
M 379 .9  * 297.04 M 287.0 249.0
A 3 7 2 .6 3 18 .9 * A 275.0 238.0
M 3 7 6 . 1 1 320 .9 5 M 3 0 1 .0 2 5 1 .0
J 3 7 3 . 1 2 3 1 2 .7 4 J 295.0 243.0
J 3 6 1 .5 2 305.58 J 308.0 . 246.0
A 32 6 .6 3 272.45 A 307.0 245.0
S 3 3 7 .5 3 284.72 S 308.0 256.0
0 3 5 7 .0 300.84 0 295.0 254.0
N 387.09 3 2 1 .4 2 N 287.0 250.0
D 3 77.9 9 299.42 D 294.0 25 5.0
19 8 1  J 3 7 9 .1 9 3 0 7 .2 1 1984 J 279.0 249.0
F 3 7 0 .5 3 303.68 F 265.0 2 5 1 .0
M 3 6 3 .3 7 308.02 M 269.0 2 5 1 .0
A 3 5 9 .0 2 288.68 A 280.0 25 5.0
M 3 5 1 .3 9 2 7 1 .3 8 M 279.0 253.0
J 3 6 3 .3 2 7 1 .5 3 J 2 7 1 .0 242.0
J 3 9 1 .6 7 286.74 J 270.0 238.0
A 384.5 294.04 A 26 5.0 ' 230.0
S 3 8 3 . 1 1 297.62 S 263.0 230.0
0 382.24 3 1 1 . 0 3  ‘ 0 265.0 235.0
N 3 7 5 .4 1 3 2 2 .3 N 264.0 233.0
D 350 .43 32 2 .0 D 256.0 236.0
1985 J 240.0 224.0
F 23 2 .0 234.0
M 240.0 246.0
A 2 52.0 242.0
M 283.0 236.0
Source: P l a t t ’ s Oilgram
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APPENDIX 4 
SOFTWARE
Program 'INTERV' has been w r i t t e n  in  s tandard  FORTRAN 77 and employed 
fo r  the  e s t im a t io n  of the  in te rv e n t io n  models. The program re q u i re s  
(1) a f i l e  ho lding th e  time s e r i e s  d a ta  in  a column, (2) the command 
f i l e  (MENU) which s p e c i f i e s  the  model by a ss ig n in g  values  to  the 
param eters ,  (3) a f i l e  ho lding p re l im ina ry  va lues  fo r  the omega and 
d e l t a  param eters in  a column and in  th a t  o rd e r .
The program i t s e l f  g en era te s  the ' in t e r v e n t io n ( s )  accord ing  to  the  
s p e c i f i c a t io n  g iven in  MENU. The example s p e c i f i c a t io n  given in  the 
program te x t  f o r  MENU f i t s  an ARIMA (0, 0 , 1) model and two 
in te r v e n t io n s :  the f i r s t  occuring  on the 34th o b se rv a tio n  (October 
1978) and being a s tep  jump (IDUR1 = 150 NPER = 111) modelled as a 
second order  t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  (Pl = 2) and the second occuring on 
the 58th o b se rva tion  (October 1979) and being an impulse (IDUR2 -  1) 
modelled as a f i r s t  o rder  t r a n s f e r  fun c tio n  (P2 = 1).
In the absence of an in te rv e n in g  event (NSER = 1) the  program 
es t im a te s  a simple ARIMA model fo r  the time s e r i e s .
A m o d if ic a t io n  of 'INTERV* c a l le d  'TRANSFER' has been employed fo r  
the e s t im a t io n  of the m u l t i - in p u t  t r a n s f e r  fu n c t io n  models. The 
program re q u ire s  the  same in p u t f i l e s :  d a ta  f i l e  (a  column of da ta  
w ith  a l l  the  in p u t time s e r i e s  followed by the output s e r i e s ) ,
MENU. TF and CFILET. Both programs are  given below.
SUBROUTINE REFERENCES
INVERT : g en era te s  the  s e r i e s  p re d ic te d  on the b as is  of the
es tim ated  model.
INPUT : reads the param eter f i l e  (MENU or MENU.TF)
NAG 11 sub rou tines  employed:
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G01BCF
G13ABF
G13BEF
: r e tu rn s  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  a sso c ia te d  w ith  the upper t a i l  
of x 2
: computes the sample ACF of a s e r i e s ,  mean, v a r ia n c e  and 
the  Q - s t a t i s t i c
: e s t im a te s  the param eters in  a m u l t i - in p u t  model using a 
choice of th re e  s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  e s t im a t io n  c r i t e r i a .
C PROGRAM INTERV
C
C PROGRAM TO COMPUTE INTERVENTION MODEL PARAMETERS.
C THE PROGRAM READS A TIME SERIES, SERIESOOO), AND THE TIME OF
C OCCURENCE, TIME(2 ) ,  OF UP TO TWO INTERVENTIONS, ASSUMED TO BE
C UNITY STEPS IN THE TIME DOMAIN.
C
C THE PROGRAM PROCEEDS TO ESTIMATE THE PARAMETERS OMEGA'S AND
C DELTA'S, AS DEFINED BY BOX & JENKINS, WHICH DESCRIBE THE TIME
C SERIES DEPENDENCE ON THE INTERVENING EVENTS.
C FURTHERMORE, A SUITABLE ARIMA MODEL IS ESTIMATED WHICH DESCRIBES
C THE STOCHASTIC PART OF THE TIME SERIES
C
C THE PROGRAM REQUIRES 3 INPUT FILES : THE DATA FILE (CFILE),
C THE COMMAND FILE (MENU) WHICH ASSIGNS VALUES TO THE PARAMETERS,
C AND CFILET WHICH HOLDS PRELIMINARY VALUES FOR THE TRANSFER
C FUNCTION PARAMETERS.
C THERE ARE 4 OUTPUT FILES : TITLECholding e s t im a te s  of the
C model param eters and r e l a t e d  s t a t i s t i c s ) , RESIDUALS(holding
C th e  r e s id u a l  s e r i e s ) ,  RES.ACF(holding the  a u to c o r re la t io n
C func tion  of the r e s id u a l s )  and PLOTCholding va lues  fo r  the
C follow ing  4 s e r i e s  : a c tu a l  s e r i e s ,  p red ic ted  s e r i e s ,
C ARIMA and . in te rv e n tio n  components, in th a t  o rder)
C
C THE FOLLOWING IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE MENU FILE USED TO ESTIMATE
C THE INTERVENTION MODEL FOR THE SPOT PRICES OF ARABIAN LIGHT,
C 1976(Jan)-1985(March) :
C INTV, NPER=111,NSER=3,PSML=0, DSML=0, QSML=1
C PCAP=0,DCAP=0,QCAP=0
C NSEAS=12,KFC5a1,KEF5=3fNIT5=40,LAGS=25,FC5=12
C B1=3»B2=1,Q1=0,Q2=0,P1=2,P2=1,TIME1=34,TIME2=58
C IDUR1=150,IDUR2=1
C CFILE=ARAB.SP,CFILET=TF1,TITLE=SP0T,DATE=10/3/85,END
C
C DEFINITION OF PARAMETERS
C
C CFILE : NAME OF FILE HOLDING THE TIME SERIES
C CFILET : NAME OF FILE HOLDING THE INTERVENTION PARAMETERS, OMEGA’S
C AND DELTA'S OF THE I th  EVENT, FOLLOWED BY THOSE OF THE
C J th  EVENT, e t c .
C TITLE : TITLE OF THE RUN -  NAME OF OUTPUT FILE
C DATE : DATE OF THE RUN
C SCAN : REFER TO 'MAIN ANALYSIS LOOP' COMMENTS.
C FC5 : THE VALUE OF THE CONSTANT, c ,  OF THE ARIMA MODEL.
C PROB ; THE TAIL DISTRIBUTION OF CHI-SQUARE REQUIRED TO EVALUATE STAT.
C NPER : THE NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS IN THE TIME SERIES.
C NSER : THE NUMBER OF INTERVENTION EVENTS PLUS ONE i . e  THE TOTAL NUMBER
C (INPUT+OUTPUT) OF TIME SERIES USED.
C PSML, DSML, QSML, PCAP, DCAP, QCAP : p ,d ,q ,P ,D ,Q  = THE ARIMA MODEL PARAMETERS.
C I B ( I ) , I Q ( I ) , I P ( I )  : THE TF ORDERS b ,q ,p  OF THE I th  EVENT.
C TIME(I) : THE MOMENT OF OCCURENCE OF THE I th  EVENT.
C IDUR(I) : THE DURATION OF THE I th  EVENT(WHETHER A STEP OR AN IMPULSE)
C NSEAS : SEASONALITY
C KFC5 : ON ENTRY KFC5 MUST BE SET TO 0 IF THE ARIMA CONSTANT, c ,  IS TO
C REMAIN FIXED AT ITS INITIAL VALUE, AND 1 IF IT IS TO BE ESTIMATED
C KEF5 : ON ENTRY KEF5 MUST SPECIFY THE LIKELIHOOD OPTION : 1 GIVES LEAST
C SQUARES, 2 GIVES EXACT AND 3 GIVES MARGINAL LIKELIHOOD.
C NIT5 : ON ENTRY NIT5 MUST SPECIFY THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF ITERATIONS.
C IF NIT5=0 NO CHANGE IS MADE TO ANY OF THE MODEL PARAMETERS EXCEPT
C THAT THE CONSTANT, c ,  (IF KFC5=1) AND ANY OMEGA RELATING TO SIMPLE
C INPUT SERIES ARE ESTIMATED.
C
C
C NOTE : EACH OF THE ABOVE PARAMETERS (EXCLUDING LOGICAL) IS ASSOCIATED WITH
C A LOGICAL PARAMETER. IF THE LOGICAL PARAMETER IS TRUE THEN PROGRAM
C EXPECTS SPECIFICATION OF THE PARAMETER VALUE, OTHERWISE IT ASSUMES
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DEFAULT VALUES.
PARAMETERS
L=MAXIMUM NO OF INTERVENTIONS '
M=MAXIMUM NO OF OBSERVATIONS
N1=MAXIMUM VALUE OF TF ORDERS q ,p
N2=MAXIMUM VALUE OF TF ORDER b
N3=MAXIMUM VALUE OF ARIMA ORDERS p,q ,P ,Q
N4=MAXIMUM VALUE OF ARIMA ORDERS d,D
N5=MAXIMUM VALUE OF SEASONALITY >1
PARAMETER( L=2, M=300, N1=4,N2=1 4 ,N3=2, N4=2, N5=12)
PARAMETER(NTP=L*(2*N1+1))
PARAMETER(NP4=4*N3)
PARAMETER(NP5=NTP+NP4+1 ,LP1=L+1)
PARAMETER( ITF5 =(N3+N4) * ( N5+1)+N3* N5+(2* N1+N2)* L)
PARAMETER(IQD=N3*( 1+N5), IDD=N4*(1+N5))
PARAMETER(IQX=IQD,NCD=NP5+1+IQX)
PARAMETER( NCE=M+IDD+6*IQX,NCF=LP1+14+5*L)
PARAMETER( IWA5=2*NCD*NCD+NCE*( NCF+4))
PARAMETER(IMWA5=16*LP1*7*NCD+3*NP5+30)
SIMPLE VARIABLES AND ARRAYS LISTED BY PROGRAM SECTIONS
INPUT/OUTPUT
CHARACTER*15 CFILE, CFILET, TITLE, DATE 
LOGICAL LB(L),LQ(L),LP(L),LTIME(L), LDUR(L)
LOGICAL FAIL 
LOGICAL LNPER,LNSER
LOGICAL LPSML, LDSML, LQSML, LPCAP fLDCAP, LQCAP 
LOGICAL LNSEAS, LKFC5, LKEF5, LNIT5, LNK6, LP ROB, LFC5 
LOGICAL SCAN, LFILE, LFILET, LTITLE, LDATE 
REAL*4 FC5,PROB
INTEGER*2 IB (L ), IQ(L),IP(L),TIM E(L), IDUR(L)
INTEGER*2 NPER,NSER
INTEGER*2 PSML, DSML,QSML, PCAP, DCAP, QCAP 
INTEGER*2 NSEAS,KFC5,KEF5, NIT5, NK6 
INTEGER*2 IFILE, IFILET, ITITLE, IDATE 
CHARACTER*15 CVALUEC30)
REAL*4 RVALUE(30)
INTEGER*2 IDUMMYC3)
READ TIME SERIES
REAL*8 SERIES(M)
INTEGER*2 I ,J ,K  
INTEGER*2 IOS
INTERVENTION MODEL
REAL*8 EVENT(M,L),TPARA(NTP)
REAL*8 G05CAF,X 
INTEGER*2 NPARA
MAIN ANALYSIS LOOP
INTEGER*2 IPS,IDS,IQS,IPC,IDC,IQC 
INTEGER*2 KPS,KDS,KQS,KPC,KDC,KQC
INTEGER*2 MR4(7),NPAR4 
OVERALL MODEL ESTIMATION
REAL*8 PARA5CNP5),XXY5(M,LP1) ,ZSP5(4),SD5(NP5),CM5(NP5,NP5) 
REAL*8 S5,D5,RES5(M),STTF5(ITF5),WA5(IWA5)
INTEGER*2 MT5( 4 , LP1 ) , ITC5, NPARA5, NDF5,KZEF5, NSTTF5, MWA5( IMVJA5)
C ANALYSIS OF RESIDUALS 
C
REAL*8 XM6, XV6, R6(M) , STAT6 , GO1BCF, PROBA 
INTEGER*2 NX6, IFAIL6, IFRD 
REAL*8 S6,PRED6(M)
C
C
C
EQUIVALENCE(RVALUE(2 4 ) ,PROB), (RVALUE(25),FC5) 
EQUIVALENCE(CVALUE(27),CFILE),(CVALUE(28),CFILET),
1 (CVALUE(29), TITLE),(CVALUE(30),DATE)
C
C COMMON STORAGE 
C
COMMON /BL2/LB, LQ, LP, LTIME, LDUR,
1 LNPER, LNSER, LPSML, LDSML, LQSML, LPCAP, LDCAP, LQCAP,
2 LNSEAS, LKFC5, LKEF5, LNIT5, LNK6, LP ROB,
3 LFC5, SCAN, LFILE, LFILET, LTITLE, LDATE 
COMMON /BL3/RVALUE
COMMON /BL4/CVALUE
COMMON /BL5/IB,IQ,IP,TIME, IDUR,
1 NPER,NSER,
2 PSML, DSML, QSML, PCAP, DCAP, QCAP,
3 NSEAS,KFC5,KEF5, NIT5, NK6,
4 IDUMMY, IFILE, IFILET, ITITLE, IDATE 
COMMON /BL6/WA5,MWA5
C -
C FORTRAN PARAMETER CHECK
C
C
C INPUT/OUTPUT
C
C DEFAULT VALUES
C , •'
PROB=.95
PSML=0
QSML=0
PCAP=0
QCAP=0
DSML=0
DCAP=0
NSEAS=12
NLAGS=1
NK6= 1
KFC5=1
KEF5=2
NIT5=10
C
CALL INPUT(FAIL)
C
IF(FAIL)STOP
IF(.NOT.LTITLE) TITLE=1 RESULTS’
OPEN(6,FILE=TITLE(1 :ITITLE),STATUS=»UNKNOWN')
IF(.NOT. LFILET) THEN 
WRITE(6,105)
105 FORMAT( / / , '  PARAMETER CFILET NOT SPECIFIED')
STOP
ENDIF
I F ( . NOT. LFILE) THEN 
WRlTE(6,110)
110 FORMAT( / / , 1 PARAMETER CFILE NOT SPECIFIED')
STOP
ENDIF
IF(LKFC5)THEN
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INTEGER*2 IFAIL5
C
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IFCKFC5 .LT. 0 .OR. KFC5 .GT. 1) THEN 
WRITEC6,115)
115 FORMATC//,' KFC5 OUTSIDE RANGE')
STOP
ENDIF
IFCKFC5 .EQ. 0 .AND. (.NOT. LFC5)) THEN 
WRITEC6,120)
120 FORMAT(//, '  VALUE OF FC5 NOT SPECIFIED')
STOP
ENDIF
ENDIF
IF(PROB .LT. 0. .OR. PROB .GT. 1 .)  THEN 
WRITEC 6, 125)
125 FORMATC//,' PARAMETER PROB OUTSIDE RANGE')
STOP
ENDIF
IF ( . NOT. LNPER) THEN 
WRITE(6,130)
130 FORMATC//,' PARAMETER NPER NOT SPECIFIED')
STOP
ENDIF
IF(NPER .GT. M .OR. NPER .LT. 1) THEN 
WRITEC6,135)
135 FORMAT( / / , '  PARAMETER NPER OUT OF RANGE')
STOP
ENDIF
IF(.NOT. LNSER) THEN 
WRITEC6,140)
140 FORMATC//, '  PARAMETER NSER NOT SPECIFIED')
‘ STOP 
ENDIF
IF(NSER .GT. L+1 .OR. NSER .LT.1) THEN 
WRITE(6,145)
145 FORMAT( / / , 1 PARAMETER NSER OUTSIDE RANGE')
STOP
ENDIF
IF (MAJQJ( PSML, QSML, PCAP, QCAP) .GT. N3 .OR.
1 MINO(PSML,QSML,PCAP, QCAP) .LT. 0) THEN 
WRITE(6,150)
150' FORMAT(//,' PARAMETERS PSML,QSML,PCAP,QCAP OUTSIDE RANGE')
STOP
ENDIF
IF (MAXO(DSML, DCAP) .GT. N4 .OR.
1 MIN0(DSML,DCAP) .LT. 0) THEN 
WRITE(6,155)
155 FORMATC//,' PARAMETERS DSML,DCAP OUTSIDE RANGE')
STOP
ENDIF
IFCNSEAS .LT. 1 .OR. NSEAS .GT. N5) THEN 
WRITEC6,160)
160 FORMATC//,' PARAMETER NSEAS OUT OF RANGE')
STOP
ENDIF
IFCNPER .LE. DSML+DCAP«NSEAS) THEN 
WRITEC6,165)
165 FORMATC//,' CONDITION NPER>DSML+DCAPWNSEAS NOT SATISFIED')
STOP
ENDIF
DO 185 1=1,NSER-1
IFCLB(I) .AND. LQ(I) .AND. LP(I) .AND. LTIME(I) .AND. LDUR(I)) 
1 THEN
IF(MINO(IB(I), I Q ( I ) , I P ( I ) )  .LT. 0 .OR.
1 MAXO(IQ(I), IP ( I )) .GT. N1 .OR. IB(I) .GT. N2 .OR.
2 TIME(I) .LT. 1 .OR. TIME(I) .GT. NPER) THEN 
WRITEC6,170)
170 FORMATC//,’ PARAMETER(S) IB,IQ,IP,TIME OUT OF RANGE1)
- A53 -
STOP
ENDIF
ELSE
WRITE(6,175)
175 FORMAT( / / , *  PARAMETER(S) TIME,IDUR,IB,IQ,IP NOT SPECIFIED') 
STOP 
ENDIF
IF ( I  .GT. 1) THEN
IF(TIMECI) .LT. TIME(I-D) THEN
WRITEC6,180)
180 FORMATC//,' TIME OF INTERVENTIONS IN WRONG ORDER')
STOP 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
185 CONTINUE
IFCKFC5 .LT. 0 .OR. KFC5 .GT.1 .OR.
1 KEF5 .LT. 1 .OR. KEF5 .GT. 3 .OR.
2 NITS .LT. 1) THEN 
WRITEC6,190)
190 FORMATC//,» PARAMETER(S) KFC5,KEF5, NIT5 OUT OF RANGE')
STOP
ENDIF
IF (NK6 . LT.1 .OR. NK6 .GE. NPER) THEN 
WRITEC6,195)
195 FORMATC//,' PARAMETER(S) NLAGS,NK6 OUT OF RANGE')
STOP
ENDIF
C PARAMETERS OK -  CONTINUE 
WRITE(6,900)
900 FORMATC/////,20X,' INTERVENTION PROGRAM RESULTS')
IF(LTITLE) WRITE(6 ,9 0 5 )TITLE 
905 FORMATC//,21X,A15)
. IF(LDATE) WRITE( 6 ,910)DATE 
910 FORMAT(70X,A15)
WRITEC6,915)
915 FORMATC//,' THE PARAMETERS OF THE RUN ARE AS FOLLOWS : ' )
WRITE(6 ,9 2 0 )NSER-1 
920 FORMATC//////,' NUMBER OF INTERVENING EVENTS = » ,I2 )
WRITE(6,945)
945 FORMATC//,' ARIMA PRELIMINARY PARAMETERS SET TO ZERO')
IF (SCAN) WRITE(6 ,9 5 0 )PSML, DSML, QSML, PCAP, DCAP, QCAP 
950 FORMATC//,' ARIMA ANALYSIS EXTENDS OVER ALL COMBINATIONS OF' 
1 , / , '  ORDERS UP TO p ,d ,q ,P ,D ,Q  = ' ,6(2X ,12))
IFCKFC5 .EQ. 0)THEN 
WRITE(6,955)FC5
955 FORMATC//,' THE ARIMA CONSTANT REMAINS FIXED TO', G10.4)
ELSE
WRITEC6,960)
960 FORMATC//,' THE ARIMA" CONSTANT IS TO BE ESTIMATED')
ENDIF
IFCKEF5 .EQ. 1) WRITE(6,965)
965 FORMATC//,' THE ESTIMATION CRITERION IS LEAST SQUARES') 
IFCKEF5 . EQ.2) WRITE(6,970)
970 FORMATC//,' THE ESTIMATION CRITERION IS EXACT LIKELIHOOD') 
IFCKEF5 .EQ. 3) WRITE(6,975)
975 FORMATC//,' THE ESTIMATION CRITERION IS MARGINAL LIKELIHOOD') 
WRITE(6 ,980 )PROB 
980 FORMATC//,' THE REQUIRED Q PROBABILITY IS »,G8.2)
C
C READ TIME SERIES
C
C CFILE : THE NAME OF THE FILE HOLDING THE TIME SERIES
C SERIES(I) : TIME SERIES
C NPER : NUMBER OF PERIODS
C
OPEN( 7 , IOSTAT=IOS, FILE= CFILE( 1 : IFILE) , STATUS=' OLD')
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IF (IOS .NE. 0) THEN 
WRITE(6 ,2 0 0 )CFILE,IOS 
200 FORMAT ( / / , ’ ERROR IN OPENING FILE:’ ,A15,' IOSTAT = M 3 )
STOP
ENDIF
READC7, * , IOSTAT=IOS)( SERIES(I),1=1,NPER)
IFCIOS .LT. 0) THEN 
WHITE(6 ,2 0 5 )CFILE 
205 FORMAT( / / , ’ UNEXPECTED END OF FILE:',A15)
STOP
ENDIF
IFCIOS .GT. 0)THEN 
WRITEC6,210)CFILE,IOS 
210 FORMAT( / / , 1 ERROR IN READING SERIES FILE:’ ,A15, 1 IOSTAT = ’ ,13) 
STOP 
ENDIF 
CLOSE(7)
WRITE(6,220)NPER
220 FORMATC//, 1 THERE ARE ' , 1 4 , '  OBSERVATIONS IN THE TIME SERIES’ ) 
WRITE(6,225)(SNGL(SERIES(I)),1=1,NPER)
225 FORMAT(1X,4(1X,G15.3))
C
C SPECIFICATION OF INTERVENTION MODEL
C IDUR(I) : THE DURATION OF THE I th  EVENT
C NSER-1 : THE NUMBER OF INTERVENTION EVENTS, ^2
C MT5(J,I) : THE I th  EVENT ORDERS b , p , q , r .
C TPARA(NPARA) : THE EVENT PARAMETERS, OMEGAs & DELTAS
C EVENT(J,I) : THE I th  EVENT TIME SERIES
C TIME(I) : THE TIME OF THE I th  EVENT OCCURENCE
DO 310 1=1,NSER-1 
DO 300 J=1 ,NPER 
300 EVENTCJ, I ) =0.0001*G05CAF(X)
DO 305 J=TIME(I),MIN0( NPER ,TIME( D+IDURC I ) )
305 EVENTCJ,I)=1,D0+0.0001*G05CAF(X)
310 CONTINUE
DO 315 1=1,NSER-1 
MT5(1,I )= IB (I )
MT5(2,I)=IQ(I)
M T5(3,I)=IP(I)
IFCMAXO( I B ( I ) , I Q ( I ) , I P ( I ) )  .LT. 1) THEN
MT5( 4 , I )=1
ELSE
MT5(4,I)=2 
END IF 
315 CONTINUE
OPEN( 7 , IOSTAT=IOS,FILE=CFILET(1 :IFILET), STATUS=’OLD»)
IFCIOS .NE. 0) THEN
WRITEC6,200)CFILET,IOS
STOP
ENDIF
NPARA=0
DO 320 1=1,NSER-1 
320 NPARA=NPARA+IQ(I)+IP(I)+1
DO 325 1=1,NPARA 
READ(7,*,IOSTAT=IOS) BUFF 
325 TPARACI) =DBLE( BUFF)
IFCIOS .LT. 0) THEN 
WRITEC6 ,205 )CFILET 
STOP 
ENDIF
IFCIOS .GT. 0) THEN
WRITE(6 ,2 1 0 )CFILET, IOS
STOP
ENDIF
CLOSEC7)
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330 FORMATC////,1 INTERVENTION ORDERS, TIME, DURATION AND PRELIMINARY 
1 PARAMETERS')
K= 1
DO 355 1=1,NSER-1
W R IT E (6 ,335)I ,IB (I) ,IQ (I) ,IP (I) ,T IM E (I) ,ID U R (I)
335 FORMATC//,' INTERVENTION NO : ' , 1 2 , '  ORDERS b ,q ,p  :
1 I 2 ,2 X , I 2 ,2 X , I 2 , / , ' INTERVENTION TIME AND DURATION : f , I4 ,2 X ,I4 )  
WRITE(6,340)
WRITEC6 ,3 4 5 ) (SNGLCTPARACJ)) , J=K,IQ(I)+K)
340 FORMATC//,' OMEGA(s) : »)
345 FORMATC1X,4(1X,G15.3))
IFCIP(I) .GT. 0)THEN 
WRITE(6,350)
WRITEC6,345)(SNGLCTPARACJ)) ,J=IQ(I)+1+K,IQ(I)+IP(I)+K)
350 FORMATC//,' DELTA(s) : ' )
ENDIF
K=K+IQ(I)+IP(I)+1 
355 CONTINUE
C
C MAIN ANALYSIS LOOP
C
C IF SCAN=.TRUE. THEN ALL COMBINATIONS OF ARIMA ORDERS
C p ,d ,q ,P ,D ,Q , ( =IPS,IDS,IQS,IPC,IDC,IQC) ARE TREATED,
C STARTING FROM 0 , 0 ,0 , 0 ,0 , 0 ,  TO PSML,DSML,QSML,PCAP,DCAP,QCAP
C IF SCAN=.FALSE. ONLY ONE CASE IS TREATED,
C p ,d ,q ,P ,D ,Q  = PSML,DSML,QSML,PCAP,DCAP,QCAP
C
IF (SCAN) THEN
KQC=0
KDC=0
KPC=0
KQS=0
KDS=0
KPS=0
ELSE
KQC=QCAP 
KDC=DCAP 
KPC=PCAP 
KQS=QSML 
KDS=DSML 
KPS=PSML 
END IF
DO 600 IQC=KQC,QCAP 
DO 600 IDC=KDC,DCAP 
DO 600 IPC=KPC,PCAP 
DO 600 IQS=KQS,QSML 
DO 600 IDS=KDS,DSML 
DO 600 IPS=KPS,PSML 
MR4C1)=IPS 
MR4(2)=IDS 
MR4(3)=IQS 
MR4(4)=IPC 
MR4(5)=IDC 
MR4(6)=IQC 
MR4(7)=NSEAS 
NPAR4=IPS+IQS+IPC+IQC
C
C OVERALL MODEL ESTIMATION 
C
DO 510 J=1, NSER-1 
DO 510 1=1,NPER 
510 XXY5( I , J ) =EVENT( I , J )
DO 515 1=1,NPER 
515 XXY5CI, NSER)=SERIES(I)
DO 500 1=1,NPAR4
WRITEC6 ,330)
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500 PARA5(I)=0.D0
NPARA5=NPAR4+NPARA+1 
DO 530 1=1,NPARA 
530 PARA5(I+NPAR4)=TPARA(I)
IFCKFC5 .EQ. 0) PARA5( NPARA5) =DBLE( FC5)
KZEF5=1 
IFAIL5=0
CALL G13BEFCMR4, NSER, MT5, PARA5, NPARA5,KFC5, NPER,XXY5,M,
1KEFS, NIT5, 0 , ZSP5, ITC5, SD5, CM5, NP5, S5, D5, NDF5, KZEF5, RES5,
2STTF5, ITF5, NSTTF5,WA5, IWA5, MWA5, IMWA5, 1 , IFAIL5)
IFCIFAIL5 .NE, 0)WRITE(6,535)IFAIL5,MWA5(1)
535 FORMATC1 G13BEF FAILURE : IFAIL= ’ ,218)
IFCIFAIL5 .NE. 0)GO TO 600 
C ANALYSIS OF RESIDUALS 
NX6=NPER-IDS-IDC*NSEAS
NK6=MIN0(NX6-1,MAX0(NK6, IPS+IQS+IPC+IQC+1))
IFAIL6=0
CALL G13ABF( RES5, NX6, NK6, XM6, XV6, R6, STAT6, IFAIL6)
IFCIFAIL6 .NE. 0) WRITEC6,5 40 )IFAIL6 
540 FORMATC G13BEF (RESIDUAL ANALYSIS) FAILURE^ *,12)
IFCIFAIL6 .NE. 0) GOTO 600 
IFRD=NK6-IPS-IQS-IPC-IQC 
P ROBA=GO1BCF( STAT6 , IFRD, IFAIL6)
IFCIFAIL6 .NE. 0)WRITE(6,545)IFAIL6 
545 FORMATC GO1BCF (RESIDUAL ANALYSIS) FAILURE* ’ ,12)
IFCIFAIL6 .NE. 0) GOTO 600
CALL INVERT(XXY5(1, NSER), NPER,IDS,IDC,NSEAS,RES5,PRED6)
S6=0.0D0 
DO 520 1=1,NPER 
520 S6=S6+(PRED6(I)-XXY5(I,NSER))**2
C ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
DO 550 1=1,NPAR4
IF(DABS(PARA5(I)) .LT. 2.D0*SD5(I) .AND. SCAN)GOT0600 
IF(DABS(PARA5(I)) .GT. 1.0D0 .AND. SCAN) GOTO 600 
550 CONTINUE
IFCPROBA .GT. DBLE(PROB) .AND. SCAN) GO TO 600
C RESULTS ARE OK
C CONDENCED RESULTS
WRITEC6,555)
555 FORMATC//,' ARIMA ORDERS ARE AS FOLLOWS')
WRITE(6 ,5 6 0 )IPS, IDS, IQS, IPC, IDC, IQC, NSEAS 
560 FORMATC p ,d ,q ,P ,D ,Q ,s=  ' ,7 (2 X ,I2 ) )
WRITE(6 ,5 6 5 )NPARA5, NPAR4, NPARA 
565 FORMATC THE MODEL HAS ' , 1 2 , '  PARAMETERS IN ALL : ' ,
1 / , I 2 , ’ ARE THE ARIMA PARAMETERS , ' , 1 2 , '  ARE THE INTERVENTION(S) 
2PARAMETERS. ' , / , '  THE FINAL PARAMETER CORRESPONDS'
3 , '  TO THE CONSTANT c . ' )
WRITEC6,575)
575 FORMATC PARAMETER STANDARD ERROR')
WRITE(6 ,5 7 0 ) (SNGL( PARA5(I)) , SNGL(SD5( I ) ) ,1 = 1 ,NPARA5)
570 FORMATC1X,G14,7»7X,G14.7)
WRITEC6,580)SNGL(S5),NDF5 
580 FORMATC THE RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES OF THE DIFFERENCED SERIES 
IIS ' , G 8 . 2 , / , ' ITS ASSOCIATED DEGREES OF FREEDOM IS ' ,1 4 )
WRITEC6,585)SNGL(S6)
585 FORMATC THE RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES OF THE ACTUAL SERIES IS '
1,G8.2)
WRITEC6,590)ITC5 
590 FORMATC THE MODEL PARAMETERS WERE ESTIMATED AFTER ' ,1 3 ,
1' ITERATIONS')
WRITE(6 ,595 )SNGL( STAT6), SNGL(PROBA) , IFRD 
595 FORMATC Q STATISTIC, TAIL PROBABILITY, DEGREES OF FREEDOM= '
1,G8.2,2X,G8.2,2X,13)
WRITE(6,610)NK6
610 FORMATC//,' THE ANALYSIS OF RESIDUALS WAS BASED ON ' , 1 4 ,
1' AUTOCORRELATION LAGS')
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600 CONTINUE
IFC.NOT. SCAN) THEN
OPEN(1 1 ,FILE=» RESIDUALS' , STATUS= ’UNKNOWN’ )
WRITE(1 1 ,6 2 0 )(I,SNGL(RES5(I)),1=1, NX6)
CLOSE(11)
OPEN(11,FILE=f RES.ACF’ , STATUS='UNKNOWN’ )
WRITE(1 1 ,6 2 0 )(I,SNGL(R6(I)) ,1 = 1 ,NK6)
CLOSE(11)
ENDIF
CLOSE(6)
IF (.NOT. SCAN) THEN
OPEN(11 .FILEs*PLOT’ , STATUSs’UNKNOWN’ )
WRITE(1 1 ,6 2 0 )(I,SNGL(SERIES(I)) ,1 = 1 ,NPER)
WRITE(1 1 ,6 2 0 )(I,SNGL(SERIES(I)-XXY5(I,NSER)+PRED6(I)) ,1 = 1 ,NPER) 
WRITE(1 1 ,6 2 0 )( I,SNGL(PRED6(I)) ,1 = 1 ,NPER)
WRITE(1 1 ,6 2 0 )( I , SNGL(SERIES( I )-XXY5( I , NSER)) ,1 = 1 ,NPER)
620 FORMAT(1X,I4,3X,G14.7)
CLOSE(H)
END IF
STOP
END
C
SUBROUTINE INVERT(X, NX, ND, NDS, NS, RES,XD)
C INVERT CARRIES OUT NON-SEASONAL AND SEASONAL DIFFERENCING
C ON AN INPUT TIME SERIES. THE RESIDUALS PREVIOUSLY ESTIMATED
C BY ROUTINE G13BEF ME THEN ADDED TO THE DIFFERENCED SERIES.
C FINALLY THE RESULTING SERIES IS TAKEN THROUGH THE INVERSE
C OF OPERATIONS INVOLVED IN DIFFERENCING THUS PROVIDING
C THE PREDICTED TIME SERIES.
C
INTEGER*2 I,J,JQ,K,KQ 
INTEGER*2 ND,NDS,NS,NX,NXD 
REAL*8 X(NX),XD(NX),RES(NX)
C
C TEST THAT NONE OF THE ORDERS IS NEGATIVE
Co
IERROR=1
IF (ND .LT. 0 .OR. NDS .LT. 0 .OR. NS .LT. 0) THEN 
WRITE(6,10)
10 FORMAT( ’ ERROR IN ROUTINE INVERT : ND,NDS,NS < O’ )
STOP
ENDIF
IF ( NS .EQ. 0 .AND. NDS .GT. 0) THEN 
WRITE (6,15)
15 FORMAT( ’ ERROR IN ROUTINE INVERT : NS=0 .AND. NDS>0 ’ )
STOP
ENDIF
C
C TEST THAT THE NUMBER OF DIFFERENCED VALUES IS NOT ZERO OR LESS 
C
NXD=NX-ND-NDS*NS 
IF (NXD .LE.O) THEN 
WRITE(6,20)
20 FORMAT( ’ ERROR IN ROUTINE INVERT : NUMBER OF DIFF. VALUES =<0’ )
STOP
ENDIF
NXD=NX
DO 25 1=1,NX 
XD(I)=X(I)
25 CONTINUE
IF(ND .GT. 0) THEN
C
C CARRY OUT NON-SEASONAL DIFFERENCING *
C
DO 60 1 = 1 ,ND
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NXD=NXD-1
DO 40 J=1,NXD
XD(J)=XD(J+1)-XD(J)
40 CONTINUE
60 CONTINUE
ENDIF
IFCNDS .GT. 0) THEN
C
C CARRY OUT SEASONAL DIFFERENCINQ
C
DO 120 1=1,NDS 
NXD=NXD-NS 
DO 100 J=1 ,NXD 
JQ=J+NS
XD( J ) =XD( JQ) -XD( J )
100 CONTINUE 
120 CONTINUE
ENDIF
C
C SUBTRACT THE RESIDUALS FROM XD
C
DO 130 J=1,NXD 
XD(J)=XD(J)-RES(J)
130 CONTINUE
IF (NDS .GT. 0) THEN
C
C CARRY OUT INVERTED SEASONAL DIFFERENCING
C
DO 150 1=1,NDS 
DO 140 J=1,NXD 
K=NXD+1-J 
KQ=K+NS
XD(K)=XD(KQ)-XD( K)
140 CONTINUE
NXD=NXD+NS 
150 CONTINUE
ENDIF 
IF (ND . GT.0) THEN
C
C CARRY OUT INVERTED NON SEASONAL DIFFERENCING
C
DO 190 1=1,ND 
DO 180 J=1,NXD 
K=NXD+1-J
XD(K)=XD(K+1)-XD(K)
180 CONTINUE
NXD=NXD+1 
190 CONTINUE
ENDIF
RETURN
END
C
SUBROUTINE INPUT(FAIL)
C
C ROUTINE TO READ PARAMETER FILE
C
PARAMETER (NSTAGE=1,NPARAM=30,LENGTH=15)
C
C NO OF STAGES=NSTAGES
C NO OF PARAMETERS=NPARAM
C MAX LENGTH OF CHARACTER VARIABLES=LENGTH
C
CHARACTER*1 KEY 
CHARACTER*80 BUFFER
CHARACTER*15 STAGE, VALUE, PARAM, CVALUE(NPARAM) 
CHARACTER*16 STAGES(NSTAGE)
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CHARACTER*31 OPCODE 
CHARACTER*32 PARAMSCNPARAM)
C STAGE TERMINATED BY ; PUT IN STAGES(NSTAGE)
C STAGE + PARAMETER +=+N/C/I/SPACE PUT IN PARAMS( NPARAM)
C WHERE N ALLOWS FOR NUMERICAL VALUE RETURNED IN RVALUE(NPARAM)
C C ALLOWS FOR CHARACTER VALUE RETURNED IN CVALUECNPARAM)
C I  ALLOWS FOR STRICTLY INTEGER VALUE RETURNED IN IVALUE(NPARAM)
C SPACE ALLOWS FOR PARAMETERS WITHOUT VALUE
C THE LENGTH OF CHARACTER VALUES IS RETURNED IN IVALUE(NPARAM)
C
REAL*4 RVALUE(NPARAM)
INTEGER*2 IVALUECNPARAM)
INTEGER*2 LINE, LENBUF, LENOP, LENSTG, LENVAL, LENPAR 
INTEGER*2 ISTAT,IOS 
INTEGER#2 I,J,IPOINT,IDIGIT
C
LOGICAL FAIL,LSTAGECNSTAGE),LPARAM(NPARAM)
C
C ONCE A VALID STAGE OR PARAMETER OCCURS IN THE INPUT FILE
C LSTAGECNSTAGE) OR LPARAMCNPARAM) IS SET .TRUE.
C
COMMON /BL1/STAGES,PARAMS 
COMMON /BL2/LPARAM 
COMMON /BL3/RVALUE 
COMMON /BL4/CVALUE 
COMMON /BL5/IVALUE 
FAIL=.TRU£.
DO 105 1=1,NSTAGE 
105 LSTAGECI)= .FALSE.
DO 110 1=1,NPARAM 
110 LPARAM(I)=.FALSE.
OPEN( 3 , IOSTAT=IOS,FILE=' MENU. OUTPUT1,STATUS=' NEW1)
OPEN(5 ,10STAT=IOS,FILE=1 MENUf , STATUS=1 OLD1)
IFCIOS .NE. 0)THEN 
WRITEC3,100)
100 FORMATC//,' ERROR IN OPENING FILE MENU')
STOP 
ENDIF 
LINE=0 
10 LENSTG=0 
15 LINE=LINE+1
READ( 5 , ' (A80)' ,IOSTAT=ISTAT)BUFFER 
IFCISTAT .LT. 0) THEN 
CLOSE(5)
CL0SEC3)
FAIL=.FALSE.
RETURN
ENDIF
C REMOVE COMMAS . LENBUF IS RESULTING LENGTH OF BUFFER
LENBUF=0 
DO 20 1=1,80
IF(BUFFER(I:I) .EQ. ' ' )  GOTO 20 
LENBUF=LENBUF+1
IF(LENBUF .LT. I ) BUFFER( LENBUF: LENBUF) =BUFFER(1:1)
20 CONTINUE
C IF BUFFER IS EMPTY READ A NEW LINE
25 IF(LENBUF .LT. 1) GOTO 15
C REMOVE NEXT OPCODE
DO 30 1=1,2*LENGTH+1
IF(BUFFER(I;I) .EQ. ' , '  .OR. I  .GT. LENBUF) GOTO 35 
30 OPCODE( 1 :1 )=BUFFER(1:1)
WRITE(3,200) LINE 
WRITEC3,205)
RETURN 
35 LEN0P=I-1
C
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IF(LENOP .EQ. 0) THEN 
WRITE(3,200) LINE 
WRITE(3,210)
RETURN
ENDIF
C REMOVE OPCODE AND COMMA FROM BUFFER AND ADJUST LENBUF
DO 40 I=LENOP+2,LENBUF 
J=I-LENOP-1 
40 BUFFER( J : J ) =BUFFER(1:1)
LENBUF=LENBUF-LENOP-1 
C IF OPCODE IS ’END' BEGIN NEW STAGE AND NEW LINE
IFUENOP .EQ. 3 .AND. OPCODE(1:3) .EQ. 'END') GOTO 10
IF(LENSTG .EQ. 0) THEN 
C OPCODE IS STAGE
IF(LENOP .GT. LENGTH) THEN 
WRITE(3*200) LINE 
WRITE(3,205)
RETURN
ENDIF
STAGE(:)=OPCODE(:)
LENSTG=LENOP 
C CHECK FOR VALID STAGE
DO 45 1=1,NSTAGE
IF (STAGE( 1 :LENSTG) / / ' ; '  .EQ. STAGES( I ) ( 1 : LENSTG+1 ))GOTO 50 
45 CONTINUE
WRITE(3»200) LINE 
WRITE(3,215) STAGE( 1 :LENSTG)
RETURN
50 IF(LSTAGE(I)) THEN
WRITE(3,200) LINE 
WRITE(3,220) STAGE( 1 :LENSTG)
RETURN
ENDIF
LSTAGE(I)= .TRUE.
ELSE
C OPCODE IS PARAMETER
C EXTRACT PARAMETER CODE ON THE LEFT OF '= '
C EXTRACT PARAMETER VALUE ON THE RIGHT OF '= '
DO 55 1=1,LENOP
IF(OPCODE(I:I) .EQ. ' = ' )GOTO 60 
55 CONTINUE
60 IF ( I  .EQ. LENOP) THEN
WRITE(3,200) LINE 
WRITE(3,225) OPCODE(1:I)
RETURN
ENDIF
LENPAR=I-1
LENVAL=MAXO( 0 , LENOP-I)
IF(LENPAR .EQ. 0) THEN 
WRITE(3»200) LINE 
WRITE(3,230)
RETURN
ENDIF
IF(LENPAR .GT. LENGTH .OR. LENVAL .GT. LENGTH) THEN 
WRITE(3,200) LINE 
WRITE(3 »205)
RETURN
ENDIF
PARAM(1 :LENPAR) =OPCODE( 1 :LENPAR)
IF(LENVAL .GT. 0)VALUE(1 :LENVAL)=0PC0DE(LENPAR+2:LENOP)
C CHECK FOR VALID PARAMETER CODE
DO 65 1=1,NPARAM
IF ( STAGE( 1 :LENSTG)//PARAM(1 :LENPAR) / / ' = '  .EQ. PARAMS( I ) ( 1 : LENSTG 
1+LENPAR+1 ))GOTO 70 
65 CONTINUE
o 
o
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WRITE(3 ,2 0 0 )LINE
WRITE(3,235)PARAM(1sLENPAR), STAGE( 1 iLENSTG)
RETURN
70 IF(LPARAMCI)) THEN 
WRITEC3 >200) LINE 
WRITE(3>220)PARAM(1iLENPAR)
RETURN 
ENDIF
LPARAM( I )= .TRUE.
CHECK FOR VALID PARAMETER VALUE AND ASSIGN TO CVALUE/RVALUE/IVALUE 
KEY=PARAMS(I)( LENSTG+LENPAR+2;)
IFCKEY .NE. 'N' .AND. KEY .NE. ’C* .AND. KEY .NE. ' I ’ )THEN 
IFCLENVAL .GT. 0)THEN 
WRITEC3>200) LINE 
WRITE(3,240)PARAM(1sLENPAR)
RETURN 
ENDIF 
ELSE
"IFCLENVAL .LT. DTHEN 
WRITE(3,200) LINE 
WRITEC3,225)PARAM(1iLENPAR)
RETURN 
ENDIF
IFCKEY .EQ. !C')THEN 
CVALUECI) C1 :LENVAL)=VALUE( 1 :LENVAL)
IVALUECI) =LENVAL 
ELSE
IPOINT=LENVAL 
DO’75 J=1,LENVAL 
IDIGIT=-1
IFCVALUECJ: J) '.EQ. ’0 ’ ) IDIGITsO
IF(VALUECJiJ) .EQ. •1* ) IDIGITsI
IFCVALUECJ: J) .EQ. »2 ») IDIGIT=2
IFCVALUECJ: J) .EQ. 13 T) IDIGIT=3
IFCVALUECJ: J) .EQ. *4f ) IDIGIT=4
IFCVALUECJiJ) .EQ. i  ^t ) IDIGIT=5
IFCVALUECJiJ) .EQ. ’6 ’ ) IDIGIT=6
IFCVALUECJiJ) .EQ. »j ») IDIGIT=7
IFCVALUECJiJ) .EQ. ' 8 *) IDIGIT=8
IFCVALUECJiJ) .EQ. tg» ) IDIGIT=9
IFCVALUECJiJ) .EQ. t i • ) THEN
IFCIPOINT .NE. LENVAL) THEN
WRITEC3>200) LINE
WRITEC3>250) PARAMC1:LENPAR)
RETURN
ENDIF
IFCKEY .EQ. TI») THEN 
WRITE(3 ,2 2 0 )LINE 
WRITE(3,260)PARAM(1iLENPAR)
RETURN
ENDIF
IPOINT=J
RVALUE CI) = RVALUECD/10.
IDIGIT=0
ENDIF
IFCIDIGIT .LT. 0)THEN 
WRITE(3,200) LINE 
WRITE(3,255) PARAMC1iLENPAR)
RETURN 
END IF
75 RVALUEC I)  = 10. *RVALUE C D+IDIGIT
RVALUE(I)=RVALUE(I)*10 .**(IPOINT-LENVAL) 
IFCKEY .EQ. »I»)THEN 
• IVALUE(I ) =NINT C RVALUE( I ))
RVALUE(I)=0
200
205
210
215
220
225
230
235
240
250
255
260
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
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ENDIF 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
GOTO 25
FORMATC//,1 ERROR IN THE MENU ON LINE',13)
FORMATC PARAMETER TOO LONG OR MISSING COMMA’ )
FORMATC UNEXPECTED COMMA')
FORMATC UNDEFINED STAGE:',A15)
FORMATC MULTIPLE ASSIGNEMENT OF PARAMETER' ,A15)
FORMATC MISSING PARAMETER VALUE',A15)
FORMATC MISSING LEFT HAND SIDE OF PARAMETER')
FORMATC UNDEFINED PARAMETER: ' ,A15, '  FOR STAGE:',A15) 
FORMATC NO VALUE IS PERMITTED FOR PARAMETER:' ,A15) 
FORMATC ERROR IN THE VALUE OF PARAMETER:’ ,A15)
FORMATC NON-NUMERIC VALUE FOR PARAMETER:' ,A15)
FORMATC NON-INTEGER VALUE FOR PARAMETER : ',A 15)
END
BLOCK DATA
CHARACTER*16 STAGES(1)
CHARACTER*32 PARAMSC30)
COMMON /BL1/STAGES,PARAMS 
DATA STAGES( 1 ) / ' INTV; ' /
DATA PARAMSC1 ) , PARAMSC12)/* INTVNPER=I' , ' INTVNSER=I' /  
DATA PARAMSC1 3 ) ,PARAMSC1 4 ) / ’ INTVPSML=I' , ' INTVDSML=I' /  
DATA PARAMS( 1 5 ) ,PARAMS( 1 6 ) / ’INTVQSMLrl' , ' INTVPCAP=I’ /  
DATA PARAMS( 1 7 ) ,PARAMS( 1 8 ) / ’ INTVDCAP=I' , ’ INTVQCAP=I’ /  
DATA PARAMSC1 9 ) / ' INTVNSEAS=I' /
DATA PARAMS(20),PARAMS(21) / ' INTVKFC5=I' , ' INTVKEF5=I' /  
DATA PARAMS( 2 2 ) ,PARAMS( 2 3 ) / 1 INTVNIT5=I1 , TINTVLAGS=I' /  
DATA PARAMS( 2 4 ) ,PARAMS( 2 5 ) / fINTVPROB=N' , ' INTVFC5=N' /
DATA PARAMSC2 6 ) / ' INTVSCAN=»/
DATA PARAMSC2 7 ) / ’ INTVCFILE=C'/
DATA PARAMS(2 8 ) ,PARAMS(29) / ’INTVCFILET=C', ' INTVTITLE=C'/  
DATA PARAMS( 3 0 ) / ' INTVDATE=C' /
DATA PARAMSC1 ) ,PARAMS(2)/’INTVB1=I', ' INTVB2=I' /
DATA PARAMSC3),PARAMS(4)/’ INTVQ1= 1 ' , ' INTVQ2=I' /
DATA PARAMSC5),PARAMS(6)/' INTVP1=1’ , 'INTVP2=I'/
DATA PARAMS( 7 ) , PARAMSC8) / 1INTVTIME1=11, ' INTVTIME2=I' /  
DATA PARAMSC9 ) , PARAMSC1 0 ) /1INTVIDUR1= 1 ' , 'INTVIDUR2=I'/
END
BLOCK DATA WORK 
PARAMETERS
L=MAXIMUM NO OF INTERVENTIONS 
M=MAXIMUM NO OF OBSERVATIONS 
N1=MAXIMUM VALUE OF TF ORDERS q,p 
N2=MAXIMUM VALUE OF TF ORDER b 
N3=MAXIMUM VALUE OF ARIMA ORDERS p,q ,P ,Q  
N4=MAXIMUM VALUE OF ARIMA ORDERS d,D 
N5=MAXIMUM VALUE OF SEASONALITY >1 
PARAMETER(L=2,M=300,N1=4,N3=2,N4=2,N5=12)
PARAMETER(NTP=L*(2*N1+1))
PARAMETER(NP4=4*N3)
PARAMETER( NP5=NTP+NP4+1 ,LP1=L+1)
PARAMETER( IQD=N3*(1+N5) , IDD=N4*(1+N5))
PARAMETER(IQX=IQD,NCD=NP5+1+IQX)
PARAMETER( NCE=M+IDD+6*IQX,NCF=LP1+14+5*L)
PARAMETER( IWA5=2*NCD*NCD+NCE*(NCF+4))
PARAMETER ( IMWA5= 16*LP 1 *7*NCD+3*NP5+30)
REAL*8 WA5CIWA5)
INTEGER*2 MWA5CIMWA5)
COMMON /BL6/WA5, MWA5 
END
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THIS PROGRAM COMPUTES THE PARAMETERS J ?  A -1UL T C-INPUT 
TKANS-ER FUNCTION MODEL
THE PROGRAM READS TIME SER IES , S E R IE S ! I , J )  WHERE :
1=1,2, . .  . , NPER 
•J=1 ,2 , . . ., NSER 
AND IT  PROCEEDS TO ES I [MATE THE PARAMETERS OMEGA.’ 3 AN0 
DEuTA’ s , AS DEFINED BY BOX •< JENKINS, WHICH DESCRIBE 
THE DEPENDENCE OF THE OUTPUT SER IES - S ER IES !I,N SER ) - 
ON THE INPUT S E R IE S ( I , J ) ,  J=1, 2 , . . . , NSER-1
FURTHERMORE, A SUITABLE ARIMA MODEL IS  ESTIMATED WHICH DESCRIBES 
THE STOCHASTIC PART OF THE OUTPUT TCME SERIES
DEFINITION OF PARAMETERS
CFILE : NAME OF F ILE  HOLDING THE INPUT AND OUTPUT TIME 
SERIES IN THIS ORDER
OF ILET : NAME OF F ILE  HOLDING THE PRELIMINARY ESTI MATES
OF THE TRANSFER FUNCTION PARAMETERS, OMEGA'S AND
DELTA’ S OF THE Its  INPUT O L  LOWED BY THOSE OF
THE J ta INPUT 
TITLE : T ITLE Or THE RUN - NAME OF OUTPUT F I l E  
DATE j DATE JF THE RUN
^JAN ; REFER TO 'MAIN ANALYSIS ^ODP' COMMENTS.
FC5 : THE VALUE >" THE CONSTANT, a, OF CHE ARIMA MODEL.
PROB ; THE TAIL DISTRIBUTION DF CHI-SQUARE REQUIRED TO EVALUATE STAT.
NPER : THE NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS IN THE TIME DERCES.
NSER : THE TOTAL NUMBER ( INP'JT^OUTPUT)OF TIME SER IES USED
PSML,DSML,QSML,PCAP, DCAP, QCAP : p ,d ,q ,P ,0 ,Q  = THE ARIMA MODEL PARAMETERS,
I U ( I ) , I Q ( I ) , I P ( I )  : THE TF ORDERS 0 , 3 , p OF THE I tn EVENT.
NSEAS : SEASONALITY
KFC5 : ON ENTRY KFC5 MUST BE SET TO 0 IF THE ARIMA CONSTANT, c , IS  TO
REMAIN FIXED AT ITS IN IT IA L  V A L U E ,  AND 1 IF  IT IS  TO BE ESTIMATED
KEFS : ON ENTRY KEF5 MUST SPECIFY CHE LIKELIHOOD OPTION ; 1 GIVES LEAST
iJUARES, 2 GIVES EXACT AND j  GIVES MARGINAL LIKELIHOOD.
NITS : ON ENTRY NIT5 MUST SPECIFY THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF ITERATIONS.
CF NIT5=U NO CHANGE IS  MADE TO ANY OF THE MODEL PARAMETERS EXCEPT 
THAT THE CONSTANT, c, ( I F  KFC5=1) AND ANY OlMEGA RELATING TO SIMPL: 
INPUT SERIES ARE ESTIMATED.
NOTE : EACH OF THE ABOVE PARAMETERS (EXCLUDING LOGICAL) IS ASSOCIATED WITH 
A LOGICAL PARAMETER. IF  THE LOGICAL PARAMETER IS  TRUE THEN PROGRAM 
EXPECTS SPECIFICATION OF THE PARAMETER VALUE, OTHERWISE IT ASSUMES 
DEFAULT VALUES.
PARAMETERS
L=MAXIMUM NO OF INPUTS
M=MAXIMUM NO OF OBSERVATIONS
N1=MAXIMUM VALUE OF TF ORDERS q,p
N2=MAXIMUM VALUE OF TF ORDER b
N3=MAXIMUM VALUE OF ARIMA ORDERS p ,q ,P ,Q
N4=MAXIMUM VALUE OF ARIMA ORDERS d,D
N5=MAXIMUM VALUE OF SEASONALITY >1
PAR AMETER( L=3 » M=120,N1=4,N2=10,N3=5, N4=2,N5=1)
PARAMETER(NTP=L*(2*N1+1) )
PARAMETER(NP4=4*M3)
PARAMETER( NP5=NTP+NP4+1,LP1=L+1)
PARAMETER( ITF5=(N3+N4)*(N5+1)+N3*N5+(2*N1+N2)*L)
PARAMETER(IQD=N3*(1+N5), IDD=N4*(1+N5))
PARAMETER( IQX=IQD, NCD=NP5+1+IQX)
PARAMETER( NCE=M+IDD+6*IQX,NCF=LP1+14+5*L)
PARAMETER!IWA5=2*NCD*NCD+NCE*(NCF+4))
P AR AMETER ( IMI/A5 = 16 #LP 1 *7 * NCD+3* NP5+ 33)
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SIMPLE VARIABLES AMD ARRAYS LISTED BY PRO!RAM SECTIONS 
IMPJf/OUTPUT
CHARACTER’* 13 C F ILE , CF I LET , T IT LE , DATE 
LOO EC AL LB ( L) , LQ ( L ) ,  LP ( L)
LOGICAL FA IL 
LOGCCAL LMPER, LNSER
LOf} CGAL LP3ML,LDSML,LQSML,LPCAP, LDCAP, LQCAP
LOGICAL LNSEAS,LKFC5, LKEF3, LMIT'3, LNK6, LPROG, LFC5
LOGCCAL SCAM, LFCLE, L*7ILET , LTCTLE, LDATE
REAL*4 FC5, PROG
INTEGERS CB(L) , CQ(L), CP(L)
CMTEGER*2 MPER, MSER
INTEGER*; PSML,03ML,QSML,PCAP,DCAP,QCAP 
INTEGER*P MS,-AS, KFC3, KEF3 ,N ITS, MK6 
INTEGER*; C F ILE ,IF [LET ,ITC TLE,ID A TE  
CH A R ACT E R * 13 C V A.+J E (2 3)
RSAL*4 RVALUE!29)
INTEGER*; IDUMMY!3)
READ TIME SERIES
REAL*3 SERIES!M ,L+ 1)
INTEGER*; I , J , K 
INTEGER*; IOS
TRANSFER FUNCTION MODEL
REAL*j iVARA(NTP)
INTEGER*; MPARA
main  a n a l y s is  loop
INTEGER*; CPSr IDS,IQS,CPC, IOC,[QC 
INTEGER*P KPS, <DS, KQS, KPC, <DC, <QC
INTEGER*; MR4( ( ) ,  HP AR4 
OVERALL MODEL ESTIMATION-
RE\l * j  PARA3(NP3) , XKY5( M,LP1 ) ,ZSP3( 4 ) , SD3( NP5), CM5 (NP5,MP3) 
REAL*3 S5,D5,RES5(M ),STTF5(CTF3),NA3(I/A3)
INTEGER*; MT5C4, LP1) , CTC3, NP AR A3, MO -'3, XZEF3, NSTTF j  ,MNA3 ( IM'V A3) 
INTEGER*; CFACL3
ANALYSIS OF RESIDUALS
REAL* j X 15, XVo, R6(M) , 3CAT5, d i s c f , ;  ORA 
CM TEGER*; IX 3 ,IFA CL5 ,1FR )
REAM*3 S3, ; RE05(1)
E -)iJ I VALE MCE! if AL JE( 23) , PROS), ( RV AL JE (?4 ) ,FC5)
EQU CVALENCS(CVALiJE!26) ,CF CLE), (CVAL'JECPY) ,CF [LED  ,
1 (CVALUEC28), T ITLE ), (CVAL'JE(;9),DATE)
COMMON STORAGE 
COMMON /8L2/LB,LQ ,LP,
1 LNPER, LNSER, LPSML,LDSML,LQSML,LPCAP,LDCAP,LQCAP,
2 LN3EAS, LKFC5, LKEF3, LNIT3, LNK6, LP ROB,
3 LFC5, SCAN, LF ILE ,LF ILET ,LT ITLE,LD A TE 
COMMON /8L3/RVALUE
COMMON ./BL4/CVALUE 
COMMON / B L 3 / IB ,IQ ,IP ,
1 NPER, NSER,
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2 PSML,DSML,QSML,PCAP,DCAP,QCAP,
i  USE AS, KFC5, KEF5, NIT5, NK6,
4 [DUMMY, IF IL E , IF C L E T ,IT  CTLS,IDATE
COMMON /BL6/WA5.MWA5
FORTRAN PARAMETER CHECK
CMPJC/OUTPUT
DEFAULT VALUES
PROU=.95
PSML=0
QSML=0
PCAP=Q
QCAP=Q
DSML=0
DCAP=Q
NSEAS=12
MLAGS=1
MK6= 1
KFC5=1
KSF5=2
NIT5=10
nyj
C A L L  INPUT(FAIL)
IF (FA IL )STO P
IF (.N O T .LT ITLE ) T ITLES ’ RESULTS’
OPEN(6 ,F IL£= T ITLE(1 :IT IT L E ) , STATUS^1 UNKNOWN') 
[F( . MOT. L.FILET) THEM 
WRITE (6,105*)
105 FORMAT(/ / , ' PARAMETER CFIUST NOT SPEC IF IED ’ )
STOP 
ENDIF
£ F (. NOT. L F IL E ) THEN 
WRITEC6,110)
110 FORMATC//,’ PARAMETER CFILE NOT SPEC IF IED ') 
STOP 
ENDIF
IF(LXFC5)TH£N
IFCKFC5 .LT . 0 .OR. KFC5 .GT. 1) THEN 
WRITEC 6,115)
115 FORMATC//,' KFC5 OUTSIDE RANGE')
STOP
ENDIF
IFCKFC5 .EQ. 0 .AND. (.NOT. LFC5)) THEN 
WRITE(6,120)
120 FORMATC//,' VALUE OF FC5 NOT SPEC IF IED ')
STOP
ENDIF
ENDIF
IFCPROB .LT . 0. .OR. PROB .GT. 1 .) THEN 
WRITE(6,125)
125 FORMATC//,' PARAMETER PROB OUTSIDE RANGE') 
STOP 
ENDIF
I F ( .NOT. LNPER) THEN 
WRITEC6,130)
130 FORMATC//,' PARAMETER NPER NOT SPEC IF IED ’ ) 
STOP 
ENDIF
I F ( NPER .GT. M .OR. NPER .LT. 1) THEN 
WRITEC6 , 135)
135 FORMATC//,’ PARAMETER NPER OUT OF RANGE')
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145
150
155 
150 
165
170 
1 75
1 31
190
195
900
140
905
STOP
ENDIF
I F ( . NOT. LNSER) THEN 
WRITE(6,140)
FORMATC//, '  PARAMETER NSER NOT SPEC IF IED 1)
STOP
ENDIF
IF(NSER .GT. L+1 .OR. NSER .LT .1 ) THEN 
WRITE(6,145)
FORMATC//,' PARAMETER NSER OiJTSCDS RANGE’ )
STOP
ENDIF
I F ( MAXO( PSML,QSML,PCAP, QCAP) .GT. Nj .OR.
1 MINO(PSML,QSML,PCAP,QCAP) . LT. 0) THEN 
WRITE(6,150)
FORMATC//,' PARAMETERS PSML,QSML,PCAP,QCAP OUTSIDE RAN<
ST .)P
ENOCF
CF( 1AK0( DSML, DCAP) . GT. N4 . OR.
1 MINO( DSM L , DC A P) .LT . 0) THEN 
WRIFEC5,135)
FORMATC//,' PARAMETERS DSML,DCAP OUTSIDE RANGE')
STOP
EMOCF
CF(USEAS .LT. 1 .OR. NSEAS .GT. N5) THEM 
WRITE(6,160)
FORMATC//,' PARAMETER NSEAS OUT OF RANGE')
STOP
ENOCF
L '(  NPER . L£ . DSML+DCAP*NSEAS) THEN 
WRITS(6,165)
FORMATC/./,' CONDITION NPER>OSML+DCAP*MSEAS NOT SATCSFI 
STOP 
E N D CF
J) 13j 1=1,NSER-1
I  7 ( L 3 ( C) .AND. LQ ( I ) .AND. L P (D )
1 THEN
£F('MIN0(£3( C), CQ( C), CP( O ) . LT . 0 .OR.
1 MA<0( CQ( I )  , CP( O ) .01. N1 .OR. IB (  I)  .GT. N2) THEN
W R ITE(6 ,170)
FORMATC//,' ?ARAIST£R(S) IB , IQ , IP  OUC OF RANGE')
S FOP
ENDIF
ELSE
NRITEC6,175)
FORMATC//,' PARAMETER(S) IB , IQ , IP  NOT SPEC O’ CED')
STOP 
END CF
CJNFCNiJE
[F(CFC3 .LT . 0 .OR. <FC5 .iT .1  .OR.
1 KEF5 . LT. 1 .OR. KEF5 .GT, 3 .OR.
2 NIF5 .LT . 1) THEN 
W R[f5(6,190)
FORMATS//, ' J AR-HETER( 3) C F C J , CE F_>. A C f j  DU F OF RAN i 7' )  
5 T ) p 
7N )!CF
7 (NT 5 .A M  , DR. N<5 M E. NPER) THEN 
NR CFE(6,195)
FOR 1AT(//, ' 3 ARA-1ETER NLAJS OUT OF RANGE' )
SCOP
ENOCF
nRAMETERS DK - CONTINUE 
,/R CTE(6 , 900)
FQRMAT(////./,20X, ' TRANSFER FJNCFCJN PROGRAM RESULTS') 
IF(LTC  FLE) WRITS( 6 ,905)TITLE 
FORMATC//,21X,A15)
IF  (LDATE) WRITE!6 ,9 1 0 )D ATE 
910 FORMAT(70X.A15)
WRITE(b,915)
915 FORMAT!//,' THE PARAMETERS OF THE RUN .ARE AS FOLLOWS ; ' )
WRITEC6,920)NSER-1 
920 FORMAT!/./////» ’ NUMBER OF INPUTS = ',1 2 )
WRITE!6,945)
945 FORMAT!//,' ARIMA PRELIMINARY PARAMETERS SET TO ZERO')
IF(SCAN) WRITE!6 ,950)PSML, DSML,QSML,PCAP, OCAP, QCAP 
950 FORMAT!//,' ARIMA ANALYSIS EXTENDS OVER ALL COMBINATIONS OF' 
1 ,/ , ' ORDERS UP TO p ,d ,q ,P ,D ,Q  =! ,6 I2 X , I2 ))
IFIKFC5 .EQ. 0)THEN 
WRITE(6,955)FC5
955 FORMAT!//,' THE ARIMA CONSTANT REMAINS FIXED TO ', 010.4)
ELSE
WRITE(6,960)
960 FORMAT!//,' THE ARIMA CONSTANT IS  TO BE ESC[MATED’ )
IN DCF
CF(CE^5 . EQ. 1) WRITE(6,965)
965 FORMAT!//,' THE ESTIMATION CRITERION IS LEAST SQUARES')
IFCKEF5 . EQ,2) WRITE(6,970)
970 FORMAT!/./,' THE ESTIMATION CRITERION IS EXACT LIKELIHOOD') 
CFCKEF5 .EQ. 3) WRITE(6,975)
975 FORMAT!//,' THE ESTIMATION CRITERION IS MARGINAL LIKELIHOOD')
WR CTE(6 ,9 8 0 )P RO 8 
930 FORMAT!//,' THE REQUIRED Q PROBABILITY IS  ' ,G3,2)
C READ TIME SERIES
C CFILE ; THE NAME OF THE F£LE HOLDING THE TIME SERIES
C S E R IE S ! I , J )  ; INPUT AND OUTPUT'TIME SERIES
C NPER ; NUMBER OF PERIODS
C NSSR : NUMBER OF INPUT AND OUTPUT TIME SERIES
OPEN! 7, .COST AT= IOS, F ILE= CFILE( 1 : 1 F IL E ) , ST ATUS=1 OLD' )
IF  (IO S .NE. 0) THEN 
WRITE(6 ,200 )C F ILE ,IO S  
200 FORMAT!/./,' ERROR IN OPENING F IL E : ',A 1 5 , ' IOSTAT = ',1 3 )
STOP
ENDIF
READ( 7 , * , IOSTAT=IOS)( ( S E R IE S ! I , J ) ,1=1,NPER), J=1, NSER)
IF ! IO S  .LT . 0) THEN 
W RITE!6 ,205)CFILE 
205 FORMAT!//,' UNEXPECTED END OF F IL E : ',A 1 5 ) .
STOP
ENDIF
IF ! IO S  .GT. 0)THEN 
WRITE!6,210)C F ILE ,IO S  
210 FORMAT!//,' ERROR IN READING SERIES F IL E :* ,A 1 5 , ' IOSTAT = ',1 3 ) 
STOP 
ENDIF 
CLOSE(7)
WRITE(6,220) NSER-1, NPER 
220 FORMAT!//,* THERE ARE ' ,1 4 , '  INPUT SERIES AND A SINGLE OUTPUT 
1 S E R IE S ,* / , ' EACH SERIES HAVING ',1 4 , '  OBSERVATIONS’ )
DO 225 J=1, NSER 
W RITE(6 ,230)
WRITE(6 ,2 3 5 )( S E R I E S ! I , J ) ,1=1,NPER)
225 CONTINUE
230 FORMAT!////)
235 FORMAT(1X ,4 !1 X , G15.3))
C
C SPECIFICATION OF TRANSFER FUNCTION MODEL
i-r
0 NSER-1 : THE NUMBER 0? INPUTS
C M T5!J,X ) : THE It'a INPUT ORDERS o, p , q , r ,
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C TPARA(NPARA) : THE INPUT PARAMETERS, OMEGAS !>. DELTAS 
DO 315 C=1 ,NSER-1 .
MT5(1 ,I)- X B (O  
MT5(2,C)=CQ(T)
MT5(3, 0  = £P( I)
IF (M A < 0 (£3 (I),IQ ( O , C P (O ) . LT . 1) THEN
MT3( 4 , 1) = 1
ELSE
M T 3 (4 ,I)=2 
END IF  
315 CONTINUE
OPEN (7, IOSTAT=IOvS ,F IlE= CF ILE f (1 ; C !•* CLET) , ST A f:JS = 1 OLD1 )
CF(LOS , NE, 0) THEN
WRITS( 6 ,200)CF[LET , IQS
STOP
END CF
NPARA=0
00 320 1=1, NSER-1 
320 N?ARA=NPARA+I;KI)+IP( 0  *-1
REA0(7,*,COSTAT=IOS) (T PA R A (J), J=1,NPARA)
IF ( IO S  .LT , 0 ) THEN 
W R ITE ( 6 ,205)CFCLET 
STOP 
END IF
C-( COS , GT. 0) CHEN
WRITE(6, 210)CF [f.ETy IOS
STOP
[NO CF
CLOSE!/)
C
WRITE( 6 ,330)
330 FORMAT!////, f TRANSFER F.jMOTION ORDERS, AND PRELIMINARY 
1RARAMST IR S ')
.<=1
00 333 1=1,NSER-1
WR ITS (3, 333) C, C3( I ) ,  CQ ( I ) ,  CP( I)
333 FORMAT! / / , 1 INPUT NO ; ' ,1 2 , '  ORDERS o , 4,p : 1,
112,2X, 12,2X, 12)
WRITE(6,340)
,WRCTEC6,343)(SNGL(TPARA(.J)) , J  = X, CQ( !)-■-<)
340 FORMAT!//,* OMEGA(s) : 1)
343 FORMAT(1X, 4( 1X,G1’3 .3 ))
IF (C P ( I )  .GT. 0)THEN 
WRITEC6 ,350)
’WRITE!5,345) (SNGLCTPARAC J ) ) , J  = IQ ( I )  + 1 + .{, IQ( I )+ IP (  I)+K)
350 FORMAT!//,f DELTA!s) : ' )
ENDIF
K=K+IQ(I)+ IP(I)+1 
355 CONTINUE
C
C MAIN ANALYSIS LOOP
C
C CF SCAN*.TRUE. THEN ALL COMBINATIONS OF ARIMA ORDERS
C p ,d ,q ,P ,D ,Q , ( = IPS ,ID S , IQ S ,IPC ,ID C ,IQ C ) ARE TREATED,
C STARTING FROM 0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 , TO PSML,DSML,QSML,PCAP,DCAP,QCAP
C IF  SCANa.FALSE. ONLY ONE CASE IS  TREATED,
C p»d ,q , P , D, Q = PSML,DSML,QSML,PCAP,DCAP,QCAP
C
IF  (SCAN) THEN
KQCsO
KDCaO
KPC=0
KQS=0
XDS=0
KPS=0
ELSE
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KQC=QCAP 
KDCaDCAP 
KPC=PCAP 
KQ3=QSML 
KDS=DSML 
KPS=PSML 
END IF
00 600 IQC=KQC, QCAP 
DO 600 IDC=KDC,DCAP 
DO 500 IPC=KPC,PCAP 
DO 600 IQS=KQ3,Q3ML 
DO 600 IDSaKDS.DSML 
DO 600 IP3=KP3,PSML 
MR4(1) =IPS 
MR4(2)=IDS 
MR4(3)=IQS 
MR4(4)=IPC 
MR4(!5)=IDC 
MR4(6)=IQC 
MR4(7)=NSEAS 
NPAR4=IP3+IQS+IPC+IQC
C
C OVERALL MODEL ESTIMATION 
C
DO 510 J- 1 , NSGR 
DO 310 1=1,NPER 
510 X X Y 5 (I, J )= S E R IE S ( I , J )
00 500 1=1,NPAR4 
500 PARAS( I)= 0 .00
NP ARA5 = NP AR4+NP AR A+1 
DO 530 1=1,NPARA 
530 PARAS( I+NPAR4)=TPARACI)
IF(KFC3 . EQ. 0) PARAS( NPARA5) = Di3LE(FC5)
KZEF5=1
IFAIL5=0
CALL G13BEF ( MR 4, MSER, MT5, PARAS, .'IP AR AS, KFC5, NP ER, XXY5, M,
1 KEF5 ,N ITS,0 ,ZSP5, ITC5,305,CMS, NP5,35 ,D5,NDF5, KZEF5, RE35, 
23TTF5, IT FS , NSTTF5,WAS, -WAS, MWAS, IMW AS,1 , IFA IL 5 )
IF U F A IL 5  .NE. 0)WRITE(6,535) IFAIL5,MWA5( 1)
535 FORMAT!' G13BEF FAILURE : IFA ILa  ',218 )
_ IF ! IF A IL S  .NE. 0 )GO TO 600
C ANALYSIS OF RESIDUALS
NX6=NPER-ID3-IDC#NSEAS
NK6=MIN0!NX6-1,MAX0!NK6,IPS+IQS+IPC+CQC+1) )
IFAIL6=0
CALL G13ABF!RES5, NX6, NK6, XM6, XV6, R6, STAT6, IF A IL 6 )
IF ( IF A IL 6  .NE. 0) W RITE(6,540)IFA IL6  
540 FORMAT!’ G13BEF (RESIDUAL ANALYSIS) FAILURE= ’ ,12)
IF ( IF A IL 6  .NE. 0) GOTO 600 
IFRD=NK6-IPS-IQS-IPC-IQC 
PROBA=G01BCF!STAT6, IFR D ,IFA IL6 )
IFC IFA IL6  .NE. 0 )W R ITE!6 ,545 )IFA IL6  
545 FORMAT!’ G01BCF (RESIDUAL ANALYSIS) FAILURE* ’ ,12)
IF ( IF A IL 6 - .NE. 0) GOTO 600
CALL INVERT(XXY5( 1 ,NSER) , NP ER, ID S , IDC, NSEAS, RES5, PRED6) 
S6=0.0D0 
DO 520 1=1,NPER 
520 S6=S6+!PRED6!I)-XXY5!I,NSER))**2
C
C ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
DO 550 1=1,NPAR4
IF !D A BS(PA RA 5 (I)) .LT, 2 .D0*SD5(I) .AND. SCAN)GQT0600 
IF (0A BS(PA RA 5!D ) .GT. 1.0D0 .AND. SCAN) GOTO 600 
550 CONTINUE
IF!PROSA .GT. D8LE(PR08) .AND. SCAN) GO TO 600 
C RESULTS ARE OK
C CONDENCED RESULTS 
WRITE(6,555)
3 5 5  F O R M A T C / / /  ARI MA O R D E R S  ARE AS F O L L O W S ' )
WRCTE( 6 , 5 6 0 ) CPS, CDS, I Q S , I P O , CDS, CQC, NSEAS 
5 6 0  FORMATC ',((/>*, 12))
/ R C T E ( 6 , 5 5 j ) W P A R A 5 , N P A R 4 , N P A R A  
5 5 5  FORM AT C  T H E  ‘O O E L  HAS 1 , 1 2 /  P A R A ME T E R S  IN ALL / ,
1 . / , C 2 /  ARE T HE  ARC HA P A R A M E T E R S  / , I 2 /  ARE T i l  T R A N S F E R  Fi JN 
^ P A R A M E T E R S / / /  THE • " I NAu P ARAME T E R C O R R E S P O N D S 1 
5 /  TO THE C O N S T  A NT o  /  )
. WRCTEC6 , 5 / 5 )
5 75  F O R M A T C  P ARAME T E R S T AN DAR D E R R O R ' )
W R I C K  5 , i / 0 ) ( S N 0  /  j AR A j ( £ ) ) ,  S H I - /  SD5C D ‘>,  ' C l ,  i ? H A 5 )
5 7 ) C R  1 A T C U / J 1 4 .  7 ,  7 X ,  i ' 1 4 , 7 )
WR CTE ( 5 , 5  3 ) )  •> T 1 ,  ( 3 5 )  + 1 0  H’ i  
5 3 0  F O R M A T C  THE R E S  CDiJ.Au S I - 1  >f  S QUAR E  3 0 - ’ THE D I F F E R E N C E D  S E R  I 
H i  ',3 3.2 ,/, » I T S  A S S O C I A T E )  )E 1 RE E S  >7 F REEDOM CS ' , 1 4 )
-'4R C‘TE ( 6 , 5 3 5 ) I N S ' ,  ( 1 5 )
5 3 3  F O R M A T C  THE R E S [ D U A L  SUM OF S Q U A R E S  OF  THE ACT UAL  S E R CSS CM 
1 , . 1 3 , 2 )
WRCCS(5 ,5 9 0 )CT05 
590 FORMATC THE MODEL PARAMETERS WERE ESTIMATED AFTER » , I J ,
1 '  I T E R A T C O N S ' )
WRCTE(6 ,595 )SNGL( STAT6) , SNGL( P ROBA ) , IFRD 
595 FORMATC Q STATISTIC, TAIL PROBABILITY, DEGREES OF FREEDOM=
1,G8.2 ,2X, G8.2 ,2X,13)
W RITE(6,610)NK6
610 FORfMAT(./// THE ANALYSIS OF RESIDUALS WAS BASED ON ',1 4 ,
1' AUTOCORRELATION LAGS')
600 CONTINUE
IF(.N O T. SCAN) THEN
0PENC11,FILE= 'RESIDUALS', STATU3=' UNKNOWN')
WRITE ( 1 1 ,620) ( I,SN G L(R ES5C I) ) , 1 = 1 , NX6)
CLOSEC11)
OPEN(1 1 , FILE= ’ RES. A C F » ,S T A T U 3 = ' UNKNOWN ' )
WRITE(11 ,620)( I , SNGLC R 6 ( I ) ),1 = 1 ,NK6)
C LO SE/1)
ENDIF 
CLOSE(6)
IF  (.NOT. SCAN) THEN
OPENC11,F ILE= 'P LO T ', STATUS=' UNKNOWN')
WRITE(1 1 ,6 2 0 )(I , SNGL( SE R IE S ( I , NSER)),1 = 1 ,NP ER)
WRITS(1 1 ,6 2 0 )(I , SNGL( SER IES ( I , NSER) -XXY5( I , NSER)+ ?RED6( I ) ) ,  
11=1,NPER)
• WRITE(11 ,6 2 0 )(I , SNGL( PRE D6( I ) ) ,1 = 1 ,NPER >
V R ITE (11 ,6 2 0 )( I , S NGL( SE R IE S ( I , NS ER)-XXY5(I,NS E R) ) , I =1,NP E R) 
620 FORMAT (1X, 14, 3X, G14. /)•
CLOSE(11)
END IF
STOP
END
nKf
SUBROUTINE INVERTCX,NX,NO, NDS,NS, RES, XD)
C I N V E R T  C A R R I E S  J U T  N O N - S E A S O N A L  AMD S E A S O N A L  D I F F E R E N C I N G
G JN AN I N P U T  T I M E  S E R I E S ,  H E  R E S I D U A L S  P R E V I O U S L Y  E S T I M A T E D
C BY U U C C N E  i 1  J d E F  ARE THEM ADO:7 ) CD CHE D I F F E R  CM CEO S E R I E S ,
C "'IWALLY THE R ES JL fIW i SER CES IS  CAT EM CHROU 1H CHE INVERSE
; ) ' +JRACIONS INVOLVE) I I  ) C F  JR IM 1 CN 1 CHUS PRO / I )  I'M
G CHE PREDICTED TIME SERCIS,
IN C E G E R * 2  I , J , J Q , K , K Q
IN CEGER* 2  N J ,  - IDS, N S , NX,  NXD
R E A L * 3 X ( N X ) , X D ( H X ) , R E S ( M X )
) CEST THAT NONE C  THE ORDERS IS  NEGATIVE
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t
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IERROR=1
IF  (ND .LT. 0 .OR. NDS .LT. 0 .OR. NS .LT. 0) THEN 
WRITE(6,10)
10 FORMAT( '  ERROR IN ROUTINE INVERT ; MU,NDS,NS < O ')
STOP
ENDIF
I f  ( NS .EQ. 0 .AND. NDS .GT. 0) THEN 
WRITE (6 ,15)
13 FORMATC ERROR IN ROUTINE INVERT j N3 = 0 . AN*). NDS>0 »)
3 TOP
ENDIF
C.
C TEST THAT THE NUMBER OF DIFFERENCED VALUES IS  NOT ZERO OR LESS
ij
N X 0=N X- N D- N DS * M 3 
IF  ( MXD . L E .0) THEN 
WRITE(6,20)
20 FORMATC ERROR IN ROUTINE INVERT ; NUMBER OF D IFF. VALUES = <0! )
STOP
ENDIF
NXD=NX
DO 25 1=1,NX 
X D (I)= X (I)
25 CONTINUE
IF(ND .GT. 0) THEN
C
C CARRY OUT NON-SEASONAL DIFFERENCING
C
DO 60 1=1,ND 
NXD=NXD-1 
DO 40 J=1, NXD 
XD (J)= XD (J+ 1j-XD (J)
40 CONTINUE
60 CONTINUE
ENDIF
IF(NDS .GT. 0) THEN
C
C CARRY OUT SEASONAL DIFFERENCING
C
DO 120 1=1,NDS 
NXD=NXD-NS 
DO 100 J= 1 ,NXD 
JQ=J+NS
XD (J)= XD (JQ )-XD (J)
100 CONTINUE 
120 CONTINUE
ENDIF
C
C SUBTRACT THE RESIDUALS FROM XD
C
DO 130 J=1,NXD 
X D (J)= X D (J)- R ES (J)
130 CONTINUE
IF  (NDS .GT. 0) THEN
C
C CARRY OUT INVERTED SEASONAL DIFFERENCING
C
DO 150 1=1,NDS 
DO 140 J=1, NXD 
K=NXD+1-J 
KQ=K+NS
XD( K) =XD( KQ) -XD( K)
140 CONTINUE
NXD=NXD+NS 
150 CONTINUE
ENDIF 
IF  (ND . GT.0) THEN
C CARRY OUT INVERTED NON SEASONAL DIFFERENCING
r*
DO 190 1=1,ND 
DO 180 -J= 1, NXO 
‘(--NX0+1-.J
XD(K)=XD(<+1)-{D(<)
13) JONTINUE
NKD=NX0+1 
190 CONTINUE
ENDIF
RETURN
END
J
S’.HR )UriME INP!JT( FA IL)
R )UT CNE 10 READ AAR ARE CSR F I lS
'j
PARAMETER ( NSTA JE= 1, >IPARAM=29, l S NGTH= 13)
n
C NO OF STAGES=NST AGES
C NO OF P AR AM ST S RS=N PAR AM
C -1AX LENGTH OF CHARACTER VAR CA8LS3=LSNGTH
n\M
CHARACTER*1 KEY 
CHARACTER*30 SUFFER
CHARACTER* 13 S T AGE „ V4LU E. PAR A 1, C V V, J E ( 'IP AR A 1)
) IA RAC TER" 1 8 ST A JES! N  ^f \ iE )
1 i  IR ACT E R* j  I- ):3 ;)!): •:
J i aRaC f:ER* j  S PAR ANS( V\\{ \ I)
SI’AjE iER- UN IT E ) if ; J 1 i’ [ 1 ■>! A .U 31 1UU iE J
iiuj-i r j  ira  1 erer u r  in u r  u h (  i 3 n  v-t)
/ . IS I •: I A / O U  7 W  T l  \ ER I DA' .  I \  , ] •  (S r  I U  E ) I I  M V ,  I E (  P  l-R A I)
; F .  . U S  f  )R C U R A C T E l  A U E  RE f  I U  ED IN : V U  IE ( P A R \-\)
I. a .  . U S  » n  S T R E C T - r f  I N  PE U R  / A . J E  RET I RNEd  I N  I V AL IE i
5 P A3 E  ALL ) . / S  FOR PAR A -IE TERM V I P  { U P  V-V,  IE
T I E  _.E T i I’M ) F  ; N A R AS T E R  A U - E S  I S  R - U I U E )  I I  I  f \ - ,  I E* P  VR A I )
R E AL*4 R7 V. I E( NIP ARAM)
I NTEGER*2 [VALUE( NPARAM)
INTEGER*? LINE,LENBUF,LENOP,LENSTG,LENVAL,LENPAR 
INTEGER*? 1STAT,IDS 
INTEGER*? I , J , IP O IN T , ID IG IT
C
LOGICAL FA IL ,LS IA G E( NSTAGE) , LPAR4M(NPARAM)
C
C ONCE A VALID STAGE OR PARAMETER OCCURS IN THE INPUT F ILS
C LSTAGECNSTAGE) OR LPARAM(NPARAM) IS  SET .TRUE,
nV
COMMON /BL1/STAGES,PARAMS 
COMMON /BL2/LPARAM 
COMMON /BL3/RVALUE 
COMMON /BL4/CVALUE 
COMMON /BL5/IVALUE 
FAIL=.TRUE.
DO 105 1=1,NSTAGE 
105 LSTAGE(I)= .FALSE.
DO 110 1=1,NPARAM 
110 LPARAM(I)=.FALSE.
OPEN( 3 , IOSTAT=IOS,FILE=1 MENU. TF. OUTPUT' , STATUS=*NEW')
OPEN(5 , IOSTAT=IOS,FILE=' MENU.TF1, STAT(JS=' OLD')
I F ( IOS .NE. 0 )THEN 
WRITEC3,100)
100 FORMAT(//,T ERROR IN OPENING F ILE  MENU')
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C
P lR  vl)
STOP 
ENDIF 
LINE=0 
10 LENSTG=0
15 LINE=LTNE+1
READ(5»f ! A80)' , EOSTATalSTAT)BUFFER 
IF ([STAT  . LT. 0) THEN 
CLOSE(5)
CLOSE!3)
FAELa.FALSE.
RETURN
ENDIF
C REMOVE COMMAS . LENBUF IS  RESIN,TING LENGTH OF SUFFER
uHM3UF=0 
00 20 1=1,80
IF !S U F F E R ! I : I )  .EQ. ’ ' )  GOTO 20 
LENBUF=LEHBUF+1
IF ( LENBUF , LT . [ )  BUFFER! LEN3!JF : LENBUF) = BUFFER! I : I )
20 CONTINUE
0 IF  BUFFER IS  EMPTY READ A NEW LINE
25 IFCLEN3UF ,LT . 1) GOTO 15
C REMOVE NEXT OPCODE
00 30 1=1,2*LENGTH*1
[F ( -iijr’FER! I ;  I )  , EQ. ' , 1 .OR, C .GT. LEN8UF) GOTO 35
30 OPCODE! C :[ )- BUFFER(£ ; [ )
WR[T2(3,200) LINE 
VRI IE (3,205)
RETURN 
35 LENOP=1-1
!>’( i.ENOP .EQ. 0) CHEN 
WRITE(3,200) CINE 
WR I CE(3#210)
RETJRN
ENDIF
C REOVE IP CODE AND COMMA FROM BJFFEft AN 0 AOJ JST L.GMBJF
>3 4) I  = L E M-) ;  j- 2, L E N 3 U F 
J = I-LSNOP-1 
40 BU FFER !J: J)= B U F F E R (I: I)
LEN BU f = L E N0U F-LEN0 P-1 
C IF  OPCODE IS 'END' BEGIN NEW STAGE AND ME/ LINE
IX-.EMOP , EQ, 3 .AND, 0PC00E(1;3> , EQ, 'END ') GOTO 10
CF(-,ENSCG ,EQ, 0) THEN 
C OPCODE IS  STAGE
[F(LENO'P ,GT, i.ENGTH) THEN 
WRITE(3,200) LINE 
WR ITH(3,205)
RETURN
ENDIF
STAGE!:)=OPCOQE(:)
LENSTG=LENOP 
C CHECK FOR VALID STAGE
00 45 1=1,NSTAGE
I F ( STAGE(1 iLEN ST G )// '; 1 .EQ, ST A G ES !I)( 1 :LENSTG+1) )GOTO 50 
45 CONTINUE
WRITE!3,200) LINE 
WRiTE!3,215) STAGE!1:LENSTG)
RETURN
50 IF !L S T A G E (I) ) THEN
W RITE!3 ,200) LINE 
WRITE(3,220) STAGE!1:LENSTG)
RETURN
ENDIF
LSTAGE(I)= .TRUE.
ELSE
C OPCODE IS  PARAMETER
C EXTRACT PARAMETER CODE ON THE LEFT OF '=»
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C EXTRACT PARAMETER VALUE ON THE RIGHT OF '='
DO 55 1=1,LENOP
IF (O PC O D E (I;I) .EQ. '= f )GOTO 60 
55 CONTINUE •
60 IF (  I  .EQ. LENOP) THEN
WRITE(3»200) LINE 
WRITE(3,225) OPCODE(1 :1)
RETURN
ENDIF
LENPAR=I-1
LENVAL=MAX0(0 ,LENOP-I)
IF(LENPAR .EQ. 0) THEN 
WRITE(3,200) LINE 
WRITE(3,230)
RETURN
ENDIF
IFCLENPAR .GT. LENGTH .OR. LENVAL .GT, LENGTH) THEN 
WRITE(3,200) LINE 
WRITE(3,205)
RETURN
ENDIF
PARAMO:LENPAR)=OPCODE(1sLEMPAR)
IF(LENVAL .GT. 0 )VALUE(1 :LENVAL)=OPCODE(LENP.AR+2:LENOP)
C CHECK FOR VALID PARAMETER CODE
DO 65 1=1,NPARAM
IF(STAGS( 1 :LENSTG)//PARAM(1 ; LENPAR) . / / '  = 1 . EQ, ? ARAM3C I) ( I ;
1^LENPAR+1) )GOTO 70 
65 CONCCNUE
WRITE(3 ,200 )LINE
WRC n: (3 ,2 3 5 )PAR AM( 1 :LSNPAR), STAGE( 1 :LSNST1)
RETURN
(j IF (  LP AR AM( I ) )  THEN
WRITS(3,200) LINE 
WR £TE(3> 220)PARAM(1 ;LENPAR)
RE URN 
ENOCF
LPARA-I(I) = , CR'JE,
0 IHEK.FDR VALCO PARAMETER VA.UE AN) ASS C IN D  W\-.■.]?./ ( A  , JE
vr a is  c r ) , •: i tc j - a  jm + m )
O’K EY  H E , ' U , A i ) ,  CEY H E , ' J* ,A f ) .  <EY . NE, 'C 'nM EN
(■•'( i-/AL , »r, J)  HEN
NR C CE(3i 200) l CNE 
m f- iC j, 24 ))P\RA1( 1 ; O i J AR)
C.FIRN 
END CF 
•USE
O’C LENVAL , LT * 1) CHEN
/R CTE(3,200) l CNE
WRCfE(3, 225)PAR AM(1 :L EN PAR)
RETURN
ENDIF
CF(KEY , EQ, ’ C'VCHEN
CVAL'JE(I)(1  ; LENVAL)=VALUE(1 ;LENVAL)
IVAL!JE(£) = LENVAL 
ELSE
IPOINT=LENVAL 
DO 75 J=1,LENVAL 
IDIGITs-1
CF(VALUE(J: J )  .EQ. ’ O' )  IDIGIT=0 
I F ( VALUE( -J; J) ,SQ. *1' )  ID IG IT s l 
I F ( VALUE( J : J )  .EQ. *2' )  IDIGIT=2 
I F ( VALUE(J; J )  , EQ. *3’ ) IDIGIT=3 
I F ( VALUE( J : J ) . . EQ. ' 4 ’ ) IDIGIT=4 
I F ( VALUE(J: J )  .EQ. »5’ ) IDIGIT=5
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75
200
205
210
215
220
225
2 JO
2Jj
2 4 )
250
255
3 1 )
IF (V A L U E ( J : J )  .EQ. ’ 6 ’ ) IDIGIT=:6 
IFCVALUEC J:J) .EQ. ’ 7 ’ ) IDIGIT=7 
IFCVALUEC JiJ) .EQ. ' 8 ' )  IDIGIT=8 
IFCVALUECJl-J) .EQ. ’ 9 ' )  IDIGIT=9 
IFCVALUECJ i J )  .EQ. 1. ' )  THEN 
IF (IPO IN T  .NE. LENVAL) THEN 
WRITEC3>200) LINE 
W RITE!3,250) PARAMC1iLENPAR)
RETURN
ENDIF
IFCKEY .EQ. ' I ' )  THEN
WRITE(3 ,2 2 0 )LINE
WRITE(3 ,2 6 0 )PARAM( 1 : LENPAR)
RETURN
ENDIF
IPQINTaJ
RVALUE( I )  = RVALUE( I ) /10.
IDIGIT=0
ENDIF
CF( [DIGIT .LT , 0)THEN
WRITE(3,200) LINE
WRITE(3,255) PARAMC1 :LENPAR)
RETURN 
END IF
RVALUE!I)=10.*RVALUE(I)+1DIGIT 
RVALUE!I)*RVALUE!I)* 1 0 ,* * ! IPOCNT-LENVAL)
IFCKEY .EQ. ' O TH EN  
IVALUE!I)=NINT( RVALU E ( I ) )
RVALUE!I)=0
ENDIF
ENDIF
ENDIF
ENDIF
GOTO 25
FORMAT!//,1 ERROR IN THE MENU ON L IN E 1, 13) 
FORMAT!f PARAMETER TOO LONG DR MISS [NG UO M U ') 
•J NEXUS TED 0 ) 4 M A1)
UNDEFINED STAGE I ' , A15)
•iu l t c p l e  a ssc  tN'Ememt j f  p a r a 4St e r 1 , a i 53
4133 C NG P AR a. -17 TER VA..JE ’ , A15)
I I  SS CNG 7 T UNO SIDE JF PARAMETER') 
:JNDE'7.[NED PARA IE TER1; ' , A15, 1 FOR S T--VGE : ? , A !5 )
FORMAT!1 
FORMAT!’
FORMAT!1 
FORMAT!’
FORMAT!1 
FORMAT!1 
FOR 14?!’
FORMAT!1 
FORMAT!'
i t n r c 1
EM1)
U  3 I C ) A T A
EU R  A ITER'MS STAGES! 1) 
.MARAGTE R'f J  I UR  A1 >(2J)
) I I  DN /-UI/STAGES, U R  A IS
d a t a  s c a g e u i ) / '  e i t /;  ' /
DATA U R  A-IS! 1 3), U R  A 13(1 1 )/ ' 
UT A 3 iR'A-l ?! ! 2) ,P  AR A I K  1 j ) /  1
i 3 VALUE IS  
ERROR I I  IM 
• ION—NU 42 RIG  
J J - I - H T S  i 5 R
PERMITTED ••UR PAR AMETER ; ' , A15) 
/A J E  D7 PARAMETER? 1 ,A15)
IE 7 OR ' U A 4 M E T E A U  , a  1 5 )
JE 7 )R UR' AUTER U , v l 5 )
V A 
■I A
INTV IP GR-C , ' ! IT / U E  R: 
: I T /P J L  = ! ' . ' C I T / ) iL - .
1 c i : / 3 ; \ 3 = 
1 C I C / ) 3 A P «
? / 
I / 
» / 
I /
3 A T A PARA4S! 14) , U R  A 13(15)/' I IT7 3 3 U U *
) AiTA 3 AR A-iS! I I ) , P AR A 13(1 { ) / '  i  IC/J  J \ P U '
3 AT A P AR A 4 3 ( I 3 ) /  1 C N T V N S E A 3 U ’ /
DATA P ARA 43(19),PARAMS( 2 0 ) / ’ CMTVKU3- 1' , 1 IN T/ (E75 = I ’ /
3 AT'A PAR AMS(21) , PARAM3(22) / ’ I  NTVN IT5 = I ' , ' CNTVLA-GSs C' /
DATA PARAiM3(23), PAR AMS (24) / ’ I  NT V PRO 3= N' , '  IWTVFC5=N' /
DATA PARAMS(2 5 ) / 1INTV3CAN=’ /
DATA PARAMS(26)/’INTVCFILE=C/
DATA PARAMS(27),PARAMS(23)/’INTVGFILET=C' , ’ INTVTITLE=C' /  
DATA PARAMS(29) / ’ INTVDATE=C’/
DATA PARAMS(1 ) ,PARAMS(2), PARAMS(3)/f INTV31=1’ , ’ INTVB2=I' 
1 ’ INTVB3 = I V
o 
o
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DATA PARAMS(4),PARAMS(5), PARAMSC6) / » INTVQ1=1’ , , INTVQ2=I’ , 
1'WTVQ3=I7
D AT A P AR AMS ( 7 ), P AR AMS ( 8 ), P AR AMS (9 ) / ' IN T VP 1 = I  V  INT VP 2=I ' , 
1f INTVP3=I?/
END
C
BLOCK DATA WORK
C
C PARAMETERS
C L=MAXIMUM NO OF INPUTS
C M=MAXIMUM NO OF OBSERVATIONS
C N1=MAXIMUM VALUE OF TF ORDERS q,p
C N3=MAXIMUM VALUE OF ARIMA ORDERS p,q,P,Q
N4=MAXIMUM VALUE OF ARIMA ORDERS d,D 
N5=MAXIMUM VALUE OF SEASONALITY >1 
PARAMETER( L=3 ,M=120,N1=4,N3=5, N4=2, N5=1)
PARAMETER(NTP=L*(2*N1+1))
PARAMETER!NP4=4*N3)
PARAMETER(NP5=NTP+NP4+1, LP1=L+1)
P ARAMETER( IQD=N3*(1+N5),100=N4*(1+M5))
? AR AMST E R(IQX = IQD, NC D=N P5+1+1QX)
P AR AM STE R ( NC S=M+1DD+6 * IQ X, NC F = L P1 +14 +5 * L)
PARAMETER!I,/A3=2*NCD*NC0+NCS*(MOF+4))
PARAMETER! I  IN U=1 5#LP1»f*NCO+J*N.J 3+3J)
REAL* 3 >f A j  ( I  ./.A'j)
' IT-GER*2 '(A iC  IC l / ' i j )
GDMMOM /SLA/ fA3,'-U\3 
END
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